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I N T R O D U C T I O N
The development of politics in the Central Provinces 
and Berar during the twentieth century is a neglected 
study. The historians of modern India have passed over 
the province in favour of provinces that enjoyed a 
longer history of British administration and had closer 
connections with the nationalist movement. As evidence 
of this neglect, there is only one political history of 
the province between 1919 and 1939> namely the History 
of Freedom Movement in Madhya Pradesh published in 1956 
by the Government of Madhya Pradesh, the successor state 
to the former Central Provinces and Berar. In addition, 
Marathi writers have written a number of biographies of 
nationalists from the Marathi region, and several 
authors have written biographies and autobiographies in 
English of nationalists from both the Hindi and Marathi 
regions. But these apart, the general reader and 
historian alike will search almost in vain for a study 
of political developments in the province between 1919 
and 1939» The writer of this thesis hopes to remedy 
that neglect in some measure. He also hopes to demonstrate 
that events of considerable significance to the Indian 
nationalist movement and contemporary Indian politics 
occurred in the province during the period under review.
A study of political events in the Central Provinces 
and Berar between 1919 and 1939 raises the question whether 
multi-lingual states form viable political units. The 
province was similar to many of the provinces of British
X V
India in that its population comprised several large 
linguistic communities. The presence of* these 
communities in the Central Provinces and Berar arose 
from the fact that the British authorities formed the 
province for administrative reasons, and took little 
account of the then largely Unimportant questions of 
history, language and ethnicity. Between 1919 and 1939» 
however, these questions grew rapidly in importance 
owing to the establishment of democratic institutions 
and to the fact that the political leaders raised them 
to win the allegiance of the people. This study 
focusses attention on the growing importance of language 
in the Central Provinces and Berar. It also shows the 
effect which the growth of linguistic consciousness had 
on the balance of power in the province, and the extent 
to which it interfered with the processes of stable 
government. In doing so, it seeks to establish whether 
multi-lingual states are politically viable and whether 
they are likely to be more or less stable than 
linguistic states.
This study also focusses attention on the new classes 
and communities that were drawn into the vortex of 
politics in the Central Provinces and Berar as the 
nationalist movement gained momentum. In 1919 the 
middle classes were almost alone in their opposition to 
the government. By 1939» however, vast numbers of 
people from every walk of life had been caught up in 
the nationalist movement. The thesis proposes to describe 
this development with particular reference to the role 
of Gandhi as the author of the changed situation; to 
the groups who responded to his leadership; and to the
xvi
nature and extent of the challenge which nationalists 
presented to the government between 1919 and 1939»
A study of political developments in the Central 
Provinces and Berar between 1919 and 1939 also 
reflects differences in the political styles used to 
draw the people into the nationalist movement. On the 
one hand, the leaders of the Indian National Congress 
prescribed tactics of passive resistance and obstruction 
in their dealings with the government. On the other 
hand, many Congressmen, among whom were the followers of 
Tilak, condemned these tactics as impractical, and 
modified them to conform with their own ideological 
preconceptions and the realities of local politics. In 
examining these different styles of politics, this 
study proposes to raise two questions: What was the 
nature of the ideological differences between Gandhi and 
the disciples of Tilak? And, were nationalists subject 
to pressures - other than their need to oppose the 
government - that compelled them to abandon the tactics 
of passive resistance and obstruction for tactics of 
their own choosing?
This thesis will also examine certain aspects of 
British rule in the Central Provinces and Berar between 
1919 and 1939» These aspects deal with the attempt of 
the British to maintain law and order and to create 
efficient government in the province. In discussing the 
government's attempt to maintain law and order, the 
writer will refer to the use of repressive measures to 
control the nationalist movement. The government’s 
attempt to create efficient rule, however, provides a 
contrasting picture. Here, the writer proposes to
xvii
examine the role of Sir Montagu Butler, Governor of the 
Central Provinces and Berar between 1925 and 19335 and 
assess the contribution made by him to the province 
during a most critical period of its history.
1. THE CENTRAL PROVINCES AND BERAR , INDIA
Chapter I
A BILINGUAL PROVINCE - 
THE CENTRAL PROVINCES AND BERAR IN 1919
The Central Provinces and Berar at the beginning of 
1919 was an isolated and relatively backward province in 
central India consisting of two linguistic regions.
These were areas where Hindi or Marathi was the language 
spoken by a majority of the population. The Hindi region 
covered the northern and eastern parts of the province 
and consisted of 14 districts grouped into the three 
administrative divisions of Narmada, Jabalpur and 
Chhattisgarh; while the Marathi region occupied the 
southern part of the province and consisted of four 
districts grouped into the division of Nagpur. Four 
additional Marathi districts lay adjacent to the division 
of Nagpur on its western side and comprised the division 
of Berar.'*’ The three Hindi and two Marathi divisions 
extended over an area of 100,000 square miles containing 
some 13 million inhabitants, and their government was in
1
See Maps 1 and 2. The Hindi districts comprising the 
division of Narmada were Nimar, Hoshangabad, Narsimhapur, 
Betul and Chhindwara; the division of Jabalpur - Jabalpur, 
Sagar, Damoh, Seoni and Mandla; the division of 
Chhattisgarh - Raipur, Bilaspur and Durg. In 1919 the 
Hindi district of Balaghat was in the division of Nagpur. 
The Marathi districts comprising the division of Nagpur, 
were Nagpur, Wardha, Chanda and Bhandara; and the division 
of Berar - Amravati, Yeotmal, Akola and Buldhana. 
(Throughout this thesis, contemporary spellings have been 
adopted for all place names still in existence).
2the hands of a Chief Commissioner with headquarters in 
the city of Nagpur."*" The Central Provinces also contained 
15 states, each of which was governed by a Feudatory 
Chief, whose relations with the government were 
controlled by a Political Agent. These states, however, 
are excluded from this study as they lay outside the 
British districts and did not for that reason share in 
the political developments which took place there 
between 1919 and 1939*
The composite nature of the Central Provinces and 
Berar had a profound effect on these political 
developments. The province had been a bilingual entity 
since 1861 when the Viceroy, Lord Canning, merged the 
Hindi Territory of Saugor and Nerbudda (which till then 
had been part of the North-Western Provinces) with the 
Hindi and Marathi State of Nagpur (which passed to the 
Government of India in 185^), and constituted the 
amalgam as the Central Provinces. In 1903 the Government 
of India gave financial support to this amalgam by adding 
to it the wealthy Marathi area of Berar, a territory 
originally presented by the British to the Nizam of 
Hyderbad. Despite its annexation, however, Berar did 
not become an integral part of the Central Provinces, 
but, under the treaty which the Government of India 
signed with the Nizam on the occasion, remained a 
possession of that ruler, the Government leasing it in 
perpetuity for an annual rental of Rs 25 lakhs. The 
physical integration of these territories into a single
1
The Chief Commissioner in 1919 was Sir Benjamin 
Robert so n.
3province did not provide an adequate basis for their 
political and cultural integration, and from the very 
outset different political institutions and values 
developed in the two linguistic regions, separating them 
from each other. Similarly, between 1919 and 1939 
political developments in the Central Provinces and 
Berar separated rather than united the two linguistic 
regions, and 1939 closed with a strong demand in both 
areas for the permanent division of the province along 
linguistic lines.
A basic factor in the development of different
political styles and institutions in the Hindi and
Marathi regions was the physical structure of the
1province and its effect on communications. The most 
prominent physical feature of the Central Provinces and 
Berar was the massive Satpura Plateau which ran across 
the centre of the province, forming a watershed for its 
four great rivers - Narmada, Mahanadi, Godaveri and 
Tapti. This plateau, together with its southern and 
northern spurs, completely severed the Marathi plain of 
Nagpur and Berar from the Narmada valley to the north 
and the extensive plain of Chhattisgarh to the east - 
the two major subdivisions of the Hindi region. The 
plateau was also responsible for the development of 
separate road and railway systems, which ran parallel to 
it in the plain country on either side. Further, 
although these systems were linked, the connections 
between them were tenuous - circuitous highways and 
railway lines of different gauge - and did little to
See Map 3*
1
kcreate a sense of unity between the different linguistic 
regions of the province. The failure of the road and 
railway communications of the Central Provinces to 
bridge the gap between the Hindi and the Marathi regions 
was only too evident to observers of the contemporary 
scene, as the following extract from a speech delivered 
in Jabalpur in 1920 illustrates:
Jubbulpore is 188 miles from Nagpur and how 
often have we not exclaimed * so near and yet 
so far®. A circuitous round about road to 
Jubbulpore from the capital of the province 
is a serious drawback to your advancement....
A chord railway between Nagpur and Jubbulpore 
...would bring Jubbulpore within six hours' 
railway journey from Nagpur. It could then be 
made a second capital of the province.
Social and cultural differences between the 
inhabitants of the Hindi and Marathi districts also 
contributed to the growth of distinct forms of political 
life in the two regions. With the exception of the 
aboriginal population, a majority of the inhabitants of 
the Hindi districts was descended from Hindi speaking 
migrants from northern India, while a majority of the 
inhabitants of the Marathi districts was descended from 
Marathi speaking migrants from western India. Although 
both linguistic communities were members of the wider 
Hindu community, each had a distinctive identity arising 
from its use of a common language and from its 
acceptance of the values, legends and religious forms 
that distinguish the outward aspect of Hinduism in one
1
Hitavada, 10 April 1920, p.7* The speaker was the 
moderate politician Sir Hari Singh Gour.
5linguistic region from that in another. Each linguistic
community, too, had ties of sentiment -with its parent
region, and each had its own historical tradition that
was connected with the region either of its origin or
its adoption. The more articulate members of each
community, for instance, remembered with pride the days
when their homeland or linguistic region had been at the
zenith of its power. In the Hindi region articulate
Hindus looked back to the rule of the Guptas in
Pataliputra on the Ganges, or to the kingdom of
Mahakoshal that spread across central and northern India
in the fourth century after Christ."*“ Articulate Hindus
in the Marathi districts of the Central Provinces, by
contrast, looked back to the rule of the Bhonslas of
Nagpur, or even earlier to the age of Sivaji and the
2Hindu resurgence in western India. In Berar, again, 
articulate Hindus drew inspiration from the Kingdom of 
Vidarbha, which flourished in the region during the 
classical age of Hinduism. The power such regional 
memories had on people's imagination is clearly reflected 
in the following passage, describing the Kingdom of 
Vidarbha, composed by the political leaders of Berar in 
1 9 3 0 :
1
Nehru Museum and Library (NML), All-India Congress 
Committee Papers (cited hereafter as AICC) 242, 1931»
H. Vyas to Secretary AICC, 21 October 1931* See Appendix I.
2
See National Library of India (NLl), the Papers of 
Dr B.S. Moonje (cited hereafter as Moonje MS), Letter
Pad 63, B.S. Moonje to _______  (c. 9 August 193l)> ibid.,
Letter Pad 66, B.S. Moonje to _______  23 April 1932;
Letter Pad 82, B.S. Moonje to Dr Hedgewar, 5 January 1935*
6From the earliest times Berar occupies an 
important place in the history of India. It 
was known as Vidarbha in those early days. In 
the Upanishads, Ramayan and Mahabharat... there 
are numerous references to the sovereigns of 
Vidarbha....Scholars and scientists, poets and 
philosophers of great reputation flourished in 
Berar during this period of Hindu rule, and 
Berar became the most important seat of learning 
and culture in India. The literary style 
(Vaidharbi-riti) used by the scholars of 
Vidarbha was the subject of universal admiration 
among men of letters and was by common consent 
recognised as the best and the most approved ^ 
style in Sanskrit as well as Prakrit literature.
Such memories did not merely evoke inspiration. With the 
historical and cultural tradition of which they were a 
part, they also united those who shared them and led 
them to realise that they were a distinct community with 
similar interests in the present and a common destiny in 
the future. As a result, each community selected its 
political leaders from its own ranks as those best 
qualified to advance its interests and lead it to its 
destiny.
Differences between the structure of society in the 
Hindi and Marathi districts also laid the basis for the 
development of distinct political institutions and styles 
in each region. The caste communities that comprised the 
population of the Hindi region were substantially 
different from those that comprised the population of 
the Marathi region. In addition the people of both 
regions were separated by time and space from their parent
1
Berar*s Position in the Indian Federation: a Case 
Prepared by the Berar All Parties Committee for
Consideration by Members of the Round Table Conference 
(Bombay, 1931)» P • 1 •
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7populations  i n  northern  and western  I n d i a .  As a r e s u l t ,  
the two l in g u is t ic  communities i n  the Central Provinces 
and Berar formed two closed so c ial  h ie r a r c h i e s ,  whose 
leaders were the leaders of  society  i n  the ir  p a r t ic u la r  
l i n g u is t ic  r e g io n  only.  These leaders  were also the 
p o l i t i c a l  leaders  for  the reg io n ,  which ,  had the terr itory  
of  Berar not e x iste d ,  would have meant that the province 
contained two groups of  p o l i t i c a l  leaders - one for  each 
of the l in g u is t ic  regions .  However, owing to the 
presence of  strong regional  lo y alt ie s  i n  Berar ,  that 
territory  possessed  i t s  own p o l i t i c a l  leaders who 
comprised the third  such group i n  the province .  As for  
the social  composition of these dominant groups, i n  the 
Hindi  region  they consisted  mainly of  Kanya K ubja  and 
other Hindi  speaking Brahmans, Rajputs  and Marwaris ;  
while  i n  the Marathi region ,  i n c l u d in g  Berar ,  they 
consisted  of  Maharashtrian  Brahmans, Marathas and 
Marwari s .
S t r i k i n g  d if fe re n c e s  i n  economic development and i n  
the level  of  p o l i t i c a l  s o p h is t ic a t io n  between the Hindi  
and Marathi regions  heightened  the d i v i s i o n  of  the 
Central Provinces and Berar into separate p o l i t i c a l  u n i t s .  
I n  1919 economic and p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  i n  the Hindi  
d is t r ic t s  was at a low level  compared with  that in  the 
Marathi region .  Th is  was mainly due to the lack  of  
secondary industry  i n  the region  and hence o f  the type 
of  urban centre associated  with  this  form o f  economic 
a c t iv it y .  I n  1919 there were only a few towns i n  the 
Hindi  reg ion  that supported large secondary i n d u s t r i e s ,  
these be ing  Burhanpur with  i ts  cotton  m i l l s ,  and 
Jabalpur with  i t s  pottery ,  brewery, f lo u r  mills  and gun
8carriage  factory .  The Hindi  reg ion  also possessed a 
number of towns that were important for other than 
i n d u s t r ia l  reasons .  These were Sagar,  which owed its  
importance to a long h istory  as an adm inistrative  
centre ;  and Raipur  and B i la sp u r ,  d is t r ic t  headquarter 
towns owing their  prominence to the b u i ld in g  of railways .  
More typical  of  the urban centres of  the Hindi  region  
than the above mentioned, however, were the small towns 
that served as administrative  centres for  the vast rural 
areas of the region .  Such a town was Narsimhapur, 
s ituated  i n  a d is t r ic t  bearing  the same name i n  the 
Narmada val ley :
Narsinghpur is  not a very b ig  place .  I t s  
population  does not exceed 1 0 ,0 0 0  souls .  There 
are only two main streets  i n  the place and about 
three mohullas. There are less than twelve 
respectable  and educated malguzars;  there are 
about twenty gentlemen who adorn the bar,  
gentlemen having various years of  experience 
and of various  c a p ac it ie s .  These r e a l ly  
constitute  the public  of N a r s i n g h p u r . . . .the  
people who r e a l ly  count. I t  is  only a small 
a g r ic ultu ra l  d is t r ic t  and there are the usual  
galaxy of landlords ,  malguzars and tenants who 
constitute  the sole population .
But whether large or small,  the towns of the Hindi  
d i s t r ic t s  were unable to susta in  any v it a l  form of 
p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  in  the region .  This  was partly  due to 
the small number of towns and their  remoteness from one 
another, and partly  to their  lack of the f a c i l i t i e s  
necessary for  st imulating  a c t i v i t i e s  of  an in t e l le c t u a l
1
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9and p o l i t i c a l  nature among- their  in h ab ita n ts .  The towns 
o f  the Hindi  region  possessed no clubs other than bar 
ass o c ia t io n s ,  for instance ,  and these were frequently  
unconcerned with p o l i t i c a l  a c t iv it y .  A g a in ,  apart from 
the Bar l ib r a r i e s ,  public  l ib r a r ie s  were rare ,  and 
vernacular  newspapers almost non-existent.'*'  Moreover, 
i n  1919 some towns i n  the H ind i  d i s t r ic t s  did  not 
possess even one h igh  school,  and there were only two
colleges  - both i n  Jabalpur  - to serve the needs of  the
2
entire  region .  As a result  the quality  of  p o l i t i c a l  
l i f e  i n  the towns of  the H ind i  region ,  whether large or 
small,  was poor. For one observer this  was nowhere more 
evident than i n  Hoshangabad, a town s ituated  on the 
Narmada r iver  and sim ilar  i n  many respects  to 
Narsimhapurs
Hoshangabad has no p o l i t i c s ,  and as such there is  
very l i t t l e  of those m anifestations  of l i f e  and 
a c t i v i t y  which are the necessary concomitants of 
p o l i t i c a l  existence .  Consequently, when the whole 
province is  busy i n  organis ing  its  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  
and e le c t in g  delegates for the p ro v in c ia l  
conference ,  Hoshangabad is  enjoying  its  wonted 
s l e e p . . . . I t c a n n o t b o a s t  of  a D i s t r ic t  Congress 
Committee. A l l  p o l i t i c s  is  taboo to the local  
bar ,  and one of its  members has recently  made 
h im self  famous by deposing against  the in s t itu t io n s  
of  v i l la g e  panchayats before the v i l lag e  
panchayats commission.3
1
At 1 January 1919 there were s ix  Hind i  journals  in  
c ir c u la t io n ,  one appearing  weekly,  two fo r tn ig h t ly ,  two 
monthly, and one quarterly .  During  the year their  number 
increased  by four and i n  1920 by nine .  See CPLC, v o l . 3 ,
3 December 1921 ,  Appendix  E ,  p p . 422-4.
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The d is t r ic t  of  Durg ,  for instance ,  had no high  school.
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The p o l i t i c a l  outlook i n  Hoshangabad was even less 
promising' i n  summer, when
the c i v i l  courts ( w e r e ) . . .  c losed ,  the l a w y e r s . . .  
r et ired  to their  dens, the ju d g e s . . .  d ispersed ,  
and a l l  that gave the appearance of  l i f e  and 
a c t i v it y  to this somnolent valley  of o u r s . . . ( w a s )  
non est.-*-
I n  the larger towns of  the H ind i  region ,  too, p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i v it y  was at a low level .  I n  B ilaspur ,  for  instance ,  
res idents  complained that they 'seldom, i f  ever,  (had)
anything  t h a t . . . ( w a s )  e ither  sensational  or controversial
2
i n  local public  a f f a i r s ' .  I n  Jabalpur ,  too, observers 
considered public  l i f e  to be 'n o toriously  d u ll  and 
3
a p a t h e t i c ' . And outside the towns of the Hindi  d i s t r ic t s ,  
on the vast p l a i n  of  Chhattisgarh  or i n  the remote 
fastnesses  of the Central P lateau ,  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  i n  any 
form was v ir t u a l l y  non-existent.
There was one other reason  why the towns o f  the 
H ind i  region  were unable to play  a major role i n  p o l i t i c s  
before  1919» Th is  concerned the nature of 'the  people 
who r e a l l y  count' - the groups of  doctors,  p leaders ,  
traders and malguzars or landlords l iv in g  i n  the towns of 
the region  - and their  d i s in c l i n a t io n  to p art ic ip ate  in  
p o l i t i c a l  a c t iv it y .  There were several reasons for  this 
d i s i n c l i n a t i o n ,  one be ing  the restr icted  size  of  the 
urban groups. Bes ides ,  these groups had comparatively
1
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l i t t l e  in flu en ce  on the government owing to their  
remoteness from Nagpur and to the lack of  representation  
i n  government service of the leading  caste communities 
from which they themselves were drawn. The limited size  
of the urban  groups and their  lack of  in fluence  with  the 
government tended to in h i b i t  them from p a r t ic ip a t in g  in  
p o l i t i c s .  Thus,  although they 1c o n st itu te (d )  the public  
. . . t h e  people who r e a l ly  c o u n t ( e d ) ' ,  the urban groups of 
the H ind i  region  lived  out the ir  l ives  i n  remote towns, 
o ften  unaware of the p o l i t i c a l  issues  a f f e c t i n g  the 
region ,  and equally  often  powerless to act upon them, 
even i f  they were aware of  such issues .
The H ind i  d is t r ic t s  of the Central Provinces ,  
nevertheless ,  possessed a d is t in c t iv e  form of p o l i t i c s  
r e s u lt in g  from the social  and economic conditions 
p r e v a i l i n g  i n  the region .  Perhaps the most characteristic  
feature  of  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  i n  the Hindi  d i s t r ic t s  before
1919 was the loyal a f f e c t i o n  with which the malguzars , 
the p o l i t i c a l  leaders of the region ,  regarded the 
Government of  the Central  Provinces .  Th is  relationship  
had i t s  b a s is  i n  the land settlement undertaken by 
B r i t i s h  o f f i c i a l s  i n  the area shortly  a fter  the formation 
of  the province  i n  1861 .  I n  making the settlement the 
o f f i c i a l s  were anxious to f in d  a body of  men who could 
lay claim to be the leaders of the people and whom the 
a dm in istrat io n  could support as a means of  e stablish ing  
its  a uthority  over the area and i ts  population .  Such a 
body o f  men were to hand i n  the malguzars or revenue 
collectors  who had in h e rited  s izab le  p roperties ,  partly  
comprising the grants made to their  forbears by some 
e a r l ie r  a d m in istrat ion ,  and partly  the accretions  to
12
those grants made during  the process of  revenue c o l le c t io n .  
Consequently ,  at the regular  settlement which began in  
I 863 and ended i n  I 87O, the incoming adm in istration  
conferred  proprietary  rights  on the m alguzars , thus 
e s t a b l i s h in g  them as the base of  i t s  power i n  the 
countryside .  The malguzars for  the ir  part were i n  no 
mood to endanger their  newly acquired  rights  to land 
by a l i e n a t i n g  the ’ good sympathy’ of  the government, and 
as a result  gave it  their  u n f l i n c h in g  loyalty."*' Th is  
r e la t io n s h ip  of interdependence  between the government 
and the malguzars o f  the Central  Provinces found 
expression  i n  two types of i n s t i t u t io n s  - one formed by 
the malguzars and the other by the government. The 
former consisted  of  local  assoc iations  through which the 
malguzars sought to protect their  interests  i n  land ;  and 
the la tte r  of local  bodies  i n  the H ind i  region  and the 
L e g is l a t i v e  Council  of  the Central  Provinces which met 
i n  Nagpur.
The man who best t y p i f ie d  the p o l i t i c a l  style  of  the
malguzars of  the H ind i  region  was Pandit Bishnu Datta
Shukul ,  a Kanya Kubja  Brahman and leading  malguzar from
Sihora  i n  the d is t r ic t  o f  Jabalpur .  Shukul was a
graduate of  the U n ive rs ity  of  A llah abad  i n  the
neighbouring  United  Provinces ,  and between 1900-1920 he
estab l ish e d  h im self  as a ’ one of  ( t h e ) . . . m o s t  i n f l u e n t i a l
2
and s p i r i t e d  leaders '  of  the H ind i  region .  During  this
1
The Private  Papers of  S ir  G .M .  C hitnavis ,  C h it n a v i s p u r a , 
Nagpur ( c i t e d  h erea fter  as Chitnavis  M S ) , M .K .  Padhye to 
S ir  G .M .  Ch itn avis ,  9 March 1907»
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p er io d ,  Shukul became an Honorary M agistrate ,  and served 
as a member o f  the Local  and D i s t r i c t  Boards of Sihora 
and Jabalpur  r e s p e c t iv e ly ,  and as Vice-president of the 
M u n ic ip a l i ty  o f  S iho ra ,  thereby earning  a Rai  Bahadurship 
from the p ro v in c ia l  government. I n  19 1 5  Shukul entered 
the newly e stablished  L e g is la t iv e  Council  of  the Central 
Provinces to represent  the in te r e sts  of  the malguzars t 
and remained a member of that body u n t i l  1917 when he 
was elected  to the Im perial  L e g is l a t i v e  Council  i n  Delhi  
as the member for  the Central  Provinces .  As a malguzar , 
Shukul also took a keen in te re st  i n  the cooperative 
movement, and by 1919 he had atta ined  the p o s it io n  of  
Governor o f  the F e d e rat io n  of  Cooperative Banks i n  the 
Central Provinces .  S h u k u l 1s whole-hearted support of 
B r it is h  r u l e ,  amply demonstrated by his  services to the 
cooperative movement, local  government and the le g is la t u r e ,  
was p a r t i c u l a r l y  evident during  the Great War when he 
toured the d i s t r i c t  o f  Jab alp ur ,  urg ing  the people to 
invest their  money i n  loans to help  the B r i t i s h  war 
e f fo rt .  The fo l lo w in g  account of  S h u k u l1s a c t i v it i e s  in  
this regard appeared i n  19 1 7  i n  the H i t a v a d a t an English  
weekly pub l ish ed  i n  Nagpur:
The Honourable Ra i  Bahadur Pandit B .D .  S h u k u l . . . ( i s )  
to be e s p e c ia l ly  congratulated  for convening a 
series  of  suc c e ss fu l  meetings in  the in ter io r  with 
a view to persuade people to invest  money i n  the 
war loan  and see that not a s ingle  v i l la g e  nor a 
s ingle  i n d i v i d u a l  should lag behind in  helping  
( the) em pire . . . .The P a n d i t . . . (has)  been personally  
v i s i t i n g  the various  important centres and 
recounting  to^the people numerous b e n e f it s  of 
B r i t i s h  ru le .
1
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The loyalty  which Pandit Shukul d isplayed  towards B r it is h  
r u le ,  however, was not inconsistent  with  his  interest  in  
the H ind i  Sahitya  Sammelan, an a sso c ia t io n  for the 
development of  the H ind i  language. Through this 
a s s o c ia t io n  Shukul encouraged the use of  H i n d i ,  and 
thereby enriched the cu ltural  l i f e  of the region  and 
widened the social  and p o l i t i c a l  horizons  of its  
i n h a b i t a n t s .
Yet another feature  of p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  i n  the Hindi  
reg io n  before  1919 was the in creas in g  a c t i v i t y  evident 
among the p o l i t i c ia n s  of  Ghhattisgarh .  Th is  a c t iv it y ,  
at times n at io n a l ist  and at times i n  support of  the 
government, was more aggressive  than that undertaken by 
Shukul i n  Jabalpur  and represented a challenge by the 
p o l i t i c ia n s  of  Chhattisgarh  to h is  leadership .  I t  also 
heralded  the collapse  of  the loyalist  style of  p o l i t i c s  
which had h itherto  held  sway in  the H ind i  region .  One 
s ig n i f ic a n t  feature  of  the p o l i t i c a l  scene in  
Chhattisgarh  was the interest  displayed  by its  
inhabitants  and leaders i n  local government. This  was 
largely  the result  of the a pp licat io n  of the Morley- 
Minto Reforms to the Central Provinces and Berar i n  1914 .  
These Reforms established  a L e g is la t iv e  Council  i n  the 
province for  the f i r s t  time, and to this  council  the 
Municipal  Committees and D i s t r ic t  Councils  were ent it led  
to send f i v e ,  and the landholders two, members. As  a 
result  the c i t i z e n s  of  backward areas like  Chhattisgarh  
put the pressure  on the government to extend municipal 
reforms to the d i v i s i o n  and thus enable them to secure 
representat io n  i n  the p ro v in c ia l  le g is la t u r e .  A centre 
of such pressure  was Durg, as is  evident from the
15
f o l lo w in g  extract which appeared i n  the Hitavada  i n  1 9 1 7 •
Drug was created a d is t r ic t  some ten years ago.
I t  has hitherto  been without a municipality  and 
the local  public  a f f a ir s  have been  managed by a 
n o t i f ie d  area committee. The inhabitants  of  the 
place  have regarded it  as a slur  on their  public  
sp i r i t  and patriotism  and ever since the creat io n  
of  the L e g is l a t i v e  Council have asserted  their  
demand for the^management of their  own a f f a i r s  i n  
their  own way.
The Morely-Minto Reforms also provided an opportunity 
for  young men with  the requ is ite  ’ education ,  enthusiasm
and e xp e r ie n c e ’ to p art ic ip ate  i n  the work of  local
2
government and the le g is la t u r e .  One such young man was 
E .  Raghavendra R a o , a member of a Naidu family  with 
in t e r e st s  i n  land and business  i n  the d is t r ic t  of 
B i la s p u r .  Rao was born i n  B ilaspur  i n  1889 and received  
h is  primary and secondary education  in  the town before  
leav ing  for  England to read law at Oxford.  A fter  
completing his  studies  there,  Rao joined  the Middle 
Temple i n  London and was elevated to the Bar in  1914 .  I n  
the same year he returned to B ilaspur  where he joined  the 
local  B ar ,  and where h is  ’ conspicuous a b i l i t y , . . . sturdy 
independence , . . . and c r i t ic a l  i n t e l l e c t '  must have been  
evident to the prominent p o l i t i c i a n s  who urged him to
3
enter public  l i f e .  Rao took their  advice and w it h in  a
1
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Words taken from an appreciation  of  Rao w ritten  a ft e r  
h is  death i n  19^3» National  Archives  of In d ia  ( N A l ) ,  
the Pr ivate  Papers of M .R .  Jayaker (c ite d  herea fter  as 
Jayaker M S ) , F i l e  7 5 4 ,  Letter  1 0 9 5 p . 1 5 •
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few years had scored the i n i t i a l  successes i n  what was to 
prove a b r i l l i a n t  p o l i t i c a l  career .  In  1916 he became the 
f i r s t  non-official  President of  the Municipal  Committee of 
B ilaspur  (a  p o s it io n  which he occupied continuously  u n t i l  
1 9 2 7 ) ;  and i n  1917 a member of the D is t r ic t  Council  of  
B i la sp u r .  Rao used these positions  to contest one of  
the municipal seats i n  the L e g is l a t i v e  Council  i n  1917» 
urg ing  the acceptance of his  candidature on the grounds 
of h is  'young age and consequent a b i l i t y  to render  
service  i n  any walk of public  l i f e ' . ^ The electors  
re jected  R a o ' s candidature ,  however, and he had to wait 
for the elections  to the L e g is la t iv e  Council  establish ed  
under the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms i n  1920 before  again  
attempting to p art ic ip ate  i n  the p o l i t ic s  of  the 
l e g i s l a t u r e .
A n  equally  s ig n i f i c a n t  feature  of the quickening  
pulse of p o l i t i c s  in  Chhattisgarh  was the growing 
interest  of  its  leaders i n  the I n d i a n  n at io n a l is t  
movement. Although  Rao had established  contact w ith  the 
lead ing  n at io n a l ists  of the Marathi region  o f  western  
I n d i a ,  the foremost leader of  nat io n al ist  a c t i v i t é s  in  
the d iv is io n  was Ravi Shankar Shukla ,  a Kanya Kubja  
Brahman lawyer from the town of Raipur .  Unlike  Rao,
Shukla obtained his  education  wholly in  I n d i a ,  graduating  
i n  A rts  from Nagpur i n  1899 and i n  Law from Jabalpur  in  
1909} when he was admitted to the Bar i n  Ra ipur .  Some 
time a fter  this date ,  Shukla came under the in fluence  
of Dr B .S .  Moonje, a leading  nat io n alist  i n  Nagpur.
1
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T h is  was an in t e r e st in g  a ss o c ia t io n ,  for  while  Moonje* s 
nat io n a l is t  outlook was aggress ively  anti- British  and 
drew i t s  in s p ir a t io n  from Hindu sources,  Shukla had 
more moderate views and probably supported the formation 
of  a const itut ional  state on western  l in e s .  Despite 
these d i f f e r e n c e s ,  however, i t  was probably due to the 
in fluence  of  Dr Moonje that Shukla joined  the In d ia n  
N ational  Congress and represented Raipur  at i ts  annual 
sessions ;  and most c e r ta in ly  due to h is  in fluence  that 
Shukla became a member of  the Provincial  A ss o c ia t io n  
formed i n  1916 to 'vo ice  the opinion  of people taking an 
in t e l l ig e n t  interest  i n  public  a f f a i r s  with  a view to 
i ts  v e n t i l a t io n  and submission to government'
Dr M oonje 's  in fluence  was apparent,  too, i n  S hu k la 's  
d e c is io n  to organise  a p o l i t i c a l  conference i n  Raipur  
i n  1918 which accepted resolutions  sympathetic to the 
n at io n alist  view.  One such re so lu t io n  was that r e la t in g  
to local  government:
That w ith  a view to t ra in  up the masses i n  the 
exercise  of  p o l i t i c a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  and to make 
the local  s e l f  government a success,  this 
conference is  of  opinion  t h a t . . .  the boards be 
wholly e l e c t e d ; . . .  that members of  the D is tr ic t  
Council  be e l e c t e d . . . d ir e c t ly  by people r e s id in g  
i n  the d i s t r i e t ; . . . and that control and 
interference  o f  government should be removed 
entirely^from  the in tern al  management of  local  
a f f a i r s .
By 1918 similar  conferences were also being  held  i n  other 
Hindi  d i s t r i c t s ,  i n d i c a t i n g  that S hu k la 's  nat ionalist
1
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views found support elsewhere i n  the region .  L ike  the 
conference organised by Shukla i n  1 9 1 8 ,  these conferences 
also  expressed support for  n at io n a l is t  o b je c t ive s ,  and 
l ik e  their  counterpart i n  Raipur
helped to spread p o l i t i c a l  awakening i n  rural  
a r e a s . . . . ( ; )  served to educate and energise the 
people and hastened the transformation of  the 
p o l i t i c a l  struggle  from a middle class  movement 
to a mass movement.1
Shukla  also re f le c te d  a third feature  of  p o l i t i c a l  
l i f e  i n  the H ind i  region  of  the Central  Provinces before 
1919* Th is  was the growing r e a l i s a t i o n  on the part of 
the lead ing  residents  of  the region  that they were 
members a l ike  of  a common cultural  and p o l i t i c a l  community. 
The leaders of  the region  contributed  to this r e a l i s a t io n  
i n  a number of  ways, one of  which was their  p a r t ic ip a t io n  
i n  the movement to reform the Kanya Kubja  Brahman 
community - the lead ing  caste community i n  the region .  
Between 1909-1919 Shukla  earned the reputation  of being  
a * lead ing  and enthusiastic  m e m b e r . . .o f  the Kanya Kubja
Sab h a1 , an a ss o c ia t io n  of  members of  the community with
2
branches throughout the H ind i  region .  Through this 
Sabha Shukla  and other leaders encouraged Kanya Kubja  
Brahmans to give their  c h i ld r e n  a western  education ,  and 
arranged annual  conferences which l ib e r a l is e d  the rules 
governing the conduct o f  members of the community. The 
fo llo w ing  tribute  to Shukla*s  work in  organis ing  the 
annual conferences of  Kanya Kubja  Brahmans comes from an
1
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observer  at the conference held  i n  1915 i n  Jabalpur :
Last  year the conference was held  at Raipur  and 
you must have been  struck with  the great 
o rg an is in g  powers of Ravi Shankar S h u k l a . . . . I t  
is  to h is  great and u n t ir in g  e f fo rts  that this 
conference also owes much of i t s  success this 
y e a r . . . . (There are)  400 delegates ,  including  
Pandit  B .N .  Datta Shukul.^-
Through these conferences Shukla and others strengthened 
the Kanya Kubja  Brahman community and enhanced its  
a b i l i t y  to p lay  a dominant role i n  the public  l i f e  of 
the H ind i  region .
As the residents  of  the Hindi  region  r e a l ise d  that 
they had common in t e r e s t s ,  they became in creasingly  
d i s s a t i s f i e d  with  the backwardness of  the region .  This  
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  found expression  in  attacks on the 
Marathi region ,  which H ind i  residents  claimed was 
dominating the l i f e  of  the province to the detriment of 
their  region .  I n  1915? for  instance ,  H ind i  residents  
complained that at the annual p o l i t i c a l  conference of 
the Central  Provinces and Berar 1 the Maratha element
d o m ina te d . . .w hile  the non-Marathas were p r a c t ic a l ly
2 , 
nowhere’ . A g a i n ,  i n  1916 the residents  of Chhattisgarh
complained b i t t e r l y  that i n  the b u i ld in g  of new colleges
Nagpur and the Marathi region  were r ec e iv in g  favourable
treatment at the expense of  the ir  d iv is io n :
Chhattisgarh  has been  le ft  e nt ire ly  i n  the cold 
so far  as c o l le g ia te  education  is  concerned.
With  no less  than s ix  h igh  schools i n  our
1
H i t a v a d a , 10 A p r i l  1915 ,  P »5»
2
I b i d . ,  11 December  1 9 1 5 ,  P»5»

20
d i v i s i o n , . . .  we were anxiously  looking  forward to 
the time when we thought that the u n iv e r s it y  
committee would plead  for the establishment  o f  a 
college  i n  R a i p u r . . . .Nagpur has at present two 
c o l leg es ,  and the committee recommends that two 
more colleges  should be provided  there .  Amraoti 
is  shortly  to have a college  of  i t s  own. . . . I t  is  
d i f f i c u l t  to understand why equal f a c i l i t i e s  
should not be given  to our boys for  h igher  
education  and why Nagpur alone should become more 
or less the exclusive  seat for  h ig h e r  s t u d i e s . ^
The d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  Hindi  r e s id e n ts  w it h  the rate  of  
progress i n  the ir  reg io n  also found e xp ress ion  i n  attacks  
on the p ro v in c ia l  government, as i n  this  extract  from 
the Hitavada  i n  1917s
So far  as local  talent is  concerned,  the imperial  
and p ro v in c ia l  services  are a b so lu te ly  blank  and 
the subordinate services  co n ta in  a few names 
which can be counted by the f in g e r s  o f  but one 
hand. I t  is  incomprehensible  why the local^  
government is  so apathetic  to local  youths .
But with  these verbal  complaints the matter rested ,  for  
the p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  of the Hindi  reg io n  had not developed 
to the point where i t s  leaders could compel the government 
to redress  the balance i n  its  favour.
P o l i t i c a l  l i f e  i n  the Marathi r e g io n  o f  the Central  
Provinces and Berar was quite d i f f e r e n t  from that i n  the 
H indi  region ,  and once again ,  economic and s o c ia l  factors
1
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were larg ely  responsible  for  its  d is t in c t iv e  features .  
Three features  were c learly  d isc e rn ib le  by 1919* These 
were an aggressive  n at io n a l is t  movement enjoying  the 
support of  the leading  p o l i t i c ia n s  of the region ;  a 
two-fold d i v i s io n  of p o l i t i c a l  leadership  i n  the region  
between the p o l i t ic ia n s  i n  the d iv i s i o n  o f  Nagpur"** on 
the one hand and those i n  Berar on the other ;  and the 
existence  of a long standing co n fl ict  between the 
p o l i t i c i a n s  of  the Central Provinces and Berar over the 
a l l o c a t i o n  of  revenues from the government.
The vigour  which characterised  the p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  
of  the Marathi reg ion  was due i n  large measure to the 
advanced state of  i ts  economic l i f e .  By contrast with 
the H in d i  region ,  the Marathi region  enjoyed a 
prosperous existence  based largely  on a f lo u r ish in g  
cotton industry .  This  industry  developed during the 
American  C i v i l  War, when supplies  of  cotton from the 
southern states were not r e ad i ly  a v a i la b le ,  and the 
demand fo r  the commodity from other sources of supply 
was consequently  h igh .  As a result  the acreage devoted 
to the growing of cotton i n  western I n d i a  increased  
enormously, and supplies  of  cotton from that region  began 
flowing  to markets i n  a l l  parts of  the world.  A f t e r  the 
C i v i l  War the demand for  I n d i a n  cotton from these markets 
p e r s is t e d ,  and t h is ,  together with  the growing demand for  
the commodity in  I n d i a  i t s e l f ,  provided an incentive  for
1
Throughout the thes is ,  the phrase 1 d i v i s i o n  of  Nagpur* 
refers  only  to the four Marathi d i s t r i c t s  of  the Central 
Provinces - Nagpur, Wardha, Chanda and Bhandara. These 
four d i s t r i c t s  also comprised one of the three provinces 
of the Congress i n  the Central  Provinces and Berar a fter  
the introduction  of the revised  c onst itution  of  the 
Congress at Nagpur in  1920.
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the expansion of  the industry  and an assured prosperity  
for  the Marathi region .
These favourable  economic conditions resulted  i n  
the growth of  a network o f  towns that served as centres 
for  p o l i t i c a l  a c t iv it y  i n  the Marathi region .  The towns 
for  the most part long established  administrative  or 
trading  centres - grew rap idly  between i860  and I 89O 
owing to the expansion  of  the cotton industry  and the 
b u i l d in g  of railways  l in k in g  the cotton country with  
Calcutta  and Bombay. At f i r s t ,  so fa r  as a c t i v it ie s  
connected with  the cotton industry  were concerned, the 
towns were merely centres for the sale  of cotton grown 
i n  the surrounding countryside .  However, with  the 
increase  i n  the amount of cotton produced, gins  and 
presses sprang up i n  the v i c i n i t y  of  the markets, while  
i n  the more c e n tra l ly  situated  towns, mills  for  the 
spinning  and weaving of cotton were also established."*” 
These developments greatly  enriched the so c ial  and 
economic l i f e  of  the towns of the Marathi region ,  and 
created i n  them an environment that was conducive to 
the growth of  p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  The following  
d escr ipt ion  of  Amravati ,  the largest  town i n  Berar ,  
i l lu s t r a t e s  this  point :
The town of  Amraoti is d iv ided  into two very 
d ist in ct  port ions ,  the old c ity  w it h in  and the 
new suburbs outside the w a l l s . . . .W it h in  the 
w a l l s . . . t h e  streets  are mostly narrow and 
crooked, and drainage  is  very unsystematic .
Houses are c lo sely  crowded and encroachments
1
The Census of  I n d i a , 1921 V o l . X I ,  The Central 
Provinces and Berar ,  part I ,  Report (Nagpur, I 923) , p . 3 ^ .
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taking up land valuable  e ither  for drainage or 
v e n t i l a t io n  have i n  the past been  only too 
common.. . .Outside  the walls  l ie  the weekly market 
and cotton market with  the gins and fa c t o r ie s ,  a 
quarter which is  usu a lly  sanitary  and clean ;  and 
Namuna, the best portion  of  the town, where are 
some of the Government o f f ic e s  and the houses of 
well-to-do pleaders and other c i t i z e n s . . . .The 
m unicipality  was created i n  I 869 ( and) . . .  consists  
of 24 members. . . .O f  the municipal b u i ld in g s ,  the 
clock tower, the Municipal  H a l l  and the b o y s ’ 
school.  . .are  alone important.  . . .Among the 
Government b u i l d i n g s . . . the Small Cause Court is 
the o ldest ,  having  been  erected i n  1 8 6 8 . . . . The 
Telegraph  O f f i c e . . . a n d  General Post O f f i c e . . .  
were constructed about the same t i m e . . . .The High 
School was b u i l t  i n . . . 1 8 7 3 • • • • The other b u ild ings  
are the Anglo-vernacular school,  the Anglo- 
Hindustani  school,  the g i r l s '  school,  the Urdu 
g i r l s '  school,  and the normal school for women 
te ac h e rs . . . .  Besides Government b u i ld in g s ,  there 
is  the f in e  e d i f ic e  recently  erected to house 
the V ic t o r ia  Technical  I n s t i t u t e . . . .The Lady 
D u f f e r i n  H o s p it a l ,  the Catholic  Dispensary  and 
Convent school,  a Free L ibrary  and a Theosophical  
H a l l  are perhaps the most important charities  
of the town. Amraoti contains two t h e a t r e s . . . .  
(and) a small club. . . •(, and) has long been known 
as the p r i n c ip a l  cotton mart of B e r a r .^
The presence o f  groups of p o l i t i c a l l y  conscious 
c it ize n s  i n  towns like  Amravati was another factor  
responsible  for  the vigour of p o l i t i c a l  l i fe  i n  the 
Marathi region .  These c i t i z e n s ,  who belonged e ither  to 
the so c ia l ly  dominant Maharashtrian  Brahman community or 
to leading  non-Brahman communities, possessed extensive 
interests  i n  land from which they derived  considerable
1
S .V .  F i t z g e r a ld  and A . E .  Nelson ( e d s . ) ,  Central 
Provinces D i s t r i c t  G a z e t t e e r s , Amraoti D i s t r ic t ,  v o l .A ,  
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wealth.  They were in  a d d it io n  well  educated, and many 
possessed p rofess ional  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s .  The possession  
of  social  and economic power by members of the lead ing  
communities of the Marathi region  aroused in  them a 
strong desire  for  p o l i t i c a l  power, and this expressed 
i t s e l f  i n  a c t i v i t i e s  designed to remove the B r i t i s h  
from the government of the province and the country a l i k e ,  
and to i n s t a l l  I n d i a n  rulers  i n  their  stead.
The man who provided the in s p i r a t i o n  for  these 
a ct iv ités  was Bal Gangadhar T i l a k ,  a Maharashtrian  
Brahman of Poona and the author of a nat ionalist  
movement that encompassed the entire  Marathi region  of  
western  I n d i a .  T i l a k  based his  movement on a b e l i e f  i n  
the ideals  and values of  c la s s ic a l  Hinduism as the 
instrument through which I n d ia  could ga in  national  
independence or s w a r a j . For this  reason  he opposed the 
attempts made by other n at io n a l is ts  to remake In d i a  i n  
the image of the West. A speech delivered  by T i l a k  i n  
Poona i n  March 1920 contains a clear  statement of  h is  
nat io n al ist  v iewpoint :
Mr T i l a k  exhorted the audience to give up the 
sp ir it  of  im itat io n  and to r e a l i s e  truths of the 
Vedanta which alone could save I n d ia  and the 
world.  I t  alone could give them sound s p ir i t u a l  
basis  for reconstruction  of s o c i e t y . . . . (He said)  
it  was a p ity  that I n d i a  had lost the faculty  
of recognis ing  her h e ro es . . .  because (she was) 
under the hypnotism of the w e s t . . . .Shake off  
these bonds (he s a i d ) . Assert  your independence 
of s p i r i t . . . . L e t us st ick  fast  to our Vedanta 
and a l l  our desires  sha ll  be f u l f i l l e d .  With 
and through Vedanta a l o n e . . . t h e  regeneration  of  
I n d i a . . .  would be p oss ible  and a s s u r e d . 1
1
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Between I 89O and 1919 three remarkable men - a l l  
lieutenants  of T i l a k  - introduced these ideas into the 
Marathi region  of the Central Provinces and Berar .  As 
a r e s u lt ,  a d is t in c t iv e  n at io n a l ist  movement took root 
i n  the area.  Perhaps the most remarkable of the three 
men was Ganesh Shrikrishna  Khaparde,  ’ a man of  great 
e rud it io n  and humour and of a generous d i s p o s i t i o n ’ .^
I n  Amravati ,  where he l iv ed ,  and indeed throughout 
Berar ,  Khaparde was a much-loved f ig u r e ,  as the 
fo llowing  tribute  from a Muslim p o l i t i c i a n  at the time 
of  h is  death i n  1938 in d ic a te s :
I n  Dadasaheb Khaparde, whom a l l  Beraris  consider 
as the grandfather  of  Berar and not only as the 
grand old man, we h a v e . . .  the embodiment of  Muslim 
and Hindu culture .  He was the p e r s o n if ic a t io n  of 
western and eastern  ideas .  He was liked  and 
loved both by Muhammadans and Hindus a l ik e .  My 
memory of him goes back to my student days. He 
had a roar ing  practice  t h e n . . . .At Amraoti he 
presided over almost a l l  Muslim meetings and his  
char it ies  did  not know the lim itations  of  caste ^ 
or creed. He helped students of a l l  communities ."
Khaparde was born in  1845 at H ing oli  in  the State of 
Hyderabad where his  father  was employed by the government 
of the Nizam. He received  his  education  i n  Berar and 
Bombay, graduating  in  Arts  i n  1877 and in  Law in  1884,  
when he was appointed as an Extra  A ss ista nt  Commissioner 
in  Berar.  Se rv ic e ,  however, ’ did  not suit his  temper’ , 
and i n  I 889 Khaparde joined the bar i n  Amravati,  where 
’ he attained  a p o s i t i o n . . . which remained unexcelled  in
1
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those parts of I n d i a * . As a prominent lawyer and a 
leading  member of  the Maharashtrian  Brahman community, 
Khaparde also played an important part in  public  l i f e ,  
and, fo llo w in g  his  contact with  T i l a k  in  the last decade 
of the nineteenth  century, he introduced T i l a k 1s 
nat io n alist  ideas into the Marathi d is t r ic t s  of the 
Central Provinces and Berar.  At f i r s t  Khaparde confined 
his n at io n a l ist  a c t i v i t i e s  to Berar,  but a fte r  its  
annexation  to the Central Provinces i n  1902 he extended 
those a c t i v i t i e s  to the d i v i s i o n  of Nagpur, thus laying  
the foundations of the n at io n a l ist  movement i n  the 
Marathi reg io n  as a whole. But whether i n  Nagpur or 
Berar, Khaparde proved h im self  a t ire le ss  and devoted 
d is c ip le  of  T i l a k ,  working, l ike  his  leader,  among 
students,  pro fess io n al  men and government servants ,  many 
of whom were also members of  his  caste community. Like 
T i l a k ,  too, Khaparde used the f e s t iv a l s  of  S iv a j i  and 
Ganapati to popularise  n at io n a l ist  id e a s ,  and advocated 
the boycott of  liquor  and fo re ig n  cloth  as a means of
restoring  a sense of national  pride  among the educated
2
townsfolk of the region .  Khaparde also followed T i l a k 1s 
example i n  attacking  the lo yalist  p o l i t ic ia n s  of the 
Marathi region ,  who sought in s p i r a t io n  for  the In d ia n  
nation  of the future i n  western  models. These 
p o l i t i c i a n s ,  mostly prominent landholders ,  dominated 
p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  i n  Nagpur u n t i l  about 1907 ,  when they
1
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suffered  their  f i r s t  major reversal  at the hands of 
Khaparde and h is  followers."*- The success of the 
n a t io n a l is t s '  attack  on the lo y al ists  is  b r i l l i a n t l y  
portrayed i n  the following- le t t e r ,  w ritten  by 
R .N .  Mudholkar, a moderate p o l i t i c i a n  from Amravati:
I n  Nagpur (K h a p a r d e ) . . .has been  able to organise 
an active  party  of noisy ,  s e l f  s u f f i c ie n t ,  
quarrelsome, impudent, unscrupulous men. I t  
grieves me to say that they are a l l  men of 
education ,  most of them graduates,  some hold ing  
two degrees.  These men h a t e . . . t h e  old m e n . . . .
They possess l i t t l e  in fluence  with  the men of 
p o s it io n  and r e s p e c t a b i l i t y  outside  Nagpur and 
they are conscious of i t . . . .Y e t ,  curiously  
enough, egged on as they are by my townsman, 
they b u l ly ,  browbeat and speak i n  a d ic t a t o r ia l  
manner to the old l e a d e r s . . . .Khaparde has many 
excellent  q u a l i t i e s .  He would never have used 
the horrid  language he d id ,  he would never have 
gone on abusing  the Nagpur leaders i n  private  
houses,  public  meetings, s tat io n  platforms and 
railway  tra ins ,  but for the knowledge that the 
audience was for the most part sympathetic and 
responsive .  I t  w i l l  take sheets to describe 
what Khaparde and his  lieutenants  are doing and 
how bad the young men have gone . ^
T i l a k  and his  supporters from the Central Provinces waged 
a s im ilar  attack  on moderate p o l i t i c ia n s  at the annual 
session  o f  the In d i a n  National  Congress at Surat in  the 
same year,  but this time they were defeated  and left  the 
Congress as a r e sult .  I n  1908 T i l a k  was imprisoned on a 
charge of se d it io n ,  and a l u l l  descended on Khaparde 's
1
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a c t i v i t i e s  in  the Marathi region .  Following  h is  l e a d e r ’ s 
release  i n  1914 ,  however, Khaparde again  took up active 
n at io n a l ist  work and played a leading  part in  e stab l ish in g  
the Home Rule League,  newly formed by T i l a k ,  in  Berar.
T i l a k  also provided the in s p i r a t io n  for Khaparde ’ s 
de c is io n  to enter the Im perial  L e g is la t iv e  Council  to 
br ing  the n at io n a l ist  viewpoint to the notice of the 
government; and to jo in  the deputation  sent to Great 
B r i t a i n  i n  1919 to convert the public  and Labour party 
of that country to the idea  of home rule  for In d ia .
Another of T i l a k * s  lieutenants  in  the Marathi region  
was a young Brahman doctor,  Balkrishna  Shivaram Moonje 
of  Nagpur. A bold and determined man with  ’ an 
inassuageable  hatred of the B r it is h  government’ , Moonje 
came to the fore as the leader of the nat ionalist  
movement i n  the d iv i s i o n  of  Nagpur a fter  1907» replacing  
G .S .  Khaparde who thereafter  confined his  a c t i v it ie s  to 
the territory  of  B e r a r . * Moonje was born in  Bilaspur  in  
1872 and spent his  early  years in  the town. During  this 
period ,  the upbringing  he received  from h is  father left  
a permanent mark upon him, and in  later  years made him 
extremely receptive  to T i l a k ’ s p o l i t i c a l  ideology:
H is  ( i . e .  M oonje 1s ) . . . father  . . .  was a staunch 
Hindu .  Mindful  of  h is  son ’ s future ,  he always 
exhorted him not to lose his  ancient fa i t h  while 
he received  En g l ish  Education  which ,  he was 
a f r a i d ,  had den at ion al ised  many b r i l l i a n t  youths 
of the day. The advice given to him had a 
la s t in g  impression  upon him and from his  very 
boyhood Dr Moonje has been of re l ig io u s  bent of
1
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mind and proud of ancient  Aryan glory.
Following  his  primary and secondary education ,  and a 
period  spent at Hislop  College in  Nagpur, Moonje entered 
the Grant Medical  College in  Bombay, r ec e iv in g  his  
medical degree i n  I 898. For two years he served as a 
doctor i n  Bombay and then went out to South A f r ic a  to 
jo in  the Boer War. On the conclusion  of  the War, he
'had to return  to Nagpur and establish ed  h imself  as a
2
very successful  and expert eye-operator ' .  Shortly 
a fter  h is  return  to Nagpur, Moonje came under the 
in fluence  of  T i l a k  and K hapard e , and under their  
guidance gradually  assumed leadership  of  the n at io n a l is t  
movement in  the d iv i s i o n  of Nagpur. Like T i l a k ,
Dr Moonje supported the conservative Hindu view of 
p o l i t i c s  and worked through r e l ig io u s  fe s t iv a ls  and the 
Rashtriya  M andal , an a sso c ia t io n  of n at io nalists  in
3
Nagpur, to popularise  that view. Moonje also reproduced 
in  the d i v i s io n  of  Nagpur the aggressive  style of 
p o l i t i c s  adopted by T i l a k  in  Bombay. Th is  was evident 
not only in  the vigour of  M oonje 's  opposition  to B r it is h  
rule  in  I n d i a ,  but also in  the in s t it u t io n s  he established  
in  order to develop a s im ilar  opposition  in  others.
Typ ical  of these in s t it u t io n s  was the akhada which 
Moonje founded in  1907 for the students of Nagpur. I n  
the following  extract ,  S ir  Gangadhaorrao Chitnavis ,  a 
leading  lo y al ist  p o l i t i c i a n  in  Nagpur, described  the useI
I .  Prakash, A Review of the H isto ry  and Work of the Hindu 
Mahasabha and the Hindu Sangathan Movement (New D e l h i ,
1 9 3 8 ) ,  P . 3 6 2 .
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Last year Dr Moonje asked me to give him some 
m unicipial  ground where he could make an akhara 
for a l l  students i n  N a g p u r . . . .Th is  ground they 
used for  (an) akhada where a l l  s tud en ts . . . used 
to m e e t . . . . T h e y  employed some teachers to teach 
them the old art of  p lay in g  the st ick  and many 
other games . . . . ( T h e ir )m o t iv e s . . .  are to seduce 
boys from other schools to attend their  special  
a khadas . . . and thereby to wean them from the 
legitimate  i n f l u e n c e s . . . .They aimed not only at 
the physical  education  o f  the boys, b u t . . . t h e y  
were actuated by some u l t e r i o r  motives there o f  
n at ionalists  . . . i . e . to create and mobilise a 
force of  students against  government and those 
who d i f fe r e d  from them i n  p o l i t i c s .
Dr Moonje was also responsible  for  introducing  two other
features  o f  T i l a k ’ s n at io n al ist  movement into the
d i v is i o n  of Nagpur. I n  1916 he set up branches of the
Home Rule League in  the area ,  and i n  the same year,  on
the advice of T i l a k ,  he led the members o f  the Rashtr iya
Mandal and their  supporters back into the I n d ia n  National
2
Congress. To give further  strength  to their  p o s it io n ,
Dr Moonje and h is  supporters also  made a determined 
assault  on the last remaining stronghold of  the lo y al ist
to which  Dr Moonje  put the a k h a d a :
1
Chitnavis  MS, S ir  G .M.  Chitnavis  to __________ ,
25 December 1908 .
2
The government disbanded the o r ig in a l  Mandal i n  1909» 
but before Dr Moonje re-entered the Congress i n  1916 he 
reformed i t .  I n  add it io n  to Dr Moonje, i t s  members 
included N .R .  Udhoji ,  N .R .  A le k a r ,  N .R .  Vaidya ,  B. P an d it ,  
B. Bhawalkar, G .R .  Deo, V .R .  K e lk a r ,  M .V .  Abhyanker,
G .R .  Ogale ,  G .V .  Deshmukh, B . S .  N iyog i ,  M. Bobde,
M .R .  Cholkar, Dr L .V .  Paranjpe and Dr N .B .  Khare.  See 
B. H a r d as , Pharmavir Dr B . S .  M o o n je , part I  (Poona, 1966) ,  
P P . 389-I; Government of Bombay, Source Material  for  a 
H istory  of  the Freedom Movement i n  I n d i a , v o 1 . 2 ,
1885-1920 (Bombay, 1 9 5 8 ) ,  p p . 240-1.
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p o l i t i c i a n s  - the M u n ic ip al  Committee of  Nagpur. These 
ventures  were completely successful .  By 1919 the members 
of  the Home Rule League were in  firm control of  the 
Marathi sect ion  of the Prov in c ia l  Congress Committee of 
the Central  Provinces ,  and held  a majority of seats on 
the M unic ipal  Committee of  Nagpur .^
Another  feature  o f  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  i n  the Marathi 
r e g io n  was the b i t t e r  c o n fl ic t  between the d i v i s i o n  of 
Nagpur ( i n  a s s o c ia t i o n  with  the H ind i  d is t r ic t s )  and 
Berar over the a l l o c a t io n  o f  the surplus revenues of
*
Berar .  Owing to i ts  f e r t i l i t y  and favourable  climate ,
Berar was a wealthy area  and every year returned to the
government revenues that far  outstripped the cost of  its
2
ad m in istrat io n .  The Central  Provinces ,  by contrast,  
was not even able to meet i t s  own expenses. Thus ,  a fter  
the annexation  of Berar  to the Central Provinces ,  the 
government drew h e a v i ly  on the surplus revenues of Berar 
to f inance  public  works i n  the province proper. This  
aroused great resentment i n  Berar,  but no suitable  
forum for  a i r i n g  that resentment existed  u n t i l  1914 ,  
when the Government o f  I n d i a  established  a L e g is lat iv e  
Council  i n  Nagpur. To this  Council Berar was ent it led  
to send three re p r e s e n ta t iv e s ,  and from its  f i r s t  session  
these members lost no opportunity to attack  the
1
H i t a v a d a , 15 June 1918 ,  p . 6; i b i d . ,  13 July  1918 ,  p . 5« 
P rov in c ia l  Congress Committee w i l l  hereafter  be referred  
to as PCC .
2
B e r a r 1s P o s i t io n  i n  the I n d i a n  Federation ,  op. c i t . ,  
p . 4. Between 1902-16 the lowest surplus was 
R s . 4 2 , 2 8 , 4 0 0 ,  and the h ighest  Rs .  1 , 0 3 , 4 8 , 5 0 0 ;  the 
former occurred i n  1902-3 » and the latter  i n  1912--1 3 .
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government and the Central Provinces for their  
appropriat ion  of  the revenues of  B e r a r . *  I n  1918 one 
member gave voice to the complaints of  many residents  
of  Berar when he pointed  out that
the fact  is  patent that since the time that 
Berar was tacked on to the Central  Provinces ,  
the authorities  commenced spending i n f i n i t e l y  
large amounts on b u ild ings  and communications 
w ith  a l l  possible  vigour at the sac r i f ic e  of  
the convenience of  Berar p e o p l e . . . . I t  would 
not be too much to say that the Central 
Provinces is  be ing  la v ish ly  cared for without 
taking care to provide even the necess it ies  of  
l i f e  to B e r a r . . . . T h e  latter  has a just ground 
to consider  that it  is  be in g  treated as a 
step-child by the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . . . a n d . . . is  
be ing  n eglected .^
To overcome these d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  the leaders of  Berar 
proposed several so lut ions ,  one of  which was to give
Berar a greater  share i n  her own revenues.  The other
so lut io n  was more drastic  and envisaged the establishment
of  a separate le g is la ture  i n  Berar ,  and the co n st itu t io n
3
o f  Berar as a separate province .
The support g iven  to these measures i n  Berar was 
due not simply to the demand for ’ f i n a n c i a l  j u s t i c e ’ , 
but also to the widespread b e l i e f  that Berar was a 
homogeneous p o l i t i c a l  unit  with  a destiny  and in te re sts
1
B e r a r 's  P o s it io n  i n  the I n d ia n  Federation ,  op. c i t .
p p .5-6.
2
CPLC, 13 March 1918 ,  p . 147.  The speaker was 
Y .G .  Deshpande.
3
I b i d . ,  29 July  1918 ,  p . 2 97 ;  i b i d . ,  22 July  1919 ,  
p p . 244-5; B e r a r ’ s P o s i t io n  i n  the In d i a n  Federation ,  
o p . c i t . , p p . 7 -8 .
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p e c u l ia r ly  i t s  own. There were good grounds for  this 
b e l i e f .  The majority of  people i n  Berar ,  for  instance ,  
spoke Marathi ,  while  the population  o f  the Central 
Provinces was divided  into H ind i  and Marathi speaking 
sections each with  i ts  own interests  and style  of  
p o l i t i c s .  Berar had an economic unity ,  too, d er iv ing  
from its  involvement in  the cotton industry ,  that was 
not possessed by the Central Provinces ,  which comprised 
several ag r ic u ltu r a l  zones with  a d i f fe re n t  crop forming 
the staple i n  each zone. Further ,  the income which 
Berar received  from the cotton industry  gave i t  a degree 
of a f f luen ce  which was u n r iv a l le d  i n  the Central  
Provinces ,  save perhaps i n  the cotton growing areas of 
the d i v i s i o n  of  Nagpur. The patterns of  land settlement,  
too, d i f f e r e d  between the Central Provinces and Berar.
I n  Berar,  as i n  Bombay., the government s ettled  the land 
on the a g r i c u l t u r i s t s ,  whereas i n  the Central  Provinces 
it  settled  it  on the m alguzars .
The movement for the separation  of Berar from the 
Central Provinces brought to light  another feature  of 
p o l i t ic s  i n  the Marathi region ,  namely, the two fold  
d iv i s i o n  o f  nat io n alist  leadership  between the d iv i s io n  
of  Nagpur and Berar.  Th is  was evident i n  the existence  
of  separate Congress Committees to direct  the 
n at io n alist  movement i n  the two areas.  Apart  from the 
o f f i c i a l  n at io n a l ist  o rganisat ions ,  too, the j u r i s d ic t io n  
of nat io n alist  leaders i n  the d iv is io n  of  Nagpur was 
o rd in ar i ly  confined to that area.  This  was also the
1
H i t a v a d a t 2 December 1 9 1 6 ,  p . 6 .
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case with  the nat ionalist  leaders of  Berar ,  with  the 
exception  of  G .S .  Khaparde,  whose in fluence  extended far  
beyond the bounds of  Berar ,  owing to h is  connections 
with  the Im perial  l e g is la ture  i n  Delhi  and his  
p a r t ic ip a t io n  i n  the Home Rule deputation  to England.
More typical  of the n at io n a l is ts  of Berar was 
Madhao Shrihari  Aney, a Maharashtrian  Brahman pleader  
from Yeotmal,  who besides  being  a lieutenant  of  T i l a k  
was also a formidable protagonist  of  the d ist inct  and 
local  interests  of Berar .  Aney received  his  education  
at Morris College i n  Nagpur and at the Un ivers ity  of 
Calcutta ,  and a fter  graduating  from those in s t it u t io n s  
i n  Arts  and Law r espect iv ely ,  became a teacher i n  the 
Kashibai  H igh  School i n  Amravati between 1904-07* I n  
1908 he joined  the Bar i n  Yeotmal and began practice  as 
a pleader .  L ike  many possessed of  high  social  and 
economic status ,  Aney also entered the public  l i f e  of 
Berar,  and was responsible  for  introducing  the 
nat ionalist  movement of  T i l a k  into the d i s t r ic t  of 
Yeotmal. Between 1916-19 Aney served as the Vice- 
president  of T i l a k * s  Home Rule League i n  western I n d ia  
and was the founder-President of  the branch of the 
League i n  Yeotmal. I n  a d d it io n  to his  work for the 
Home Rule League ,  Aney  also championed the cause of  
Berar and was c losely  associated  with the campaign to 
persuade the government to redress  the f in a n c i a l  
grievances o f  the terr itory .  I n  waging this  campaign 
Aney had the support of  the Yeotmal D i s t r ic t  A s s o c ia t io n ,  
a p o l i t i c a l  o rganisat ion  formed i n  1915 before the Home 
Rule League was established  i n  the d i s t r i c t .  Through 
this o rganisat ion  Aney brought pressure on the government
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to estab l ish  a separate leg is lature  i n  Berar and mooted 
the p o s s i b i l i t y  of serving Berar completely from the 
Central  Provinces .  The fo llo w ing  extract from a 
c ir c u la r  letter  which the Yeotmal D is t r ic t  A ss o c ia t io n  
sent i n  1917 to prominent c it izen s  of  Berar at the 
instance  of  Aney i l lu s t r a t e s  h is  case for a separate 
province of  Berar:
A f e r t i l e  tract ,  with  an industrious  population ,  
these d is t r ic t s  have a l l  along been  a province 
i n  themselves . . . . The popular f e e l i n g  i n  Berar 
was decidedly  against  the amalgamation of  these 
d is t r ic t s  ■with the Central Provinces and the 
experience of the last  eleven years has not 
served i n  the least to reconcile  the public  
opinion  i n  Berar to this  f a c t . . . .The p re v a i l in g  
t e r r i t o r i a l  d i v i s i o n  should be abolished ,  and a 
r e d is t r ib u t i o n  on the basis  of  l i n g u is t i c ,  
r a c ia l  and h i s t o r i c a l  a f f i n i t i e s  be s u g g e s t e d . . .
I n  such a scheme, Berar w i l l  have to be linked to 
other parts  of  India.'* '
Despite  the cleavage i n  the n at io n al ist  leadership  
between the d iv is io n s  of  Nagpur and Berar ,  however, 
n a t io n a l ists  from the Marathi region  worked together to 
disseminate n at io n a l ist  values which had taken firm root 
i n  their  region  to the Hindi  d i s t r i c t s .  They did  so in  
order that the two regions could o f fe r  united  opposition  
to the government. The men responsible  for this were 
Dr Moonje and G .S .  Khaparde. Between 1915-19 the two 
men, ass isted  by their  l ieutenants ,  presided  at p o l i t i c a l  
meetings i n  the H ind i  region ,  and formed branches of 
T i l a k * s  Home Rule League i n  Hindi  towns where their  
fellow  Maharashtrian  Brahmans lived  i n  s ign if ican t
1
H i t a v a d a , 3 November 1917»  P*3*
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numbers. Marathi n at io n a l is ts  were also responsible  for 
drawing lo y al ist  and n at io n a l ist  p o l i t i c i a n s  from both 
regions together for an annual p o l i t i c a l  conference; 
for  b r in g in g  H ind i  p o l i t i c ia n s  into the Provincial  
A s s o c ia t io n ;  and for  e s t a b l ish in g  i n  the Hindi  region  
branches of the G raduates1 A ss o c ia t io n ,  an organisation  
founded by members of the Home Rule League to awaken 
public  opinion  on major p o l i t i c a l  issues.'*'  F in a l l y ,  
n a t io n a l is t s  from the H ind i  and Marathi regions of the 
Central Provinces were linked  by their  membership of the 
P rov in c ia l  Congress Committee which had its  headquarters 
i n  Nagpur, and through that Committee to the wider 
org an isat io n  of  the I n d i a n  National  Congress.  Time alone 
would t e l l ,  however, whether the e fforts  of the Marathi 
nat io n a l ists  to unite  the p o l i t i c a l  leaders of the two 
l i n g u is t ic  regions would prove successful .
1
H i t a v a d a , 25 September 1915» P *5;  7 October 1916, p . 3;
10 November 1917» P»7;  22 September 1917» P * 8 ;
30 October 1917» P«5;  H a r d a s , op. c i t . ,  p . 287; Mishra,  
op. c i t . ,  p . 2 7 1 .
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THE DIVERGENCE OF THE REGIONS; NATIONALIST AGITATION
IN THE CENTRAL PROVINCES AND BERAR, 1919-1922
Despite  the attempt of  Dr Moonje and G . S .  Khaparde 
to draw the p o l i t i c a l  leaders of  the H indi  and Marathi 
regions into a common stance ,  between 1919 and 1922 the 
d if feren ces  between them increased  rather  than decreased. 
The d if feren ces  emerged during  the two nationwide 
campaigns of a g it a t io n  launched against  the Government of 
In d ia  by Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi.  Through these 
campaigns, Gandhi aimed to arouse the people of In d ia  
against  B r i t i s h  ru le ,  and to create in  them, over and 
above their  e x i s t in g  lo y a l t ie s ,  a new loyalty  to the 
concept of the P o l i t i c a l  Nation .  The f i r s t  campaign, 
which took place i n  1919» consisted  of  a Satyagraha to 
persuade the government to withdraw the Rowlatt Act .
The second, which occurred between 1921-1922,  took the 
form of  a movement of  non-cooperation. The two 
campaigns, however, f a i l e d  to draw the Hindi  and Marathi 
regions together. I n  1919» the two regions responded 
d i f f e r e n t l y  to h is  c a l l  for  a Satyagraha,  thus confirming 
their  e a r l ie r  tendency to develop d is t in c t iv e  p o l i t i c a l  
styles .  This  tendency became even more marked during 
the campaign of non-cooperation. Whereas Gandhi had to 
prod the Marathi n at io n a l is ts  into accepting  his  
leadership  and style  of a g it a t io n ,  the Hindi  n at io n alists  
r e a d i ly  gave their  a l leg ian ce  to Gandhi and supported 
his campaign of non-cooperation. And although the
C h ap te r  2
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campaigns i n  both regions involved  the urban middle 
c la s s e s ,  the merchants, and the lower classes i n  town 
and country, i n  other respects  they d i f fe r e d  greatly .
By March 1922 ,  the H ind i  and Marathi leaders were 
deeply d iv ided  over G and hi 's  leadership  of  the I n d i a n  
N at ional  Congress and over his  modes of n at io n al ist  
a g i t a t i o n .  This  posed a severe threat to nat io n alist  
u n it y ,  and hence to the p o l i t i c a l  s t a b i l i t y  of the 
Central  Provinces and Berar.
I
The response of the Central Provinces and Berar 
to G a n d h i ’ s c a l l  for a Satyagraha against  the Rowlatt 
Act  showed that ,  despite  the e fforts  of  Dr Moonje, no 
re a l  unity  existed  between the p o l i t i c i a n s  of the Hindi  
and Marathi regions .  The A c t ,  which conferred on the 
Government of In d i a  extraordinary  powers to deal with  
terrorist  crime throughout the country, provided Gandhi 
with  an excellent  opportunity to unite  the peoples of 
In d i a  against  B r i t i s h  rule .  A ccordingly ,  when the 
Government of I n d ia  introduced the l e g is l a t io n  into the 
Im perial  L e g is la t i v e  Council on 6 February 1919 ,  Gandhi 
warned that he would launch a Satyagraha i f  the measure 
was formally enshrined as the law of the land. Despite  
this  warning,  however, the Government of  In d ia  proceeded 
w ith  the b i l l ,  and it  passed into law i n  the third  week 
of  March 1919* Immediately therea fter ,  Gandhi called  
upon the people of  In d i a  to observe 6 A p r i l  1919 as a 
'd ay  of  h um il iat ion  and p ra y e r ’ i n  protest against  the 
repressive  measure enacted by the Government of I n d i a .
So far  as the Central  Provinces and Berar were concerned,
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the response of  p o l i t i c a l  leaders i n  both regions was 
n e g l i g i b l e ,  yet their  responses re f lected  the d i f f e r i n g  
levels  of  p o l i t i c a l  maturity and contrasting  styles  of 
p o l i t i c s  obtain ing  i n  each region .
I n  the H ind i  region  lo y al ists  and n at io n a l ists  
a l ik e  were u n w il l in g  to p art ic ip ate  i n  the Satyagraha of 
6 A p r i l  1919* They d id ,  however, summon meetings to 
protest against  the introduction  of the Rowlatt b i l l  
into the Imperial  l e g is l a t u r e ,  but these meetings owed 
nothing to G a n d h i ’ s i n s p i r a t io n  and were u su a lly  held  
long before  he issued  his  c a l l  to action.'*'  And th is ,  
apparently ,  was as far  as the leaders were prepared to 
go, for on 6 A p r i l  only one hartal  took place  i n  the 
entire  Hind i  region .  There were several reasons for  
th is .  Foremost among these was the opposition  of
Pandit Shukul and the lo y al ists  to the notions of
2
satyagraha and passive  re s ista n c e .  A g a in ,  as malguzars 
and members of the l ib e r a l  pro fess io ns ,  the lo y al ists  
had l i t t l e  reason to be discontented with  their  lot and 
hence to oppose the government. Ravi Shankar Shukla and 
the n at io n a l ists  were also u nw il l in g  to j o in  i n  the 
Satyagraha,  poss ibly  owing to the in fluence  of  Dr Moonje,  
who was h im self  cool towards Gandhi and his  new style of  
p o l i t i c s .  A g a in ,  although the Muslims of northern I n d i a  
strongly  supported the Satyagraha on the basis  of their
1
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See N A I , the Private  Papers of G .S .  Khaparde (c ited  
hereafter  as Khaparde M S ) ,  F i l e  4, Part 3» Letter  S 2 , 
B .D .  Shukul to G .S .  Khaparde,  20 March 1919*
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o pposition  to B r i t i s h  p o l ic y  i n  Turkey ,  the Muslims of4 
the H ind i  region  d isp layed  no interest  whatever i n  the 
a g it a t io n .  There was only one exception  to the 
apparent lack o f  in t e r e st  by Hindi  p o l i t i c ia n s  i n  the 
Rowlatt Satyagraha ,  and that occurred i n  the town of  
Chhindwara. I n  that town on 6 A p r i l  1919 the only 
complete hartal  recorded anywhere i n  the Central Provinces 
and Berar took place."*" The occurrence of  a hartal  i n  
Chhindwara, however, was not prim arily  due to the 
p opular ity  of  Gandhi i n  the town, but to the presence 
there of  his  p o l i t i c a l  a ss o c ia te s ,  Mohammed and Shaukat 
A l i ,  who had been  in tern ed  i n  the town i n  1918* But 
although the A l i  brothers  were not permanent residents  
o f  Chhindwara, they persuaded the local  Hindu and Muslim 
populat ion  to hold  an e f fe c t iv e  and peaceful  protest 
against  the Government of  I n d i a .  According  to one 
obs e r v e r :
The day was observed here as a day of p u r i f i c a t i o n  
by Hindus ,  Muslims,  Ja ins  and Sikhs i n  exceptionally  
large numbers. Many, in c lu d in g  women and c h i ld re n ,  
fasted .  M u s l im s . . .  began  the day. . . (by) reading  
the Koran. Later  on, Hindus and Muslims gathered 
before a temple and j o in t ly  offered  prayers to 
God for d iv ine  guidance  of the government (and) 
grant of power to the people to bear oppression  
with  courage and fo r t it u d e .  The J a i n  temple 
remained f u l l  of  worshippers throughout the d a y . . . .  
A l l  bazaars remained closed.  Such a complete and
1
N A I , Home P o l i t i c a l ,  J u l y  1919»  46 D e p o s i t ,  F o r t n i g h t l y  
R e p o r t s  on the I n t e r n a l  P o l i t i c a l  S i t u a t i o n  i n  the 
C e n t r a l  P r o v in c e s  and B e r a r  f o r  the f i r s t  h a l f  o f  A p r i l
1 9 1 9 ,  p . 2 3 .  (T h e s e  r e p o r t s  w i l l  be c i t e d  h e r e a f t e r  as 
N A I ,  Home P o l l ,  J u l y  1919»  46 D e p o s i t ,  F R , F i r s t  H a l f  
o f  A p r i l  1 9 1 9 * )
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a b s o lu t e  s u s p e n s i o n  o f  b u s i n e s s  has  b e e n  unknown 
i n  l i v i n g  memory. V i l l a g e r s  rem ained  at home 
f a s t i n g  and p r a y in g .  . . .The  Muslims broke  t h e i r  
f a s t  at the end o f  the d a y , . . . a n d  a l l  H ind us  and 
Muslims g ath e r e d  b e f o r e  the temple.  Mr Ghate 
p r e s i d e d  and d e l i v e r e d  a n  eloquent  speech  on 
the R o w la t t  l e g i s l a t i o n . . . .The  su c c es s  was beyond  
h i g h e s t  e x p e c t a t i o n  and would  have g lad d e n e d  
Mahatma G a n d h i ’ s h e a r t . 1
N a t i o n a l i s t  le ad e rs  i n  the M a r a th i  r e g i o n  were a lso
r e l u c t a n t  to p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  the S a t y a g r a h a  a g a in s t  the
R o w la tt  A c t .  A s  i n  the H i n d i  r e g i o n ,  the leaders  h e l d
p u b l i c  m eetings  to p r o t e s t  a g a i n s t  the l e g i s l a t i o n ,  but
most o f  them were f i r m l y  opposed  to the h o l d i n g  of
h a r t a l s .  A s  a r e s u l t  o n ly  f o u r  r e c o r d e d  h a r t a l s  took
p l a c e ,  and each  was in c o m p le t e .  O f  the f o u r ,  two
o c c u r r e d  i n  the C e n t r a l  P r o v in c e s  and two i n  B e r a r .  The
men p r i m a r i l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  the h a l f- h e a r t e d  r esp onse
to G a n d h i ' s  c a l l  f o r  a Sa ty ag rah a  i n  the M a rath i  r e g i o n
were Dr  Moonje  i n  the d i v i s i o n  o f  Nagpur  and G . S .  K h ap a rd e
i n  B e r a r .  O f  the two, Dr Moonje  was le s s  c e r t a i n  i n  h i s
o p p o s i t i o n  than  K h a p a rd e .  Dr  M o o n j e ’ s u n c e r t a i n t y  was
p o s s i b l y  roo te d  i n  the c o n f u s i o n  w h ich  Gandhi  caused
throughout  M a h ar as h t r a  by  mounting  a n a t i o n a l i s t
a g i t a t i o n  a g a in s t  the government ,  and at the same time
o v e r - r i d i n g  T i l a k  as the acknow ledged  le a d e r  o f  the
2
r e g i o n .  The c o n f u s i o n  was most marked i n  Poona ,  the 
c e ntr e  o f  the n a t i o n a l i s t  movement i n  M a h a r a s h t r a .  T here
1
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na t io n a l is t s  f i r s t  approved, then disapproved,  of  the 
Satyagraha,  the latter  response in d ic a t in g  that they had 
had second thoughts about the a g it a t io n  and decided  to 
stand against  i t .  The newspapers of Poona c le ar ly  
revealed the n a t i o n a l i s t s 1 in d e c is io n  in  the matter. On
2 March 1919» for  instance ,  the Mahratta t a weekly 
published  under the auspices of T i l a k ,  expressed the 
hope that In d ia  would ' r i s e  to a man to follow  this  
war-worn f i e l d  marshal of passive  resistance  ( i . e .  Gandhi) 
to stop the aggression  of the Rowlatt b i l l s * .  A week 
la te r ,  however, it  stated that ,  although
the Poona n a t io n a l ists  h a v e . . . w i r e d  their  support 
to the movement, . . . they have reserved for  
themselves the l iberty  to settle  d e t a i l s . . . .The 
divergence of opinion  on the point of s e t t l i n g  
the d e t a i I s . . .  shows how d i f f i c u l t  the problem i s ,  
and any hasty  conclusion  on it  w i l l  simply be 
harmful to the movement. . .  .The question  should 
be approached and solved with  f u l l  consciousness 
of  the tremendous r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  it involves .
Statements from Nagpur, too, revealed  an i n i t i a l  
acceptance o f ,  and a subsequent withdrawal from, G a nd hi 's  
p lan  of  campaign. On 6 March 1919» the Maharashtra , a 
Marathi paper expressing  similar  views to those of  the 
M ahratta , came out i n  support of passive  resistance  and 
urged its  readers to s ign  the pledge to observe
2
satyagraha against  the government as requested by Gandhi.  
W it h i n  two weeks, however, n at io n al ist  opinion  i n  Nagpur, 
for  which the Maharashtra was the spokesman, seems to
1
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have undergone a change i n  keeping  with  that a lready  
observed among p o l i t i c a l  leaders i n  Poona. Th is  change 
was evident on 23 March when Dr Moonje expressed 
h e s i t a t io n  about taking any course o f  a ct io n  that would 
d iv ide  the n at io n a l ists  of Maharashtra ,  be they from 
Poona, Nagpur or Berar.  I n  Berar ,  G . S .  Khaparde was 
much more forthright  i n  h is  o pposit ion  to G and hi 's  
proposal for  a Satyagraha than Dr Moonje. I n  March 1919» 
when asked i n  Bombay whether he would lead the passive  
resistance  movement in  that province ,  Khaparde replied
that he did  not believe  i n  the movement. He 
also remarked that Gandhi would say one thing 
today and another thing  tomorrow. He had no 
f a i t h  i n  the s ignatories  (Guzerathi )  to the 
satyagraha vow. He said  that one stripe  of  
with  a whip was s u f f ic ie n t  to deter  them from 
their  determination.  He doubted the genuineness 
of the s ignatories  to the v o w . . . . I n  the 
circumstances he said  that the passive  resistance  
movement was im p o ssib le .^
Loyalty  to the n at io n a l ist  views and leadership  of  
T i l a k  was the main factor  behind the opposition  of 
Moonje and Khaparde to the Rowlatt Satyagraha.  I n  1919 
neither  man desired  to see Gandhi exalted to the p o s i t i o n  
of national  leader at the expense of  T i l a k ,  more 
p a r t ic u la r ly  i f  the attainment of that p o s it io n  gave him
1
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entry to ' T i l a k ' s  country'  - the Marathi region  of the 
Central Provinces and B e r a r . *  I n  a d d it io n ,  Moonje and 
Khaparde saw i n  T i l a k ' s  aggressive  style of leadership  
the embodiment of  M aharashtra 's  proud resistance  to 
f o r e ig n  rule ,  and they were u n w il l in g  to renounce that 
style for  the a l i e n  concept of non-violent soul force 
which Gandhi advocated as the only weapon capable of 
d r iv in g  the B r i t i s h  away from I n d ia .  Thus ,  when asked 
whether he would practise  passive  resistance  and 
withdraw from the Im perial  leg is lature  i n  protest  against  
the Rowlatt A c t ,  Khaparde r id ic u le d  the concept of 
withdrawal as a p o l i t i c a l  strategy  and postulated  a more 
active  form of  protest i n  its  place :
He said  that he did  not l ike  to throw up h is  
work i n  that manner and sit  at home like  an 
old woman i n  a h u f f . . . .He said  that he was 
unable to lead the movement. . . as he could not 
walk on foot a l l  the way from Amraoti to D elh i  
to attend the council  meetings,  as i n  the 
s tr ictest  sense of  the term 'pass ive  r e s ista n c e '  
he could not travel by fo r e ig n  r a i l w a y s . . .  .He 
gave it  as his  op in ion  that the best they could 
do would be to use swadeshi goods as a p r o t e s t .^
I t  was h igh ly  probable ,  too, that Khaparde and 
Dr Moonje had reservations  about one other aspect of  the 
movement of protest  organised  by Gandhi against  the 
Government of I n d i a  i n  1919* Th is  concerned the 
p a r t ic ip a t io n  of  I n d i a n  Muslims i n  nat ionalist  a g i t a t io n
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Tor the f i r s t  time. I t  was not the p a r t ic ip a t io n  of  the 
Muslims per s e , which they opposed, for  T i l a k  h im self  
had tr ied  to persuade Muslims i n  Bombay to jo in  the 
Hindus i n  opposing the p a r t i t i o n  of  Bengal.  Rather ,  
they were suspicious  of the conditions  on which Gandhi 
had won over the Muslims, for  they b e l ieved  that i n  
e x p lo it in g  the pan-Islamic sympathies of the Muslims to 
w in  their  support for  the Satyagraha,  Gandhi was 
a ct u ally  turning their  thoughts, not to the future 
n ation  of  I n d i a ,  but to the Is lamic  states of the Middle 
E ast ,  thus a l ie n a t in g  them completely from the Hindus .  
Evidence  of these fears  was re flected  in  a statement made 
by N .C .  Kelkar ,  one of  T i l a k * s  foremost l ieutenants  i n  
Poona, i n  react ion  to G a nd hi 's  appeal to the Muslims to 
j o i n  in  n at io n a l ist  a g it a t io n  i n  1920 .  I t  was h ighly  
probable that K e lka r ,  T i l a k  and their  colleagues i n  the 
Central  Provinces and Berar held  sim ilar  views on 
G a n d h i 's  appeal to the Muslims to j o i n  i n  the Rowlatt 
Satyagraha  some twelve months before hand:
The n at io n al ist  party i n  Poona is  not favourably 
disposed  towards Mr G and hi 's  non-cooperation 
movement. . .  .My b e l i e f  is  that he is p lay ing  the 
game i n  order to please  the Muhammadans. . .  .To 
speak the truth ,  the I n d i a n  Muhammadans ought to 
have no sympathy for  Turkey ,  and the a g it a t io n  
i n  this part of  the country is  only s u p e r f ic ia l  
. . . . I f  governm ent . . .take  some drastic  measures 
against  Mr Gandhi,  then h is  cause w i l l  prosper 
and there w i l l  be a series  of r io t s ,  and then 
some of  the emotional and rash Muhammadans w i l l  
commit a tr o c it ie s  and the whole country w i l l  be 
i n  a state of confusion  and consternation .  . . .
We have no heart i n  this  movement, and government 
should not misunderstand our act ion .  We have to 
keep up some appearances to please  Mr Gandhi and 
h is  Muhammadan fr ie n d s .  My personal b e l i e f  is 
that this  is  a pan-Islamic question ,  and the
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Hindus have no right  to j o i n  the Muhammadans, and 
so long as the In d ia n  Muhammadans have one eye 
towards Turkey and the other to the B r i t i s h  
government, their  loyalty  towards the latter  is 
shaky and they are not f i t  to be the fr iends  of 
the H i n d u s . ^
N a t io n al ist  leaders i n  Berar had a d d it io n al  reasons 
for  opposing the Rowlatt Satyagraha.  During 1918 ,  
rumours that the Government of  I n d i a  intended to restore  
Berar to the Nizam of Hyderabad, who was a Muslim, 
gained currency i n  Berar.  Some leaders l inked  these 
rumours with  the noticeable  increase  of  pan-Islamic 
sentiment among Muslims i n  I n d i a ,  and they feared  that
the resto ra t io n  of Berar would contribute to a revival
2
o f  Muslim power i n  I n d i a ,  as i n  Berar.  A ccordingly ,  
when Gandhi called  on Hindus and Muslims to observe a 
Satyagraha on 6 A p r i l  1919» appealing  to the latter  on 
the basis  of their  opposition  to B r it is h  p ol icy  i n  
Turkey ,  the Hindu leaders of  Berar declined  to obey the 
c a l l .  These leaders had a further  reason for opposing 
G a n d h i 's  campaign of  withdrawal and passive  res istance  
i n  1919« They regarded the le g is la ture  as the arena as 
i n  which they could best wage the nat ionalist  struggle 
against  B r i t i s h  rule  and at the same time remove the 
grounds for the ir  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  with the government's
1
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policy  towards Berar. Hence, they saw that p a r t ic ip a t io n  
i n  a g it a t io n  outside  the council  would not only prevent 
them from a tt a in in g  the latter  o b je c t iv e s ,  but also 
antagonise the government at the very time when they 
needed its  sympathy and support.
D e s p it e  the o p p o s i t i o n  o f  T i l a k ’ s l i e u t e n a n t s ,  
n a t i o n a l i s t s  i n  the M a r ath i  r e g i o n  d i s c l o s e d  some 
support f o r  the R o w latt  S a t y a g r a h a .  A small  h a r t a l  
o c c urre d  i n  N a gp ur ,  and a more s u c c e s s f u l  one i n  Chanda 
where the b a z a a r s  c l o s e d ,  the p e o p le  o f f e r e d  p r a y e rs  and  
a p u b l i c  m eeting  p r o t e s t e d  a g a i n s t  the p as s a ge  o f  the 
R o w latt  A c t . ’*" I n  B e r a r ,  there  was more support  fo r  
Gandhi  than  i n  the d i v i s i o n  o f  Nagpur .  Much o f  th is  was 
due to Wamanrao J o s h i ,  a Brahman le a d e r  from A m r a v a t i ,  
who a c c e p te d  G a n d h i ’ s i d e a s  and l e a d e r s h i p  e a r l y  i n  
1919*  B e in g  a Brahman and a n  a s s o c i a t e  o f  T i l a k  gave 
J o s h i  two great  a d v a n t a g e s ,  and he u t i l i s e d  these  to the 
f u l l  to w i n  support fo r  Gandhi  i n  B e r a r .  S h o r t l y  a f t e r  
the l a t t e r  launched  h i s  movement o f  p r o t e s t ,  Jo s h i  set 
o f f  on a tour  o f  B e rar  to pe rsuad e  p e op le  to adopt the 
new s t y l e  o f  a g i t a t i o n .  I n  A m r a v a t i  and A k o l a ,  at 
l e a s t ,  he had c o n s i d e r a b l e  s u c c e s s ,  and on 6 A p r i l  1919  
members o f  the Brahman, Marwari  and M uslim  communities  
o b se rve d  a S a ty a g r a h a  i n  those towns.  I n  A k o l a  on that  
day
An  open a ir  meeting of satyagraha was held  in
Nanabhai Icharam ’ s compound. Maulvi Mahamad
Usaf  presided .  A l l  c lasses ,  e spe c ia l ly  the
1
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merchant c lass ,  eagerly  attended.  Gand hi ’ s and 
T i l a k ' s  photos were garlanded.  Mr Wamanrao Joshi 
of  Amraoti explained the satyagraha doctr ine ,  and 
exhorted the public  to s t ic k  to the satyagraha 
movement as no other force could surpass the 
s p i r i t u a l  force .  Bazars were closed and the day 
was observed as a h um il iat io n  day. People 
observed the f a s t . ^
Owing to the d is in te re st  of  a majority  of  n a t io n a l i s t s ,  
however, the hartals  were only p a r t i a l ,  and e f fo r ts  by 
Joshi to hold hartals  elsewhere proved a f a i l u r e .
I I
The divergence between the H ind i  and Marathi leaders ,  
as seen in  their  response to the Rowlatt Satyagraha,  
became more pronounced during  the campaign of non­
cooperation  launched by Gandhi i n  1921 .  Th is  divergence 
was f i r s t  evident i n  1920 - the year of G and hi 's  
preparation  for  the campaign. During  the f i r s t  part of 
1920 ,  the H ind i  leaders were reluctant  to support non­
cooperation  and concentrated the ir  a tten t io n  on the 
Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms which were to come into 
operation  in  the Central Provinces and Berar i n  the same 
year.  The interest  of  the H ind i  p o l i t i c ia n s  centred i n  
p ar t ic u la r  on the enlarged le g is la ture  and the p ro vis io n  
i n  the Reforms for  m inisters ,  since such changes o ffered  
their  region  the opportunity to compete more favourably  
with  the Marathi region  for its  share of  public  works 
than i n  the past .  This  was evident from a speech made
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by a prominent Hindi  p o l i t i c i a n  at Jabalpur i n  A p r i l  
1920:
Loud complaints are made by the H ind i  speaking 
people that their  in te re sts  are sadly  neglected.
I t  is  Tor you now to organise  and make your 
voice  heard through your ministers  i n  the 
c o u n c i l . . . .  You have been neglected so far  
because you have not cried  aloud or not at a l l .
You must now organise  and convene d i s t r i c t ,  
t a h s i l  and v i l la g e  conferences ,  pass resolutions  
and send them up to government for c o m p lian c e . . . .  
But f i r s t  formulate your demands .*
H ind i  p o l i t i c i a n s  also stressed  the usefulness  of  the 
Reforms i n  ga in ing  s e l f  government for I n d i a .  And with 
regional  and national  objectives  i n  mind, they prepared
to contest the elections  to the new leg is lature  to be
2
held  in  December 1920.
But even while  these preparations  were being  made, 
Gandhi was gathering  support for a nationwide assault 
on the Government of  In d i a  outside the le g is la ture s .  By 
September 1920 he had persuaded the K h i l a f a t  Committee 
(a  body formed to safeguard the p o s it io n  of  the K h a l i f  
of Constantinople)  and the In d ia n  National  Congress to 
take part i n  a campaign of  non-cooperation against the 
government. Through this  campaign, Gandhi aimed to 
secure a r e v i s i o n  of the peace treaty between B r it a i n  
and Turkey ,  and to make an emphatic protest  against the 
suppression  of  the Rowlatt Satyagraha in  the Punjab.
1
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To these o b je c t iv e s ,  Gandhi added a third  - that of  
s w a r a j , dec la r ing  that Indians  could achieve this  goal 
i f  they wholeheartedly  took part i n  non-violent non­
cooperation  against  the government. The a g i t a t i o n  as 
devised by Gandhi consisted  of  constructive  work and a 
series  of  boycotts against  B r i t i s h  i n s t i t u t i o n s .
H ind i  leaders led by Ravi Shankar Shukla responded 
en t h u s ia s t ic a l ly  to G a n d h i 's  proposal for a campaign of 
non-cooperation against  the government. They d id  so for  
a number of  reasons ,  not the least of  these b e in g  that 
the l o y a l i s t ,  Pandit Shukul ,  was aging ,  and the 
nationalist-minded Shukla  was fast  replac ing  him as the 
leader of  the Hindi  region .  A g a in ,  although the 
n at io n a l is t  movement in  the Marathi region  was long 
established  and possessed i t s  own d is t in c t iv e  s ty le ,  
that in  the Hindi  region  was i n  its  in fancy .  As a 
result  n a t io n a l is t s  i n  that region  were prepared to 
support any leader who could capture their  im agination  
and confidence  and at the same time ass ist  their  attack  
on B r i t i s h  rule .  I n  a d d it io n  some who i n  1920 were 
ready to enter public  l i f e  did  so on the wave of  
enthusiasm created by Gandhi;  others followed him i n  the 
b e l i e f  that non-cooperation would awaken the H ind i  reg ion  
to p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  on a large scale .
H ind i  leaders made their  d e c is io n  to support Gandhi 
against  a background of repeated disagreements w ith  the 
Marathi leaders  on passive  resistance  and non-cooperation. 
The f i r s t  of  these disagreements occurred at a 
conference of p o l i t i c i a n s  held  at Khandwa i n  A p r i l  1919» 
During the conference Raghavendra Rao proposed, and 
Shukla seconded, a re so lu t io n  congratulating  Pandit  Shukul
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on h is  withdrawal  from the Im perial  leg is lature  i n  
protest  against  the Rowlatt Act and c a l l in g  on other 
members of that body to follow  suit."*- G .S .  Khaparde,  
who was the president  of  the conference and who had not 
resigned  from the Im perial  l e g i s l a t u r e ,  interpreted  the 
r e s o lu t io n  as an attack  on him. A ccordingly ,  he 
threatened that unless  Rao withdrew the r e s o lu t io n ,  he 
would r e s ig n  from the p re s id e n ts h ip .  Th is  Rao d id ,  but 
not before  the incident  had created a great deal  o f  
misunderstanding between H indi  and Marathi representatives  
at the conference .  I n  his  d iary ,  Khaparde described  his  
co nfrontation  with  Raghavendra Rao:
T h is  was the f i r s t  day of the Central Provinces 
and Berar c o n f e r e n c e . . . .Mr Rao whom I  took to be 
a reasonable man, I  am sorry ,  turned out quite  
the reverse .  He developed obstructive  tactics  
and it  appeared a few supported h i m . . . .Rao wanted 
a re solu t io n  to thank Sukul and a l l  who res igned .
I  thought it  was not proper. He was defeated  by 
a large majority .  Later  on, towards the c lose ,  
a man who is  the president  of  the Kanya Kubja  
caste desired  to revive  the subject ,  but I  as 
president  would not allow it  to be reopened.
There was a good deal o f  w ra n g l in g .^
The misunderstanding  created at Khandwa increased  further  
owing to a c o n fl ic t  between Dr Moonje and Pandit Shukul 
over a p o l i t i c a l  journal  for  the H ind i  region .  During
1919 Dr Moonje sponsored the production  of a H ind i  weekly 
Sankulp to promote the n at io n a l ist  views of T i l a k  i n  the 
H ind i  region .  I n  Jabalpur ,  however, Pandit Shukul and
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other H ind i  leaders countered this move by producing  the 
Karm avir , a H ind i  weekly expressing  views s im ilar  to those 
of  G a n d h i . ^ There were also acute d if ferences  between 
Raghavendra Rao and Dr Moonje over the preparations  to 
enter the le g is la t u r e .  During  May 1920 H ind i  and 
Marathi p o l i t i c ia n s  met i n  conference at Sagar and 
formed a committee with  a view  to conducting a joint  
e lectoral  campaign. Prominent members of  the committee 
were Dr Moonje for the Marathi region ,  and Rao and 
Shukla for  the Hindi  region .  During  June and J u ly  1920 
Moonje repeatedly  urged Rao to hold a meeting o f  the 
committee, but on each occasion  Rao raised  o b je c t io ns ,  
thus i n d i c a t in g  that he and h is  H ind i  colleagues  were
2
having  second thoughts about entering  the le g is la t u r e .  
Despite  M oonje 's  protests ,  however, the committee did 
not meet, a result  that apparently  caused l i t t l e  concern 
i n  the H ind i  region  where the leaders decided at an 
early  stage to support non-cooperation.
By the close of  1920 the n at io n a l ists  of  the H ind i  
region  had withdrawn from the elections  to the leg is lature  
and thrown i n  their  lot with Gandhi.  The man most 
responsible  for  this  was Ravi Shankar Shukla.  As early  
as March 1920 Shukla declared his  support for  the 
K h i l a f a t  movement i n  a meeting i n  Raipur  at which
1
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About 2000  persons,  Hindus and Muslims, gathered 
. . . .Mr Syed A sg hara li  thanked the p r e s i d e n t . . .  
and the Hindu brothers present for their  heart 
f e l t  sympathy with  their  Muslim brothers ,  to 
which Pandit  Ravi Shankar Shukla re pl ie d  i n  most 
emphatic terms saying  that we are no more Hindus 
or Muslims but H ind ustan is  i n  the s tr ic te st  
s e n s e . ■*"
S h u k la 's  d e c la ra t io n  set i n  motion a wave of sympathy for
2
the K h i l a f a t  movement throughout the H ind i  region .
Shukla was also the f i r s t  H ind i  n at io n al ist  to withdraw
his  nomination  from the e le c t io n  to the p ro v in c ia l
l e g is l a t u r e .  He did so on 20 September 1920 ,  just
eleven days a f te r  the I n d i a n  National  Congress had
decided at Calcutta  to j o i n  the K h i l a f a t  committee i n
launching  non-cooperation. Following  Shukla*s  withdrawal ,
his  close p o l i t i c a l  associates  from Chhattisgarh  also
withdrew their  nominations. Among these men were Rao;
Thakur C b h e d i la l ,  a Rajput  barrister-at-law and son of
the landlord  of A kaltara  i n  the d i s t r ic t  of  B ila sp u r ;
and Ganshyam Singh  Gupta, a Bania by caste ,  and a
pleader  and Vice-president of  the Municipal  Committee of
Durg. A month later ,  p o l i t i c ia n s  and leaders from the
d iv is io n s  of  Jabalpur  and Narmada followed their
3
colleagues  from Chhattisgarh .  These included  Pandit 
Shukul ,  who rather  than face  public  obloquy and p o l i t i c a l
1
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2
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a n n ih i la t io n  by pursuing  h is  opposition  to non­
cooperation, renounced his  Ra i  Bahadurship and withdrew 
from the elections  to the Council  of  State.'*' Further ,  
by the time the annual s e ss ion  of  the Congress met in
Nagpur in  December 1920 ,  the f i r s t  students had left
2
their high  school i n  Jabalpur .
The Marathi n a t io n a l is t s ,  however, did  not pledge 
their  support for Gandhi as the Hindi  leaders had done, 
and Gandhi had to compel them to f a l l  into l in e .  The 
leaders of the Marathi reg io n  d isclosed  their  opposition  
to Gandhi i n  two ways: f i r s t ,  by p e r s is t in g  i n  their  
attempts to enter the reformed l e g is la t u r e ;  and second, 
when these attempts proved f r u i t l e s s ,  by working to 
prevent a v ictory  for Gandhi at the Congress session  i n  
Nagpur. I n  planning  to enter the p ro vinc ia l  leg is lature  
the Marathi n at io nalists  followed  the lead given  by 
T i l a k .  A f t e r  the fa ilure  of  h is  deputation  i n  England,  
T i l a k  returned to In d ia  and adopted a policy  of 
responsive cooperation with  the new Reforms. Under this 
policy  n at io n alists  were to enter  the leg is latures  to 
advance the cause of se l f  government for I n d ia  and work 
the Reforms for the benefit  of  the people.  These aims 
were p ar t ic u la r ly  important to the Marathi n a t io n a l is t s ,  
who, while  pledged to eject  the B r i t i s h  from I n d i a ,  also 
represented urban groups who were strongly entrenched i n
1
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government service and the professions  and who possessed
extensive  interests  i n  banking and land. Under
responsive cooperation  the Marathi leaders could advance
the cause of s e l f  government and to protect the interests
of these groups at the same time. Hence their  desire  to
enter the l e g is la t u r e .  T h e ir  desire  to do so had the
f u l l  encouragement of  Lokamanya T i l a k .  I n  February
1920 T i l a k  sent Kelkar  to the Marathi region  to address
public  meetings on the Reforms, and i n  A p r i l  formed the
Congress Democratic party  to pract ise  responsive
cooperation  i n  the councils.'*'  These a c t i v it ie s  bore
f r u i t ,  for  during May and June the Marathi n a t io n a l ists
joined  the party in  large numbers and i n t e n s i f i e d  their
preparations  for the e lect ions .  These preparations
were espec ia l ly  evident i n  the d i s t r ic t  of Vardha. I n
May 1920 the D is t r ic t  Congress Committee arranged a
1swarajya to ur ’ to expla in  the Reforms to v i l lag e rs  in
the in t e r io r  of the d i s t r i c t ,  and in v ite d  n at io n a l ists
2
from a l l  over the province to jo i n  the tour.
N a t io n al is ts  from the d is t r ic t  also undertook an 
intensive  campaign i n  the town of  Wardha and i ts  environs.  
Whether in  town or country, these e f fo rts  bore f r u i t ,  as 
is evident from a d escr ipt io n  by G .S .  Khaparde of an  
e lectoral  meeting in  the town of Wardha on 27 June 1920 :
We got down at Wardha. On the platform were
Balwantrao Deshmukh of Chanda, A t r e ,  Trimbak
M ahratta , 7 March 1920 ,  p . l ;  Source Material  for  a 
H isto ry  of  the Freedom Movement i n  I n d i a ,  op. c i t . ,  
p p . 324-27.
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Rao Deshpande, A r j u n l a l  S e th i ,  the brother  of 
Abhyankar ,  J o s h i ,  Kedar p leader  and many others 
with v o l u n t e e r s . . . .The meeting was held i n  the 
t h e a t r e . . . ( and) I  p res ided .  More than a 
thousand people were present .  The Wardha 
Congress committee v i s i t e d  27 v i l lag es  and did  
very good p ro p a g a n d a . . .and elections  w o r k . . . .
The meeting was s u c c e s s f u l . ’*'
Despite  growing support for  non-cooperation during
J u l y ,  T i l a k  continued to in sp ire  the Marathi n a t io n a l is t s
2
to pers ist  i n  their  preparations  for the e le c t io n s .
He did  so by e x h ib i t in g  an unmistakable coolness towards 
the K h i l a f a t  a g it a t io n  and non-cooperation a l i k e .  As 
regards the la tt e r ,  when asked by a questioner  i n  Bombay 
whether he b e l ie v e d  i n  non-cooperation, T i l a k  r e p l ie d
We are a l l  b e l i e v e r s , . . . .but the question  i s :  
what sort of  non c o o p e r a t i o n . . . ?  He said  it  
did  not matter which method was adopted - 
whether method of  total  abstinence  or the 
S in n  F e i n  method of  contesting  seats and 
boycotting  p ar l ia m e n t . . .  .As long as the people 
were unanimous i n  working it  o u t . . . .The danger 
was that no such unanimity  could be expected 
from the moderates. I f  Congressmen ab sta in ed ,  
they would succeed i n  posing  as the elected  
representatives  of  the people of I n d i a .  I t  
was a l l  a question  of p ra c t ic a l  p o l i t i c s . . . .
I f  it  were necessary for  the achievement of 
success to contest the council  seats ,  he would 
be prepared to do so. But he was of  the opinion  
that i f  it  came to t h i s ,  i t  was better  to boycott
1
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With  advice such as t h i s ,  the Marathi n a t io n a l is t s
i t e n s i f i e d  their  e lectoral  a c t i v i t i e s  and i n  Ju ly  moved
to select  candidates to represent the Congress Democratic
2
party  at the e le c t io n s .
Gandhi had h is  way with the Marathi leaders ,  
however, despite  their  determination  to contest the 
e le c t io n s .  Two events occurred i n  August and September
1920 to t i l t  the scales  i n  favour of  Gandhi.  The f i r s t  
was the death of  T i l a k  on 1 August 1920 ,  an occurrence 
that le ft  the Marathi n a t io n a l is t s  without a leader  and 
hence more open to pressure  from Gandhi.  The second 
event was the overwhelming vote i n  favour of non­
cooperation  at the special  session  of  the Congress i n
3
Calcutta  i n  September. These events undermined the 
determination  and u n it y  of  the Marathi n at io n a l is t s  and 
caused them to waver between lo y alty  to their  late 
leader  and obedience to the d e c i s io n  of the Congress.
I n  the d i v i s i o n  of  Nagpur, Dr Moonje moved quickly  to 
prevent n at io n a l is ts  from d iv id in g  on the issue o f  non­
cooperation  by withdrawing  from the elections  to the 
p ro v in c ia l  l e g is la t u r e .  This  p re c ip it a te d  a withdrawal  
o f  their  nominations by the majority  of n a t io n a l ists  i n
the c o u n c i l s  a f t e r  the e l e c t i o n .
1
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so is  c learly  evident i n  the fo l lo w in g  d e s c r ip t io n  of
events i n  Amravati on 28-29 September 1920 as seen  by
G . S . Khaparde :
I  reached Amravati about 5 p .m .  and walked to 
my house. Godbole and Gopal Rao Dovie were 
there.  I  sat and talked w ith  them. Later  on 
came my sons Balwant and Baba and Shevade,
Wamanrao Joshi  and many others .  They do not 
care for non cooperation ,  but think  that since  
Congress has passed a r e s o l u t io n ,  i t  should be 
carried  o u t . . .  .Everyone recognises  that (non  
cooperation) . . .  is  fo o l is h  and s u i c i d a l ,  and 
yet they do not l ike  to d issent  p u b l i c l y  from 
G a n d h i ’ s view and programme because Congress,  
they say, has adopted i t . ^
Although the Marathi n a t io n a l is t s  had y ie ld e d  to 
Gandhi on the question  of  the e l e c t io n s ,  they were 
determined not to allow him to score any further  points  
against  them. At f i r s t  Dr Moonje and h is  supporters on 
the Prov in c ia l  Congress Committee tr ie d  to prevent the 
pro-Gandhian members of  the committee from implementing
3
the remaining items of the programme of  non-cooperation. 
They r e a l i s e d ,  however, that their  re a l  showdown w ith  
Gandhi would take place  at the annual  s e ss ion  of  the 
Congress i n  Nagpur, and they thus decided  to make a last
4
ditch  stand against  him there.  A cco rd in g ly  Dr Moonje and
the M a r a t h i  r e g i o n .  The  r e l u c t a n c e  w i t h  w h ic h  th ey  d i d
1
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his  supporters canvassed support in  the Central Provinces 
and Berar ,  Bombay and Bengal for a r iv a l  re solution  to 
the o f f i c i a l  motion endorsing non-cooperation (to be 
submitted to the annual s e s s i o n ) , and inv ited  the old 
n a t i o n a l i s t ,  Arabindo Ghosh, to become the president  of 
the s e s s i o n . ^  These moves were only p a r t i a l l y  successful ,  
for while  Dr Moonje received  encouraging promises of 
support for  the anti-Gandhian resolu t io n ,  Ghosh declined
the i n v i t a t i o n  on the grounds of his  retirement from
2
n a t io n a l is t  p o l i t i c s .  N a t io n a l is t s  from the d i v i s io n  of 
Nagpur, however, received  welcome support from Berar in  
their  stand against  Gandhi.  Khaparde declared p ub l ic ly  
that the re so lu t io n  passed at the spec ia l  session  of 
the Congress at Calcutta  was ’ not mandatory but a d v iso r y ’ , 
and announced that he ,  for one, intended to stand for
3
e le c t io n  to the Council  of  State .  Supporting Khaparde 
in  his  d ef iance  of  Gandhi was a fe llow- nationalist ,
Ramrao Madhaorao Deshmukh, who, although a comparative 
newcomer to p o l i t i c s ,  was an enthusiastic  advocate of 
the views of Lokamanya T i l a k .  Deshmukh’ s support posed 
some threat to G and hi 's  p o s i t i o n  in  Berar ,  for he was 
an i n f l u e n t i a l  b a rr iste r  i n  Amravati and a member of  one
1
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Gandhi met this  opposition  to non-cooperation i n
the Marathi r e g io n  w ith  a w ell  organised campaign of
propaganda and persuasion .  I n  Berar ,  h is  c h ie f
propagandist  was Wamanrao J o s h i ,  who toured the
territory  's p e ak in g  against  Lokamanya T i l a k ,  and
2
d e c la r ing  h im self  the d is c ip l e  of  G a n d h i ' .  I n  
a d d it io n ,  supporters o f  Gandhi from Nagpur, and even 
Gandhi h im s e lf ,  came to Berar to convert the unb elievers
3
to non-cooperation. And where argument f a i l e d ,  personal
4
abuse and so c ial  boycott were kept i n  readiness .  These 
methods appear to have been  e xtra o rd in ar ily  s uc c e s s ful ,  
for  during  November 1920 the Berar Provincial  Congress 
Committee approved of  non-cooperation, and i n  T i l a k ' s  
former stronghold of  Amravati ,  Khaparde complained 
b i t t e r l y  that 'people  h e r e . . . ( a r e )  out of hand and can
' 5
think o f  nothing but non-cooperation .
I n  the d i v i s i o n  of  Nagpur Gandhi drew on the support 
of  various groups, in c lu d in g  some who were new to 
p o l i t i c s ,  to persuade Dr Moonje and his  followers  to 
accept non-cooperation. Among these groups were the
o f  the l e a d i n g  M a r a t h a  f a m i l i e s  i n  the t e r r i t o r y .  ^
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Marwari merchants and members of the lower c lasses  i n  
Nagpur. Gandhi had been  unable  to make any s i g n i f i c a n t  
inroads into the Maharashtrian  Brahman community. As a 
result  he turned to Jamnalal B a j a j , a prominent Marwari 
and owner of  a huge in d u s t r i a l  and mercantile  empire, 
who lived i n  Wardha. By 1920 ,  B a j a j ,  who was a 
re l ig io u s  man, had become a devoted follower  of  Gandhi 
and frequently  gave him large sums of  money to further  
h is  p o l i t i c a l  and social  a ct iv it ies . ' * ’ I n  B a j a j ,  however, 
Gandhi did not merely posses a valuable  source of  f in a n c e .  
He also had a man who could w in  the Marwaris of the 
Marathi region  to h is  s ide ,  and at the same time exercise  
a leadership  that would challenge the n at io n al ist  
credentials  of  the Marathi leaders who were opposed to 
non-cooperation. Between October and December 1920 ,
Baja j  fu l ly  r e a l ise d  G a n d h i ’ s expectations .  He f i r s t  
renounced the Rai Bahadurship presented by the p ro v in c ia l  
government i n  1918 ,  and then launched a campaign to 
persuade h is  fellow Marwaris to support non-cooperation. 
During  November 1920 ,  Bajaj  issued  a c irc ula r  i n  which 
he declared:
Fellow business-men, our trade ,  industry  and 
commerce w i l l  f l o u r is h  a hundred-fold by our 
p a r t ic ip a t io n  i n  the great national  endeavour 
for swaraj.  We must shed our fear  c o m p l e x . . . .
I f  we do not do the right thing on this 
occasion ,  we shall  shut the doors of  prosperity  
to our future generations  and we shall  be
1
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committing a moral crime against  the nation.
Such appeals were success ful ,  for i n  December the
government observed that ’ the class  most a ffected  ( i . e .
by non-cooperation) . . . ( w e r e ) . . . the Marwari traders and
shopkeepers ’ . Besides  drawing the Marwaris into G a n d h i ’ s
camp, Baja j  also set up h is  own l ieutenants  in  Wardha
and tr ie d  ’ h is  level  b e s t . . .to make this  a model d is t r i c t
2
i n  non co o p e r at io n * . Gandhi also undermined the 
Marathi n at io n a l is ts  by winning  the support of large 
numbers of  people i n  Nagpur, most of  them from the 
lower c lasses  who had had l i t t l e  previous  connection 
with  p o l i t i c a l  a c t iv it y .  Those who actu ally  carried  
out this  work included  B aja j  and h is  c h ie f  lieutenant  i n  
Wardha, A r ju n l a l  S e th i ;  men like  Pandit  Sunderlal ,  the 
editor  of  Bhawishya of  A l lah ab ad ,  and Bhagwandin, who 
took up permanent residence  i n  Nagpur; popular orators 
from other provinces ;  and pleaders  who relinquished  
practice  i n  Bombay and entered the Marathi region  as
3
it in e ran t  preachers .  These men used a var iety  of 
methods to convert their  hearers to non-cooperation, the 
most popular  being  the public  meeting as the following  
extract from the Times of  I n d ia  for  17 December 1920 
i l l u s t r a t e s :
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During  this week mass meetings are held  every day 
and speeches on non-cooperation are delivered .
Last evening, under the auspices of  the Bharat 
Sewa Sangha, i n  the cotton market an open a ir  
meeting attended by 5000  people ,  with  Mr Sunderlal  
. . . o f  A llahabad  i n  the c ha ir ,  was h e l d ; . . .Pandit  
A r j u n l a l  S ett i  and Mr Bhagwandin delivered  
speeches on non-cooperation; caps and fo re ig n  
a r t ic le s  worth about Rs 5000 were burnt to ashes 
amid enthusiasm.
At such meetings, too, the popular orators abused the
government or poured scorn on the Brahman n at io n a l ists
for r e fu s in g  to accept non-cooperation. They also
in c it e d  their  hearers to boycott the reluctant
n at io n a l is ts  or indulge i n  rowdyism i f  the latter  dared
to c r i t i c i s e  Gandhi i n  p u b l ic .  F i n a l l y ,  hard on the
heels  of the lesser  orators came Vallabhbhai  P ate l ,  the
General Secretary of  the Congress,  and Gandhi h im self  to
2
put the f i n i s h i n g  touches to a strenuous campaign.
At the annual session  of the In d ia n  National  Congress 
which took place i n  Nagpur i n  the last week of December
1920,  Gandhi compelled the s t i l l  reluctant  Marathi 
n at io n a l is ts  to accept non-cooperation. He did so by 
i s o l a t i n g  them from the delegations  from Bombay and 
Bengal who came to Nagpur with  the in te n t io n  of opposing 
non-cooperation. Others who arrived  in  Nagpur with  this  
in t e n t io n  were the Muslim leader M .A .  J innah ;
1
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Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya ,  a leading  Hindu from the 
United  Provinces ;  and Lala  Lajpat  R a i , the ' L io n  of  the 
P u n j a b ' .  Gandhi considered it  imperative to overcome 
this  opposition ,  for  he b e l iev ed  that he could only  
defeat  B r i t i s h  rule  i n  I n d i a  i f  he had the unanimous 
support of  the In d i a n  National  Congress. He thus won 
over the delegations  from Bombay and Bengal,  leaving  
the national  leaders and delegates  from the Central  
Provinces and Berar without sup po rt .^  Alone i n  the ir  
opposition  to non-cooperation, the latter  found it  
impossible  to withstand  the noisy  support which the 
other n a t io n a l is t s  gave to Gandhi.  G .S .  Khaparde r ecalls  
the scene on 28 December 1920 ,  shortly  before the 
delegates  voted on non-cooperation:
Today the confusion  was greater  than ever. Gandhi 
proposed h is  c r e e d . . . . J inna  opposed and was very 
badly  treated by the audience .  I  wished to speak.
Dr Moonje asked me not to and recommended that I  
should not even vote against  the motion. T h is  I  
would not submit to and I  went to the platform, 
when at last he said that he would use physical  
force .  The confusion  was so great (however) that
I  also deemed it  wise  not to speak.
Thus ,  when the vote was taken, the Marathi n at io n a l ists
joined  the other delegates  to the annual session  i n
recording  an overwhelming vote in  favour of
3
non-cooperation.
1
J . H .  Broomfield ,  E l i t e  C onflict  in  a P lural  S o c i e t y : 
Twentieth  Century Bengal ( B e r k e l e y , 1968) ,  p p . 167-8 ; 
Times of  I n d i a , 28 December 1 9 20 ,  p . 9*
2
N A I , Khaparde MS, D ia ry ,  28 December 1920.
3
H i t a v a d a , 23 A p r i l  1939»  p . l 4 .
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The Hindi and Marathi regions of the Central 
Provinces and Berar diverged further from each other 
during 1921 by sponsoring distinctive campaigns of non­
cooperation. This was partly due to the fact that the 
Hindi leaders accepted, and most Marathi leaders 
rejected, the programme of non-cooperation laid down by 
Gandhi. In the Marathi districts, too, Gandhi1s 
supporters tried to stage the campaign as their leader 
intended, and this further distinguished the agitation 
there from that in the Hindi region. Another important 
element in the existence of separate and distinct 
campaigns in the different parts of the Central Provinces 
and Berar was their division into separate provinces of 
the Indian National Congress under the revised 
constitution accepted at the annual session at Nagpur in 
December 1920. This constitution established three 
provinces in the Central Provinces and Berar - one each 
in the Hindi region, the division of Nagpur, and Berar. 
Under the constitution each province comprised a 
separate unit of the Congress with its own leadership 
that was responsible for organising nationalist activity 
within that particular province. This arrangement 
formalised the three-fold political division of th<^  
province, and resulted in three campaigns of non­
cooperation - two in the Marathi region and one in the 
Hindi region.
Despite differences between the Hindi and Marathi 
agitations, each benefited directly from the economic
I I I
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conditions prevailing in the province during 1920-21. 
During this period a series of disasters struck the 
province leaving few people unaffected. Poor seasons 
resulted in a 'failure of crops unparalleled since 
1899-1900', and caused widespread distress in the 
countryside. The shortage of food in turn raised the 
price of grains which 'pressed with unexampled severity 
on the urban population' . The latter were also victims 
of the 'grave industrial and commercial depression' 
which followed the post-war boom. In addition, cotton 
growers in the Marathi region were badly hit by a slump 
in the price of cotton. These disasters created unrest 
and frustration among people in the towns and rural areas 
alike which agitators turned to good account in launching 
their programme of non-cooperation.
The decision of the Hindi leaders to link the 
political fortunes of their region to those of the Indian 
National Congress gave the campaign of non-cooperation 
there its distinctive shape. Hindi leaders launched a 
campaign which bore a strong resemblance to that laid 
down by Gandhi, and in so doing drew in groups with 
previous political experience as well as groups who had 
not participated in political activity before. The first
1
1
The Census of India, vo1.X I , 1921, Report, op.cit.,
PP • 9 > 9; NAI, Home Poll, July 1920, 88 Deposit, F R ,
First Half of February 1920, p.l4; June 1921, 13 Deposit, 
F R , Second Half of May 1921, p.24; Report of the 
Administration of the Central Provinces and Berar 1920-21 
(Nagpur, 1922), p .viii; Administration R e p o r t , 1921-22, 
op. cit., p.ix; Report on the Excise Revenue of the 
Central Provinces and Berar 1921-22 (Nagpur, 1923)» P •1•
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phase of the agitation took place in the towns of the 
region, and moved from there during the second phase to 
the surrounding rural areas and the more remote highlands 
of the Central Plateau. As a result people all over the 
Hindi region took part in nationalist activités for the 
first time, and thus advanced the area still further 
towards its goal of political maturity.
The campaign of non-cooperation in the towns of 
the Hindi region first affected members of the middle 
classes who had previously taken part in political 
activity. These comprised the lawyers, who suspended 
practice and boycotted British courts in conformity 
with the directives of the Indian National Congress. 
Although only 3^ lawyers participated in the boycott, 
the agitation was a success from other points of view.“*"
It took place in most of the important towns of the 
region, and occurring as it did in the early months of
1921, formed a dramatic curtain-raiser to the agitation 
to follow. The lawyers' boycott could hardly have had a 
more successful beginning:
After his visit to Vardha, Gandhi left Nagpur 
for Chhindwara on 6 (January). All along the 
route large numbers of people mustered strong 
at every station to have darshan of the great 
leader(s)....(There was) a rousing reception at 
Chhindwara....The little town of Chhindwara can
1
CPLC, vol.3» 1921, p.170. The numbers of lawyers who 
suspended practice in the various Hindi districts were 
as follows: Chhindwara 7, Sagar 6, Damoh, 3,
Nimar 3> Durg 3» Bilaspur 3» Balaghat 2, Betul 2, 
Narsimhapur 2, Jabalpur 1, Seoni 1, and Raipur 1. There 
were some 900 lawyers in the province.
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rightly feel proud of having taken the lead in such 
a pronounced and enthusiastic manner as was 
evidenced by the fact that six leading vakils... 
announced that they had suspended practice. About 
Rs 2500 was subscribed on the spot, which was 
neither anticipated or previously asked for.'*'
From Chindwara the movement spread to other towns, where 
it encompassed established leaders like Raghavendra R a o , 
and those new to public life such as D.K. Mehta, a 
leading lawyer in the town of Seoni, and established the 
nationalist credentials of both.
The next group to participate in the campaign of 
non-cooperation were the students. These were also 
drawn from the middle classes, but up to that time had 
played little part in the political life of the Hindi 
region. The boycott of schools and colleges had got 
off to an early start in Jabalpur in November 1920, and 
students from the Hindi region voted in favour of non­
cooperation at the All-India Students Conference held in 
Nagpur in December. During January 1921, however, this 
enthusiasm languished, and nationalist leaders assisted
by the nationalist press conducted a strong campaign to
2persuade the students to observe the boycott. These 
appeals had an immediate effect in Jabalpur. On 
8 February the Bombay Chronicle reported that
1
Bombay Chronicle, 10 January 1921, p.9«
2
Times of India, 28 December 1920, p .13j NAI, Report on 
Indian Papers Published in the Central Provinces and 
Berar (cited hereafter as Indian Papers), no.6, 1921, 
p.53» Karmavir (Jabalpur), 29 January 1921.
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29 students of Government college here have 
withdrawn themselves unconditionally and more 
are expected to follow suit. An ashram has 
been started for those desirous of devoting 
themselves to the congress organisation work.
Many boys have left the affiliated schools and 
joined the national school already started....
Great enthusiasm prevails in the city.1
Support for the boycott of schools and colleges in 
Jabalpur led to a withdrawal by students from secondary 
and tertiary institutions in other towns of the Hindi 
region. And as in Jabalpur, nationalists in some towns 
founded national schools to train the non-cooperating
2students as workers for the Indian National Congress.
As the campaign of non-cooperation developed, it 
involved other social groups besides the middle classes. 
These groups included the merchants and lower classes of 
the towns, both of whom were new to politics. With the 
boycott of schools well under way, nationalist leaders 
turned their attention to the boycott of liquor shops 
and the liquor trade in general. Their aim in so doing 
was to paralyse the Reformed constitution by depriving 
the government of its excise revenue. To this end 
nationalist leaders and itinerant agitators urged Hindu,
1
Bombay Chronicle, 8 February 1921, p .10.
2
For the number of students taking part in the boycott, 
see CPLC, vo1.2, no.8, Appendix B, pp.725-9* The 
percentage of non-cooperating students was highest in 
Chhattisgarh where 50 per cent of the students left their 
high schools, and 50 per cent left Anglo-vernacular 
schools. In the division of Jabalpur, 23 per cent of 
students left high schools and 35 per cent Anglo- 
vernacular schools. In the division of Narmada, 9 per 
cent left high schools and 29 per cent Anglo-vernacular 
schooIs.
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Muslim and Parsi liquor contractors to boycott the 
excise auctions, and posted volunteers outside their 
liquor shops to prevent the sale of liquor. In some 
towns, too, Municipal Committees or District Councils 
tried to prevent the sale of liquor within municipal 
limits.'*" The appeal of leaders and local bodies was so 
successful that in some places the liquor contractors 
boycotted the auctions, and members of the lower classes 
were drawn into the agitation. This occasionally resulted 
in violence, as in Raipur. The following report by the 
Commissioner of Raipur describes the situation in the 
town after the arrival of Pandit Sunderlal and 
Kutubuddin, a Muslim agitator, in January 1921, to launch 
the boycott:
He explained how feeling at Raipur had been 
intensified by the speeches of Sunderlal and 
Kutubuddin and that he had been warned by the 
non-violent non-cooperators of the presence of 
elements in the town making for violence. He 
referred to the picketting of liquor shops, the 
interruption of the excise sales, the appearance 
of 2000 men, many armed with lathis, at the 
railway station to meet Kutubuddin whose arrest 
was expected, and the stoning of Europeans 
driving through the city....Mr Clarke represented
1
NAI, Home Poll, June 1921, 45 Deposit, F R , Second Half 
of March 1921, p.17; Home Poll, F-179, 1929, General 
Political Situation in India, Notes on Boycott Movements, 
p.27; NAI, Indian Papers, no.7, 1921, p.70, Maharashtra 
(Nagpur), 9 February 1921; Madhya Pradesh Secretariat 
(MPS), Local Self Government Department (LSG), File 8-1, 
1923, Annual Review of the working of District Councils 
and Local Boards in the Jubbulpore Division for the Year 
1921-2, pp.9-10.
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that in consequence of both the general growth 
of self-consciousness and the direct challenge 
to the authority of the government maintained by 
the extremists, there had been (a) noticeable 
disturbance of the law-abiding instincts of the 
people.1
The government could not ignore the situation in Raipur, 
nor the excitement prevailing in other towns of the Hindi 
region. Accordingly it abandoned the liquop auctions in 
six districts and partially suspended them in four, and 
'took prompt action to suppress any further tendency
towards intimidation, violence and arson through
2prosecutions*. In so doing, it conceded victory to the 
nationalists.
The boycott of foreign cloth was another item in 
the campaign of non-cooperation in the towns of the Hindi 
region that affected, among others, the merchants and the 
lower classes. The boycott included the attempt by 
nationalists to persuade people in the region to spin 
and wear clothes of home-spun clo th or khadi . The 
agitation began some time after the campaign against 
liquor had begun to subside, and reached its peak after
1
Maharashtra Secretariat, Nagpur (MSN), Police Department, 
File 1-1, no.642, 1922, Increase in the Special Armed 
Force in the Central Provinces, Proceedings of the 
Conference of Commissioners held at Pachmarhi on 
27 June 1921, p.8.
2
The government abandoned the sales in Raipur, Durg,
Nimar, Hoshangabad, Seoni and Damoh; and partially 
suspended them in Balaghat, Chhindwara, Jabalpur and 
Betul. NAI, Home Poll, F-179, 19^9, General Political 
Situation in India, Notes on Boycott Movements, p.2 7 .
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Gandhi's call to nationalists to don 'the peaceful white 
khadi from 1 October (1921)'.“*“ Again, as in other aspects 
of non-cooperation, Raipur and Jabalpur led the agitation, 
followed by the other towns of the region. In Raipur, 
the Municipal Committee played a leading part in 
popularising the boycott. As Gandhi noted with approval
The Raipur municipality has adopted by a majority 
the following proposals that all the boys reading 
in the municipal schools should have the national 
uniform of khadi coat or kurta and khadi cap from
1 August 1921;....that this committee expects its 
servants to use country-made cloth; (and).... that 
all dresses supplied to municipal servants should 
be of khadi....It is a wise use the Raipur 
municipality has made of its powers.^
Nationalist leaders used a variety of other methods to 
encourage the widest possible participation in the 
boycott. These methods were invariably successful.
In Jabalpur during March railway men responded to the 
call of local leaders to replace their European hats 
with white Gandhi caps ; while 2000 people attended a
3bonfire of foreign cloth in the town in September.
In Sagar, too, large crowds of people witnessed a 'huge 
bonfire of foreign clothes' held at Muhurrum on the 
instructions of the Provincial Congress Committee.
And there could have been few in Sagar who
1
NAI, Indian Papers, no.42, 1921, p.467, Prajasewak 
(Hoshangabad), 6 October 1921.
2
The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol.XXI, August- 
December 1921 (Ahmedabad, I966), pp.31~2.
3
Ibid., vol.XIX, November 1920-April 1921 (Ahmedabad, 
1966), p.487; Bombay Chronicle, 17 September 1921, p.7*
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were unaffected by the following events that took place 
in their town:
Following Gandhi caps, khadi is coming to the 
front....Even the gods in temples were softly 
dressed in garments of khadi on show nights....
The other day a huge charka was taken out in 
a grand procession (it is termed the swadeshi 
gun)... .A Sunday market is held for sale of 
locally spun yarn and woven khadi.^
In addition, groups of townsfolk participated in the 
boycott by picketing cloth shops, and some merchants 
agreed not to indent further supplies of foreign cloth 
for a fixed period of time. The Provincial Congress 
Committee of the Hindi region also drew members of the 
Muslim community into the agitation by requesting all 
subordinate Congress Committees to arrange activities 
connected with the boycott at Muhurrum in September
1921. These activités were carried out on a large scale
and contributed to harmony between the Hindus and
2Muslims of the region.
From the towns of the Hindi region, the campaign of
1
Bombay Chronicle, 16 September 1921, p.6; Hitavada,
27 August 1921, p.3*
2
NAX, Home Poll, F-18, 1921, F R , First Half of September
1921, p.12. The report does not specify whether the 
activities of the pickets and merchants took place in the 
Hindi or the Marathi regions, but it is unlikely that 
they were confined to the latter. Hi tavada, 22 October
1921, p.6; 27 May 1925, P-5; 3 June 1926, p.6; NAI,
Indian Papers, no.39, 1921, p.422, Karmavir (Jabalpur),
17 September 1921.
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non-cooperation spread out into the rural areas where it 
encompassed people who had not participated in 
nationalist activity before. The agitation, which 
affected areas close to the main centres of population 
and those in the more remote parts of the region, was 
largely the work of nationalists from the towns.
Foremost among these was Seth Govind Das of Jabalpur, 
who during 1921 rose from virtual political obscurity to 
become the most prominent leader of the campaign of 
non-cooperation in the Hindi region.^ Govind Das was 
born in I896 into the most influential Marwari family 
in Jabalpur with interests in banking, textiles, pottery 
and land and with a record of loyal service to 
British rule. Following the completion of his Arts 
degree in 1914, Govind Das devoted himself to the cause 
of Hindi, but contacts with Shukul and Gandhi 
strengthened his desire to enter politics. He stayed 
his hand in this direction, however, until the annual 
session of the Indian National Congress at Nagpur when 
he decided to enter public life as a disciple of Gandhi. 
Following this decision, Govind Das quickly attained a 
premier position among the nationalist leaders of the 
Hindi region, typifying the identification of the 
merchants with the movement of non-cooperation.
Govind D a s 1s rise to power was partly due to the death 
in January 1921 of Pandit Shukul, the former leader of 
politics in Jabalpur, and partly due to the unpopularity 
of Ravi Shankar Shukla who had refused to suspend his
1
See B. Hooja, A Life Dedicated: Biography of 
Govind Das (Delhi~j 1956) .
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legal practice in Raipur. Govind Das's political 
success was also due to the energy and determination 
with which he took up his new political career in town 
and country districts alike. As for the latter, during 
1921 Govind Das toured the rural areas of Jabalpur 
preaching and establishing Congress Committees as 
required under the new Congress constitution. He also 
made contact with political workers in the towns and 
villages of the Hindi region by sending out circular
letters urging them to adopt the programme of non-
2cooperation in its entirety. To supplement the work or 
urban nationalists such as Govind Das, the District 
Congress Committees of the Hindi region also employed 
itinerant preachers drawn either from the region itself 
or from neighbouring provinces. In addition, those who 
came into the towns from rural areas at the time of 
Muhurrum must have returned home full of stories of the 
meetings, processions and bonfires they had seen, thereby 
acting as unwitting missionaries of non-cooperation.
Local leaders, too, were active in asking tenants not to 
pay rents to their malguzars, or in igniting bonfires of 
foreign cloth that 1 left an everlasting influence on the 
minds of poor innocent villagers’. Congressmen also 
went among the Gonds, an aboriginal community living in 
remote areas of Balaghat, and organised several of them 
to act as preachers of non-cooperation to their own
1
N A I , Home Public, 953, 1924, p.268.
2
Hooja, op. cit., p.56.
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people.
There was evidence aplenty of the effectiveness of
these activities in the rural areas of the Hindi region.
Tahsil headquarter towns and larger villages became
centres of nationalist activity; and thousands of people
2enrolled as members of the Congress organisation. In 
addition the name of Gandhi and the notions of 
satyagraha and swaraj spread through rural areas; the 
number of offences against the regulations in force in 
government forests rose; and a general unrest seemed to
3pervade the whole countryside. The most eloquent 
tribute to the work of nationalists in the rural areas 
of the Hindi region in 1921 was contained in a report on 
the situation in Seoni compiled by the district 
magistrate:
1
Report on the Police Administration of the Central 
Provinces for the year 1920 (Nagpur, 1921), p p .26-7 >
Hitavada, 16 July 1921, p. 5 ?  1 May 1927, P * 4 ;  W.V. Grigson, 
The Aboriginal Problem in the Balaghat District: a 
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1 9 2 1 , pp.9 5 0 - 9 5 3 .
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The Khilifat and non-cooperation agitations were 
carried on vigorously by local agitators as well 
as by men from other districts and provinces, 
the declared object of these gentlemen being to 
create universal hatred of government and to make 
government impossible. Sedition has penetrated 
the interior and a propaganda of misrepresentation 
of all acts of government has bewildered the 
masses. The weapon of social boycott has been 
threatened against weavers, as also really loyal 
and peaceful men of influence. In fact, short 
of actual violence no stone has been left 
unturned to bring lawful authority into contempt 
and to surcharge the whole atmosphere with ^
suspicion and hostility towards the government.
Although the results of non-cooperation in the 
divisions of Nagpur and Berar were similar in some 
respects to that in the Hindi region, in other respects 
they were quite different. In all campaigns alike, 
nationalists drew new social groups into the struggle 
against the government besides using those with previous 
political experience. The pattern of the campaigns in 
the two regions, however, was quite different. This was 
mainly due to the presence in the Marathi region of two 
groups of nationalists - those who accepted Gandhi1s 
leadership and political philosophy, and those who 
rejected both in favour of the political philosophy of 
Lokamanya Tilak. Each group was determined to use the 
forms of agitation laid down by its leaders and at the 
same time emerge as the leading opponents of the
1
Police Administration Report, 1920, op. cit., pp.26-7»
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government in the Marathi region. It was the presence 
of these rival groups and the effect their rivalry had 
on events in the Marathi region in 1921 that 
distinguished the Marathi and Hindi campaigns and 
widened the gulf between nationalists in the two regions.
Gandhi used his lieutenants in Nagpur to persuade
the Marathi nationalists to implement the resolution on
non-cooperation they had accepted in December 1920.
These lieutenants were the same men who had won people
in Nagpur to non-cooperation in December, namely
Pandit Sunderlal, Arjunlal Sethi and Bhagwandin.
Between December 1920 and January 1921 these men opened
the campaign of non-cooperation in Nagpur by appealing
to the lower classes to support the boycotts, and by
persuading many students to boycott their schools and
1colleges. This latter was a relatively easy matter,
as the students had a long record of opposition to the 
2government. In addition, by early January 1921 the
three leaders had established a national school in the
city and an ashram to train students and others in the
3art of non-violent agitation against the government.
The Marathi nationalists, who at first were unsympathetic 
to non-cooperation, responded to this challenge by 
assuming direction of the campaign in the division of
1
See p p .62-3.
2
See, for instance, Mishra, op. cit., pp.214-5; 
Hitvada, 12 May 1917» p.6.
3
Mishra, op. cit., pp.307-8; Bombay Chronicle,
10 January 1921, p.9«
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Nagpur. On their own confession, they did so to prove 
that the form of agitation devised by Gandhi was 1 bound 
to fail1. Nevertheless, it must also have been clear to 
them that,they could not allow the Gandhians to usurp 
their leadership of the nationalist movement in Nagpur; 
nor could they appear reluctant to take up the cudgels 
against the government. Whatever the reason, the 
Marathi nationalists did not launch their campaign of 
non-cooperation on Gandhi's terms. This was clear from 
the account of an interview between Dr Moonje and a 
deputation of students during January 1921 published in 
Hi tavada?
From an account of the interview between the non- 
cooperating students and Dr Moonje published in 
the Young Patriot recently, we gather that the 
faith of the...doctor in the weapon of potential 
magical powers is only skin-deep. Driven to the 
wall,.,, the doctor came out with quite a 
heroic impatience with the pace things were 
running and made a clean breast of himself....
He is quite aghast at the idea of national 
regeneration by means of the spinning wheel....
He has no faith in non-cooperation, says he.
But why does he pose to be a non-cooperator then? 
Because he...remarks that he wants to prove that 
the Mahatma's non-cooperation movement is bound 
to fail because it is an impossibility....
Dr Moonje wants to prove the futility of the non­
cooperation movement....This is not a myth. This 
is exactly what Dr Moonje said to the deputation 
that was sent by the student non-cooperators.^
In assuming control of the campaign of non-cooperation, 
the Marathi nationalists first promoted the boycott of 
schools and courts. In doing so they drew heavily on
1
Hi tavada, 5 February 1921, pp.4, 6.
80
the urban middle classes, who had traditionally regarded
them as the political leaders of the region. The Marathi
nationalists, however, supported these boycotts with
considerable scepticism, and they were neither surprised
nor displeased when the agitations collapsed before the
year was out. Their decision to support the boycott had
immediate repercussions in Nagpur, where the first and
third year Arts and Science students at Hislop College
'unanimously decided to withdraw in a body1.^ During
February and March 1921, students of other colleges and
high schools throughout the division of Nagpur followed
their example, and nationalists of all persuasions set
2up schools to cope with the exodus. Despite this 
promising start, however, the boycott was of temporary 
duration only, for after the summer holidays many
1
Times of India, l4 February 1921, p.95 N A X , Home Poll, 
June I92I, 12 Deposit, F R , First Half of February 1921, 
p. 17.
2
See CPLC, vo1.2, n o .8, 1921, Appendix B, pp.725-729 for 
decline in enrolments in schools and colleges in the 
division of Nagpur. 32.5 per cent of students left Hislop 
College, 27.5 Morris College, 27.2 Medical College, 24.6 
Engineering College, and 4.3 Agricultural College. The 
percentage of students leaving high schools in Nagpur 
ranged from 72 per cent at Neill City High School to 
25 per cent at Patwardhan High School; in Wardha the 
range was from 72.6 per cent at the Hinganghat High School 
to 47 per cent at the Wardha High School. 59*5 per cent 
of the students left Bhandara High School, and 5*6 per 
cent Chanda High School. The percentages of students 
leaving the Anglo-vernacular schools in the four districts 
were as follows: Chanda 51 per cent, Nagpur 50 per cent, 
Bhandara 33 per cent and Wardha 22 per cent. In the 
division of Nagpur nationalists founded 36 Vernacular 
and 12 Anglo-vernacular schools, in addition to the 
national schools in Nagpur. See Memorandum on the 
Development of Education in the Central Provinces and
Berar (Nagpur, 1 9 3 0 ) , p .44.
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students returned to their schools and colleges. They
did so partly because Dr Moonje and his colleagues
allowed the boycott to lapse; and partly because many
national schools were too poor, and their staffs not
sufficiently enthusiastic, to continue on a permanent
basis.^ The Marathi nationalists were also sceptical
about the boycott of courts, but supported it in January
1921 following the challenge held out by the followers
of Gandhi. As a result by mid-1921 some 40 pleaders had
withdrawn from courts in the towns of the division.
Leading lawyers demonstrated their disbelief in the
boycott, however, first by returning to the courts to
defend nationalists charged with sedition, and then by
resuming practice only six months after they had begun 
2the agitation. But, despite the Marathi nationalists' 
disbelief, there was little doubt that by participating 
in the boycotts they regained the political initiative 
they had lost to the Gandhians by allowing them to begin 
the struggle against the government.
With the initiative in their hands, the Marathi 
nationalists launched a massive campaign against the 
sale of liquor. In so doing, they upset the programme 
of agitation laid down by Gandhi and demonstrated their 
loyalty to the nationalist movement of Maharashtra in
1
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them in carrying out this campaign, the Marathi
nationalists drew heavily on non-cooperating students
and members of the low class weaving communities of
Koshtis and Momins. Owing to the economic threat
provided by the cotton mills of Nagpur, these communities
lived in a constant state of insecurity and hardship and
had long been restive on that account.^ For this reason,
too, they had long been associated with political activity
in Nagpur and it was not surprising that they were drawn
into the liquor agitation in February 1921, when food was
in short supply and prices high. For this situation, the
Koshtis and Momins held the government responsible. It
was thus possible that these and other groups from the
lower classes of Nagpur joined in the agitation to
2express their antagonism towards the government.
Although the lower classes got out of control, the 
liquor agitation nonetheless resulted in a victory for 
the Marathi nationalists. There were three stages in 
the agitation. The first stage began well before the 
annual session of the Indian National Congress, when ’it
3formed no part of Gandhi's non-cooperation'. During
which the liquor boycott had a central place. To assist
1
See A.H.L. Fraser, Amon^ Indian Rajahs and Ryots: A 
Civil Servant's Recollections and Impressions of Thirty- 
Seven Years of Work and Sport in the Central Provinces 
and Bengal (London, 191l)» pp.121-2.
2
See N A I , Horae Poll, June 1921, 13 Deposit, F R , Second 
Half of April 1921, p .19.
3
NAI, Indian Papers, n o .19, 1921, p. 196, Maharashtra 
(Nagpur), 4 May 1921.
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this stage, the leader of the campaign, Dr L.V. Paranjpe,
a Brahman medical practitioner and a prominent lieutenant
of Dr Moonje, launched a boycott of liquor shops in
Nagpur using students as pickets. Dr Paranjpe also tried
to persuade the liquor contractors to boycott the liquor
auctions due to be held in the last week of February
1921.^ The second stage of the boycott began on
22 February 1921 when the lower classes of Nagpur joined
the agitation and violence occurred as a result. Action
by the government brought the lower classes into the
agitation. On 22 February the government ordered
Dr Paranjpe to stop the boycott of liquor shops, and
arrested Dr M.R. Cholkar, the Vice-president of the
Municipal Committee of Nagpur and another lieutenant of
Dr Moonje, on a charge of sedition. The government also
arrested two Muslim volunteers for allegedly causing
violence at a liquor shop and went ahead with its plan
2to hold the liquor auctions. These incidents provoked 
the lower classes of Nagpur to violence on 23 February!
This incident (i.e. the arrest of Dr Cholkar) 
coupled with the arrest of two Muslims for 
some alleged violent proceedings at the liquor 
shops drew a large crowd to the court the next 
day where the picketers were to be tried and 
the auction sales of the shops to be held.
The crowd is reported to have laid violent 
hands upon some contractors who had bid at the 
auction sales; (an) attempt to disperse by the 
reserve police seems to have provoked the mob
1
Pioneer, 25 February 1921, p.4.
2
Ibid., p.4; N A I , Home Poll, April 1921, 43 Deposit, F R ,
Second Half of February 1921, p .18.
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to violence. Policemen were assaulted and some 
Europeans passing in a motor were attacked....
In the city some shops were looted in the evening 
and some liquor houses were demolished.^
In the disturbances, two European officers and 
seven policemen were injured. To prevent any further 
outbreak the government called out the soldiery and 
prohibited all meetings for one month. At the end of 
this month, on 24 March 1921, the nationalists expressed 
their opposition to the government by holding a meeting
when speeches were delivered exhorting the 
audience to carry on the non cooperation and 
temperance movements vigorously, not caring 
for arrests and imprisonments. The people... 
burnt their foreign caps.^
This meeting marked the beginning of the last stage of 
the liquor boycott, when the mobs took control of the 
agitation with disastrous consequences. Following the 
meeting on 24 March, tension rose in Nagpur, and three 
days later a mob of 400 Koshtis and others bearing stones 
and lathis looted liquor shops in the city. The police 
immediately went to the locality of Koshtipura and 
arrested 30 suspects. The Koshtis retaliated, and the 
police retreated, firing as they did so. In this firing, 
nine people were killed and 14 seriously wounded. This 
caused considerable excitement, and, fearing further 
retaliation, the police vacated control posts in the 
inner part of the city. With the removal of the police 
the mob went beserk, burning four of their posts and
T
Hitavada, 26 February 1921, p.4.
2
Bombay Chronicle, 28 March 1921, p.6.
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Nagpur. By 30 March all was quiet again, and when an
armed patrol marched through the city to re-establish
the police posts, it met no opposition. The following
day, the government prohibited public meetings in Nagpur
for two months within a radius of 10 miles from the city.
1And with that order, the agitation ceased.
Although the Marathi nationalists lost control over 
the mobs, they turned the liquor agitation to good 
account. During the agitation, the government admitted 
defeat by closing the liquor shops and abandoning the 
auction sales. This caused a drop in the consumption
of liquor and a consequent loss of revenue by the
2government. The government suffered an even greater 
defeat on 28 June 1921, when the city magistrate 
dismissed its case against Dr Cholkar for want of
3evidence. The stocks of the Marathi nationalists rose 
as a result, and at the elections to the Municipal 
Committee of Nagpur in August 1921, they won a majority 
of seats and Dr Cholkar was elected President. In
assaulting individual policemen in different parts of
1
Hitavada, 9 April 1921, p.7; ibid., 30 April 1921, p .6 ; 
NAI, Home Poll, June 1921, 45 Deposit, F R , Second Half 
of March 1921, p .17; MSN, General Administration 
Department (GAD), File 12-2, no.3 8 0, 1921, Paper Relating 
to the Two Disturbances and Firing at Nagpur, p.74.
2
See Report on the Excise Revenue of the Central Provinces 
and Berar for the Year 1921-2 (Nagpur, 1923)> p .4.
3
NAI, Home Poll, July 1921, 1 Deposit, F R , Second Half
of June 1921, p .19•
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conjunction with the municipal poll, the nationalists 
also held a poll on prohibition, and these results, too, 
were a striking vindication of their agitation against 
the liquor trade.^
The Gandhians disapproved of the turn of events in 
the Marathi region and tried to draw the merchants and 
people of the towns into the boycott of foreign cloth - 
'Gandhi's principal item'. Their efforts, however, met 
with only limited success. The centre of the boycott 
was Wardha, which as
a growing commercial town and...a large cotton 
centre contains many possibilities for making 
the local merchants realise the high importance 
of embarking upon the large enterprises for hand 
spinning and generally for the promotion of 
swadeshi.2
The nationalists of Wardha, led by Bajaj and Gandhi,
achieved many of these objectives. They held bonfires
of foreign cloth; encouraged ordinary townsfolk to spin
and wear khadi; and possibly persuaded some merchants of
3the district not to indent foreign cloth. In Nagpur,
1
NAI, Indian Papers, no.36 , 1 9 2 1 ,  p.3 7 4 ,  Young Patriot 
(Nagpur), 29 August 1 9 2 1 ;  Hitavada, 20  August 1 9 2 1 ,  p.5* 
The total number of voters at the elections was 267 5 »  
and in the liquor poll 23^3» Of these 2332 voted against 
liquor, six were indifferent and five voted for liquor.
2
NAI, Indian Papers, no.4 3 » 1 9 2 1 ,  p.4 8 6 ,  Young Patriot 
(Nagpur), 17 October 1 9 2 1 ;  Bombay Chronicle, 7 January
1 9 2 1 ,  p.9.
3
NAI, Indian Papers, no . 4 2 , 1 9 2 1 ,  p.4 7 0 ,  Rajasthan 
Kesari (Wardha), 9 October 1 9 2 1 ;  The Collected Works of 
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87
however, the Marathi nationalists remained unmoved by
the agitation. For while they accepted the boycott of
foreign cloth, as enjoined by Tilak, they rejected the
importance Gandhi placed on khadi and charka, and thus
launched the boycott in Nagpur on 1 August 1921 in a
half-hearted manner.^ During September Seth Govind Das
came to Nagpur to boost the boycott, but although 20
merchants agreed not to indent foreign cloth, the
Marathi nationalists remained lukewarm towards the
2agitation. Their attitude drew the severest condemnation 
from the Gandhian press in Nagpur:
The worst charge against them is in the matter of 
the charkhas. Gandhi has staked his all on 
spinning and wearing of khaddar.... Not only have 
several of these people not put on khaddar but 
in the Nagar Congress Committee a sum of money 
was allocated to charkhas only when the secretary 
offered to resign. Since then, no effort on an 
adequate scale seems to have been made to carry 
out Gandhi's principal item. Their object is to 
damn the movement by faint e f f o r t . 3
These attacks, however, made little difference to the 
leaders of Nagpur, who, although opposed to non­
cooperation, were firmly in control of the Indian 
National Congress in the division.
The Marathi nationalists and Ghandians alike aroused 
opposition to the government in the rural areas of the
1
N A I , Home Poll, F-18, 19.2.1, FR, Second Half of July
1921, p.11; see also Times of India, 1 April 1921, p. 10.
2
Bombay Chronicle, l4 September 1921, p.7*
3
NAI, Indian Papers, n o .43, 1921, pp.486-7, Young Patriot 
(Nagpur), 17 October 1921.
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division of Nagpur. The Gandhians did so by sending 
non-cooperating students and orators into the countryside; 
while the Marathi nationalists made contact with the 
villagers at district conferences, and as they toured 
the division collecting money, enrolling Congressmen, 
or establishing Congress Committees in the tahsiIs and 
villages. But, whether Gandhians or Marathi leaders, 
the urban visitors found a ready welcome among village 
people. Their visits had contrasting results. Sometimes 
they evoked non-violence, as villagers refused to carry 
out their long established duty of extinguishing forest 
fires; removed forest produce; resorted to illicit 
grazing; or declined the customary food and services to 
officers on tour. Sometimes the visits of the urban 
nationalists had violent results, as villagers attacked 
the police, looted grain, or started fires. In some 
villages, too, the visits of Brahman nationalists 
resulted in counter demonstrations by members of the 
depressed Mahar community who bore a grudge against the 
socially dominant Brahmans.
In Berar, as in the division of Nagpur, the Gandhians 
launched the campaign of non-cooperation, but the Marathi 
nationalists quickly assumed control and thereafter
1
NAI, Home Poll, April 1921, 4l Deposit, F R , First Half 
of January 1921, p .13; June 1921, 12 Deposit, Second Half 
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Police Administration of the Central Provinces for 1921
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directed the campaign along their own lines. In so doing 
they strengthened their leadership of the Indian National 
Congress in that area. The Gandhians led by Wamanrao 
Joshi directed the campaign of non-cooperation in Berar 
from January till the end of March 1921, when Joshi was 
arrested. During this time they launched the boycott of 
schools and courts with some assistance from the urban 
middle classes, and aroused other opposition to the 
government in the towns and neighbouring villages. The 
following is a description of the success achieved by 
the Gandhians up to the end of February 1921. The town 
referred to is Amravati, where Wamanrao Joshi had his 
headquarters:
A recent visit of the Commissioner of Berar to a 
typical town of the interior disclosed a most 
serious state of things. There was a hartal of 
shops in consequence of his arrival and the 
municipal weekly market was stopped. An 
arbitration court has been set up and a national 
school opened. Collections of cotton were being 
made from each cart entering the cotton market to 
provide funds for the so called national work.
All this was done at the instance of political 
leaders who employed a considerable number of
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volunteers to enforce their orders both in the 
town and in the neighbouring villages.^
Joshi did not remain long in control of non-cooperation, 
however, for during his campaign to promote the boycott 
of schools, he urged the people to overthrow the 
government ’by violent methods* and was arrested on
31 March. Six weeks later he was sentenced to 18 months'
, 2imprisonment.
Following Joshi's arrest, the followers of Tilak 
took charge of the campaign of non-cooperation and
3directed it along their own lines. Their campaign bore 
a striking resemblance to that undertaken by the Marathi 
nationalists in the division of Nagpur. The leader of 
the followers of Tilak was Balkrishna Ganesh Khaparde, 
a pleader in Amravati and the elder son of G.S. Khaparde, 
Gandhi's leading opponent in Berar. Until Khaparde and
1
N A I , Home Poll, April 1921, 43 Deposit, F R , Second Half 
of February 1921, p .18. Despite the efforts of Joshi, 
however, the boycott of schools was not very successful 
in Berar, where only 14 per cent of all students left 
the high schools. The highest percentage of students 
leaving high schools occurred in Khamgaon where 31*7 per 
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High School in Amravati lost 11 per cent of its students. 
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the Tilakites came to the fore, they ’wobbled over non 
cooperation' in some places supporting certain items in 
the campaign, and in others refusing to have anything 
to do with it.'*' After the disciples of Tilak assumed 
control, however, they made it quite clear that they 
intended to carry out the campaign on their own, and not 
Gandhi's, terms. This was evident from a letter which 
B.G. Khaparde wrote to Gandhi in May 1921:
If you expect me to support the non-cooperation 
movement exactly on your own basis and lines, I 
am sorry I shall not be able to do so. I do not 
believe in its religious character or efficacy, and 
regard it purely as a political instrument for 
gaining freedom for my motherland; and as such
I use it and follow it as far as I can....The 
ultimate goal, which alone can be an incentive 
to such humble services and sacrifices as I can 
undertake and do, is freedom of my countrymen 
from the present condition of bondage; and Panjab 
and Khilafat grievances occupy secondary position 
in my mind. In order to reach the goal, the 
working of the government must be made very 
difficult, it not impossible....1 would say we 
must succeed in bringing the government to a fix 
where we can dictate our own terms, and they would 
be compelled to accept them for their very life 
and safety. I believe non-violent non-cooperation 
to be one of the ways for bringing this about.
The present programme of putting non-cooperation 
in practice will need alteration as we proceed 
and gather experience.^
1
N AI, Home Public, 953» 1924, p.280; Times of India,
2 March 1921, p.9; NAI, Indian Papers, n o .4, 1921, p.21, 
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As indicated in the letter, Khaparde and the disciples
of Tilak modified Gandhi's programme of non-cooperation
after they assumed control of the campaign in Berar.
These modifications were clearly evident in the boycotts
of courts, liquor and foreign cloth. While Joshi led
the campaign of non-cooperation, the supporters of
Tilak opposed the boycott of courts, but after Joshi1s
arrest, Khaparde and a few of his colleagues suspended
practice. In doing so, however, Khaparde did not
thereby support the boycott, but appeared to do so to
show that the boycott of courts alone could not lead to
swaraj. Consequently, the boycott retained its
unpopularity in Berar, arid only 11 pleaders suspended
1practice. As for the boycott of foreign cloth,
Khaparde and his colleagues supported the boycott
enjoined by Tilak but they expressed doubts about the
2charka and ridiculed the burning of foreign cloth. As 
disciples of Tilak they also supported the campaign 
against liquor, but were unable to prevent the mob in
Amravati from wrecking the principal liquor shop in the
3town. The followers of Tilak, assisted by the Gandhians 
also aroused opposition to the government in the rural 
areas of Berar, fomenting non-violent agitation not
1
NAI, Home Public, 953» 1924, p.280; NAI, Indian Papers, 
no .6, 1921, p .51, Lokmat (Yeotmal), 28 January 1921.
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unlike that in the rural areas of the division of 
Nagpur.
IV
Between 1921 and 1922 the Hindi and Marathi leaders 
adopted widely differing views on the place of Gandhi 
and non-cooperation in the Indian nationalist movement. 
These differences threatened the unity of the nationalist 
movement in the province itself. At the beginning of 
1921 Gandhi's opponents in the Marathi region adopted 
only those items of non-cooperation which in their view 
would weaken the position of the government. The other 
items they viewed with scepticism and only promoted them 
to prove their impracticability. During the latter part 
of 1921, however, the Marathi nationalists felt that 
circumstances had changed sufficiently for them to 
disavow non-cooperation and Gandhi's leadership of the 
Indian nationalist movement. One of their strongest 
arguments against non-cooperation was that it had failed 
to bring swarajt as they had prophesied before the 
movement began. The Marathi press was quick to attack 
Gandhi on this point. On 27 November 1921 the 
Prajapaksha of Akola asked pointedly
Where is swaraj now?...(Gandhi) believes in 
non resistance and patient suffering and this 
is the reason why he could not take the people 
with him, nor could they follow him. This was
1
A Review of the Administration of the Province: The 
Central Provinces and Berar 1921-2~2 (Nagpur 1923) » p • x x ; 
NAI, Indian Papers, no.9» 1921, p*9^, Lokmat (Yeotmal),
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the main difficulty that came in the way of 
attaining swaraj. The only way to accomplish 
swaraj is to resort to counteraction....It now 
remains the duty of every province to prepare 
the ground for these last effective steps in 
counteraction. Each PCC ought to have a free 
scope to work the scheme of opposition on its 
own lines without any interference from the 
National Congress.^
And not only had non-cooperation not brought swaraj, 
insisted the Marathi nationalists, but support for the 
boycotts was daily collapsing. As evidence of this they 
pointed to the pleaders who had returned to practice
and the students who were once more at work in colleges
2and schools.
The Marathi nationalists also held non-cooperation 
responsible for an outbreak of violence that occurred in 
Malabar in August 1921. In that month the Muslims of 
Malabar, or Moplahs as they were more commonly known, 
revolted against the British authorities in the area. 
During the revolt they also attacked members of the 
Hindu community and converted many of them to Islam by 
force. These incidents confirmed the worst fears of the 
Marathi nationalists concerning the movement of non­
cooperation. From the beginning of the satyagraha 
movement, they had watched with suspicion and foreboding 
as Gandhi aroused the Muslims on the one hand and 
instilled the principle of non-violence into the Hindus 
on the other. Thus, it was not surprising that the
1
NAI, Indian Papers, no . 49 , 1921, p.561, Prajapaksha 
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Marathi nationalists saw the revolt in just those terms. 
On 6 September 1921, for instance, the Nagpur Samachar 
said that
It is no doubt very difficult to attribute the 
riots to any definite cause, but they might be 
the outcome of the blending of the non violent 
non-cooperation movement of Mahatma Gandhi and 
the Khilafat agitation which in reality should 
concern only Turkey.1
As a result, the Marathi nationalists led by Dr Moonje 
questioned the philosophy underlying non-cooperation and
determined to protect the Hindus against a repetition
2of such attacks.
The Marathi nationalists had further reasons for 
condemning non-cooperation. They belonged for the most 
part to the urban middle classes, and were anxious to 
protect their interests in government service, the 
professions, banking and land. The Brahmans among them, 
too, faced growing opposition from the non-Brahmans of 
the Marathi region. Since 1900, a movement of protest 
against the social dominance of the Brahmans had been 
at work among members of the non-Brahman community. By
1921, however, this movement had developed a strong
NAI, Indian Papers, no.37» 1921, p.387» Nagpur Samachar 
(Nagpur), 6 September 1921.
2
Ibid., no.43» 1921, p.482, Prajapaksha (Akola),
16 October 1921; NLI, Moonje M S , Letter Pad 8 , Circular,
17 February 1922; ibid., Letter pad 10, B.S. Moonje to 
Gulab Babu, 13 March 1922; B.S. Moonje to Mr Menon,
16 March 1922; B.S. Moonje to Nagarjee, 19 March 1922; 
Letter Pad 11, B.S. Moonje to Malavanker, 31 March 1922.
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political, flavour. In that year non-Brahman leaders 
warned their caste-fellows not to participate in the 
campaign of non-cooperation which was mostly led by 
Brahmans; and urged the government to give the non- 
Brahmans separate electorates to enable them to 'throw 
off the Brahmanical yoke'. The non-Brahman movement 
thus threatened the political leadership of the Brahmans 
of the Marathi region, and they could not afford to 
lgnore xt.
The nationalists of Berar had additional reasons 
for condemning non-cooperation. Besides attacking 
British rule, they also desired to gain the assistance 
of the government in solving the problems confronting 
Berar. The nationalists believed that they could do 
both by entering the legislature rather than by launching 
a campaign of non-cooperation. One problem was posed
by the recurrent rumours that the Government of India
2intended to return Berar to the Nizam. There was also 
the perennial problem of the revenues of Berar. This 
problem assumed an added urgency in January 1922 when a 
committee appointed by the government to investigate 
the provincial finances released its findings. The 
committee, which was known as the Sim Committee,
1
The Indian Statutory Commission, vol.XVII, Selections 
from Memoranda and Oral Evidence by Non-Officials,
Part 2 (H.M.S.O., 1930), p.512; NAI, Indian Papers, no.21,
1921, pp.212-3, Mali Pudhari (Amravati), April 1921;
NAI, Home Poll, July 1920, 105 Deposit, F R , First Half 
of July 1920, p.21.
2
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supported the pooling of revenues from the Central 
Provinces and Berar, and also directed that the Central 
Provinces should receive 60 per cent, and Berar 40 per 
cent, of the revenues allocated to works in either part 
of the province.^ The leaders of Berar objected to 
both conclusions.
To serve their interests as nationalists and leaders 
of the urban middle classes, the Marathi nationalists 
urged that Tilak’s policy of responsive cooperation in 
the councils replace that of non-cooperation. Although 
suggestions to this effect came from the division of
Nagpur, the strongest clamour for responsive cooperation
2came from Berar. The nationalist press took a strong 
stand on the issue, as witness the following extract 
from the Bharat of Amravati:
If they want to banish the drink evil, let them 
go into the councils and bring about prohibition 
....People are grown sick of mere vituperation 
and defiance of authority. They certainly prefer 
the Lokamanya’s Responsive Cooperation to the 
Mahatma’s non-violent Non-cooperation....It is 
now high time that the followers of both should 
speak out their minds candidly. If Lokamanya’s 
life work is not to be wasted, his followers 
should not sit with folded arms any longer.
The followers of the Mahatma are shirking their 
political responsibilities....It i$ hoped that 
...the Tilakites will discard renunciation and
1
Hitavada, 14 January 1922, pp.5-6. The Committee was 
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chalk out a practical and vigorous line for the
attainment of swaraj.1
Such appeals did not fall on deaf ears, for between 
1-3 December 1921 two conferences took place at Akola.
Their purpose was to review the programme of non­
cooperation. One conference was attended by members of 
the four Provincial Congress Committees of Bombay, 
Maharashtra, the Central Provinces and Berar, and the other 
by nationalists from the Marathi region of the Central 
Provinces and Berar alone. Each conference reflected the 
strong opposition in the Marathi region of western India 
to non-cooperation, for each requested that the campaign 
be withdrawn and that nationalists pursue a policy of
2'obstructive cooperation’ in the legislatures instead.
In 1922 the demands of the Marathi nationalists for 
responsive cooperation became more insistent. The 
occasion for this was Gandhi’s decision to launch mass 
civil disobedience against the government in January 
1922; and then to suspend the campaign within two weeks 
owing to an outbreak of violence in the United Provinces.
At the same time, Gandhi counselled nationalists to work 
the constructive programme until the country became 
sufficiently non-violent for civil disobedience to begin 
again. This provoked a violent reaction in the Marathi 
region. The Maharashtra of Nagpur thundered its 
disapproval of Gandhi's ’political blunders'; while the
1
N A I , Indian Papers, n o .45, 1921, p.512, Bharat 
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nationalists condemned the ’new programme of social 
reform', and urged that ’Gandhi should either have 
carried his policy through to the bitter end or should 
have retired from the political arena’.'*' The Marathi 
nationalists carried their condemnation of Gandhi and 
non-cooperation into the councils of the Indian National 
Congress. At a meeting of the All-India Congress 
Committee in Delhi between 24-26 February, Dr Moonje led 
the attack on Gandhi and the resolution on constructive 
work, but he was unable to defeat the motion. Dr Moonje 
refused to admit defeat, however, as he believed
that the time has come for examining the 
principles on which this movement of non 
cooperation is based - particularly as to 
whether those principles are practicable 
or otherwise.^
In this belief he first canvassed support for a review
3of the nationalist programme in the Punjab and Bengal.
Then he persuaded the Nagpur Provincial Congress Committee 
to appoint a Sub-committee ’to review the whole situation
. v 4and to suggest a programme of work for (the) future’.
1
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In these moves, Dr Moonje received the fullest support 
from the nationalists of Berar. In February 1922 the 
nationalist press there vociferously attacked Gandhi for 
turning the Congress into 'an organisation for doing... 
mere social service'; and during April Aney urged his 
fellow Beraris to capture 'all public and semi-government 
institutions as well as the councils' subject to the 
approval of the Indian National Congress.^
During 1922 the Hindi leaders, still linking the
fortunes of their region to those of the Indian National
Congress, supported non-cooperation. In January 1922
the Provincial Congress Committee met at Hoshangabad and
resolved that civil disobedience begin 'where a favourable
2atmosphere of mass satyagraha may be prepared' . And 
although Gandhi suspended the agitation, nationalists in 
the Hindi region continued to favour, and even practise, 
some form of non-cooperation with the government. Much 
of this activity took place in Chhattisgarh. In Bilaspur 
and Durg, Congressmen prepared for a resumption of civil 
disobedience by enrolling new Congressmen, enlisting
3volunteers and inciting tenants not to pay their rent.
1
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Provinces for the Year 1922 (Nagpur), 1923, p .1; NAI,
Home Poll, F-18, 1922, F R , First Half of February 1922, 
p.21; ibid., Second Half of February 1922, p.6l.
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Nationalists in Durg also attacked the Montagu-Chelmsford 
Reforms and called on the ministers and councillors to 
resign from the legislature. In addition, village 
agitators and subordinate Congress officials of Dhamtari 
tahsil in the district of Raipur supported civil 
disobedience so strongly that they launched their own
campaign without reference to the leaders of the Congress,
2either at the national or the district level. The
agitation had its roots in the opposition of the
villagers of Sihawa tract in Dhamtari to the regulations
in force in government forests in Sihawa. As a result
local agitators and Congress officials from Dhamtari
found it an easy matter to persuade 125 men from villages
in the tract to 'cut and remove each a head load of fuel
3from the reserved forest without licence'. The leaders 
of Dhamtari also organised a campaign of non-cooperation 
against the officials who came to investigate the theft 
of wood. The following report describes this campaign, 
and demonstrates the extent to which notions of non­
cooperation had penetrated the Hindi countryside by 1922. 
The author was the District Magistrate of Raipur:
By the date 24 February I arrived at Sihawa with 
Messrs Taylor and Bailey....There was partial 
hartal (and)...many difficulties had to be 
overcome; both watermen, for example, were
1
NAI, Home Poll, F-18, 1922, F R , Second Half of February 
1922, p.6 1.
2
MPS, Political and Military Department (Confidential), 
No.2 7, 1922, Removal of Forest Produce from the Sihawa 
tract of Raipur district, Memo by R.J. Bailey, p.37*
3
Ibid., Letter no.45 from the Divisional Forest Officer, 
South Raipur division, to the Deputy Commissioner,
Raipur, p.2.
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withdrawn from the camp by volunteers on the 
second day; and one of my sowars, when attending 
market, was first told that he would be sold 
nothing and then that he could have two pailies 
for a rupee, four times the market rate....In 
Sihawa the children of almost every village have 
been taught to shout Gandhi ki jai as soon as 
the hoof-beats of an officer's horse are heard 
....No violence is now preached, but, as 
reported...at Balargaon the villagers are exhorted 
to boycott foreign goods and to make extravagant 
demands from government officers both for supplies 
and service....The forest guard at Umargaon gave 
evidence... but has had to leave the village since, 
and today I hear that a criminal case against two 
volunteers for snatching and burning a school 
master's headdress has failed . . . . 1  also found also 
at Sihawa that vaccination has been suspended 
because Nagri volunteers had set the people 
against it;...and...because...(a teacher) 
maintained relations with officers, his school 
at Ghatula had been boycotted....We found (also) 
that forest subordinates and practically all 
others were boycotted in all leading villages and 
were unable to obtain the services of barber,T 7waterman and dhobi.
In Raipur, , too, Ravi Shankar Shukla symbolised the mood 
of Hindi nationalists by taking part in a personal act of 
non-cooperation against the government. In so doing he 
asserted his leadership in the face of the unauthorised 
Satyagraha in Sihawa, and regained some of the popularity
he had lost for refusing to suspend his legal practice
2in 1921. On 25 March 1922 nationalists in Raipur held
their district conference. Before the conference, they
1
M PS, Political and Military Department (Confidential), 
A Note by the District Magistrate, Raipur.
2
NAI, Home Public, no.953> 1924, p.268.
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issued the customary free tickets to the police. The 
police authorities considered the number of such tickets 
insufficient, however, and on the day of the conference, 
a sub—inspector tried to enter the conference pandal 
without paying for an extra ticket. Shukla, warned 
beforehand that the police intended to force an entry, 
decided to oppose them and thus court arrest. One 
observer described the scene thus:
Volunteers were lined up and Messrs Rao, Lakhe 
and Shukla formed the front line. Mr Shukla 
was standing hand in hand with Mr Lakhe. The 
police city inspector arrived with a junior 
magistrate,...two sub-inspectors and about 
eight or nine constables with handcuffs.... 
Subinspector Girdharilal began enforcing his 
entrance in spite of protest....between Shukla 
and Lakhe. As he pressed forward, they allowed 
their hands to go as far as they could and as 
soon as the sub—inspector began to use force, 
to release their hands and pass through, Mr Row 
said ’That is enough for purpose', and he and 
Mr Shukla immediately left off their hands.
Exactly at this moment, the-^city inspector 
ordered Mr Shukla's arrest.
Following this, the police handcuffed Shukla and marched 
him on foot to the ko twali where they held him for 48 hours 
before releasing him. The government subsequently formed
a committee to enquire into the handcuffing, but Shukla
2 ! refused to appear before the committee. In this way, he
again demonstrated his support for non-cooperation, and
that at a time when Marathi leaders were pressing for a
return to the councils.
1
CPLC, Vol.2, 13 September 1922, pp.576-7* Wamanrao 
Lakhe was a leading nationalist in Raipur.
2
Ibid., p .622.
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REGIONS IN CONFLICT: THE SWARAJYA PARTY IN THE 
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF THE CENTRAL PROVINCES,
1 9 2 3 - 1 9 2 6
Between 1923-6 nationalists from the Hindi and 
Marathi regions clashed in the legislature of the Central 
Provinces, and serious divisions occurred in the 
nationalist movement as a result. The clash arose from 
a series of disputes concerning larger ideological 
questions as well as the personnel of the ministry. On 
31 December 1922, after the Congress had refused to 
allow its members to enter the councils, Congressmen 
from all over India formed the All-India Congress 
Khilafat Swarajya party for that purpose. During the 
early months of 1923» nationalists established branches 
of the Swaraj party, as it was called, in the Hindi region 
and the divisions of Nagpur and Berar in preparation for 
the elections to the legislature to be held at the end 
of the year. Nationalists from the merchant community 
and the lower classes in the towns and rural areas of 
the province, however, who still supported Gandhi, 
fought determinedly to prevent members of the Swaraj party, 
or Swarajists, from contesting the elections. But this 
opposition came to nothing, and at the elections in 
November 1923 Swarajists in the Central Provinces and 
Berar won an absolute majority of seats in the provincial 
legislature.
Differences between the Swarajists in the legislature
Chapter 3
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caused a permanent cleavage in the ranks of nationalists 
in the Central Provinces and Berar. After an initial 
period of harmony, during which the Swarajists obstructed 
the work of the Council, members of the party from all 
parts of the province raised the question of forming a 
ministry. As there were, in fact, three Swaraj parties 
and only two ministerships, successive moves by 
Swarajists from one region or another to form a ministry 
ended in frustration and failure. In 1925, the Governor 
of the Central Provinces and Berar, Sir Montagu Butler, 
resolved the situation by appointing a former leader of 
the Swaraj party of Berar as Home Member. This 
precipitated the division of Swarajists from all parts 
of the province into two groups. One group comprised the 
orthodox Swarajists who, in obedience to the Indian 
National Congress, refused to accept office in the 
government. This group drew most of its support from the 
Hindi region. The other group comprised those nationalists 
who were pledged to a policy of responsive cooperation in 
the legislature. This group drew most of its support 
from the Marathi region, where its members formed the new 
Responsive Cooperation party. They were joined by a 
number of former Swarajists from the Hindi region who 
formed the Independent Congress 'party*. But whether in 
the Hindi or the Marathi regions, the responsive 
cooperators had one aim in common. They desired to 
persuade the electors of the Central Provinces and Berar 
to regard their parties - and not the Swaraj party or the 
Indian National Congress - as the main nationalist party 
in the province.
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intensified their efforts to persuade the Indian National
Congress to abandon non-cooperation and allow them to
enter the Councils. As for the division of Nagpur, on
14 April 1922 the Sub-committee formed by Dr Moonje to
review nationalist policy recommended that the Congress
modify the programme of non-cooperation. On 7 May the
Provincial Congress Committee accepted that recommendation.
Nationalists from Nagpur again demonstrated their
opposition to non-cooperation by absenting themselves
from a meeting of the All-India Congress Committee held
in Bombay on 9 June 1922, and by treating with
indifference a committee appointed at that meeting to
2assess the support for civil disobedience in India. At 
the same time, Marathi nationalists strengthened their 
links with Congressmen in other parts of the country who
3also desired to enter the legislative councils.
The nationalists of Berar fully supported these
moves. On 25 May 1922 the Berar Provincial Congress
Committee recommended that the Congress allow its members
4to enter the councils. At the same time, G.S. Khaparde,
1
The Pioneer, 10 May 1922, p.3; Hitavada, 26 April 1922, 
p .6. See p .99•
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Ibid., 14 June 1922, p.4; NAI, Indian Papers, no.25,
1922, p.317, The Maharashtra (Nagpur), 21 June 1922; NAI, 
Home Poll, F-18, 1922, F R , Second Half of July 1922, p.55.
3
Ibid., F-18, 1922, F R , First Half of November 1922, p.l.
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NML, AICC, I, 1922, Secretary Berar PCC to Secretary 
AICC, 17 June 1922.
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In 1922 nationalists in the Central Provinces and Berar
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overjoyed that the principles he had espoused in 1920 
were at last ’coming by their own’, led moves to revive 
the Congress Democratic party formed by Tilak in 1920.^ 
By mid-August Khaparde was confident that such a party 
would command substantial support among nationalists.
As a result he issued a manifesto condemning Gandhi and 
non-cooperation and urging his fellow-nationalists to 
revert to the modes of agitation used by the Congress 
before Gandhi appeared on the scene.
Experience has shown that, like most short-cuts, 
...(non-cooperation) is a delusion and a snare 
....It divided the Nationalists into non­
cooperators and independents of the Tilak school, 
who still hold fast to their method....The 
congress itself has become a one man show....The 
reforms are condemned root and branch; and anybody 
and everybody trying to work them is hated as 
the enemy of his country. . . .All wisdom is 
regarded as the monopoly of the followers of 
Mr Gandhi... .There is a retrogression of a 
serious kind and a great deal of unnecessary 
suffering absolutely inefficient to accomplish 
any political end. The goal has receded further 
than ever and nothing but disaster stares the 
people in the face if the course followed in the 
last 18 months is perversely persisted in.... 
Fortunately there is a revulsion of feeling 
visible,...(and) advantage may be taken of these 
to give a turn to the present disruptive trend 
of thought and a reversion to the sane methods 
of the Indian National Congress in pre-non 
cooperation days.^
In his manifesto Khaparde also requested that all
1
NAI, Khaparde MS, Diary, 11 April 1922; NAI, Home Poll, 
F-18, 1922, FR, First Half of April 1922, p.l6.
2
NAI, Jayaker MS, File 402, Letter 8 5, a Proposal by
G.S. Khaparde, 15 August 1922.
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nationalists who agreed on the importance of entering
the legislatures should meet to discuss the best means
of achieving that objective. This appeal had gratifying
results. On 4 November 1922 Dr Moonje, C.R. Das and
N.C. Kelkar came to Amravati to confer with Khaparde.
Following this meeting the nationalist leaders published
another manifesto advocating entry to the councils which
they intended to submit to the annual session of the
Indian National Congress at Gaya in December."*" The
nationalists of Berar signified their approval of the
manifesto by attending a meeting of the Home Rule League
of Maharashtra at Yeotmal on 10 December 1922. At this
meeting they agreed that nationalists must persuade the
electorate of the need to enter the councils to win
2'more rights' from the government.
The supporters of Gandhi in the Marathi region 
strongly opposed the moves by the middle class leaders 
to enter the councils. The Gandhians were recruited in 
the main from two groups who had been drawn into 
political agitation in 19 2 1, namely, the merchant community 
and the lower classes of the towns. The former was led 
by Jamnalal Bajaj and the latter by Pandit Sunderlal.
During 1922 Bajaj and Sunderlal held a number of meetings 
throughout the division of Nagpur to condemn the
1
NAI, Home Poll, F-18, 1922, F R , First Half of November 
1922, p.l.
2
NAI, Home Poll, F-18, 1922, F R , First Half of December 
1922, p.l; NAI, Indian Papers, no.51, 1922, p.604,
Prajapaksha (Akola), 17 December 1922.
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’regular Mahratta Brahmin leaders’ and the new doctrines."*” 
Bajaj also tried to undermine the control exercised by 
Dr Moonje and the Marathi nationalists over the Provincial 
Congress Committee, complaining to the All-India Congress 
Committee in May 1922 that
the public opinion of this province is strongly 
against the new scheme drafted by the Nagpur PCC, 
and against the postponement of the PCC elections 
to October next....Many of the existing members 
or office-bearers of the PCC and bodies 
subordinate to it do not represent the real 
opinion of the province. The view recently put 
forward by the spokesmen of Nagpur are not the 
views of the public.^
The All-India Congress Committee subsequently ordered
Dr Moonje to hold the elections to the Provincial and
other Congress Committees by 15 August 1922. This
Moonje did, but when the results foreshadowed a ’complete
change’ in the composition of the Provincial Congress
Committee in favour of Bajaj and the Gandhians, he
coopted his own supporters to the Committee and thus
3retained control over the organisation.
1
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Similar clashes between the Gandhian populists* and 
the long established Marathi leaders occurred in Berar.
As the Udaya complained in June 1922
Ever since the recommendation by the Berar PCC 
for a revision in the present congress programme, 
some political upstarts have made it a point to 
tour round in Berar, convene public meetings 
and to excite and prejudice the mob against the 
Nationalists....It will after all widen the gulf 
already existing between the literate and the 
illiterate classes.^-
The elections to the various Congress Committees
provided another focus of interest in the clash between
the two groups of nationalists in Berar. During 1922
the Gandhians contested the elections with a view to
removing the Marathi nationalists from control of the
Congress organisation. These attempts failed, however,
and consequently 'the Tilakites maintain(ed) their
2ascendancy in Berar'.
A determined conflict between Gandhian populists 
and the middle class leaders also took place in the 
Hindi region. At first the initiative lay with the 
Gandhians. The leader of this group was Pandit Sunderlal, 
who, after serving a term of imprisonment for taking part
*
The term 'populist' in this thesis refers to the 
Gandhian leaders who attempted to draw the mass of 
people in town and country into agitations based on 
Gandhi's principle of non violence.
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in the campaign of non-cooperation, went up into the
Hindi region in 1922 to ’revive enthusiasm for the Gandhi
programme’.'*" His chief assistant was Makhanlal
Chaturvedi, a Kanya Kubja Brahman who was well known
throughout the region as the editor of the Karmavir.
In April 1922 Sunderlal and Chaturvedi attended the
political conference of the Hindi region at Chhindwara to
promote the constructive programme. The two leaders not
only won the support of a majority of those who attended
the conference, but on its completion won control of the
Provincial Congress Committee from Rao and his associates.
During the remainder of 1922 both men took up the cause
of civil disobedience - Sunderlal by undertaking a massive
tour of the Hindi region, and Chaturvedi by his writings
in the Karmavir. Considerable success followed these
efforts. During April Sunderlal opened a national school
at Khandwa in Nimar, and in May he persuaded a conference
of Gonds in the Narmada division to 'pass a resolution
ion the Gandhi programme . There were reports, too, from
the towns of a revival of the boycotts of liquor and
foreign cloth, and of attempts to popularise spinning
3and khadi. There were also many reports of acts of
1
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non-cooperation that did not conform to the constructive 
programme or the agitation that had taken place during
1921.^ As a result, so strong was the support for non­
cooperation in the Hindi region, that on 10 August 1922 
the populist dominated Provincial Congress Committee 
'resolved to inform the All-India Congress Committee 
that collective civil disobedience is the only weapon
2to restore the Khilafat and remedy the Punjab wrongs*.
The populists, however, were unable to prevent the 
middle class nationalists from preparing for the 
elections to the provincial legislature. The leader of 
these men was Raghavendra Rao. Even during the campaign 
of non-cooperation, Rao had expressed doubts about that 
form of agitation. This was evident from the reports of 
a speech made by Rao at the provincial conference held 
at Bilaspur in May 1921. According to the Hitavada:
(Rao’s) address, in spite of a conscious attempt 
to fall in with the prevailing political passion 
of the hour shows that the speaker is quite 
uneasy about the immediate result of all the „ 
raging propaganda that he sees all about him.
Similarly, in 1922, Rao encouraged Hindi Congressmen to 
participate fully in the work of local government in
4contravention of the principles of non-cooperation.
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During 1922, too, Rao and his colleagues refused to 
cooperate with Sunderlal and the populists, and as a 
result the campaign for civil disobedience aroused little 
support among the urban middle classes. Thus, Rao and 
his colleagues must have been heartened when the campaign 
began to languish, and even the Karmavir declared that 
participation in the 'forthcoming council elections 
(would) ... infuse fresh life in the country'.'** Against 
a background of increasing interest in the elections,
Rao, Shukla, Mehta, Govind Das, Chhedilal and others 
issued a manifesto from Chhindwara on 16 December 1922, 
which declared that
the present programme should be so adjusted as to 
rejuvenate its vigour and make it aggressive in 
offering resistance to the government....(The) 
forthcoming elections provide a suitable occasion 
to justify an adjustment of the programme.... We 
do not stand for the proposal of entering 
councils, nor do we wish them to be worked for 
what they are worth...but to capture the 
electoral machinery as to close all avenues of 
cooperation created by the state (and)...to 
offer effective resistance to a system of ^ 
government which we desire to mend or end.
1
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Whether in the Central Provinces and Berar or India 
as a whole, the Gandhians were unable to prevent the 
middle class nationalists from forming a party to contest 
the elections to the legislatures. The two groups 
clashed at the annual session of the Indian National 
Congress at Gaya in December 1922. Those who desired 
to contest the elections opposed the official motion 
endorsing non-cooperation, but were not strong enough 
to defeat it. The middle class nationalists immediately 
disassociated themselves from the resolution, and on 
31 December 1922 formed the All-India Congress Khilafat 
Swarajya party to contest the elections to the councils 
in December I9 23. The Swarajists, as the members of the 
new party were called, elected as President and Secretary 
of the new party respectively, C.R. Das of Bengal, and 
Motilal Nehru, a prominent nationalist from the United 
Provinces. The main objective of the party was to put 
pressure through constitutional means on the British 
government to grant self government to India. If such 
pressure failed to achieve its objective, the Swarajists 
were to destroy the reformed constitution by obstructing 
the work of the government in the legislatures.
Following the establishment of the national Swaraj 
party, the middle class nationalists formed branches of 
the party in the divisions of Nagpur and Berar and the 
Hindi region of the province. The leading Swarajist in 
the division of Nagpur was Dr Moonje. During the early 
months of 19^3 Dr Moonje circulated a constitution for 
the proposed party, and directed the formation of party 
committees and the enrolment of party members throughout
II
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the division.'*' By May 1923 the Swaraj party was in 
existence, and Moonje informed Motilal Nehru that
we are in a position to start intensive agitation 
in our province....1 am enclosing a cheque of 
Rs 1000 in payment of our provincial contribution 
as fixed by you toward the finances of the 
all-India Swaraj Party.^
By June 1923, the Swarajists in the division were hard 
at work persuading the voters to defy the Indian
National Congress and return them to the provincial
3council in December. Similar reports also came from 
Berar, where the move to enter the legislature had the 
backing of the Gandhian leader, Wamanrao Joshi, and the 
Marathi nationalists led by M.S. Aney. Between January 
and May 1923 Aney presided over the formation of 
Swarajist organisations in Berar and toured the territory 
urging the voters to support the Swarajists at the 
elections. By June the nationalists of Berar had the
4work of canvassing well in hand. In the Hindi region 
Raghavendra Rao took the lead in forming a Swaraj party 
after a period of apparent inactivity. In October 1923 
the following report appeared in the Lokmitra of
1
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Chhindwara:
A Swaraj party headed by Mr Raghavendra Rao of 
Bilaspur has been formed for the Hindi speaking 
districts; and another party for the southern 
Marathi speaking districts has also been brought 
into existence under Dr Munje. These two parties 
working side by side and acting in coordination 
and consultation with each other will set up 
their own candidates for every constituency.... 
Accordingly the process of selection and 
elimination is going on vigorously.^"
During 1923 the populists replied with bold but 
unsuccessful moves to divert the attention of the people 
from the elections to the constructive programme and 
non-cooperation. Their first move was in accordance 
with the resolution accepted at Gaya that nationalists 
should prepare for civil disobedience by collecting 
Rs 25 lakhs, enrolling 50,000 volunteers and implementing 
the constructive programme. In no part of the province, 
however, did the Gandhians achieve their objectives.
In the division of Nagpur, their appeals evoked little 
response, as the following reference to an attempted 
boycott of foreign cloth demonstrates!
The number of volunteers is very small, and 
though they...are acquitting themselves 
honourably, they find it difficult to carry 
on picketing from shop to shop....This state 
of affairs is in our opinion partly due to the 
lack of enthusiasm among the local Congress 
workers...; but mainly due to the apathetic 
attitude of the local Maharashtra leaders who 
have...no faith in picketing.^
1
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In Berar, the Gandhians under Wamanrao Joshi had even
less success than in the division of Nagpur. This was
mainly due to the fact Joshi advocated that nationalists
enter the council and participate in civil disobedience
as well. Support for the former in the towns was so
strong that Joshi aroused little support for civil
disobedience and had difficulty in persuading
nationalists to chair his meetings.^ It was in the Hindi
region, however, that the populists had their greatest
defeat, perhaps because that area had once been the
scene of their greatest success. From the beginning of
1923 the townsfolk of the region responded apathetically
to Sunderlal’s appeals for men and money, and showed
little sympathy with the boycott of foreign cloth. The
cloth merchants, too, renounced the vows they had taken
earlier to stock only Indian goods and began to indent
2fresh supplies of foreign cloth. These setbacks threw
the Gandhians onto the defensive, and with the continued
conflict between Sunderlal and Raghavendra R a o , they
suffered further reverses. This conflict undermined the
people’s confidence in the Gandhian movement and
discouraged them from responding to Sunderlal*s appeals
3for support.
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In March 1923 the populists turned from these
failures to a series of dramatic demonstrations to win
the population to the Gandhian cause. These demonstrations
consisted of satyagrahas in which the Congress or
National Flag was the dominant feature.^ The leaders of
the Satyagrahas were Pandit Sunderlal in the Hindi region,
and Jamnalal Bajaj in the Marathi region, and each drew
heavily on the lower classes in town and country to
provide volunteers for the demonstrations. The first
phase of the agitation began in Jabalpur on .11 March
1923, when the District Commissioner refused to allow
nationalist members of the Municipal Committee to fly the
National Flag on the Town Hall in honour of members of
the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress
who were visiting the city at the time. Six days later
the nationalists flew the flag from the Town Hall in
reprisal, and, when the police forcibly removed it,
carried it in procession to the civil lines. A group
of volunteers led by Sunderlal, however, refused to get
permission to take out such a procession. Consequently
2they were arrested, but released the following day.
This incident apparently awoke Sunderlal and the 
populists to the possibilities of arousing popular 
support for the Congress by demonstrating with the 
National Flag. Accordingly, on 11 April 1923 they 
appointed a sub-committee in Jabalpur to 'vindicate the
1
This flag, adopted by the Indian National Congress, 
consisted of bands of green, white and saffron with a 
small charka in the centre.
2
Hi tavada, 28 March 1.923 9 P*5*
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honour of the national flag1, and called for donations 
and volunteers for the purpose. The response in men and 
money, however, was poor and the Gandhians could do 
little more than hoist the Flag in Jabalpur during May."*”
The Gandhians also held a number of Flag 
demonstrations in the other towns of the Hindi region 
using townsfolk as volunteers. These occurred at the 
same time as the demonstration in Jabalpur, and 
constituted the second phase of the agitation. The most 
important demonstration took place in Bilaspur, the home 
of Raghavendra R a o , in defiance of Rao and his colleagues 
who opposed any form of civil disobedience including 
that based on the National Flag. On 31 March 1923 
Gandhians hoisted the Flag on the Town Hall in Bilaspur, 
just as the twentieth session of the provincial Rajput 
Conference was opening in the town. As the Hitavada saw 
the demonstration;
The provincial Rajput Conference... provided a
suitable occasion of vindicating the honour of
the national flag to those to whom was entrusted
the work of decorating the Town hall....Official
efforts to persuade them to bring it down were
unavailing. The flag was flying the whole day in
front of the district court and the district
commissioner's bungalow....(There was) excitement
and enthusiasm in the town and volunteers wereoready for all emergencies.
During April 1923, Flag demonstrations also took place in 
Chhindwara, Seoni and Narsimhapur. In the latter district,
1
Hi tavada, 11 April 1923, P*3j N A I , Home Poll, F-25,
1923, FR, First Half of April 1923, P •175 ibid., F-25, 
F R , Second Half of May 1923, p.50.
2
Hi tavada, 4 April 1 9 2 3 , p.5*
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On 13 April 1923 Jamnalal Bajaj opened the third
and most important phase of the agitation - the Flag
Satyagraha of Nagpur. This Satyagraha was a populist
demonstration against the middle class nationalists of
the city and province. In addition to Bajaj, the
leaders of the campaign were A w a r i , a Parsi militant,
and Bhangwandin, the foremost inmate of the Asahayoga
Ashram and a leading agitator in the campaign of 1921.
By 1923 both men were well known as leaders of the
lower classes of Nagpur, and it was not surprising that
these classes figured prominently among the demonstrators
in the Flag Satyagraha. Others who took part included
members of the Depressed communities and aboriginal
tribes of the Central Provinces, and a small number of
men with a similar social background from neighbouring
provinces. In addition, the Satyagraha was simple in
nature, consisting of attempts to carry the National
Flag through a prohibited area, and thus had an
2immediate appeal to the popular mind.
The Flag Satyagraha in Nagpur had three distinct 
stages. During the first stage Bajaj drew his support 
from the city of Nagpur and the districts of the division. 
The agitation began on 13 April 1923» when observers
the message of the Flag penetrated into the villages.
1
Hitavada, 18 April 1923, P*4; ibid. , 25 April 1923» P*5*
2
See CPLC, vol.3» 9 August 19 2 3, p.210; ibid., 14 August
1923, p .473, Appendix C; ibid., Appendix D, pp.474-7*
3
N A I , Home Poll, F-25, 1923, F R , First Half of May 19^3,
p.17; ibid., Second Half of May 1923, p.50.
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witnessed the following scene on the western edge of 
Nagpuri
On the anniversary of the Jallianwallah Bagh, 
a procession of 30 or 40 volunteers and about 
100 other persons marched from the city into 
the civil station singing national songs and 
carrying swaraj flags....(in) imitation of a 
similar procession that had taken place in 
Jubbulpore. "*■
The government led by Sir Frank Sly, possibly fearing a 
repetition of the events of 1921, took a strong stand 
against the demonstration. On 13 April, Hyde Clarendon 
Gowan, the District Magistrate of Nagpur and a civilian 
of some twenty years’ standing, forbade the first 
procession entry to the civil station. When the
satyagrahis stepped forward to defy his prohibition,
2Gowan ordered their arrest. The populists decided,
however, to persist in their defiance of the government,
and on 30 April 1923 made plans to place the Satyagraha
3on a permanent footing. The following day Gowan again 
intervened and banned all processions with the National 
Flag for two months. This did not deter the populists.
On 2 May a procession carrying the Flag and singing 
songs marched towards the civil station, but when they 
tried to enter the prohibited area they were arrested as 
before. This pattern of events was repeated on many days 
following. According to one observer
1
Hi tavada, 18 April 1923> P*5*
2
Mishra, op. cit., p.323; N A I , Indian Papers, no.24,
1923, p .253, Pranavir (Nagpur), 7 June 1923*
3
Hi tavada, 2 May 1 9 2 3 , P*5*
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Every day ten volunteers march to the prohibited 
area and court arrest. They are duly arrested 
and carried off amidst the enthusiastic cheers 
of thousands of sympathetic onlookers.^
Owing- to the number of arrests, the supply of
volunteers from the division of Nagpur was soon exhausted,
and the leaders of the Satyagraha called for volunteers
2from the Hindi region to carry on the agitation. The 
influx of Hindi agitators, in response to these appeals, 
began in mid-May and lasted until mid-June and 
constituted the second stage of the Satyagraha. Among 
those who recruited volunteers in the Hindi region 
included national school teachers, itinerant preachers,
3pleaders and district leaders. The fruits of their work
were clearly evident in the hundreds of volunteers who
arrived in Nagpur - some on foot, and some by train -
from the districts of Seoni, Sagar, Jabalpur, Narsimhapur,
Balaghat, Betul and Hoshangabad between May and June, to
take their place in the daily processions to the civil
4station. For the most part illiterate and unemployed, 
these men responded readily to the inducements held out 
to them to come to Nagpur. The case of Jhadoo, son of
1
Hi tavada, 2 May 1923» P*4; CPLC, vol.3» 9 August 1923, 
pp.247-8; Hi tavada, 9 May 1923, P*4; India Office Records 
(iOR), History of Services, Central Provinces and Berar,
H.C. Gowan, pp.3“5*
2
Mishra, op. cit., p.3^3; Hi tavada, 30 May 1923, p.4.
3
See for instance A Compilation of Important Political 
Trials in the Central Provinces and Berar, op. cit., 
pp.1-2, Cases under Section 117 of the Indian Penal Code.
4
Mishra, op. cit., p.323*
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Harnam, from village Botijhari in Balaghat was typical 
of many satyagrahis:
A few days before I arrived at Nagpur, one 
Pathan, whose name I do not know, visited my 
village along with others, and asked me to join 
as a volunteer for a sabha to be held at Nagpur 
for obtaining swaraj. During swaraj things 
would be sold at a very cheap rate. Anandi 
patel of my village, advised me to join, 
promising to look after my mother and assured 
me that when swaraj is obtained Mahatma Gandhi 
will give me a good appointment. With all these 
hopes I accompanied the Pathan who brought me to 
Balaghat, where several other volunteers joined 
us, and we all came to Nagpur. I did not pay 
the railway fare. On arrival at Nagpur I was 
told that I would be required to carry the flag 
for which I will get at the most one month’s 
imprisonment and this sacrifice will bring the 
swaraj. With this idea I came to jail.
Owing to the frequent arrests, the supply of Hindi
volunteers also tapered off and Bajaj was compelled to
2seek assistance from neighbouring provinces. The use
of volunteers from these provinces constituted the third
stage of the Satyagraha, which lasted from early June
until the final procession of 18 August 1923« This stage
of the agitation began well, but soon ran into trouble as
3the numbers of volunteers and onlookers declined. Bajaj, 
too, was arrested, and Vallabhbhai Patel, a leading 
Congressman from Gujarat, came to Nagpur with his brother
1
CPLC, vol.3, 14 August 1923, pp.474-7*
2
N A I , Home Poll, F-25, 1923» F R , Second Half of June
1923, P . 54; ibid., F-25, 1923, FR, First Half of July
1923, P . 18.
3
See Hitavada, 1 August 1923, p.6.
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Vithalbhai to lead the declining Satyagraha. Shortly 
after his arrival Vithabhai entered into conversations 
with Sir M.V. Joshi, the Home Member, and the Governor, 
Sir Frank Sly, in an attempt to end the agitation without 
loss of face on either side.’*' These talks were 
successful and, as a result, the government and the 
nationalists agreed to suspend hostilities. Patel, for 
the nationalists, conceded that the government had the 
right to regulate processions, and he accepted the 
conditions it imposed on processions through the civil 
station. The government, for its part, agreed to 
release all volunteers imprisoned during the Satyagraha. 
As a result, when the Gandhians carried the Flag into the 
civil station on 18 August 1923, they conformed to the 
regulations imposed by the government. The government 
permitted the Flag to pass ’without let or hindrance'
and the day 'ended in peace and reconciliation all
. 2round'.
The Flag Satyagrahas held in Nagpur and other towns 
in the Central Provinces in 19^3 failed to deter the 
middle class nationalists from contesting the elections
1
G.I. Patel, Vithalbhai Patel; Life and Times, Book I 
(Bombay, n.d.), pp.513“7* Vithalbhai and Sly had been 
friends since their student days in England.
2
Hitavada, 2 2  August 1 9 2 3 ,  P*3j ibid., p . 4; Patel, 
op. cit., p.516. The provincial government agreed to 
release the prisoners without consulting the Government 
of India, and the latter expressed its strong disapproval 
of the release. See NAI, Home Poll, F - 2 8 0 ,  1 - 3 4 ,  1 9 2 3 ,  
Civil Disobedience in the Central Provinces, Telegram 
from Government of India, p.28.
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'local Swarajya party is not spited at all and its
weathers are unwrung’.  ^ From the inception of the Nagpur
Satyagraha, Dr Moonje regarded it as an attempt to ’thwart
the attempts of the leaders of the Swaraj party’, and
2refused to have any part in it. The Maharashtra spelt 
out Dr Moonje’s objections in greater detail:
The non cooperators ask the Swarajists as to why 
they raise mere protests against the government 
action instead of taking an active part in the 
struggle. To this our answer is that although 
we fully approve of the weapon of civil 
disobedience, we shall not be dictated to as to 
when and against what injustice it should be 
used. We will lend our support to that 
satyagraha which will meet with our approval... 
at a proper time and under favourable circumstances 
....It is the intention of the government to fill 
its councils with sycophants and it is zealously 
working towards that end....The government will 
therefore achieve its object if the Swaraj party 
joins the satyagraha movement.-^
Accordingly, with the Satyagraha at an end, the 
Swarajists threw themselves into the task of persuading 
the voters to return them to the provincial council at 
the elections.
to the legislature. In the words of the Mahratta, the
1
Hitavada, Extract from the Mahratta, 9 September 1923, 
p.15.
2
NLI , Moonje MS, Letter Pad 15, B.S. Moonje to Gopal 
Menon, 31 May 1923; ibid., Letter Pad 16, B.S. Moonje 
to Narsopant, 22 June 1923»
3
N A I , Indian Papers, no.29, 1923, P P •334-5, Maharashtra 
(Nagpur), 18 July 1923*
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A t  the e l e c t i o n s  i n  November 1923  the S w a r a j i s t s  i n  
the C e n t r a l  P r o v in c e s  and B e r a r  won a n  a b s o l u t e  m a jo r i t y  
o f  seats  i n  the p r o v i n c i a l  l e g i s l a t u r e . ' * ’ On ly  two months 
b e f o r e  the e l e c t i o n s ,  the l e a d e r s  o f  the I n d i a n  N a t i o n a l  
C ongress  f i n a l l y  bowed to S w a r a j i s t  p r e s s u r e  and summoned 
a s p e c i a l  s e s s i o n  o f  the o r g a n i s a t i o n  to d e c i d e  w hether  
to permit C ongressm en  to c o n te st  the e l e c t i o n s .  T h i s  
s e s s i o n ,  w h ich  was h e l d  i n  D e l h i  i n  September  1 9 2 3 ,  
approved  o f  c o u n c i l  e n t r y ,  and f o l l o w i n g  i t s  d e c i s i o n  
S w a r a j i s t s  i n  the C e n t r a l  P r o v in c e s  and B e rar  turned  to 
t h e i r  campaigns  w i t h  renewed  v i g o u r .  As  a r e s u l t  o f  these  
cam paigns ,  they  won a d e c i s i v e  v i c t o r y  over  the moderate 
p o l i t i c i a n s  who c o n s t i t u t e d  the m a j o r i t y  o f  members i n  
the f i r s t  reform ed  C o u n c i l .  T h e r e  were many r e as o n s  f o r  
th is  rem arkable  r e s u l t .  Among these  were
t h e i r  e f f i c i e n t  p a r t y  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  t h e i r  c a t c h i n g  
programme combined  to h i g h  s o u n d in g  p r o m is e s ,  the 
magic name o f  the C o n g r e s s ,  (and )  the f i c k l e n e s s  
o f  the e l e c t o r a t e . . . .A lmost  a l l  the I n d i a n  
government s e r v an ts  vote d  f o r  t h e i r  c a n d i d a t e s . . .
Many B e n g a l i s  voted  f o r  the nominees o f  the 
p a r t y  b e ca use  o f  r e s p e c t  fo r  t h e i r  le a d e r  i n  
B e n g a l ,  C . R .  D a s .  The  i l l i t e r a t e  voters  i n  many 
cases  were le d  to expect  that  the S w a r a j i s t s  
have  only  to e n te r  the c o u n c i l s  to wrest  swaraj  
from the hands  o f  the B r i t i s h .  The  L i b e r a l s  were
1
I n  the d i v i s i o n  o f  N a g p u r ,  the S w a r a j i s t s  c ap tu re d  the 
n ine  H i n d u  seats  and the one M usl im  seat  a l l o t t e d  to the 
d i v i s i o n .  A S w a r a j i s t  sym p ath iser  a lso  won the seat 
r e s e r v e d  f o r  the U n i v e r s i t y  o f  Nagpur .  I n  B e rar  the 
S w a r a j i s t s  won 12 o f  the 14 s e a t s ;  and i n  the H i n d i  
r e g i o n  19 o f  the 23 s e a t s .  A S w a r a j i s t  s y m p ath ise r  a lso  
won the seat  r e s e r v e d  f o r  m in in g  i n t e r e s t s .  I n  the C e n t r a l  
L e g i s l a t i v e  A ssem b ly  the S w a r a j i s t s  won f i v e  o f  the s i x  
seat  s .
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not p r o p e r l y  o r g a n i s e d  and some l e a d i n g  l i g h t s  
i n  Nagpur s c a n d a l i s e d  the p u b l i c  by  e x p r e s s i n g  
t h e i r  d e s i r e  to vote  f o r  the S w a r a j i s t s  i n  ^ 
p r e f e r e n c e  to the nominees o f  t h e i r  own p a r t y .
I n  f i g h t i n g  the e l e c t i o n s ,  the S w a r a j i s t s  d i v i d e d  
into  three  p a r t i e s  - one each  f o r  the H i n d i  r e g i o n  and 
the d i v i s i o n s  o f  Nagpur  and  B e r a r  - and  conducted  
campaigns a p p r o p r i a t e  to the l o c a l  s i t u a t i o n  i n  each  part  
o f  the p r o v i n c e .  T h e s e  campaigns  r e v e a l e d  that  the three  
p a r t i e s  h e l d  c o n f l i c t i n g  v iew s  as to the course  o f  a c t i o n  
to adopt once they  e n te r e d  the l e g i s l a t u r e .  I n  the 
d i v i s i o n  o f  N a gp ur ,  where the Sw araj  p a r t y  lau nched  a 
h eavy  a t t a c k  on  the moderate  p o l i t i c i a n s ,  some
S w a r a j i s t s  fa v o u r e d  a p o l i c y  o f  o b s t r u c t i o n ,  and others
2
a p o l i c y  o f  r e s p o n s i v e  c o o p e r a t i o n  i n  the c o u n c i l .  I n
B e r a r ,  by  c o n t r a s t ,  most S w a r a j i s t s  s upported  the p o l i c y
3
o f  r e s p o n s iv e  c o o p e r a t i o n .  The  m ain  f e a t u r e  o f  the 
c am paign  th e r e ,  h ow e ve r ,  was the c o n f l i c t  b e tw e e n  the 
Brahman and non-Brahman S w a r a j i s t s ,  on  the one han d ,  
and t h e i r  non-Brahman opponents  o f  the Sa ty a s h o d h a k  
S a m a j , on the o t h e r .  T h i s  was an  anti-Brahman b od y ,  
formed i n  the p r o v i n c e  o f  Bombay, that  had b e e n  at work 
i n  the M a r a th i  r e g i o n  s in c e  1 9 0 1 .  By 1923  the le a d e r s  
o f  the Samaj had  e s t a b l i s h e d  a number o f  b ranc he s  i n
1
H i t a v a d a , 12 December  1 9 2 3 ,  P * 4 ;  19 December  1 9 2 3 ,  p . 4.
2
See N A I , I n d i a n  P a p e r s ,  n o . 5 1 ,  1 9 ^ 3 ,  p . 6 0 1 ,  M a h a r a s h t ra  
( N a g p u r ) ,  19 December 1 9 2 3 ;  N A I ,  Home P o l l ,  F - 2 5 , 1 9 ^ 3 ,  
FR ,  F i r s t  H a l f  o f  O c t o b e r  1 9 ^ 3 ,  p . l ;  i b i d . ,  F- 25 ,  1 9 ^ 4 ,
F R , F i r s t  H a l f  o f  J a n u a r y  1 9 2 4 ,  p . l .
3
I b i d . ,  p . l ;  N A I ,  I n d i a n  P a p e r s ,  n o . 4 l ,  1 9 2 3 ,  P P •4 9 2 - 3 ,  
P r a j a p a k s h a  ( A k o l a ) ,  7 O c to b e r  1923 .
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B e rar  and had e n r o l l e d  some thousands  o f  members.  The  
o r g a n i s a t i o n  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  a c t i v e  b e tw e e n  1922-3 , 
and at the time o f  the e l e c t i o n s  s ta ge d  a number o f  
tamashas or p l a y s  a t t a c k i n g  members o f  the Brahman and 
Marwari  communities."*" The  S a t y a s h o d h a k  Sama j , supported  
by  the non-Brahman p re s s  o f  B e r a r ,  a lso  a t t a c k e d  the 
middle  c l a s s  n a t i o n a l i s t s  and u r g e d  non-Brahmans to vote
for  members o f  t h e i r  own community r a t h e r  tha n  fo r
2
S w a r a j i s t s .  The S w a r a j i s t s  c o u n te r e d  t h i s  propaganda
by h o l d i n g  le c t u r e s  and m eetings  and by  c a n v a s s i n g  through
the Congress  Committees i n  the d i s t r i c t s , towns and
t a h s i l s  o f  B e r a r .  T h e i r  cam paign ,  too ,  r e c e i v e d  stron g
3
support from the n a t i o n a l i s t  p r e s s .
The  cam paign  c ond uc te d  by  the S w a r a j i s t s  i n  the 
H i n d i  r e g i o n  d i f f e r e d  from the campaigns  o f  t h e i r  M a r a th i  
c o l l e a g u e s  i n  s e v e r a l  important  r e s p e c t s .  I n  the f i r s t  
p l a c e ,  the H i n d i  cam paign  d id  not get u n d e r  way u n t i l  
a f t e r  the s p e c i a l  s e s s i o n  had  ta k e n  p l a c e  at D e l h i ,
1
N A I ,  I n d i a n  P a p e r s ,  n o . 2 3 ,  1 9 2 2 ,  p p . 2 98- 9 ,  Sa ty ad ay a  
(A m r a v a t i ? ) ,  June  1 9 2 2 ;  N A I , Home P o l l ,  F-25 ,  1 9 2 3 ,  F R , 
Second  H a l f  o f  J u l y  1 9 2 3 ,  p . 51? i b i d . ,  F- 25 ,  1 9 2 3 ,  F R , 
F i r s t  H a l f  o f  O c to b e r  .1923, p . l .
2
N A I ,  I n d i a n  P a p e r s ,  n o . 2 3 ,  1 9 2 2 ,  p p . 298-9 , S a ty ad ay a  
( A m r a v a t i ? ) , June  1 9 2 2 ;  i b i d . ,  n o . 3 0 ,  1 9 2 3 ,  P * 3 5 2 ,  
K s h a t r i y a  M a l i  P u d h a r i  ( A m r a v a t i ) ,  J u l y  1 9 2 3 ;  N A I ,  Home 
P o l l ,  F-25 ,  1 9 2 3 ,  FR ,  F i r s t  H a l f  o f  O c to b e r  1 9 2 3 ,  P-l-
3
N A I ,  I n d i a n  P a p e r s ,  n o . 4 2 ,  1923 , P P • 5 0 3 - 4 ,  P r a ja p a k s h a  
( A k o l a ) ,  Ik  O c to b e r  1923? N A I ,  K h ap a rd e  MS, D i a r y ,
13 O c tob e r  1 9 2 3 ;  N A I ,  Home P o l l ,  F-25 ,  1 9 2 3 ,  F R , F i r s t  
H a l f  o f  November 1 9 2 3 ,  p . l .
m ain ly  ow ing  to c o n t in u e d  c o n f l i c t s  b e tw e e n  the G an dhians  
and the Swarajists . "* "  F o l l o w i n g  that  s e s s i o n ,  however ,  
R a g h ave nd r a  Rao assumed l e a d e r s h i p  o f  the cam paign ,  w h ic h ,  
so f a r  as most S w a r a j i s t s  were c o n c e r n e d ,  took i t s  stand  
on the p o l i c y  o f  o b s t r u c t i o n .  To ensure  the success  o f  
the p a r t y ,  Rao e n l i s t e d  the support  o f  s e v e r a l  w e l l  known 
moderate p o l i t i c i a n s ,  who had a p p a r e n t l y  shed t h e i r  b e l i e f
i n  c o o p e r a t io n  w i t h  the government i n  fa v o u r  o f  ' the aims
2
and o b j e c t s  o f  the Swaraj  p a r t y ' . Rao made these  aims
and o b j e c t s  e x p l i c i t  i n  a m eeting  i n  B a l a g h a t  i n  Octob er
1923 , when he
emphasised  that  non c o o p e r a t io n  and c i v i l  
d i s o b e d i e n c e  s t i l l  c o n t in u e d  to be the bed rock  
o f  t h e i r  ( i . e .  the S w a r a j i s t s ' )  f a i t h . . . . ( T h e y  
w ould )  ig n o r e  the ephermeral  ad v a n ta g es  that  
maybe dyarchy  y i e l d e d  ( a n d ) . . . e x e r t  such 
p r e s s u r e  through  the s t r e n g t h  o f  the e l e c t o r a t e  
as w i l l  b r i n g  the s o v e r e i g n  a u t h o r i t y  to terms 
and a n n i h i l a t e  those i n s t i t u t i o n s  as instrum ents  
c ap ab le  o f  e v i l  i n  the hands  o f  the b u r e a u c r a c y .3
I I I
F o l l o w i n g  the e l e c t i o n s ,  S w a r a j i s t s  from a l l  parts  o f  
the p r o v in c e  launched  a c r i p p l i n g  a t t a c k  on the government 
i n  the L e g i s l a t i v e  C o u n c i l .  They  d id  so d e s p i t e  some 
t e n d e n c ie s  to d i s u n i t y  w i t h i n  t h e i r  own r a n k s .  Between  
December 1923  and J a n u a r y  1 9 2 4 ,  the S w a r a j i s t s  from the 
H i n d i  r e g i o n ,  Nagpur  and B e r a r  formed three  s e p arate
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1
N A I , Home P o l l ,  F - 2 5 , 1923»  F R , F i r s t  H a l f  o f  October  
1923»  p . 1; H i t a v a d a ,  3 O c to b e r  1923»  p . 4.
2
See N A I ,  I n d i a n  P a p e r s ,  n o . 4 l ,  1923> P * ^ 9 3 »  L okm itra  
( C h h i n d w a r a ) , 6 O c to b e r  1 9 2 3 ;  N A I ,  Home P o l l ,  F-25 ,
1 9 2 3 ,  F R , F i r s t  H a l f  o f  O c to b e r  1 9 2 3 ,  p . l .  One 
prominent  moderate  who j o i n e d  the Swaraj  p a r t y  was 
Beohar  R a g h u b ir  S i n h a ,  a m alguzar  from J a b a l p u r .
3 Hitavada, 17 October 1923» p.6.
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C o u n c i l  p a r t i e s .  The  f o r m a t i o n  o f  these  p a r t i e s  
r e p r e s e n t e d  som ething  more than  n a t i o n a l i s t  t a c t i c s . ^  
Each  p a r t y  r e c e i v e d  i t s  g r e a t e s t  support from the more 
a f f l u e n t  and ed ucated  s e c t i o n s  o f  the p o p u l a t i o n  l i v i n g  
i n  those three  a r e a s .  I n  v ie w  o f  the l i n g u i s t i c  and 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  d i v i s i o n s  w i t h i n  the p r o v i n c e ,  i t  was 
n a t u r a l  f o r  vote r s  i n  each  a r e a  to c o n s i d e r  that  
t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  were q u ite  d i s t i n c t  from those  o f  
voters  i n  other  p arts  o f  the p r o v i n c e .  O b v i o u s l y ,  
voters  and c o u n c i l l o r s  a l i k e  f e l t  that  s e p a r a t e  p a r t i e s  
would best  serve  those  i n t e r e s t s .  The  S w a r a j i s t  
c o u n c i l l o r s  from B e r a r  led  the way by  fo r m in g  the 
Swaraj  p a r t y  o f  B e rar  on 2 0  December 1923  un de r  the
l e a d e r s h i p  o f  S h r i p a d  Balwant  Tambe,  a Brahman p l e a d e r
2 , 
from A m r a v a t i .  E a r l y  i n  J a n u a r y  1 9 2 4 ,  S w a r a j i s t s  from
the d i v i s i o n  o f  Nagpur  formed t h e i r  p a r t y  u n d e r  the
l e a d e r s h i p  o f  Dr  M o onje .  A nd  on  17 J a n u a r y  1 9 2 4  the
H i n d i  S w a r a j i s t s  formed the H i n d i  Sw araj  p a r t y  and
3
e l e c t e d  R a g h av e n d ra  Rao as t h e i r  l e a d e r  i n  the C o u n c i l .  
The  e l e c t o r a t e ' s  p r e s s u r e  on  the S w a r a j i s t s  to r e p r e s e n t  
i t s  i n t e r e s t s  was a lso  r e f l e c t e d  i n  the p o p u l a r i t y  o f  
the stance  o f  r e s p o n s i v e  c o o p e r a t i o n ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  among 
the M a r a th i  S w a r a j i s t s .  By a d o p t i n g  th i s  s t a n c e ,  the 
S w a r a j i s t s  c o u ld  a t t a c k  the government and at the same 
time a s s i s t  i t  i n  d e v e l o p i n g  the r e s o u r c e s  o f  the 
p r o v i n c e .  And  under  the re fo r m ed  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,
1
H i t a v a d a , 2 J a n u a r y  1 9 2 4 ,  p . 4.
2
P i o n e e r ,  20  December 1 9 2 3 ,  P *5 *  The  p a r t y  had  two 
s e c r e t a r i e s ,  W . J .  M o h a r ir  and R . A .  K a n i t k a r ;  and two 
w h i p s ,  R .M .  Deshmukh and D . K .  K an e .
3
I b i d . ,  19 J a n u a r y  1 9 2 4 ,  p . 7*
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o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  such  development  were c o n s i d e r a b l e .
Be for e  the S w a r a j i s t s  e n te r e d  the l e g i s l a t u r e ,
Dr  Moonje  and Rao e s t a b l i s h e d  a p r e c a r i o u s  u n i t y  b e tw e e n  
the three  p a r t i e s .  The  q u e s t i o n  o f  a common o r g a n i s a t i o n  
and p o l i c y  was one that  e x e r c i s e d  M o o n j e ' s  mind soon a f t e r  
the e l e c t i o n s .  On  22 December  1 9 ^3  he  w rote :
The  next most im portant  t h i n g  that  we have  to 
de c id e  i s  the p o l i c y  and the l i n e  o f  conduct 
that we have to adopt i n  the c o u n c i l . . . .We must 
be a w e l l- o r g a n i s e d  p a r t y  i n  the c o u n c i l .  I  am 
h o p e f u l  that  we s h a l l  be a b l e  to d is c h a r g e  the 
un iq u e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  that  has  f a l l e n  on our 
p r o v in c e  i n  a way that w i l l  command the ap p ro val  
o f  our A l l - I n d i a  Swaraj  p a r t y  and our v o t e r s .
A c c o r d i n g l y ,  Moonje  sounded  out the le a d e r s  o f  the other
Swaraj  p a r t i e s  and a r r a n g e d  m eetings  w i t h  t h e i r  members.
T h e s e  meetings  r e s u l t e d  i n  the f o r m a t i o n  on 14 J a n u a r y
19 2 4  o f  a u n i t e d  C o u n c i l  Sw araj  p a r t y  un der  the
2
l e a d e r s h i p  o f  Dr  M o onje .  I t  was not M o o n je ,  how ever ,  
but  Rao and the H i n d i  S w a r a j i s t s  who d eterm ined  the 
p o l i c y  to be adopted  by  the p a r t y  i n  the C o u n c i l .
F o l l o w i n g  the m eeting  o f  S w a r a j i s t  c o u n c i l l o r s  on
14  J a n u a r y  1 9 2 4 ,  the f o l l o w i n g  news item  ap p eared  i n  
the H i t a v a d a :
1
N L I , Moonje  MS, L e t t e r  Pad  19, B . S .  Moonje  to 
Mr G o lw e l k e r ,  22 December  1923«
2
I b i d . ,  L e t t e r  Pad 1 9 ,  B . S .  Moonje  to S . B .  Tambe,
26 December 1923; i b i d . , B . S .  Moonje  to Mr K a b e e r ,
26 December 1923; i b i d . , C i r c u l a r ,  31 December 1923; 
P i o n e e r , 17 Ja n u a r y  1924, p . 6 .
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As i s  w e l l  known,  the M a h r a tt a  s e c t i o n  o f  the 
Swaraj  has  no f a i t h  i n  o b s t r u c t i o n . . . . I t  i s  an  
open  secret  that  the members from the H i n d i  
d i s t r i c t s  who are  s ta u n c h  w r e c k e r s ,  b e i n g  i n  
a m a j o r i t y ,  were a b le  p r a c t i c a l l y  to coerce  
the members from the M a h r a t t a  d i s t r i c t s  
i n c l u d i n g  B e rar  into  s u b m i s s i o n . 1
But d e s p i t e  Dr M o o n j e ' s  s u b m i s s io n  to the H i n d i  m a j o r i t y ,
he made i t  c l e a r  that  the p o l i c y  o f  o b s t r u c t i o n  was merely
on t r i a l  and was not to be r e g a r d e d  as a permanent
2
m e a s u r e .
I n  im plem enting  the p o l i c y  o f  o b s t r u c t i o n ,  the 
Sw araj  p a r t y  r e t a i n e d  i t s  u n i t y  and at the same time 
com pelled  the Governor  to suspend  the reformed  
c o n s t i t u t i o n .  The  S w a r a j i s t  a t t a c k  o c c u r r e d  b e t w e e n
15 J a n u a r y  and 10 March  1 9 2 4 ,  and was d i r e c t e d  at three 
t a rg e ts  - the m i n i s t e r s ,  government b u s i n e s s  and the 
budget  fo r  1924- 25 .  The  S w a r a j i s t s  opened  t h e i r  a t t a c k  
on  the m i n i s t e r s h i p s  s h o r t ly  a f t e r  the e l e c t i o n s ,  when 
the Gov ern or ,  S i r  F r a n k  S l y ,  i n v i t e d  Dr Moonje  to form 
a m i n i s t r y .  Moonje  r e f u s e d  the o f f e r  on  the grounds 
that to accept  would  be ' c o n t r a r y  to the d e c l a r e d  p o l i c y
3
o f  the p a r t y ' . I n  so d o i n g ,  he com pelled  S l y  to o f f e r  
the m i n i s t e r s h i p s  to a moderate  p o l i t i c i a n ,  S .M .  C h i t n a v i s ,  
who was r e l u c t a n t  to accept  the p o s t ,  and to
1
H i t a v a d a , 7 May 1 9 2 4 ,  p . 8 .
2
N L I , Moonje  MS, L e t t e r  Pad 1 9 ,  C i r c u l a r ,  31  December 1923*
3
P a r l ia m e n t a r y  Papers  ( c i t e d  h e r e a f t e r  as P P ) , 1 924- 5 ,  x ,  
c m d . 2632 , Reforms E n q u i r y  Committee 1 9 2 4 ,  Views  o f  L o c a l  
Governments  on the W o r k in g  o f  the Reforms ( H . M . S . O . ,  
L o n d o n ) ,  p .  317*
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Syed Hif 'azat  A l i ,  a v i r t u a l l y  unknown M uslim  member of  
the C o u n c i l .  The S w a r a j i s t s  were an g ere d  by the 
appointment  o f  m i n i s t e r s  who d id  not command the support 
o f  the l e g i s l a t u r e ,  t h e i r  a n g e r ,  no d o u b t ,  h e ig h t e n e d  
by the fa c t  that they  were them selves  u n a b le  to accept  
o f f i c e .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  they  lau nc h e d  a savage a t t a c k  on 
the l e g i s l a t i o n  w h ich  the government brought  b e f o r e  the 
House  on  16 J a n u a r y  1 9 2 4 .  Two days l a t e r ,  Rag h avend ra  
Rao moved a vote o f  no c o n f i d e n c e  i n  the m in is te r s . ' * ’ I n  
the course  o f  h i s  sp e e ch  Rao a s s e r t e d  the S w a r a j i s t s *  
r i g h t  to d ism is s  the two m i n i s t e r s :
By v i r t u e  o f  our  p l e d g e ,  we may not accep t  the 
o f f i c e ,  b u t . . .no one I  hope c an  m a i n t a i n  that 
i t  takes away our  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r i g h t  o f  
e x e r c i s i n g  our  l e g i t i m a t e  vote  o f  d i s m i s s i n g  
any p e r s o n  who on  our b e h a l f  and i n  our name 
wants  to e x e r c i s e  the r i g h t  o f  g o v e r n in g  the 
t r a n s f e r r e d  s u b j e c t s . . . . We d e s i r e  to t e l l  them 
( i . e .  the government)  i n  u n m i s t a k e a b l e  terms 
that we do not and p o s s i b l y  cannot g iv e  our 
s a n c t i o n  to i t ,  so f a r  as i t  r e s t s  on our
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .2
The c o u n c i l  a c c e p te d  the motion  by a huge m a jo r it y  and
the m in i s t e r s  r e s i g n e d .  I n  what c ould  h a r d l y  be
d e s c r i b e d  as a c o n c i l i a t o r y  move, S i r  Fr an k  S l y  p e r s u a d e d
the m in i s t e r s  to w ithd raw  t h e i r  r e s i g n a t i o n s  and rem ain  
3
i n  o f f i c e .  T h i s  i n f u r i a t e d  the S w a r a j i s t s  a l l  the more, 
and they  r e t a l i a t e d  by  f o r c i n g  S l y  to suspend  the 
reform ed  c o n s t i t u t i o n .  The  S w a r a j i s t  c ou n te r - a tta ck  had
1
C P L C , v o l . l ,  n o . 2 ,  1 6 J a n u a r y  1 9 2 4 ,  p p . 7 - 2 7 ;  i b i d . ,  
v o 1 . 1 , n o . 4 ,  18 J a n u a r y  1 9 2 4 ,  pp-70-5*
2
I b i d . ,  p p . 7 3 - 4 .
3
P P , 1 9 2 4 - 5 ,  x, c m d . 2 6 3 2 , p.3 1 8 .
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a l l  the a i r  of  a c a r e f u l l y  p la n n e d  cam paign .  F i r s t  they 
d e f e a t e d  fo u r  b i l l s  in tr o d u c e d  by  the government ;  then  
they  r e j e c t e d  the supplementary  budget  demands;  re d u c ed  
the demand fo r  the m i n i s t e r s '  s a l a r i e s ;  and f i n a l l y  threw 
out the demands f o r  a l l  grants  over  w h ic h  the c o u n c i l  
e x e r c i s e d  control . '* ’ F o l l o w i n g  t h is  o n s la u g h t  the 
m i n i s t e r s  tendered  t h e i r  r e s i g n a t i o n s  to the Governor  
and the l a t t e r  prorogued  the c o u n c i l .  I n  the c ir c u m s t a n c e s ,  
there  was l i t t l e  that  S ly  could  do but accep t  d e f e a t .  
A c c o r d i n g l y ,  he r e s t o r e d  as many o f  the r e j e c t e d  grants  
as p o s s i b l e ,  c e r t i f i e d  the e x i s t e n c e  o f  a n  emergency,
2
and assumed r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  fo r  the m i n i s t e r s '  p o r t f o l i o s .
I V
Betw een  1925-6,  the S w a r a j i s t s '  u n i t y  c o l l a p s e d  as 
the members o f  the three Swaraj  p a r t i e s  v i e d  w i t h  each 
o t h e r  to form a m in i s t r y .  The  most i n s i s t e n t  p r e s s u r e  
to do so came from the S w a r a j i s t s  o f  B e r a r .  T h e r e  were 
many reasons  f o r  t h i s .  The l e a d e r s  o f  B e r a r  b e l i e v e d  
that  i n  t a k i n g  o f f i c e  they c ould  more e f f e c t i v e l y  weaken  
the fo u n d a t i o n s  o f  B r i t i s h  r u l e  and h a s t e n  the grant  o f  
s e l f  government to I n d i a .  As the P r a ja p a k s h a  o f  A k o l a  
remarked  on 4 Ja n u a r y  1925
1
C P L C , v o l . 2 ,  n o . 1,  4 March 1 9 2 4 ,  p p . 7 - H ;  i b i d . ,  v o l . 2 ,  
n o . 3» 6 March  1 9 2 4 ,  p p . 127-130? i b i d . ,  v o 1 . 2 ,  no . 5 ,
8 March  1 9 2 4 ,  p p . 245- 252 .
2
I n d i a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  Refo rm s ,  V iew s  o f  L o c a l  Governments 
on  the W orking  o f  the Reforms date d  1 9 2 7 ,  C e n t r a l  P r o v in c e s  
( H . M . S . O . ,  1 9 2 8 ) ,  p p . 4 6 6 ,  4 7 0 ,  478- 81 .
135
The p r e s e n t  a t t i t u d e  o f  the S w a r a j i s t s  h a s . . .  
g iv e n  a f r e e  l i c e n c e  to the b u r e a u c r a c y  to act 
i n  any way i t  c h oose s .  T h i s  can  be stopped  i f  
the Berar  Sw araj  p a r t y  d e c i d e s  to change i t s  
p r e s e n t  t a c t i c s .  I t  w i l l  do w e l l  to remember 
that  i f ,  u n de r  the i n f l u e n c e  o f  the S w a r a j i s t s  
o f  other  p r o v i n c e s ,  i t  f a i l s  to a l t e r  i t s  
p r e s e n t  p o l i c y  at  th is  j u n c t u r e ,  i t  w i l l  be 
d o i n g  a d i s t i n c t  d i s s e r v i c e  to the p r o v i n c e .
I t  ought not to fo r g e t  the s a l u t a r y  te a c h in g s  
o f  the l a t e  L o k a m a n y a .^
H owever ,  the S w a r a j i s t s  o f  B e r a r  were not merely  
i d e o l o g i c a l  n a t i o n a l i s t s .  They  a lso  r e p r e s e n t e d  the 
i n t e r e s t s  o f  l a n d h o l d e r s ,  p r o f e s s i o n a l  p e o p l e ,  and the 
u r b a n  middle  c l a s s e s .  The  problems o f  B e rar  were t h e i r  
p r o b le m s ,  and they  r e a l i s e d  that  they  c ould  d e a l  w i t h  
those problems much b e t t e r  by  a c c e p t i n g  o f f i c e  than  by 
r e m a in in g  i n  o p p o s i t i o n .  Foremost among the problems 
a f f e c t i n g  Berar  was the d r a i n  o f  i t s  re v e n u e s  into  the 
C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s .  T h i s  d r a i n  d i r e c t l y  a f f e c t e d  the 
S w a r a j i s t s ,  f o r  as la n d h o ld e r s  they  c o n t r i b u t e d  large  sums 
o f  revenue  to the p r o v i n c i a l  government .  A g a i n ,  a lt h o u g h  
the government had  t r i e d  to implement the f i n d i n g s  o f  
the Sim Committee,  the form ula  f o r  a p p o r t i o n i n g  the 
d i v i s i b l e  e x p e n d it u r e  b e t w e e n  the C e n t r a l  P r o v in c e s  and 
Berar  had  not f u n c t i o n e d  as p l a n n e d .  I n s t e a d  o f
r e c e i v i n g  40 per  cent o f  such  e x p e n d i t u r e  i n  1924- 25 ,
2
Berar  r e c e i v e d  o n ly  27 p er  c e n t .  The  f a i l u r e  o f  the 
government to observe  the Sim r a t i o  and the d r a i n  o f  
revenue  into  the C e n t r a l  P r o v in c e s  were a cause  o f  deep
1
N A I , I n d i a n  P a p e r s ,  n o . 2 ,  1 9 2 5 ,  p p . l 9 “ 2 0 ,  P r a ja p a k s h a  
( A k o l a ) ,  4 January  1925*
2
CPLC, v o l . l ,  n o . 1 ,  4 March  1 9 2 6 ,  p p * 3 “ 4.
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resentm ent  among the S w a r a j i s t s  o f  B e r a r .  No l e s s  a 
p e r s o n  than  S . B .  Tambe,  the l e a d e r  o f  the B e r a r  Sw araj  
p a r t y ,  v o i c e d  t h i s  resentm ent  i n  the l e g i s l a t u r e  - and 
he v o i c e d  i t  d u r i n g  the S w a r a j i s t  a t t a c k  on the budget  
i n  March .1924. O n  7 March  Tambe d e c l a r e d  that
The  a f f a i r s  o f  B e r a r . . . a r e  not i n  prop er  hands  
. . . . S i n c e  the am algam ation  o f  the p r o v i n c e s ,  
what is  the s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s ?  The revenues  o f  
B e r ar  have  b e e n  spent f o r  the o r n a m e n ta t io n  o f  
the C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s ,  I  might s a y . . . .The  
revenues  o f  B e r a r  were spent on  so many 
government b u i l d i n g s .  The  b u i l d i n g s  i n  Nagpur  
and oth er  p a r t s  o f  the p r o v i n c e  are  a p r o o f  o f  
th a t .  I  b e l i e v e ,  i f  you look  at the a c t u a l  
f i g u r e  spent on  b u i l d i n g s ,  i t  would  come to 
n e a r l y  three  crores  o f  r u p e e s ,  ajjid a l l  that 
money was out o f  B e r a r  r e v e n u e s .
T here  were ot h er  r e a s o n s ,  too ,  why the S w a r a j i s t s  o f  
B e r a r  d e s i r e d  to accept  o f f i c e .  T h e y  r e a l i s e d  that  to 
do so would  e n a b le  them to i n f l u e n c e  the d e c i s i o n s  o f  the 
government on the q u e s t i o n  o f  the land  s e t t le m e n t .  I n
1 9 2 4  the government d e c i d e d  to r e v i s e  the land  settlem ent  
i n  B e rar  by e n h a n c in g  the r e ve nue s  and r e d u c i n g  the 
d u r a t i o n  o f  the s e t t le m e n t .  T h i s  d e c i s i o n  t h r e a te n e d  
the S w a r a j i s t s 1 i n t e r e s t s  i n  l a n d ,  b e s i d e s  c o m p e ll in g  
them to c o n t r ib u t e  f u r t h e r  to the d r a i n  o f  revenue  to 
the C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s ,  and i t  thus p r o v i d e d  a good 
r e a s o n  why they sh o u ld  become p a r t  o f  the government
1
CPLC,  v o l . 2 ,  n o . 4 ,  7 March  1 9 2 4 ,  p p . 199- 200 .
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i t s e l f .  The S w a r a j i s t s  o f  B e r a r  must a lso  have  r e a l i s e d  
that  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  the government would  h e lp  them to 
w i t h s t a n d  the o p p o s i t i o n  o f  the non-Brahmans,  and p r o v id e
some guarantee  a g a i n s t  a s u r p r i s e  r e s t o r a t i o n  o f  B e ra r
2
to the Nizam.
The  S w a r a j i s t s  o f  B e r a r  were not the only  contenders  
f o r  o f f i c e  d u r in g  1925*  So a lso  were the members o f  the 
Sw a ra j  p a r t y  o f  the d i v i s i o n  o f  Nagpur .  T h e se  men were 
f e r v e n t  n a t i o n a l i s t s ,  but l i k e  t h e i r  c o u n te r p a r ts  i n  
B e r a r ,  they ,  too ,  were  u n d e r  p r e s s u r e  to d e fe nd  l o c a l  
i n t e r e s t s .  T i l a k ' s  p o l i c y  o f  r e s p o n s i v e  c o o p e r a t io n  
p r o v id e d  them w i t h  the means to do so. I t  also  
p r o v i d e d  them w i t h  the means o f  a t t a c k i n g  the government.  
C o n s e q u e n t ly  i t  was to t h i s  p o l i c y  that many o f  the 
S w a r a j i s t s  from Nagpur  turned  when they  saw that 
o b s t r u c t i o n  had f a i l e d  to advance  the cause  o f  s e l f  
g o v e r n m e n t , and that  the government was l i k e l y  to
w ithdraw  the re form ed  c o n s t i t u t i o n  from the C e n t r a l
3
P r o v i n c e s .  I t  was to r e s p o n s i v e  c o o p e r a t i o n ,  to o ,  that 
they turned  when t h e i r  e l e c t o r s  demanded that  they work
1
See  N A I , I n d i a n  P a p e r s ,  n o . 5 0 ,  1 9 2 4 ,  p p . 5 7 7 “ 8 ,
P r a ja p a k s h n a  ( A k o l a ) ,  7 December  1 9 2 4 ;  i b i d . ,  n o . 5 1 ,
1 9 2 4 ,  p . 5 9 1 ,  Sw a ta n tr a  H i n d u s t h a n  (A m r a v at i )  , 13 December 
1 9 2 4 ;  CPLC, v o 1 . 1 ,  n o . 5 ,  7 March  1 9 2 5 ,  p . 1 7 7 ?  i b i d . ,  
v o l . 1, n o . 1 2 ,  19 March  1 9 2 5 ,  PP-623-43«
2
F or  r e f e r e n c e s  to these  problems  see N A I ,  K h ap ard e  MS, 
D i a r y ,  22  A p r i l  1.924; H i t a v a d a , 13 F e b r u a r y  1 9 2 4 ,  p.  4 ;
21  May 1 9 2 4 ,  p . 3 ;  30 J u l y  1 9 2 4 ,  p . 4 ;  13 A u g u s t  1 9 2 4 ,  p . 2 .
3
N L I , Moonje  MS,  L e t t e r  Pad 2 0 ,  B . S .  Moonje  to M. Nehru ,
14  March 1 9 2 4 .
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the c o n s t i t u t i o n  and ac c e p t  o f f i c e .  As  Dr  Moonje  wrote  
i n  A ug ust  1 9 2 4
T he  governor  ap p e a rs  to have  d e c i d e d  to convene 
no more m eetings  o f  the c o u n c i l  u n t i 1 . . . March  
( 1925) . . . . H e  does not p rop ose  to ap p o in t  any 
m in i s t e r s  now. We are  thus  p r a c t i c a l l y  shut out 
o f  the c o u n c i l  government .  The  p e o p le  have  b e gu n  
to ask  us q u e s t i o n s  as to what we propose  d o i n g  
. . . .U n l e s s  we f i n d  out a w a y , . . .we s h a l l  re n d e r  
o u r s e l v e s  l i a b l e  to p u b l i c  c r i t i c i s m . . . . I f  the 
p e op le  f i n d  that  ot h er  p r o v i n c i a l  c o u n c i l s  are  
f u n c t i o n i n g  and  i t  i s  o n ly  the CP c o u n c i l . . .  
w h ich  i s  not f u n c t i o n i n g . . . , p e o p le  w i l l  b e g i n  to 
be d i s a f f e c t e d  towards us and  w i l l  a t t r i b u t e  i t  
to our l a c k  o f  r e s o u r c e f u l n e s s  i n  our 
s ta te s m a n s h ip  and t a c t i c a l  m anouvering .
The  o p p o s i t i o n  o f  the e l e c t o r a t e  was not a n  academic
q u e s t i o n  to Dr  M o o n je ,  f o r  d u r i n g  1 9 2 4  the S w a r a j i s t s
lost  h e a v i l y  at the e l e c t i o n s  to l o c a l  b o d ie s  i n  the
d i v i s i o n  o f  Nagp ur .  The  non-Brahmans were i n  part
2
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  these  r e s u l t s .
P r e s s u r e  from the e l e c t o r a t e  was a lso  the main  
r e a s o n  why R a g h a v e n d r a  Rao and R a v i  Sh ankar  Sh u k la  led  
the H i n d i  Sw araj  p a r t y  i n  the quest  f o r  o f f i c e .  Rumours 
that  the two le a d e r s  f a v o u r e d  the fo r m a t io n  o f  a m i n i s t r y  
ap p e a re d  i n  the p r e s s  d u r i n g  1 9 2 4 ,  and by  March  1925  both
3
men were op e n ly  committed to that  p o s i t i o n .  T h e y  took
1
N L I , L e t t e r  Pad 2 4 ,  B . S .  Moonje  to ,
2 A u g u s t  1 9 2 4 .
2
H i t a v a d a , 21  May 1 9 2 4 ,  p . 5 ;  N A I , Home P o l l ,  F- 25 ,  1 9 ^ 4 ,  
F R , Second  H a l f  o f  December  1 9 2 4 ,  p . l ;  P i o n e e r ,
25  December 1 9 2 4 ,  p . 7 *
3
H i t a v a d a , 9 J a n u a r y  1 9 2 4 ,  p . 4 ;  27 August  1 9 2 4 ,  p . 5 ;
N L I ,  Moonje  MS, D i a r y  1, 4 J u l y  1 9 2 6 .
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th i s  s tand  on the c r i e s  o f  the H i n d i  e l e c t o r a t e  fo r  p u b l i c  
works .  D u r i n g  the co ld  w e a t h e r  o f  1925  S i r  Montagu B u t l e r ,  
the new Governor  o f  the p r o v i n c e  and a man d eterm ined  to 
r e l i e v e  the C e n t r a l  P r o v in c e s  o f  the charge  of  b a c k w a r d n e s s ,  
toured  the n o r th e r n  d i s t r i c t s  o f  the H i n d i  r e g i o n .  He 
found  there  a gre at  clamour  f o r  develop m ent ,  as he to ld  
the C o u n ci l  i n  1926s
I n  the last  20  y e a r s ,  f o r t u n e  had  put money into  
the c o tt o n  d i s t r i e t s . . . ( b u t ) the wheat t r a ct s  of  
the north  had  had  to b e a r  the f u l l  brunt  o f  the 
f i n a n c i a l  s t r i n g e n c y . . . . I n  each  o f  these  d i s t r i c t s
I  found  much to be done and l i t t l e  to do i t  w i t h .
. . . .Everyw here  was the same t a l k  o f  money n e e d e d ;  
money f o r  s c h o o l s ,  money f o r  r o a d s ,  money f o r  
e v e r y t h in g .
D e s p i t e  these  demands,  i t  was not the H i n d i  S w a r a j i s t s  
but  t h e i r  c o l l e a g u e s  from B e r a r  who led  the moves to 
form a m i n i s t r y .  I n  1925  the l a t t e r  twice  attem pted  to 
take o f f i c e ,  but on each  o c c a s i o n  f a i l e d  to do so.  T h i s  
was m ainly  due to the fa c t  that S w a r a j i s t s  from the 
d i v i s i o n  o f  Nagpur  and the H i n d i  r e g i o n  a lso  d e s i r e d  to 
form a m i n i s t r y .  I t  was a lso  apparent  that  S i r  Montagu 
B u t l e r  p r e f e r r e d  to form a m i n i s t r y  supported  by  
S w a r a j i s t s  from the C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s ,  r a t h e r  than  one 
formed by S w a r a j i s t s  from B e r a r .  S i r  F r a n k  S l y ,  whose 
term as Governor  d i d  not e x p i r e  u n t i l  25  Ja n u a r y  1925»  
opened  the way f o r  the S w a r a j i s t s  o f  B e r ar  to form a 
m i n i s t r y  by d e c l a r i n g  on 11 J a n u a r y  that  he in t e n d e d  
g i v i n g  the c o u n c i l  a n o t h e r  o p p o r t u n i t y  to work the
1
C P L C , v o l . l ,  n o . l ,  4 M arch  1 9 2 6 ,  p . 5*
c o n s t i t u t i o n . ^  D e s p i t e  an  attempt by M o t i l a l  Nehru  to
thwart the f o r m a t i o n  o f  a m i n i s t r y ,  the S w a r a j i s t s  o f
B e r a r  made p l a i n  t h e i r  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  to take o f f i c e .  I n
March  1925  they  s e c u r e d  s eats  on a number o f  government
committees and Tambe was e l e c t e d  P r e s i d e n t  o f  the
2
l e g i s l a t u r e .  D u r i n g  March ,  too ,  they  announced  that 
they  in t e n d e d  to form a government .  A t  t h i s ,
S w a r a j i s t s  from the C e n t r a l  P r o v in c e s  c l o s e d  ranks  
a g a i n s t  the members from B e r a r ,  p o s s i b l y  b e ca us e  they  
sensed  some th r e a t  to t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s ,  and poured
3
’ contempt and r i d i c u l e '  on  them. T h i s  made the B e r a r i s  
more determ ined  t h a n  ever ,  and they i s s u e d  an  u lt im atum  
d e c l a r i n g  that  they  would  not r e j e c t  the budget  as they  
had  done i n  1 9 2 4 .  They  f u r t h e r  d e c l a r e d  that  they  
i n t e n d e d  to sponsor  e i t h e r  a S w a r a j i s t  or a non-
4
S w a r a j i s t  m i n i s t r y .  F o l l o w i n g  t h i s  d e c l a r a t i o n ,
B . G .  K h a p a rd e ,  who had  become l e a d e r  o f  the B e rar  Swaraj
p a r t y  a f t e r  T a m b e ' s  e l e c t i o n  as P r e s i d e n t  o f  the C o u n c i l ,
nominated  two members o f  the p a r t y  as p r o s p e c t iv e  
5
m i n i s t e r s .  T h e n  i n  the C o u n c i l  on 12 March 1925  the 
B e r a r  Swaraj  p a r t y  voted  w i t h  the government on  the f i r s t  
demand o f  the b udget  f o r  1 92 5 - 26 ,  and p r e p a r e d  to vote
i4o
1
I n d i a n  A n n u a l  R e g i s t e r , n o . l ,  1 9 2 5 ,  p . 1 8 .  S i r  Montagu 
B u t l e r  took o f f i c e  on  26  J a n u a r y  1925 •
2
C P L C , v o l . l ,  n o . 2 ,  4 M arch  1 9 2 5 ,  p p . 4 4 ,  49-55•
3
H i t a v a d a ,  29  A p r i l  1925»  P*7 *
4 ~
I b i d . ,  p . 7 •
5
One o f  the nominees was Ramrao Deshmukh o f  A m r a v a t i .
l 4 l
D e s p it e  these  moves,  h o w e v e r ,  the S w a r a j i s t s  o f
B e r a r  f a i l e d  to form a m i n i s t r y .  They  could  not r e l y
2
on  support from the C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s ,  and the new 
Governor ,  S i r  Montagu  B u t l e r ,  would  not g u a r a n t e e ,  even  
i f  the B e r a r i s  d i d  vote  the s a l a r i e s ,  that he would  
choose h is  m in i s t e r s  from B e r a r .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  the 
S w a r a j i s t s  from B e r ar  dropped  t h e i r  p l a n  to form a 
m i n i s t r y .  As  the H i t a v a d a  saw the s i t u a t i o n :
I n  a moment o f  weakness  they  ( i . e .  S w a r a j i s t s  
o f  Be rar )  committed a s e r io u s  b l u n d e r  on that 
f a t a l  day  on w h ich  the m i n i s t e r s 1 s a l a r y  was 
to be voted  upon .  C o u n c i l  was to r eassem b le  
at 3 p .m .  S h o r t l y  b e f o r e  3» some shrewd f e l l o w  
w h is p e r e d  into  the ears  o f  some o f  t h e . . . B e r a r i s ,  
p la y e d  upon  t h e i r  d i s t r u s t  o f  the government and 
in d u c e d  one o f  them to go and as k  government to 
g ive  a p l e d g e  that two p a r t i c u l a r  i n d i v i d u a l s  
would  be a p p o in t e d  m in i s t e r s  b e f o r e  the v o t in g  
o f  the demand. H i s  E x c e l l e n c y ,  the Governor  as 
new could  not be e xp e c te d  to g iv e  a p le d g e  and 
d id  not know the names o f  those  m entioned .  . . .
The  p o i s o n  i n  the w h is p e r  had  i t s  e f f e c t  ( a n d ) ^  
. . . s u s p i c i o n  and p e r s o n a l  i n t e r e s t s  triumphed .
And  w i t h  B u t l e r ' s  r e f u s a l  to g uar a nte e  that h i s  m in i s t e r s  
w ould  come from B e r a r ,  the S w a r a j i s t s  o f  Berar  j o i n e d  
t h e i r  c o l le a g u e s  from the C e n t r a l  P r o v in c e s  i n  r e d u c i n g
f o r  the m i n i s t e r s '  s a l a r i e s  on  the f o l l o w i n g  day .
1
CPLC, v o 1 . 1 ,  n o . 6 , 12 March  1 9 2 5 ,  p p . 2 5 5 - 2 9 5 ,  3 1 1 .
2
Hi  t a v a d a , 29  A p r i l  1 9 2 5 ,  P *7*
3
I b i d . ,  p . 7* Rumour had i t  that the Home Member,
S i r  M .V .  J o s h i ,  who was a lso  from B e r a r ,  p la y e d  a 
l e a d i n g  part  i n  a d v i s i n g  the Governor  a g a i n s t  a c c e p t i n g  
D eshm ukh .
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B u t l e r ' s  h e s i t a t i o n  on  the m i n i s t r y  d id  not extend
to the S w a r a j i s t s  from the C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s ,  and he
2
attempted  to form a government w i t h  t h e i r  support .  H i s  
attempt to do so met the same f a t e  as the attempt by  the 
S w a r a j i s t s  o f  B e r a r .  E a r l y  i n  J a n u a r y  1925  Dr Moonje  
d i s c l o s e d  h i s  p lan s  to form a m in i s t r y  ' i f  a n  o c c a s i o n  
a r i s e s ' . W r i t i n g  to a f r i e n d ,  he s a i d  that
I  am n o t . . . t o  be one o f  the two m i n i s t e r s .  I n  
my mind I  have  f i x e d  the persons  - one o f  the 
two m i n i s t e r s  s h a l l  be Mr Row, a non Brahmin  
from CP H i n d u s t h a n i  and an othe r  Mr Deshmukh 
B a r r i s t e r  a non Brahm in  or Mr Tambe a Brahmin  
from B e r a r .  So you see my i n s i s t i n g  upon  
a c c e p ta n c e  o f  m i n i s t e r s h i p s  i s  i n s p i r e d  p u r e ly  
by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o f  the i n t e r e s t s  o f  the p a r t y  
i n  my p r o v i n c e . 3
A small  group o f  S w a r a j i s t s  from the d i v i s i o n  o f  Nagpur 
and the H i n d i  r e g i o n ,  h ow ever ,  p r e v e n t e d  Dr  Moonje  and 
B u t l e r  from fo rm in g  a m i n i s t r y .  T h e y  d i f f e r e d  on t h e i r  
grounds  fo r  so d o i n g .  The  S w a r a j i s t s  from Nagpur 
supported  the p o l i c y  o f  o b s t r u c t i o n  and were s t r o n g ly
4
opposed  to any move by Dr Moonje  to form a government.  
Most o f  the H i n d i  S w a r a j i s t s ,  by  c o n t r a s t ,  d e s i r e d  to 
form a government ,  but  i n t e r n a l  q u a r r e l s  as to who should
the grant f o r  the m i n i s t e r s '  s a l a r i e s  to two r u p e e s .
1
CPLC, v o 1 . 1 ,  n o . 7 ,  13 March  1 9 2 5 ,  p p . 296-3 1 3 .
2
C h i t n a v i s  MS, S i r  M. B u t l e r  to S i r  G .M .  C h i t n a v i s ,
11 March  I 925 .
3
N L I , Moonje  MS, L e t t e r  Pad 2 7 ,  B . S .  Moonje  to Mr Reddy ,  
8 J a n u a r y  1925*
4
H i t a v a d a , 8 A p r i l  1 9 2 5 ,  P*3*
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c o n s t i t u t e  the m in i s t r y  p r e v e n t e d  them from s u p p o r t in g  
Dr  Moonje .  Rao o b j e c t e d  to a m i n i s t r y  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  
h i m s e l f  and Deshmukh '  on the ground  that such a 
c o m b in a t io n  might not be s u f f i c i e n t l y  h o m o g e n e o u s . '  He 
s ug g e ste d  i n  p l a c e  o f  Deshmukh Shyam Su nd er  B h a rg a v a ,  an  
i n f l u e n t i a l  l a n d l o r d  from Jabalpur . " *- S h u k la ,  h ow ever ,  
r e s e n t e d  b e i n g  e xc lud e d  from the m in i s t r y  and p e rs u ad e d
a number o f  H i n d i  S w a r a j i s t s  to w ith d raw  t h e i r  support
2
from R a o .  The  combined o p p o s i t i o n  o f  S w a r a j i s t s  from
N a gp ur ,  C h h a t t i s g a r h  and B e r a r  l e f t  Moonje  and Rao w ith
i n s u f f i c i e n t  numbers to form  a m i n i s t r y .  Thus  a lt h o u g h
B u t l e r  d e s i r e d  to s e l e c t  m i n i s t e r s  from the C e n t r a l
P r o v in c e s  and a c t u a l l y  c a l l e d  Rao and Moonje  to
Government House  f o r  d i s c u s s i o n s  on  the s u b j e c t ,  the two
3
l e a d e r s  were u n a b l e  to form a m i n i s t r y .
As  a r e s u l t ,  B u t l e r  turn ed  to B e r a r  to h e lp  him 
launch  the reform ed  c o n s t i t u t i o n  i n  the C e n tr a l  
P r o v i n c e s .  T h i s  time he was s u c c e s s f u l .  B u t l e r  took 
t h i s  step  b ecause  the S w a r a j i s t s  o f  B e r a r  s t i l l  d e s i r e d  
to take o f f i c e ,  i n  s p it e  o f  t h e i r  f a i l u r e  to do so i n  
March  192 5 •  They  dem on strated  th i s  i n  the C o u n c i l  by
4
s u p p o r t in g  the government i n  d i v i s i o n s  on  the b u d g e t .  
O u t s i d e  the H o u s e ,  too ,  the S w a r a j i s t s  p u b l i c l y  ad vo cated
1
H i  t a v a d a , 8 A p r i  1 1 9 2 5 , P . 3 ; N L I , Moonje  MS, D i a r y  I ,
4
2
J u l y  1926 .
H i  t a v a d a , 8 A p r i  1 1 9 2 5 , p-3; N L I , Moonje  MS, D i a r y  1,
4 J u l y  1 9 2 6 .
3
C h i t n a v i s  MS,  S i r  M. B u t l e r  to S i r  G .M .  C h i t n a v i s ,
11  March 1 9 2 5 ;  CPLC,  v o 1 . 1 ,  n o . 7 ,  13 March  1 9 2 5 ,  p . 295-
4
I b i d . ,  v o 1 . 1 ,  n o . 10 ,  17 March  1 9 2 5 ,  p p . 479- 83 .
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r e s p o n s i v e  c o o p e r a t i o n  as b e i n g  ' i n  the i n t e r e s t s  o f  
B e r a r ' . ^ The  S w a r a j i s t s '  attempt to r e v i v e  r e s p o n s i v e  
c o o p e r a t io n  r e c e i v e d  the a s s i s t a n c e  o f  no less  a p e r s o n  
than  G . S .  K h a p a r d e , who d u r i n g  June  19^5  vowed ' to  get
r e s p o n s iv e  c o o p e r a t i o n  b a c k ,  and u n t i l  i t  was
r  \ 2
a c c o m p l i s h e d , . . . not ( t o )  r e t i r e '  from p o l i t i c s .  And
f o l l o w i n g  d i s c u s s i o n s  that  K h ap arde  had  w i t h  the
f o l l o w e r s  o f  T i l a k  i n  Poona on  3 A ug ust  1 9 2 5 ,  th is  vow
seemed to be on  the verge  o f  f u l f i l m e n t :
I  r e t u r n e d  to the wada where I  d in e d  i n  company 
w i t h  J a g g a n a t h  M a h a r a j , T a t y a s a h e b  K e l k a r ,
Baburao G o k h a l e ,  Dhondo Bab a ,  K e t k a r  and o t h e r s .
We were a l l  i n  a very  p l e a s e d  mood and sat 
t a l k i n g  long .  The  r e s p o n s i v e  c o o p e r a t i o n  p a r t y  
of  Lok  T i l a k  i s  r e v i v e d  and may f u n c t i o n  s o o n . 3
S i r  Montagu B u t l e r  resp ond ed  to these  statements  
and events  w i t h  a s e r i e s  o f  s k i l f u l  moves that  brought  
the former S w a r a j i s t  l e a d e r  S . B .  Tambe into  the e x e c u t i v e  
c o u n c i l  o f  the C e n t r a l  P r o v in c e s  as Home Member.  The  
government f i r s t  made a tem pting  f i n a n c i a l  o f f e r  to B e r a r .  
I t  was a b l e  to do so not o n ly  b e ca use  the p r o v i n c i a l  
f i n a n c e s  were i n  a sound c o n d i t i o n ,  but  b ecause  i n  19^5 
the Government o f  I n d i a  had  g i v e n  the C e n t r a l  P r o v in c e s
4
a non- recu rr ing  grant  o f  R s .  9 lak h s .  B u t l e r  was aware
1
N A I , I n d i a n  P a p e r s ,  n o . 3 1 ,  1 9 ^ 5 ,  p . 4 0 6 ,  Sw atan tra  
H i n d u s t h a n  ( A m r a v a t i ) , 25  J u l y  1925*
2
N A I ,  K hap ard e  MS,  D i a r y ,  14  June  19 2 5 •
3
I b i d . ,  3 A ug ust  1 9 2 5 .
4
C P L C , v o l . l ,  n o . 3 ,  5 March  1 9 2 5 ,  p . 9 1 ;  i b i d . ,  v o l . l ,  
n o . 10 ,  17 March 1 9 2 5 ,  p . 475-
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o f  the resentm ent  i n  B e r a r  over  the g o ve r nm e nt ’ s f a i l u r e  
to implement the Sim r a t i o  and the S w a r a j i s t s ’ f a i l u r e  to 
form a m i n i s t r y .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  he d e c i d e d  to use  the 
grant  to r e c o n c i l e  B e rar  w i t h  the government.  I n  J u l y
1925  he set out on a tour o f  B e r a r
to f i n d  out on the s p o t ,  i f  r e a l l y  there  was 
scope fo r  a b i g  programme o f  w o r k . . . . G i v e n  
c e r t a i n  a d j u s t m e n t s ,  i t  seemed c l e a r  that  
money, at l e a s t  to make up most o f  B e r a r ’ s 
d e f i c i e n c y  un der  the ( Sim) s e t t l e m e n t ,  would  
be f o r t h c o m i n g . ^
B u t l e r  a p p a r e n t l y  found  s u f f i c i e n t  scope f o r  e x p e n d it u r e
i n  B e r a r ,  f o r  on  h i s  r e t u r n  he d e c i d e d  to earmark two
2
t h ird s  o f  the n o n - r e cu rr in g  grant  f o r  the t e r r i t o r y .  To
ensure  that the S w a r a j i s t s  o f  B e r ar  would  re spond
f a v o u r a b l y  to th is  d e c i s i o n ,  B u t l e r  a lso  u s e d  h i s  tour  to
w i n  the c o n f i d e n c e  o f  the p e o p l e .  D u r i n g  the to ur ,
B u t l e r  mixed f r e e l y  w i t h  the l e a d i n g  c i t i z e n s  o f  B e r a r ,
h i s  manner c o n t r a s t i n g  s t r o n g l y  w i t h  the more form al
s ty le  of  h i s  p r e d e c e s s o r ,  S i r  F r a n k  S l y ,  who had  a
r e p u t a t i o n  f o r  b e i n g  a ’ c o n s e r v a t i v e  by  temperament and
3
a b ur e a u c r a t  by  l i f e - l o n g  t r a i n i n g .  B u t l e r ’ s tour was 
a great  s u c c e s s ,  f o r  where S l y  had l e f t  resentm ent  and
4
s u s p i c i o n ,  B u t l e r  c re a te d  sympathy and g ood - w ill .
1
G P L C , v o l . l ,  n o . 1 ,  4 March  1 9 2 6 ,  p p . 3-4.
2
I b i d . ,  v o l . 2 ,  no . 1 ,  3 A u g u s t  1925  , p p . 173- 81 .
3
N A I , I n d i a n  P a p e r s ,  n o . 4 ,  1 9 2 5 ,  P P * 4 2 - 3 ,  H i t a v a d a  
(N a g p u r ) ,  21  J a n u a r y  1925»
4
N A I ,  K haparde  MS,  D i a r y ,  27  November 1 9 2 4 ;  i b i d . ,
11  December 1 9 2 4 .  See  a lso  H i  t a v a d a , 25 March  1 9 2 5 ,  P *9*
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B u t l e r ’ s success  was c l e a r l y  e v id e n t  i n  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  
he d e ve lop e d  w i t h  G . S .  K h a p a r d e ,  as  p o r t r a y e d  by  the 
l a t t e r  i n  h i s  d i a r y .  Two o f  K h a p a r d e ’ s e n t r i e s  were 
notew orthy  i n  this: r e s p e c t :
15 J u l y  - I  got e a r l y  through  th ings  that I  may
v i s i t  H is  E x c e l l e n c y  the G o v e r n o r . . . .
I  had  my i n t e r v i e w . . . .He was very  g lad  
to see me and sat t a l k i n g  fo r  over  
f i f t e e n  m i n u t e s . . . .We t a l k e d  o f  the 
B e r a r  land  revenue  b i l l  w hich  i s  at 
p r e s e n t  on the a n v i l .  He s a i d  he 
would  have  a t a l k  w i t h  me b e fo r e  
s e t t l i n g  about i t  f i n a l l y .
16 J u l y  - The f i r s t  t h i n g  to come up was an
i n v i t a t i o n  to d i n n e r  from the Governor .
I  a c c e p t e d  i t  o f  c o u r s e . . . . 1  sat to the 
r i g h t  o f  HE ( a n d ) . . . a f t e r  the l a d i e s  
r e t i r e d ,  S i r  Montagu B u t l e r  as k e d  me to 
s i t  near  him.  He ask ed  what the 
S w a r a j i s t s  would  d o . . . . ( a n d )  s a id  that  
he would  l i k e  to see me at N a g p u r . . .
I  ag r e e d  to c a l l  i n  on him t h e r e . ^
On h i s  r e t u r n  to Na gp ur ,  B u t l e r  o f f e r e d  the
S w a r a j i s t s  o f  B e rar  a n  o p p o r t u n i t y  to form a m i n i s t r y .
O n  3 A ug ust  1925  he came i n  p e r s o n  to the c o u n c i l  to
in fo r m  members that  he i n t e n d e d  to ’ i n v i t e  the le a d e rs
o f  the dominant p a r t y  amongst you to c o n fe r  w i t h  me
d u r i n g  the next few days on  the q u e s t i o n  o f  form in g  a 
, 2
m i n i s t r y ’ . T h i s  c o n f e r e n c e ,  h ow ever ,  f a i l e d  to produce  
a m i n i s t r y .  Two S w a r a j i s t  le a d e r s  - B . G .  Khaparde  o f  
B e r a r ,  and Rao from the H i n d i  d i s t r i c t s  - e x p re s se d  
i n t e r e s t  i n  B u t l e r ' s  o f f e r .  Dr Moonje  t r i e d  to p revent
1
N A I , K h ap ard e  MS ,  D i a r y ,  15 J u l y  1 9 2 5 ;  i b i d . ,  16 J u l y  
1 9 2 5 .
2
CPLC , v o l .  2 ,  no . 1 ,  3 A u g u s t  1925  , p .  6 .
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the two le a d e r s  from c om bin ing  by  o p p o s i n g  any c o o p e r a t io n  
w i t h  the government u n t i l  B r i t a i n  g r an t e d  a f u r t h e r  
in s ta lm e n t  o f  home r u l e  to I n d i a .  Rao was not o f  th i s  
o p i n i o n  and o f f e r e d  to form a m i n i s t r y  w i t h  B e r a r .  The  
S w a r a j i s t s  o f  B e r a r ,  h ow ever ,  r e f u s e d  to take R a o ' s  o f f e r  
s e r i o u s l y .  A c c o r d i n g  to the  H i t a v a d a
the H i n d i  S w a r a j i s t s  have  p r a c t i c a l l y  g i v e n  the 
B e rar  group a b l a n k  cheque i n  the matter  o f  
a c c e p t i n g  o f f i c e .  T he  B e r a r  group ( h o w e v e r ) . . .  
d id  not f e e l  c e r t a i n  about  the b o n a f i d e s  o f  
the p r o f e r r e d  he lp  and n a t u r a l l y  r e f u s e d  to r i d e  
f o r  a f a 1 1 . 2
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  some S w a r a j i s t s  from B e r a r  opposed  K h a p a r d e * s
l e a d e r s h ip  o f  the p a r t y  and th i s  f u r t h e r  c o m p l ic a te d  the
3
s i t u a t i o n .  As  a r e s u l t ,  Rao was f o r c e d  b ac k  into  
Dr  M o onje *s  arms,  and when  the two l e a d e r s ,  a l o n g  w i t h  
B . G .  K h a p a r d e , met B u t l e r  on  6-7 A u g u s t  1925  at 
Government H o u s e ,  they  d e c l i n e d  to accept  o f f i c e .  T h i s  
com pelled  K hap ard e  to ab a n d o n  h i s  p l a n s  to form a 
m i n i s t r y  and once a g a i n  i t  a p p e a re d  as i t  B u t l e r  would
4
have  to admit f a i l u r e .
B u t l e r ,  how ever ,  r e f u s e d  to le t  the matter  r e s t  
t h e r e ,  and w i t h i n  two months announced  the appointment  
o f  Tambe,  a form er  l e a d e r  o f  the B e rar  Swaraj  p a r t y  as
1
N L I , Moonje  MS,  L e t t e r  Pad 31» B . S .  Moonje  to 
Mr Prakasham ,  16 A u g u s t  1.925j i b i d . ,  L e t t e r  Pad 3 3 ,  
B . S .  Moonje  to Mr Sa d an a n d ,  12 June  1925«
2
H i t a v a d a „ 9 A u g u s t  1 9 2 5 ,  p . 6 .
3
I b i d . ,  13 A u g u s t  1 9 2 5 ,  p . 4.
4
CPLC, v o l . 2, n o . 4 ,  7 A u g u s t  1925, p . 4 l l .
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Home Member. D u r i n g  O c to b e r  1925  the Home membership ,  
h i t h e r t o  o c c u p ie d  by S i r  Moropant  J o s h i ,  f e l l  v a c a n t .  
B u t l e r  saw h i s  chance  to e l i c i t  n a t i o n a l i s t  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
i n  the Reforms and at the same time h e a l  the d i v i s i o n s  
i n  the p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  o f  the p r o v i n c e .  A c c o r d i n g l y  he 
o f f e r e d  the post  to Tambe,  who im m ed iate ly  a c c e p t e d  and 
so became the f i r s t  f o l l o w e r  o f  T i l a k  i n  w e s t e r n  I n d i a  
to p r a c t i c e  r e s p o n s i v e  c o o p e r a t i o n  as a member o f  a 
p r o v i n c i a l  g o v e r n m e n t .^  I n  a l l  p r o b a b i l i t y  Tambe 
a c c e p te d  the post  w i t h  the support  o f  h i s  S w a r a j i s t  
c o l l e a g u e s ,  who met him at K h ap a rd e  wada i n  A m ravati  on 
2 O c t o b e r ,  and who s i x  days  l a t e r  were p r e s e n t  at the
h i l l  s t a t i o n  o f  Pachmarhi  where Tambe f o r m a l l y  ac c e p te d
2
B u t l e r ’ s o f f e r .  On 17 December  1 9 2 5 ,  Tambe was
f o r m a lly  sworn i n  as Home Member at Government House  i n
3
Nagpur .
V
T a m b e ’ s ac c e p tan ce  o f  the Home Membership  com pletely  
a l t e r e d  the l i n e s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  d i v i s i o n  i n  the C e n tr a l  
P r o v in c e s  and B e r a r .  W i t h i n  a y e a r ,  a l l  p o l i t i c i a n s  - 
moderate  and n a t i o n a l i s t  - had  d i v i d e d  into  two groups :  
one group supported  the Congress  p o l i c y  o f  o b s t r u c t i o n
1
Views  o f  L o c a l  Governments  on  the w o r k in g  o f  the 
R e fo r m s ,  1 9 2 7 ,  o p . c i t . ,  p . 467-
2
N A I , K h ap arde  MS, D i a r y ,  2 O c to b e r  1 9 2 5 ;  i b i d . ,  9 
O c t o b e r  1 9 2 5 .
3
P i o n e e r , 19 December 1 9 2 5 ,  P *3 *
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i n  the c o u n c i l  and the ot h er  the p o l i c y  o f  r e s p o n s i v e  
c o o p e r a t io n  w i t h  the government .  Each  group thus had  a 
d i f f e r e n t  p l a t f o r m  on w h ich  to ap p e a l  to the e l e c t o r a t e .  
The  Congress  a p p e a le d  to the peop le  on the b a s i s  o f  i t s  
o p p o s i t i o n  to the government .  T hose  s u p p o r t in g  
r e s p o n s i v e  c o o p e r a t i o n  made the same a p p e a l ,  but  d e c l a r e d  
that  they would  advance  the i n t e r e s t s  o f  the p e o p le  at 
the same time.  R e s p o n s iv e  c o o p e r a t i o n  thus had  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  a p p e a l  f o r  the u r b a n  middle  c l a s s e s .  F o r ,  
they  r e a l i s e d  t h a t ,  were i t  s u c c e s s f u l ,  i t  would  enable  
them to p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  government and promote t h e i r  
i n t e r e s t s  and those  o f  the d i s t r i c t s  i n  w h ic h  they  
l i v e d .
F o l l o w i n g  T a m b e 's  ac c e p ta n c e  o f  o f f i c e ,  the 
S w a r a j i s t s  o f  B e r a r  moved to form a R e s p o n s iv e  C o o p e r a t io n  
p a r t y  to a t t a c k  the government and advance  the i n t e r e s t s  
o f  B e r a r .  I n  so d o i n g ,  they  hoped  to p e r s u a d e  the 
Congress  to r e c o g n i s e  r e s p o n s i v e  c o o p e r a t io n .  The  
n a t i o n a l i s t s  o f  B e rar  res p o n d e d  f a v o u r a b l y  to T a m b e ' s  
a c t i o n .  Among the n a t i o n a l i s t  ne w spapers ,  Udaya merely  
c h id e d  Tambe f o r  not r e s i g n i n g  from the Sw araj  p a r t y  
b e f o r e  a c c e p t i n g  o f f i c e ;  w h i l e  P r a ja p a k s h a  ' h e a r t i l y  
c o n g r a t u l a t e ( d ) ' him and had  'no h e s i t a t i o n  i n  p r e d i c t i n g  
that  h i s  tenure  o f  o f f i c e  w i l l  always be sym pathetic  
towards the p o p u la r  p a r t y ' . " * ” O f  the n a t i o n a l i s t  l e a d e r s ,
1
N A I , I n d i a n  P a p e r s ,  n o . 4 2 ,  1 9 2 5 ,  p . 5 8 0 ,  Udaya
( A m r a v a t i ) , 13 O c t o b e r  1 9 2 5 ;  i b i d . ,  p . 5 8 2 ,  P r a ja p a k s h a  
( A k o l a ) ,  13 O c t o b e r  1925 .
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t o o 5 G . S .  K haparde  was ' d i s p o s e d  to o v e r lo o k  (th e  
i n c i d e n t ) . . .w i t h  a mild  d i s c l a i m e r ' ; w h i l e  h i s  son  
B . G .  Khaparde  and o t h e r  S w a r a j i s t s  w rote  to Tambe 
c o n g r a t u l a t i n g  him on  h i s  ac c e p ta n c e  or  B u t l e r ' s  o f f e r .
The S w a r a j i s t s  o f  Berar  fo l l o w e d  these  e x p r e s s io n s  o f
o p i n i o n  w i t h  b o l d e r  p o s t u r e s .  On 25 O c to b e r  1 9 ^5  the
e x e c u t i v e  o f  the B e r a r  Sw araj  p a r t y  supported  r e s p o n s i v e
c o o p e r a t io n .  A nd  i n  December  A n e y  and Deshmukh r e s i g n e d
2
from t h e i r  p o s i t i o n s  i n  the Sw a ra j  p a r t y .  T h e s e  e v e n t s ,  
however ,  p roduced  no change  i n  the p o l i c y  o f  the A ll-  
I n d i a  Sw araj  p a r t y ,  w h ich  by  the end o f  19^5  was f u l l y  
merged w i t h  the C o n g r e s s .  T h i s  was e v ide n t  from the 
r e s o l u t i o n s  p a s s e d  at the an n u a l  s e s s i o n  o f  the I n d i a n  
N a t i o n a l  C ongress  i n  K anpur  i n  December .  T he se  
r e s o l u t i o n s  r e i t e r a t e d  the f a i t h  o f  the Congress  i n  c i v i l  
d i s o b e d i e n c e  and o b s t r u c t i o n ,  and d i r e c t e d  the S w a r a j i s t s  
to w a l k  out o f  the c o u n c i l s  i n  March  1926, i f  by  that  
time the government had  not r e p l i e d  to t h e i r  demand for  
s e l f  government fo r  I n d i a .  The S w a r a j i s t s  o f  B e r a r  thus 
r e a l i s e d  that they  had  f a i l e d  to change the p o l i c y  o f  the 
C o n g r e s s .  As  a r e s u l t  at Yeotmal  on  10 J a n u a r y  1926  they  
d e c i d e d  to a b o l i s h  the B e r a r  Swaraj  p a r t y  by  r e s i g n i n g
3
from i t  en masse.  S h o r t l y  a f t e r w a r d s  many S w a r a j i s t s
1
N A I , K hap ard e  MS, D i a r y ,  18 O c to b e r  1 9 2 5 ;  H i t a v a d a ,
29  Octob er  1 9 2 5 ,  p . 4.
2
Pio neer  9 28 O c to b e r  1925?  P • 6 °ÿ N A I ,  Home P o l l ,  F-112 ,
1 9 2 5 ,  FR , Second  H a l f  o f  November 1 9 2 5 ,  P » l ;  H i t a v a d a ,
3 December 1 9 2 5 ,  p . 6.
3
P i o n e e r 9 13 J a n u a r y  1 9 2 6 ,  p . 7? N A I ,  K h ap ard e  MS, D i a r y ,
11 J a n u a r y  I 926 .
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from B e rar  r e s i g n e d  t h e i r  seats  i n  the C o u n c i l  and 
c o n t e s t e d  b y - e le c t io n s  on  a p l a t f o r m  o f  r e s p o n s i v e  
c o o p e r a t io n .  A l l  members were suc c essfu l . " * ” A s  a r e s u l t ,  
they  warmly supported  a p r o p o s a l  to form a R e s p o n s iv e  
C o o p e r a t io n  p a r t y  i n  w e s t e r n  I n d i a ,  and agreed  to meet 
at A k o l a  i n  F e b r u a r y  1926  f o r t h a t  p u r p o s e .
I n  the d i v i s i o n  o f  N a gp u r ,  the p o s i t i o n  was somewhat 
d i f f e r e n t .  There  T a m b e 's  a c t i o n  le d  to a d i v i s i o n  o f  
the n a t i o n a l i s t s  into  two group s :  one ,  led  by  Dr M o o n je ,  
w h ich  supported  r e s p o n s i v e  c o o p e r a t io n ;  and an o th e r  w hich  
rem ained  l o y a l  to the C ongress  and was led  by  a former  
l i e u t e n a n t  o f  M o o n j e ' s ,  Moreshwar  A b h y a n k e r .  A 
M a h a r a s h t r i a n  Brahman,  A b h y a n k e r  was b o r n  i n  1886  into  
a p r o f e s s i o n a l  and lan d ed  f a m il y  at Dhanodi  Bahadur  i n  
the d i s t r i c t  o f  W ardha .  I n  1 9 0 4 ,  a f t e r  a n  i n d i f f e r e n t  
r e c o r d  at p r im ary  and second ary  s c h o o l ,  A b h y a n ke r  went 
to E n g l a n d  to study  law .  F i v e  years  l a t e r ,  he was c a l l e d  
to the B a r ,  and he r e t u r n e d  to I n d i a  to commence p r a c t i c e  
i n  Nagp ur .  T h e r e  he came un de r  the i n f l u e n c e  o f  Dr  Moonje  
and j o i n e d  the N a t i o n a l i s t  p a r t y  o f  Lokamanya T i l a k .  I n  
1 916  A b h y a n k e r ,  th e n  an  eminent law y er ,  a c c e p t e d  T i l a k
2
as h i s  ' p o l i t i c a l  guru* and j o i n e d  the Home R u l e  L ea g u e .  
L i k e  many o f  the staunch  f o l l o w e r s  o f  the Lokamanya,  
A b h y a n ke r  v i g o r o u s l y  opposed  Gandhi  and the r e s o l u t i o n  
on  no n- cooperat ion  at the an n u a l  s e s s i o n  o f  the Congress  
at Nagpur i n  1 9 2 0 .  A g a i n ,  a l t h o u g h  he suspended  p r a c t i c e
1
N A I , I n d i a n  P a p e r s ,  no . 9 > 1 9 2 6 ,  p . 99» P r a ja p a k s h a  ( A k o l a ) ,  
28 F e b r u ar y  1 9 2 6 .
2
N. A b h y a n k e r ,  W a s h i s t e c h e  P a n i :  A r t h a t  N a r k e s a r i  
A b h y a n ke r  ( N a g p u r , n . d . ) , p . 1 1 5 •
M .V .  A bhyanker
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i n  1921 , he d id  so u n w i l l i n g l y  and ' c o n t i n u a l l y  t r i e d  to 
m odify  the s c h e m e ' . ^ D u r i n g  1922  A b h y a n k e r  c o n t in u e d  to 
oppose G a n d h i ,  and a f t e r  the an n u a l  s e s s i o n  o f  the 
Congress  at Gaya j o i n e d  the S w a r a j y a  p a r t y .  I n  1 9 2 4 ,  
f o l l o w i n g  a s u c c e s s f u l  e l e c t i o n  cam paign ,  he took  h i s  
seat  i n  the C e n t r a l  L e g i s l a t i v e  A s s em b ly  as the 
S w a r a j i s t  member fo r  the d i v i s i o n  o f  Nagpur .
A b h y a n k e r ' s  e l e c t i o n  to the A s s em b ly  r e f l e c t e d  a 
r i v a l r y  w i t h  Moonje  that  r e a c h e d  a c l im ax  i n  1925  when 
Tambe j o i n e d  the government .  T h i s  r i v a l r y  f i r s t  became
m an ife st  when each  d e s i r e d  to r e p r e s e n t  Nagpur  i n  the
2
C e n t r a l  L e g i s l a t i v e  A s s e m b ly .  The c e n t r a l  e x e c u t i v e  o f
the Congress  s e t t l e d  the matter  by  c h o o s in g  A b h y a n k e r ,
a d e c i s i o n  w h i c h  seemed to i n d i c a t e  that  i t  r e g a r d e d
A b h y a n k e r  and  not Moonje  as i t s  l e a d i n g  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e
i n  the c i t y ,  and w h ic h  p r o b a b l y  f u r t h e r  e x a c e r b a t e d
r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  the two men. The  p e r s o n a l i t i e s  o f  the
two le ad e r s  a lso  d i v i d e d  them - Dr M o o n je ,  v i r i l e  and
a g g r e s s i v e ;  and A b h y a n k e r ,  proud  and commanding,  u n w i l l i n g
3
to act  as a s u b o r d in a t e  to Dr M o onje .  T h e i r  e x p e r i e n c e  
as S w a r a j i s t s  w i d e n e d  the r i f t .  Dr  Moonje  supported  
r e s p o n s i v e  c o o p e r a t i o n ;  w h i l e  A b h y a n k e r ,  p o s s i b l y  un der  
the i n f l u e n c e  o f  M o t i l a l  Nehru  i n  the A s s e m b ly ,  s t r o n g l y  
fa v o u re d  the p o l i c y  o f  o b s t r u c t i o n .  T h u s ,  s h o r t l y  a f t e r
1
N A I , Home P o l l ,  F -66,  KW X I ,  1 9 2 4 ,  A G e n e r a l  H i s t o r y  o f  
M . V .  A b h y a n k e r ,  p . l .
2
A b h y a n k e r ,  op.  c i t . ,  p . 2 1 8 .
3
See H i t a v a d a , 6 J a n u a r y  1 9 3 ^ ,  p . 7*
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Gokhale  th in k s  that  A b h y a n k e r  o f  Nagpur  has 
become an  out and out G a n d h y ite  and -will g ive  
us a good d e a l  o f  t r o u b l e .  He i s  a n  adm irer  
o f  P a n d it  M o t i l a l  Nehru and d e a d ^ a g a i n s t  
R e s p o n s iv e  c o o p e r a t i o n  o f  T i l a k .
K h a p a r d e ' s p r o g n o s is  proved  c o r r e c t .  I n  the storm that
f o l l o w e d  Tambe*s  ac c e p ta n c e  o f  o f f i c e ,  A b h y a n ke r  went
on the 'w ar  p a t h * , as  Moonje  d e s c r i b e d  i t ,  ' to  k i l l  the
2
p o i s o n  l e f t  as le g ac y  b y . . . t h e  great  L o k a m a n y a ' . I n
d o in g  so ,  A b hya nke r  condemned not o n ly  Tambe,  but  also
Dr Moonje  f o r  t a c i t l y  s u p p o r t in g  T a m b e 's  act o f
3
c o o p e r a t io n  w i t h  the government.
F o l l o w i n g  the Congress  at Kanpur  i n  1925  the 
estrangement  b e tw e e n  A b h y a n k e r  and Moonje  and t h e i r  
r e s p e c t i v e  f o l l o w e r s  became com plete .  E a r l y  i n  1926  
Dr  Moonje  w ithdrew  from the Sw araj  p a r t y  and r e s i g n e d
4
the seat  o f  Nagpur  i n  the L e g i s l a t i v e  C o u n c i l .  A 
b y - e l e c t i o n  f o r  the seat  f o l l o w e d  almost im m e d ia te ly ,  and 
b o t h  the Congress  and the r e s p o n s i v e  c oop erators  f i e l d e d  
c a n d i d a t e s .  A b h y a n ke r  and Moonje  c l a s h e d  v i o l e n t l y ,  
but  as 'A b hy ank e r  was swimming on the h i g h  t id e  o f  
C ong ress  p r e s t i g e '  and had  the a s s i s t a n c e  o f  ' P a n d i t  
M o t i l a l . . . n o n  Brahmins  and even  the M uh am m ad an s ' , the
Tambe j o i n e d  government i n  1925»  K hap ard e  noted  that
1
N A I , K haparde  MS, D i a r y ,  24  November 1925«
2
N L I , Moonje  MS,  L e t t e r  Pad 3 ^ ,  B . S .  Moonje  to N a r s o p a n t ,
17 November 19 25 •
3
A b h y a n k e r ,  op.  c i t . ,  p . 2 4 6 .
4
H i t a v a d a , 14 J a n u a r y  1 9 2 6 ,  p . 3» N L I ,  Moonje  MS,
D i a r y  I ,  13 J a n u a r y  1 9 2 6 .
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Congress  won the s e a t .  F o l l o w i n g  the v i c t o r y  A bhyanker  
h e l d  ' c o n g r a t u l a t o r y  m e e t i n g s '  and denounced  Moonje  as 
' d i s h o n e s t  and a t r a i t o r  to the C o n g r e s s ’ , but  the 
l a t t e r  was a l r e a d y  on h i s  way to A k o l a  to p a r t i c i p a t e
2
i n  the f o r m a t i o n  o f  the R e s p o n s iv e  C o o p e r a t io n  p a r t y .
The  f o r m a t i o n  o f  the R e s p o n s iv e  C o o p e r a t io n  p a r t y  at
A k o l a  on 14-15 F e b r u a r y  1 9 2 6  s e a le d  the d i v i s i o n  b e tw e e n
the R e s p o n s i v i s t s , on  the one h a n d ,  and the S w a r a j i s t s
or Congressmen ,  on  the o t h e r .  N a t i o n a l i s t s  from three
main  are a s  came to A k o l a .  T h e s e  were the former
S w a r a j i s t s  from Nagpur  le d  by  Dr  M o onje ;  those  from
Berar  un der  B . G .  K h a p a r d e ;  and those  from the p r o v in c e
o f  Bombay un der  the l e a d e r s h i p  o f  N .C  K e l k a r  and
M .R .  J a y a k e r ,  a l e a d i n g  law yer  i n  Bombay c i t y .  As  a
r e s u l t  o f  t h e i r  d i s c u s s i o n s ,  the n a t i o n a l i s t s  ag re e d  to
set up a R e s p o n s iv e  C o o p e r a t io n  p a r t y  w i t h  p r o v i s i o n  fo r
s e p e r ate  branch es  i n  the a r e a s  r e p r e s e n t e d  at the
3
c o n f e r e n c e .  The  p o l i c y  o f  r e s p o n s i v e  c o o p e r a t i o n  
f i g u r e d  p r o m in e n t ly  i n  the m anifesto  o f  the new p a r t y  
drawn  up at A k o l a .  The  m an ife sto  d e c l a r e d :
1
N L I , Moonje  MS,  D i a r y  I ,  2 - 1 3 ( ? )  F e b r u a r y  1 9 2 6 .  The  
Congress  c a n d i d a t e  N . R .  U d h o j i  p o l l e d  1 , 3 2 4  v o t e s ;  and 
the R e s p o n s i v i s t  B . S .  N i y o g i  1 , 1 3 3 *  O n l y  50 p e r  cent o f  
the e l e c t o r a t e  voted .
2
I b i d . ,  16 F e b r u a r y  1 9 2 6 .
3
The  P r e s i d e n t  o f  the R e s p o n s i v e  C o o p e r a t io n  p a r t y  was 
M .R .  J a y a k e r ;  the V ic e - p r e s i d e n t  J .  B a p t i s t a ;  G e n e r a l  
S e c r e t a r y  D . V .  G o k h a le ;  and as S e c r e t a r i e s  o f  the 
d i v i s i o n  o f  N a gp ur ,  B e r a r ,  and  M a h a r a s h t ra  r e s p e c t i v e l y  
Dr M .R .  C h o l k a r ,  B . G .  K h a p a r d e ,  and L . B .  B h o p a tk a r .
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We b e l i e v e  that  the b e s t  c ourse  un de r  the 
pre s e n t  c irc um stan ce s  i s  that  o f  R e s p o n s iv e  
C o o p e r a t io n  w h ic h  means w o r k in g  the Reform s ,  
u n s a t i s f a c t o r y ,  d i s a p p o i n t i n g  and in a d e q u a t e  
as they a r e ,  f o r  a l l  they  are  w orth ;  and 
u s i n g  the same f o r  a c c e l e r a t i n g  the grant  o f  
f u l l  r e s p o n s i b l e  government and a lso  f o r  
c r e a t i n g  i n  the meanwhile  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  fo r  
the peop le  f o r  a d v a n c in g  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  and 
s t r e n g t h e n i n g  t h e i r  power and r e s i s t a n c e  to 
i n j u s t i c e  and m i s r u l e . ^
F o l l o w i n g  the c o n f e r e n c e ,  the R e s p o n s i v i s t s  e s t a b l i s h e d  
br an c h e s  o f  the p a r t y  i n  the M a r a t h i  r e g i o n  o f  the C e n tr a l  
P r o v in c e s  and B e r a r .  D i s c u s s i o n  b e t w e e n  M o t i l a l  Nehru  
and the R e s p o n s i v i s t s  fo l l o w e d  i n  A p r i l  1926  on the 
q u e s t i o n  o f  a n  a l l i a n c e  b e tw e e n  the new p a r t y  and the 
C ong ress .  T h e se  d i s c u s s i o n s  f a i l e d ,  how ever ,  and the 
R e s p o n s i v i s t s  com pleted  t h e i r  b r e a k  w i t h  the Congress  by 
j o i n i n g  the N a t i o n a l  p a r t y ,  newly  formed by M a l a v i y a  to
2
u n i t e  a l l  p o l i t i c i a n s  who supported  r e s p o n s i v e  c o o p e r a t io n .
Ta m b e ’ s a c c e p tan ce  o f  o f f i c e  also  paved  the way f o r  
the c r e a t i o n  o f  two o p p o sin g  n a t i o n a l i s t  p a r t i e s  i n  the 
H i n d i  r e g i o n .  T h e s e  were the I n d i a n  N a t i o n a l  Congress  
un der  Se th  Govind  D a s ,  and the In d e p e n d e n t  Congress  ’ p a r t y ' *
1
I n d i a n  R e v i e w , 1 9 2 6 ,  v o l . 2 7 ,  n o . 4 ,  p . 273*
2
I b i d . ,  1 9 2 6 ,  v o l . 2 7 ,  n o . 4 ,  p . 265*
#
The In d e p e n d e n t  Congress  ’ p a r t y ’ was the f i r s t  o f  many 
s i m i l a r  groups w h ich  were not p a r t i e s  i n  the u s u a l  sense .  
T h e se  ’ p a r t i e s ’ were temporary phenomena ,  formed e i t h e r  
b e f o r e  an  e l e c t i o n  to d e f e a t  a n  o p p o s i n g  group ,  or a f t e r  
an  e l e c t i o n  to g iv e  them power to manoeuvre i n  the 
l e g i s l a t u r e .  They  had  no in d e p e n d e n t  e x i s t e n c e  o u t s id e  
the l e g i s l a t u r e .  Such  ’ p a r t i e s ’ w i l l  h e r e a f t e r  be 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from the more t r a d i t i o n a l  p a r t i e s  such  as 
the Congress  or the R e s p o n s iv e  C o o p e r a t io n  p a r t y  by  the 
use  of  i n v e r t e d  commas.
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led  by  Raghavendra  R a o . The former a p p e a l e d  to the
p e o p le  on  the p o l i c y  o f  o b s t r u c t i o n  i n  the C o u n c i l ;  and
the l a t t e r  on i t s  o p p o s i t i o n  to the government and
p rom otion  o f  r e g i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s .  R a o ' s  ’ p a r t y '  had  a
p a r t i c u l a r  ap p eal  f o r  the u r b a n  m iddle  c l a s s e s  of  the
H i n d i  r e g i o n ,  fo r  he formed i t  at a time when the t id e
o f  resentm ent  a g a in s t  the government and  the M a rath i
r e g i o n  f o r  n e g l e c t i n g  the H i n d i  r e g i o n  was r u n n in g  h i g h .
T h i s  resentment  mounted s t e a d i l y  b e tw e e n  1921- 6 ,  and
was a r t i c u l a t e d  through  p u b l i c  m e e t in g s ,  debates  i n  the
2
l e g i s l a t u r e  and the columns o f  the H i n d i  p r e s s .  The  
resentm ent  sprang  from the str o n g  b e l i e f  o f  many H i n d i  
le a d e r s  that
the n e g le c t  o f  the H i n d i  d i s t r i c t s  commenced about 
the b e g i n n i n g  o f  S i r  F r a n k  S l y ' s  government and 
at the end o f  i t  a t t a i n e d  f u l l  b l o o m . . . .As  the 
M arath a  Brahmans were h o l d i n g  the r o p e s ,  they 
were g iv e n  the plums and prunes  o f  o f f i c e ;  and 
the needs o f  a l l  the areas  where  the Maratha  
element p redom inated  r e c e i v e d  very  courteous  
t r e a t m e n t . . .  .The  H i n d i - s p e a k i n g  ar e a s  were sent 
to the d e v i l . . . .No attempt was p a i d  to the 
development o f  i n d u s t r i e s ;  n o t h in g  was done f o r  
the e x p a n s io n  o f  p r im ary  e d u c a t i o n  and no steps  
were taken  to lay  out good roads  to a f f o r d  means 
o f  com munication ,  and no new sc hools  or c o l l e g e s  
were e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  the north  to g iv e  h i g h e r  and 
secondary  e d u c a t i o n .
1
H i t a v a d a , 22 J u l y  1 9 2 5 ,  p . 6.
2
C P L C , v o l . I ,  3 March 1 9 2 1 ,  p . 1 5 5 ;  i b i d . ,  21  March  1 9 2 1 ,  
p . 5 7 6 ;  i b i d . ,  v o l . I ,  3 March 1922»  p p . l 6 l - 4 ;  i b i d . ,  v o 1 . 2 ,
12 September  1 9 2 2 ,  p p . 487- 8 ;  H i t a v a d a , 9 Aug ust  1 9 2 5 ,  P * 8 ;  
i b i d . ,  22 O c tob e r  1 9 2 5 ,  p . 6.
3
N A I , I n d i a n  P a p e r s ,  n o . 3 ,  1 9 2 6 ,  p p . 37-8 ,  Lokm itra  
( C h h i n d w a r a ) , 16 Ja n u a r y  1 9 2 6 ;  i b i d . ,  no. 4 ,  1 9 2 6 ,  p p .4 9 - 5 0 ,  
Lokm itra  ( C h h i n d w a r a ) ,  23 Ja n u a r y  1 9 2 6 .
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Resentment  i n c r e a s e d  s t i l l  f u r t h e r  i n  A ug ust  1925  when 
S w a r a j i s t s  from the d i v i s i o n s  o f  Nagpur  and B e r a r  j o i n e d  
to geth er  to prevent  Rao from fo r m in g  a m i n i s t r y .  And  
when S i r  Montagu  B u t l e r  a p p o i n t e d  Tambe,  a M a r a t h i ,  as 
Home Member i n  O c tob e r  the l e a d e r s  o f  the r e g i o n  
e x p l o d e d :
They  f i n d  to t h e i r  great  amazement and r e g r e t  
that appointment  o f  Home Member,  i n s t e a d  o f  
g o in g  to H i n d i  d i s t r i c t s  has  a g a i n  gone to the 
w i l d s  o f  B e r a r . . . . I t  i s  not un d e r s to o d  why 
Berar  is  always  g i v e n  s p e c i a l  prominence  i n  the 
s e l e c t i o n  o f  an  e x e c u t i v e  c o u n c i l l o r . . . .  The  
people  o f  the C e n t r a l  P r o v in c e s  are  e n t i t l e d  to 
say that  they  r e f u s e  to be governed  by a c a b in e t  
w hich  c o n s i s t s  o f  p e o p le  who are  incompetent  and 
who have  no knowledge  o f  the p r o v i n c e .
A c c o r d i n g l y ,  some H i n d i  l e a d e r s  demanded that the r e g i o n  
be s e p arate d  from Berar  and j o i n  the U n it e d  P r o v in c e s
3
to ’ g a i n  a h e a r i n g ' .
W h i l e  th is  tempest was at i t s  h e i g h t ,  B u t l e r  t r i e d  
hard  to l i n k  tile H i n d i  r e g i o n  w i t h  the government .  I n  
so d o in g  he took a somewhat d i f f e r e n t  l i n e  from S i r  Frank  
S l y .  T here  were those who b e l i e v e d  that
S i r  F r a n k  c h e r is h e d  the i d e a  that the M a rath i  
Brahmans were f a r  more p o l i t i c a l l y - m i n d e d  than  
the p e op le  o f  the H i n d i - s p e a k i n g  d i s t r i c t s ;  and 
that  there  would  be l e s s  p o l i t i c a l  tr o u ble  i f  the 
M arathas  were p l a c a t e d  i n  one form or o t h e r . 4
1
CPLC, v o l . 2 ,  n o .5»  8 A ug ust  1 9 2 5 ,  p p . 4 67- 514 .
2
H i t a v a d a , 22 O c tob e r  1 9 2 5 ,  p . 6 .
3
I b i d . ,  p . 4 ;  29 O c tob e r  1 9 2 5 ,  P-7-
4
N A I , I n d i a n  P a p e r s ,  n o . 4 ,  1 9 2 6 ,  p p . 49- 50 ,  Lokm itra  
( C h h in d w a r a ) ,  23 J a n u a r y  1 9 2 6 .
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Fo r  B u t l e r ,  how ever ,  the work o f  a Governor  i n v o lv e d
more than  the m aintenance  o f  law and o r d e r .  D u r i n g  h i s
term o f  o f f i c e  he attempted  to a s s o c i a t e  the important
l e a d e r s ,  groups and are a s  o f  the p r o v in c e  w i t h  the work
o f  government.  I n  so d o in g  he s t a b i l i s e d  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e
i n  the C e n tr a l  P r o v in c e s  and B e r a r .  He also  pe rsuad e d
n a t i o n a l i s t s  to work  the re form ed  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  and thus
h e lp e d  the p r o v in c e  to p ass  from c o n t r o l  by  B r i t i s h
o f f i c i a l s  to a s t a t e  o f  r e a d i n e s s  f o r  p r o v i n c i a l  autonomy
under  I n d i a n  r u l e .  B u t l e r ' s  c h o ice  o f  Tambe as Home
Member was the f i r s t  step i n  the im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  th is
p o l i c y .  So f a r  as the H i n d i  r e g i o n  was c o n c e r n e d ,  B u t l e r
i n i t i a t e d  th i s  p o l i c y  f o l l o w i n g  the appointment  o f
Tambe. Betw een  December 19^5  and Ja nua ry  1926  he toured
the r e g i o n ,  i n v e s t i g a t i n g  i t s  problems and m eeting  i t s
l e a d e r s .  B u t l e r  found  the r e g i o n  b a d l y  i n  need o f
p u b l i c  works ,  and  on  h i s  r e t u r n  set to work to see what
2
c ould  be done to ease  the s i t u a t i o n .  F i n d i n g  that  the 
f i n a n c e s  o f  the p r o v i n c e  were sound enough to g iv e  Berar  
her  share  under  the Sim r a t i o ,  B u t l e r  d e c i d e d  to w ithdraw  
the non- recurr ing  grant  from Berar  and a l l o c a t e  i t  
c om pletely  to the C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  on
4 March  1926  he came to the c o u n c i l  to announce the
3
r e - a l l o c a t i o n  o f  the g ra n t .  A t  the same time B u t l e r  
ar r a n g e d  to send the grant fo r  the m i n i s t e r s '  s a l a r i e s
1
NML, The P r i v a t e  Papers  o f  Dr  E .  R ag havend ra  Rao 
( h e r e a f t e r  c i t e d  as Rao M S ) ,  S i r  M. B u t l e r  to E . R .  R a o ,  
24  F e b r u a r y  1935*
2
See p . 1 3 9 •
3
CPLC, v o l . l ,  n o . 1 ,  4 March 1 9 2 6 ,  p p . 5-6
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to the c o u n c i l  Tor the t h i r d  time.  He d id  so w i t h  an 
eye on the H i n d i  S w a r a j i s t s ,  many o f  whom were r e p o r t e d  
to be 'w a v e r i n g  ( and)  . . .  l o o k i n g  f o r  a s u i t a b l e  o p p o r t u n i t y  
to r e p u d ia t e  t h e i r  a l l e g i a n c e  to the party ' . "* "
The d e c i s i o n  o f  the Congress  that  the S w a r a j i s t s  
should  leave  the c o u n c i l s ,  h ow e ve r ,  t e m p o r a r i ly  thwarted  
B u t l e r ' s  p l a n  to b r i n g  the H i n d i  le a d e r s  into  the 
government.  As  the Government o f  I n d i a  had  not resp onded  
to the S w a r a j i s t s '  demand f o r  s e l f  government ,  the 
A l l - I n d i a  Congress  Committee o r d e r e d  S w a r a j i s t s  to leave  
the l e g i s l a t u r e s  i n  a l l  p r o v i n c e s .  R a o , who had  b e e n  
e l e c t e d  le a d e r  o f  the c o u n c i l  Sw araj  p a r t y  i n  the C o u n c i l
a f t e r  Dr Moonje  r e s i g n e d  the p o s t ,  r e c e i v e d  h i s  o r d e r  on
- 2
8 March  1 9 2 6 .  At  f i r s t  he r e f u s e d  to obey the o r d e r ,
but  d e c l i n i n g  support i n  the l e g i s l a t u r e  com pelled  him
to lead  the S w a r a j i s t s  from the c o u n c i l  chamber.  B e fore
he d id  so ,  the Swaraj  p a r t y  r e j e c t e d  the grant  f o r  the
m i n i s t e r s '  s a l a r i e s  and thus w recked  the M a r a th i
3
R e s p o n s i v i s t s ' chances  o f  fo rm in g  a m i n i s t r y .  W i t h  the
s a l a r i e s  r e j e c t e d  and more than  h a l f  the members absent
from the c o u n c i l ,  there  was l i t t l e  that B u t l e r  c ould  do
but  prorogue  the l e g i s l a t u r e  and take over  the
k
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  the t r a n s f e r r e d  s u b j e c t s .
1
N A I , I n d i a n  P a p e r s ,  n o . 1 5 ,  1 9 2 6 ,  p . 1 5 6 ,  L okm itra  
( C h h i n d w a r a ) , 10 A p r i l  1 9 2 6 .
2
P i o n e e r , 10 March  1 9 2 6 ,  p . 7*
3
I b i d . ,  p . 7 ;  CPLC,  v o l . l ,  N o . 5 ,  9 March 1 9 2 6 ,  p p . 266- 88 .
4
H i t a v a d a , 26  A p r i l  1 9 2 6 ,  p . 7*
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W i t h i n  three  months Rao had  r esponded  to B u t l e r ' s
i n i t i a t i v e s  by form in g  the In d e p e n d e n t  Congress  ’ p a r t y ’ i n
the H i n d i  r e g i o n .  The  membership o f  the ’ p a r t y ’ comprised
those  S w a r a j i s t s  who d e s i r e d  to accept  o f f i c e  i n  the
government h o p i n g  thereby  to advance  s e l f  government and
promote the i n t e r e s t s  o f  the H i n d i  r e g i o n .  The  H i n d i
Swaraj  p a r t y  had  long  b e e n  d i v i d e d  on  the i s s u e  o f
a c c e p t i n g  o f f i c e . ' * ’ I n  1926  the d i f f e r e n c e s  b e tw e e n  the
S w a r a j i s t s  who fa v o u r e d  o b s t r u c t i o n  and those  who
supported  r e s p o n s i v e  c o o p e r a t i o n  came to a head  over  the
choice  o f  c a n d i d a t e s  to r e p r e s e n t  the Swaraj  p a r t y  at
the fo r th co m ing  e l e c t i o n s  to the l e g i s l a t u r e .  The
P r o v i n c i a l  Congress  Committee,  w h ich  was i n  the hands
2
o f  the o b s t r u c t i o n i s t s ,  opposed  the nominees o f  Rao .
A c c o r d i n g l y ,  i n  J u l y  1926  Rao r e s i g n e d  from the Swaraj
3
p a r t y  and formed the In d e p e n d e n t  Congress  ’ p a r t y ’ . The 
programme o f  the new ’ p a r t y ’ was s i m i l a r  to that  o f  the 
R e s p o n s iv e  C o o p e r a t io n  p a r t y  o f  the M a r a th i  r e g i o n .  As 
Rao s a i d ,
W e . . . o p i n e  that  the p r e s e n t  p o l i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n  
i n  the c oun try  w arrants  a m o d i f i c a t i o n  o f  the 
programme w h ich  Congress  c h a lk e d  out at Cawnpore 
to secure  more e f f e c t i v e  c o o r d i n a t i o n  o f  o p i n i o n  
i n  th is  p r o v i n c e . . . .The  p o l i c y  o f  o b s t r u c t i o n . . .  
should  be p ursue d  h a v i n g  r e g ar d  to the v e r d i c t  
o f  e l e c t o r a t e  throughout  the c o u n t r y . . . . (We) are
1
Views  o f  L o c a l  Governments on  the W orking  o f  the R eform s ,
1 9 2 7 ,  op. c i t . ,  p . 4 6 7 ;  N L I , Moonje  MS,  L e t t e r  Pad 2 9 ,
B . S .  Moonje  to M. N e h r u ,  7 A p r i l  1925*
2
H i t a v a d a , 9 May 1 9 2 6 ,  p p . 6 ,  7 ;  N L I ,  Moonje  MS,  D i a r y  1,
12 J u l y  1 9 2 6 .
3
P i o n e e r , 4 A u g u s t  1926 , p . 6 .
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o f  o p i n i o n  that  u n l e s s  and u n t i l  Congressmen 
are  r e t u r n e d  i n  a m a j o r i t y  i n  two of* the major 
p r o v i n c e s ,  the C e n t r a l  P r o v in c e s  a lo ne  should  
not be h a r n e s s e d  to a n  o b s t r u c t i v e  program m e .^
And  on t h is  s tatem ent ,  Rao went to the e l e c t o r a t e .
V I
V oters  i n  the M a r a th i  r e g i o n  behaved  somewhat 
d i f f e r e n t l y  from those  i n  the H i n d i  r e g i o n  at the 
e l e c t i o n s  to the p r o v i n c i a l  l e g i s l a t u r e  i n  November
1 9 2 6 .  I n  the M a ra th i  r e g i o n  the voters  s t r o n g ly  
f a v o u r e d  the n a t i o n a l i s t  programme o f  the R e s p o n s iv e  
C o o p e r a t io n  p a r t i e s .  I n  the H i n d i  r e g i o n  they showed a 
p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  the programme o f  the I n d i a n  N a t i o n a l  
C o n g r e s s .  The  r i v a l  n a t i o n a l i s t  p a r t i e s  i n  the M a rath i  
r e g i o n  b e g a n  t h e i r  e l e c t i o n  campaigns i n  Ju n e .  I n  the 
d i v i s i o n  o f  Nagpur  the Congress  and the R e s p o n s iv e  
C o o p e r a t io n  p a r t y  b a t t l e d  w i t h  each  other  to w i n  the 
support o f  the e l e c t o r a t e .  The  le ad e r s  o f  the r i v a l  
p a r t i e s  were A b h y a n ke r  f o r  the Congress  and Moonje  fo r  
the R e s p o n s iv e  C o o p e r a t io n  p a r t y ,  and both  fought  a 
v ig orous  cam paign  i n  w h ich  n e i t h e r  ask ed  nor r e c e i v e d  
any q u a r t e r .  The  f o l l o w i n g  rep ort  i l l u s t r a t e s  the v ig o u r  
w i t h  w hich  the two le ad e r s  fough t  the campaign :
Dr Moonje  and A b h ya nke r  are  the two dominant 
f i g u r e s . . . . O n  one o c c a s i o n  t h e i r  coming to geth er  
at the same m eeting  was very  d ram atic .  Dr  Moonje  
and h i s  sup p orters  had  ju s t  a d d r e s s e d  a g a t h e r i n g  
and warned  a g a in s t  A b h y a n k e r  who was e xp e c te d  to
1
P i o n e e r , 4 A u g u s t  1 9 2 6 ,  p . 6 .
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come i n  a couple  o f  d ay s ,  when lo and b e h o ld  
Mr A b h y a n k e r  was t h e r e ,  h a v i n g  to r n  h i s  way down 
by  a motor car  from a very  long  d i s t a n c e .  . . .
Jum ping  up on the p l a t f o r m  he c h a l l e n g e d  the 
statements  o f  h i s  r i v a l  p a r t y ’ s sp eaker  and 
e ncouraged  by  the a u d i e n c e ,  w h ich  always  enjoys  
s e n s a t i o n a l  t h e a t r i c a l i t i e s ,  he har a n g u e d  the 
R e s p o n s i v i s t s  down. T he  m eeting  resumed the 
f o l l o w i n g  d a y . l
D e s p i t e  A b h y a n k e r ’ s energy  and b i t t e r  condem nation  
o f  the R e fo rm s ,  the e l e c t o r s  o f  the d i v i s i o n  o f  Nagpur 
voted  s t r o n g l y  f o r  the R e s p o n s iv e  C o o p e r a t io n  p a r t y .
T h i s  was due to the ad v a n ta g es  w h ich  Dr  Moonje  had  over 
h i s  opponents  i n  the C ong ress .  I t  was Moonje  and not
A b h y a n k e r ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  who i n h e r i t e d  the 'c r e am  o f  the
2
Swaraj  p a r t y  a n d . . . t h e  l a t t e r ' s  s p l e n d id  o r g a n i s a t i o n ' .
I t  was M o o n je ,  too ,  who c o n t r o l l e d  the P r o v i n c i a l  Congress  
Committee and who use d  the body  to r u n  the e l e c t i o n s  for
3
the b e n e f i t  o f  h i s  own p a r t y .  Moonje  a lso  e x p l o i t e d  
the d i f f e r e n c e s  b e tw e e n  the ' t h o r o u g h l y  i r r a t i o n a l '  
p o l i c y  o f  o b s t r u c t i o n  and the more a c t i v e  p o l i c y  o f  
r e s p o n s i v e  c o o p e r a t i o n  - the p o l i c y  ' o f  the Congress
1
H i t a v a d a , 24  O c to b e r  1 9 2 6 ,  p . 7*
2
I b i d . ,  3 O c t o b e r  1 9 2 6 ,  p . 5*
3
I b i d . ,  31  J a n u a r y  1 9 2 6 ,  p . 6 ;  31  O c tob e r  1 9 2 6 ,  p . 5 ;  
See  NML, A I C C ,  G-57 ( i i ) >  1 9 2 6 ,  A .  Rangaswami Iy e n g a r  
to M. N e hru ;  A I C C ,  G-57 ( i l l ) ,  1 9 2 6 ,  M .V .  A b h y a n ke r  to
A .  Rangaswami I y e n g a r ,  2 J u l y  1 9 2 6 ;  i b i d . ,  M a tte r s  on 
Agenda  o f  W o r k in g  Committee,  4 J u l y  1 9 2 6 ;  i b i d . ,
A .  Rangaswami I y e n g a r  to J .  N e h r u ,  14 J u l y  1 9 2 6 ;  A I C C ,  
G-52 ( i ) ,  M . V .  A b h ya nke r  to A .  Rangaswami I y e n g a r ,
18 J u l y  1 9 2 6 .
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Dem ocratic  p a r t y  o f  the great  L o k a m a n y a ' . I n  a d d i t i o n  
D r  Moonje  had  a n  ad va nta g e  over A b h y a n ke r  i n  that he 
was a w e l l  e s t a b l i s h e d  le a d e r  and commanded a f o l l o w i n g  
among a l l  s e c t io n s  o f  s o c i e t y .  The  H i t a v a d a  put the 
p o in t  w e l l :
A c l e v e r  manager o f  men, (Dr  M o o n j e ) . . .  commands a 
compact f o l l o w i n g  who w i l l  go w i t h  him  i n  a l l  
h i s  a c t i v i t i e s . . . . (He h as )  a dogged  t e n a c i t y ,  
the q u a l i t y  o f  moving w i t h  a l l  sorts  o f  men. He 
i s  n e i t h e r  w e l l  r e a d  or always  w e l l  m eaning ,  but 
he c an  lead  a mob a n d . . . a n  e ducated  a u d i e n c e . . . .
T i l l  now nobody c h a l l e n g e d  h i s  a u t h o r i t y  or h i s  
l e a d e r s h i p  and i t  was a l l  smooth s a i l i n g . . . .  But 
a new s ta r  has r i s e n  i n  the Congress  firmament 
. . . ( w h o )  p re ac h e s  h i s  programme w i t h  a s t o n i s h i n g  
f e a r l e s s n e s s ,  ( b u t ) . . . h i s  somewhat a r i s t o c r a t i c  
bent  o f  mind and h i s  a f f l u e n t  c irc um stan ce s  keep 
him a l i t t l e  apart  from the masses and he cannot 
mix w i t h  a crowd w i t h  the easy  f a c i l i t y  o f  
Dr  M o o n j e . 2
Dr Moonje  w as ,  i n  f a c t ,  a g i f t e d  p o l i t i c i a n  who u s e d  ' a l l  
the r e s o u r c e s  o f  h i s  d ip lo m acy  to d i s c r e d i t . . .A b h y a n k e r ' .  
A b h y a n k e r ,  h ow ever ,  knew ' n o t h i n g  o f  d iplom acy  a n d . . .  
t h e r e f o r e  r e s o r t ( e d )  to vehement a d j e c t i v e s  and
3
e x p l e t i v e s ' .  But these  t a c t i c s  were in a d e q u a t e  to 
overpower  Dr Moonje .
Moonje  and h i s  p a r t y  had  a f u r t h e r  ad vantage  over 
A b h ya nke r  and the Congress  i n  t h e i r  p le d g e  to d e fend
4
H i n d u  i n t e r e s t s  i n  the l e g i s l a t u r e .  I n  making  th is
1
H i  t a v a d a , 13 June  1 9 2 6 ,  p . 1 0 .
2
I b i d . ,  7 F e b r u a r y  1 9 2 6 ,  p . 6 .
3
I b i d . ,  10 O c tob e r  1 9 2 6 ,  p . 6.
4
I b i d . ,  11 November 1 9 2 6 ,  p.
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p l e d g e ,  they  drew on  the n a t i o n a l i s t  t r a d i t i o n  o f  
M a h a r a s h t r a .  S i n c e  1 921  Moonje  had  a c t i v e l y  d e fe n d e d  
H i n d u  i n t e r e s t s  i n s i d e  and o u t s id e  the p r o v i n c e ,  thereby  
w i n n i n g  a degree  o f  p e r s o n a l  support that was d e n i e d  to 
A b h y a n k e r .  "** F i r s t ,  D r  Moonje  t r i e d  to r e h a b i l i t a t e  the 
H i n d u s  o f  M a la b a r  who had  b e e n  a f f e c t e d  by the r e v o l t  
o f  the Moplahs  i n  1 9 2 1 .  He th en  opposed  G a n d h i ,  whom 
he b e l i e v e d  to be i n d i r e c t l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  the
M a la b a r  r e v o l t  and the growth  o f  M uslim  n a t i o n a l i s m  i n
2 ,
I n d i a .  By 1 9 2 6 ,  too ,  Dr Moonje  had become an  
e n t h u s i a s t i c  worker  f o r  the H i n d u  M a hasab h a ,  a body 
formed i n  1915 to p r o t e c t  the r e l i g i o n  and c u l t u r e  o f  the 
H i n d u s .  Between  1922-6 r e l a t i o n s  b e tw e e n  H in d u s  and 
Muslim s  throughout  I n d i a  d e t e r i o r a t e d ,  and Dr  Moonje  
d e te rm in e d  to s t r e n g t h e n  the H i n d u  community to meet the 
s i t u a t i o n .  To do th is  he o r g a n is e d  a b r an c h  o f  the 
M ahasabha  i n  the C e n t r a l  P r o v in c e s  i n  1 9 2 3 ,  and as one of  
i t s  le a d e r s  p r e ac h e d  the message of  H i n d u  u n i t y  and
3
s t r e n g t h .  Dr Moonje  a lso  o r g a n is e d  and t r a in e d  H in d u
1
H i t a v a d a , 25 November 1 9 2 6 ,  p . 6.
2
N L I , Moonje  MS,  L e t t e r  Pad 16 ,  B . S .  Moonje  to 
Dr K u r t k o t i ,  n . d .  June  1 9 2 3 ;  i b i d . ,  L e t t e r  Pad 1 2 ,
B . S .  Moonje  to N a r s o p a n t ,  11 A p r i l  1 922 ;  L e t t e r  Pad  2 2 ,
B . S .  Moonje  to Mr M u c k e r j e e ,  4 June  1 9 2 2 ;  L e t t e r  Pad 31» 
Pr e ss  I n t e r v i e w ,  22 June  1 9 2 5 ;  L e t t e r  Pad 2 5 ,  Press  
I n t e r v i e w ,  3 J u l y  1 9 2 5 ;  L e t t e r  Pad 3 2 ,  B . S .  Moonje  to 
Mr R a j g o p a l  A c h a r y a ,  8 J u l y  1 9 2 5 ;  N A I , Khaparde  MS,
D i a r y ,  1 J u l y  1 9 2 2 .
3
See N L I ,  Moonje  MS,  L e t t e r  Pad 1 5 ,  B . S .  Moonje  to 
Dr K u r t k o t i ,  2 4  F e b r u a r y  1 9 2 3 ;  L e t t e r  Pad 2 0 ,  B . S .  Moonje 
to Dr .  L a x m in a r a y a n ,  19 March 1 9 2 4 .
4
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v o l u n t e e r s ,  h i s  p urpose  b e i n g  to i n s t i l l  a sense  o f  
d i s c i p l i n e  into  H i n d u  youths  i n  a d d i t i o n  to p r o t e c t i n g  
H in d u s  from a t t a c k  by  Muslims at the time o f  riots. '* '  
F i n a l l y ,  Moonje  t r i e d  to u n i t e  H in d u s  by  a t t a c k i n g  
u n t o u c h a b i l i t y , a p r a c t i c e  that  was a l i e n a t i n g  members
o f  the D e p r e s s e d  community from those  H in d u s  who
2
p e r p e t u a t e d  i t .  A s  a r e s u l t  o f  h i s  a c t i v i t i e s  Dr  Moonje  
d e t e c t e d  a slow change i n  the ’H i n d u  m en tal ity *  i n  the 
p r o v i n c e ,  as  w i t n e s s  h i s  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  the s i t u a t i o n  i n  
Sa lod  F a k i r ,  a v i l l a g e  i n  the d i v i s i o n  o f  Nagpur :
S a lo d  F a k i r  ( h a s ) . . . h a r d l y  10 or 15 houses  o f  
Mohamedans and the whole  v i l l a g e  c o n s i s t s  
e n t i r e l y  o f  H i n d o o s . . . . U n t i l  a year  ago the 
Mohamedans were a b le  to t e r r o r i s e  f o r  the las t  
so many years  the whole  H i n d u  p o p u l a t i o n ,  not 
o nly  o f  that  v i l l a g e  a l o n e ,  but o f  the 
s u r r o u n d in g  v i l l a g e s  a l s o ,  to such a n  extent  
that they  could  commandeer a n y t h in g  they  l i k e d  
w ith o u t  p a y i n g  f o r  i t . . . . B u t  l a t t e r l y  ow ing  to 
the a c t i v i t i e s  and the propaganda  o f  the H i n d u  
s ab h a ,  the H i n d u  m e n t a l i t y  i s  ve r y  s low ly  
c h a n g in g .  I n  th is  v i l l a g e . . . .T r im bak  Rao 
D e s h p a n d e ,  a Brahm in  young  man, has  taken  it  
into  h i s  head  to f i g h t  t h i s  M uslim  d o m in ation  
and t e r r o r i s i n g ,  and has  b e e n  a b le  to b r i n g  
about some c o m b in a t io n  among the H i n d o o s . 3
Betw een  1922-26  Dr Moonje  a lso  went o u t s id e  the C e n t r a l  
P r o v in c e s  and B e r a r  to address  H i n d u s  on the need to 
o r g a n i s e  them selves  and d evelop  a s p i r i t  o f  s e l f
1
N L I , Moonje  MS,  L e t t e r  Pad 1 9 ,  B . S .  Moonje  to Mr S i n h a ,  
18 December 1923*
2
See i b i d . ,  L e t t e r  Pad 1 6 ,  B . S .  Moonje  to ___________
5 June  1 9 2 3 .
3
I b i d . , D i a r y  1 ,  21  March  1926.
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c o n f i d e n c e .  T he se  a c t i v i t i e s  were a l l  g r i s t  to 
Dr M o o n j e ’ s m i l l  i n  h i s  campaign  a g a i n s t  the Congress  i n  
Nagpur  i n  1 9 2 6 .
I n  B e rar  the e l e c t o r a t e  d i v i d e d  i t s  support b e tw e e n
the R e s p o n s iv e  C o o p e r a t io n  p a r t y  and a group o f
c a n d i d a t e s  s t a n d i n g  on  a non-Brahman t i c k e t .  Both  groups
a d vo ca te d  the ac c e p ta n c e  o f  o f f i c e .  The  R e s p o n s i v i s t s
had  t h e i r  cam paign  w e l l  i n  hand  by  June  1 926  and i n  the
f o l l o w i n g  months can v as s e d  w i d e l y  throughout  B e r a r .
U n l i k e  the R e s p o n s i v i s t s  i n  the d i v i s i o n  o f  Na gp ur ,
h ow ever ,  they  en c o u n te r e d  l i t t l e  o p p o s i t i o n  from the
C o ng re ss .  Wamanrao J o s h i ,  r e p o r t e d l y  out o f  p o c k e t ,
was i n  Poona ’ p u r s u i n g  h i s  l i t e r a r y  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  the
2
t h e a t r i c a l  a t m o s p h e r e ’ . Fur t h erm o r e ,  the A l l - I n d i a
C ongress  Committee r e f u s e d  to f i n a n c e  an  e l e c t o r a l
cam paign  i n  B e r a r  u n l e s s  i t  could  be sure  that the
3
Congress  would  w i n  some s e a t s .  M a tte rs  improved  i n  
September  1 9 2 6 ,  h ow e ve r ,  when the A l l - I n d i a  Congress  
Committee a p p o in t e d  A b h y a n k e r  to conduct  the cam paign  
th e r e .  A month l a t e r  he was j o i n e d  by J o s h i  on the
4
l a t t e r ’ s r e t u r n  from Poona .  D e s p it e  the p r e s e n c e  o f
1
N L I , D i a r y  I ,  23 A p r i l  1 9 2 6 ;  N A I , Home P o l l ,  F - 1 8 7 / 2 6 ,  
Communal T e n s i o n  i n  B e n g a l ,  A p p e n d ix  2 ,  E x t r a c t  from 
the S w a r a jy a  of  M a d r a s ,  p . 1 8 .
2
H i t a v a d a , 7 O c t o b e r  1 9 2 6 ,  p . 5 ;  NM L , A I C C ,  G-57 ( i i i ) ,  
1926), M . V. A b h y a n k e r  to A .  Rangaswami I y e n g a r ,  2 J u l y  
1 9 2 6 .
3
I b i d . , A .  Rangaswami I y e n g a r ,  to J .  Neh ru ,  14 J u l y  1926
4
H i t a v a d a , 16 September  1 9 2 6 ,  p . 5 ,  i b i d . ,  7 O c tob e r  1926
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these  l e a d e r s ,  h ow ever ,  B e rar  remained  a s t r o n g h o ld  o f  
R e s p o n s i v i s m ,  and the Congress  f i e l d e d  o n ly  two 
c a n d i d a t e s  f o r  the 17 seats  a l l o t t e d  to Berar."*" More 
s e r io u s  r i v a l s  fo r  the R e s p o n s i v i s t s  were the non-
Brahmans who nominated  n ine  c a n d i d a t e s  to c o n te st  the
2
e l e c t i o n s .  The  o r g a n i s a t i o n  b e h in d  these  c a n d i d a t e s  
was the S a t y a s h o d a k  S a m a j , w h ich  d u r i n g  the cam paign  
pre ac h e d  o p p o s i t i o n  to the Brahman R e s p o n s i v i s t s  and
3
staged  tamashas i n  every  im portant  v i l l a g e  i n  B e r a r .
I n  c o n t r a s t  to B e r ar  the e l e c t o r a t e  i n  the H i n d i  
r e g i o n  re c o rd ed  i t s  p r e f e r e n c e  for  the Congress  p o l i c y  
o f  o b s t r u c t i o n .  S e t h  G ovind  Das dominated  the campaign  
f o r  the C o n g r e s s ,  and accom panied  by  l e a d i n g  
Congressmen  toured  e x t e n s i v e l y  i n  the n o r t h e r n  d i s t r i c t s  
and C h h a t t i s g a r h ,  a t t a c k i n g  R ag h avend ra  Rao and the
4
In d e p e n d e n t  Congress  ' p a r t y ' .  A b h y a n k e r ,  too ,  went to 
C h h a t t i s g a r h  ' to b r e a k  the c i t a d e l  o f  the In d e p e n d e n t  
Congress  p a r t y » . ^ The  n a t i o n a l i s t  p re ss  i n  the H i n d i  and 
M a r a th i  r e g io n s  a lso  campaigned  a g a in s t  R a o î i n  Khandwa ,  
Gov ind  D a s '  p ap er  Deshbandhu  wreaked  ' p e r s o n a l  vengeance*  
on  R a o ;  w h i l e  from Nagpur  the M a r a th i  T a r u n  Bharat  
a r r a i g n e d  Rao b e f o r e  the b a r  o f  the p r o v in c e  fo r  
a l l e g e d l y  s a y i n g  that  he had ' n e v e r  b e l i e v e d  i n  non-
1
H i t a v a d a , 30  September  1 9 2 6 ,  p . 5*
2
I b i d . ,  8 A u g u s t  1 9 2 6 ,  p . 5*
3
I b i d . ,  14  O c to b e r  1 9 2 6 ,  p . 5*
4
I b i d . ,  19 September  1 9 2 6 ,  p . 5 ;  3 O c tob e r  1 9 2 6 ,  p . 5*
5
I b i d . ,  10 O c to b e r  1 9 2 6 ,  p . 9*
c o o p e r a t i o n  and the Swaraj  p a r t y 1 . I n  a d d i t i o n ,  H i n d i
Congressmen won back  to the Congress  s e v e r a l  n a t i o n a l i s t s
2
who had  o r i g i n a l l y  thrown i n  t h e i r  lot  w i t h  R a o . T h u s ,  
a l t h o u g h  Rao made a de te rm ine d  b i d  f o r  v i c t o r y  and c a l l e d  
i n  o u t s id e r s  o f  the s t a t u r e  o f  M a l a v i y a  and L a j p a t  R a i  
to a s s i s t  h im ,  the e l e c t o r a t e  r e c o r d e d  i t s  p r e f e r e n c e  
f o r  p o l i c i e s  o f  the I n d i a n  N a t i o n a l  C ong ress .
The C ongress  cam paign  i n  the H i n d i  r e g i o n  owed much 
o f  i t s  success  to a f i e r y  young  n a t i o n a l i s t ,  Dwarka  
Pr a s a d  M i s h r a .  Born  into  a K an ya  K u b j a  Brahman f a m il y  
i n  the U n i t e d  P r o v in c e s  i n  1 9 0 1 ,  M is h r a  was ed ucated  i n  
Kanpur  and  A l l a h a b a d ,  where he completed  h i s  B . A .  b e fo r e  
g o in g  to C a l c u t t a  to study  j o u r n a l i s m  i n  the o f f i c e  o f  
the B e n g a l i  newspaper  A m rita  B a z a r  P a t r i k a . I n  1921  
M is h r a  a c c e p te d  employment un de r  Govind  Das i n  
J a b a l p u r ,  and from that time on the two men became 
i n s e p a r a b l e  com panions .  One important  r e s u l t  o f  th is  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  was that  M is h r a  commenced l e g a l  s t u d i e s  
w i t h  a v iew  to e n t e r i n g  p o l i t i c s .  I n  1 9 2 6 ,  w h i l e  s t i l l  
a law s t u d e n t ,  M is h r a  threw h i m s e l f  w h o l e h e a r t e d l y  into  
the Congress  e l e c t i o n  campaign .  I n  a l e t t e r  to M o t i l a l  
N e hru ,  i n  O c to b e r  1 9 2 6 ,  Gov ind  Das wrote  o f  the part  
M ish ra  p l a y e d  i n  the cam paign  and o f  the l i k e l y  p ro s p e c ts  
f o r  the Congress  i n  the e l e c t i o n s ;
B e l i e v e  me, C e n t r a l  P r o v in c e s  s i t u a t i o n  has  
m ir a c u l o u s l y  changed  i n  our  f a v o u r .  The 
In d e p e n d e n t  Congress  p a r t y  c a n d i d a t e s  are  
e x p e c t i n g  d e fe a t  i n  most o f  the p l a c e s .  E v e n
168
1
H i t a v a d a , 14  O c tob e r  1 9 2 6 ,  p . 5 ;  7 O c to b e r  1 9 2 6 ,  p . 4.
2
I b i d . , p . 4 .
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the p o s i t i o n  o f  the l e a d e r s  o f  th is  p a r t y  i s  
very  c r i t i c a l .  R a v i  Sh ankar  S h u k l a ' s  d e f e a t  
i n  R a i p u r  i s  c e r t a i n .  To s t r e n g t h e n  the 
chances  o f  our  c a n d i d a t e s  a g a i n s t . . . B h a r g a v a ,
I  have  i n d u c e d  Behoar  R a g h u v ir  S i n g h  to stand  
as a n  in d e p e n d e n t  c a n d i d a t e .  T h a k u r  C h h e d i l a l  
a lso  i s  not s a f e .  Mr Rao i s  i n d i v i d u a l l y  s t i l l  
very  s tr o n g ,  but  h i s  p o s i t i o n  i s  a lso  u n c e r t a i n  
. . . .Y o u  can  know the d e t a i l s  from M i s h r a j i . . .  
who i s  the f a t h e r  o f  the changed  s i t u a t i o n .
He b e i n g  my c l o s e s t  f r i e n d ,  cannot be p r o p e r l y  
p r a i s e d  by  me. But I  w i l l  be a f a i t h l e s s  
f r i e n d  i f  I  do not t e l l  you that  no one i n  the 
whole  o f  CP H i n d i  has  worked so s i n c e r e l y  f o r  
you as the young  b e a r e r  o f  th is  l e t t e r . !
A t  the e l e c t i o n s  i n  November 1 9 2 6 ,  the e l e c t o r s  o f
the C e n t r a l  P r o v in c e s  and Berar  vote d  s o l i d l y  f o r
2
r e s p o n s i v e  c o o p e r a t io n .  A s  a r e s u l t ,  a l t h o u g h  the 
Congress  won 16 s e ats  - the l a r g e s t  number g a in e d  by  any  
s i n g l e  p a r t y ,  - the R e s p o n s iv e  C o o p e r a t io n  p a r t i e s  and
3
a l l i e d  groups won  33  s e a t s .  I n  the M a r a th i  r e g i o n  the
1
NML, A I C C , 78-A, 1 9 2 6 ,  G ov ind  Das  to M. N ehru ,
21  O c t o b e r  1 9 2 6 .
2
So f a r  as the v o t i n g  p e r c e n t a g e s  o f  the main  p a r t i e s  
were c o n c e r n e d ,  the Congress  p o l l e d  2 8 , 2 6 8  votes  or 
3 0 .7  per  cent  o f  the p r o v i n c i a l  to t a l  o f  92,003  v o t e s .  
The  R e s p o n s iv e  C o o p e r a t io n  p a r t i e s  o f  the M a r a t h i  r e g i o n  
f o l l o w e d  w i t h  2 1 , 6 2 8  votes  or 23.6  p er  c e n t ;  and the 
In d e p e n d e n t  Congress  ’ p a r t y 1 w i t h  1 0 , 1 9 6  or 1 1 . 0 8  p er  
cent o f  the v o t e s .  The  I n d e p e n d e n t ,  non-Brahman, and 
ot h er  H i n d u  c a n d i d a t e s  p o l l e d  2 5 , 9 9 8  votes  or 2 8 . 2 5  p er  
cent o f  the t o t a l .  The  Muslims  p o l l e d  5 , 9 1 3  v o t e s ,  
equal  to 6 . 3 6  p e r  cent o f  the t o t a l .
3
N A I , Home P o l l ,  F-112-IV-26 ,  1 9 2 6 ,  FR ,  Second  H a l f  o f
November 1 9 2 6 ,  p . l .
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Congress  p o l l e d  b a d l y  and secured  only  f o u r  o f  the 2 4  
H i n d u  s e a t s ,  three  o f  these  b e i n g  the u r b a n  seat  o f  
Nagpur-Kamptee and the m u n i c i p a l  s e ats  o f  East  and West 
Berar. '* ’ The  R e s p o n s i v i s t s , by  c o n t r a s t ,  d id  w e l l  to w i n  
se ve n  o f  the ten  H i n d u  seats  i n  the d i v i s i o n  o f  N a gp u r ,  
an d ,  l e s s  s u c c e s s f u l l y ,  to w i n  s i x  o f  the 14  H i n d u  seats  
i n  B e r a r .  The Congress  p o l l e d  much b e t t e r  i n  the H i n d i  
r e g i o n  than  i t  d id  i n  the M a r a th i  r e g i o n .  T h e r e  
Congressmen  won 11 o f  the 20  H i n d u  seats  and had  the 
prom ise  o f  support from one I n d e p e n d e n t .  The  In d e p e n d e n t  
C ongress  ’ p a r t y '  won o n ly  se ve n  s e a t s ,  a key  d e f e a t  b e i n g  
that  o f  S h ukla  i n  R a i p u r  South .  O f  the sm a lle r  ' p a r t i e s ’ , 
the In d e p e n d e n t s  won n ine  s e a t s ,  the non-Brahmans t h r e e ,  
and one seat  went to a moderate  p o l i t i c i a n .  The  e l e c t io n s  
f o r  the C e n t r a l  L e g i s l a t i v e  A s s em b ly  and the C o u n c i l  o f  
S t a t e  were h e l d  at the same time as those  f o r  the 
p r o v i n c i a l  l e g i s l a t u r e .  I n  the former  the Congress  also  
p o l l e d  b a d l y ,  w i n n i n g  o n ly  one o f  the s i x  s e a t s ,  w h i le  
i n  the l a t t e r ,  the Congress  and the R e s p o n s i v i s t s  
secured  one seat  each .  P a r t i c u l a r  s i g n i f i c a n c e  a t t a c h e d  
to the p r o v i n c i a l  r e s u l t s ,  h ow ever ,  f o r  they p l a c e d  the 
R e s p o n s i v i s t s  i n  a s tr o n g  p o s i t i o n  to form a m i n i s t r y .
1
For  these  and the f o l l o w i n g  r e s u l t s ,  see H i t a v a d a ,
11 November 1 9 2 6 ,  p . 7 ;  14 November 1 9 2 6 ,  p .7>
18 November 1 9 2 6 ,  p p . 6 ,  7j 21  November 1 9 2 6 ,  pp . 5 > 6 ,  7> 
28 November 1 9 2 6 ,  p . 5*
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RESPONSIVE  COOPERATION IN  THE LEGISLATURE ;  THE CENTRAL 
PROVINCES AND BERAR UNDER H I N D I  LEA DERSHIP ,  1927- 1937
From 1927-37 the r e s p o n s iv e  c oop erators  dominated  
the l e g i s l a t u r e  o f  the C e ntra l  P r o v i n c e s ,  and d u r in g  
that  time the H i n d i  r e g i o n  a c q u ir e d  a commanding p o s i t i o n  
i n  the p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  o f  the p r o v i n c e . ’*’ I n  1 9 2 7 ,
Dr  M o onje ,  who had  form e rly  p lay e d  a l e a d i n g  part  i n  
p r o v i n c i a l  p o l i t i c s ,  e n te r e d  the ar e n a  o f  n a t i o n a l  
p o l i t i c s  as a member o f  the C e n tr a l  L e g i s l a t i v e  A ssem bly  
and a le ad e r  o f  the H i n d u  Mahasabha .  At  the same time ,  
Moonje  t r i e d  to c o n t r o l  p o l i t i c s  i n  the C e n tr a l  P r o v in c e s  
and B e rar  from b e h in d  the s c e n e s ,  thus k e e p i n g  p o l i t i c a l  
i n i t i a t i v e  i n  M a r a th i  h an d s .  T h i s ,  how ever ,  he f a i l e d  
to do owing  to the emergence o f  Ra g h ave nd ra  Rao as the 
c e n t r a l  f i g u r e  i n  the p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  o f  the p r o v i n c e .
Rao owed h i s  l e a d i n g  p o s i t i o n  to h i s  own s k i l l  as a 
p o l i t i c i a n  and to a noteworthy  a l l i a n c e  b e tw e e n  h i m s e l f  
and the G overnor ,  S i r  Montagu B u t l e r .  Between  1927-37» 
he u t i l i s e d  both  to dominate  the government and so 
t r a n s f e r  p o l i t i c a l  power from the M a r a th i  to the H i n d i  
r e g i o n .
Chapter  4
1
R e s p o n s iv e  cooperators  r e f e r s  to a l l  n a t i o n a l i s t s  who 
s upported  the fo r m a t io n  o f  m i n i s t r i e s .  The  R e s p o n s i v i s t s  
are  members o f  the R e s p o n s iv e  C o o p e r a t io n  p a r t i e s  o f  
Nagpur  and B e r a r .
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The  t r a n s f e r  o f  power was c l e a r l y  r e f l e c t e d  i n  R a o 1s 
p o l i t i c a l  c a r e e r  d u r in g  the p e r i o d .  T h i s  c a r e e r  opened 
i n  1927  when Rao became C h i e f  M i n i s t e r  o f  the C e n t r a l  
P r o v in c e s .  R a o ’ s attem p ts ,  as C h i e f  M i n i s t e r ,  to dominate  
the government annoyed  the M a r a th i  n a t i o n a l i s t s ,  who had 
p r o v i d e d  R a o 1s c o l le a g u e  i n  the f i r s t  m i n i s t r y .  As a 
r e s u l t  they w ithdrew  t h e i r  support from Rao and compelled  
him to form a second m in i s t r y  w i t h  the a s s i s t a n c e  of  
o ther  groups i n  1 9 2 8 .  T h i s  m in i s t r y  a lso  c o l l a p s e d  
owing  to o p p o s i t i o n  from the M a r ath i  n a t i o n a l i s t s .  
F o l l o w i n g  t h is  c o l l a p s e ,  the M a r a th i  n a t i o n a l i s t s  
themselves  formed a m in i s t r y  i n  1929 i n  a n  attempt to 
r e s t o r e  the p o l i t i c a l  importance  o f  t h e i r  r e g i o n  and keep 
f a i t h  w i t h  t h e i r  su p p o r t e r s .  A year  l a t e r  they  launched  
a campaign o f  c i v i l  d i s o b e d i e n c e  a g a i n s t  the government 
w i t h  the same end i n  v ie w .  P a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  government 
and a g i t a t i o n  a g a i n s t  government at one and the same 
time ,  however ,  p l a c e d  the M a r a th i  n a t i o n a l i s t s  i n  a 
d i f f i c u l t  s i t u a t i o n ,  and i n  1930 they  were com pelled  to 
r e l i n q u i s h  t h e i r  h o ld  over the m in i s t r y .  T h i s  gave 
S i r  Montagu B u t l e r  the o p e n in g  he had  d e s i r e d .  B u t l e r  
had  long  r e a l i s e d  that the k e y  to s t a b l e  and e f f e c t i v e  
government i n  the p r o v in c e  l a y  w i t h  Rao and the H i n d i  
r e g i o n .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  soon a f t e r  the r e s i g n a t i o n  o f  the 
M a ra th i- led  m i n i s t r y  i n  1 9 3 0 ,  he a p p o in t e d  Rao as Home 
Member o f  the p r o v i n c e .  Over  the next s e v e n  y e a r s ,  Rao 
f u l l y  c onfirm ed  B u t l e r ' s  a n a l y s i s  o f  p r o v i n c i a l  p o l i t i c s .  
D u r i n g  th is  p e r i o d  he dom inated  the government and the 
l e g i s l a t u r e ;  formed s u c c e s s i v e  m i n i s t r i e s  w ith  h i s  own 
nom inees ;  secured  the p a s s a g e  o f  s i g n i f i c a n t  l e g i s l a t i o n ;  
and rose  to the p o s i t i o n  o f  A c t i n g  Governor  o f  the
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C e n t r a l  Pro v in ce s  and B e rar .  The  M a r a th i  n a t i o n a l i s t s  
at the same time c ont in ue d  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  to r e s t o r e  the 
p o l i t i c a l  importance  o f  t h e i r  r e g i o n .  But these  moves 
were l a r g e l y  u n s u c c e s s f u l ,  and the p e r io d  c lo s e d  w i t h  
R a o 1s appointment as the f i r s t  Pre m ie r  o f  the U n i t e d  
C e n t r a l  P ro v in c e s  and Be r ar .
I
Between  1927-9 the H i n d i  r e g i o n  e n l a r g e d  i t s  area  
o f  power i n  the Government o f  the C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s .
T h i s  was apparent  i n  the a c t i v i t i e s  o f  two m i n i s t r i e s  
formed d u r i n g  the p e r i o d .  I n  each  o f  these  m i n i s t r i e s  
the C h i e f  M i n i s t e r  was Raghavendra  Rao .  D u r i n g  the f i r s t  
m i n i s t r y  Rao t r i e d  to enlarge  h i s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  as 
C h i e f  M i n i s t e r  and the m in is t r y  c o l l a p s e d  as a r e s u l t .
Rao then  formed a second m in i s t r y  i n  w h ich  the H i n d i  
r e g i o n  h e l d  the r e i n s  o f  power.
I t  was not R a o ,  how ever ,  but  Dr Moonje  o f  Nagpur  who 
formed the f i r s t  m i n i s t r y .  Moonje  had  b e e n  e l e c t e d  a 
member o f  the C e n tr a l  L e g i s l a t i v e  A ssem b ly  i n  1 9 2 6 ,  and 
a l t h o u g h  h i s  d u t i e s  there  and i n  the ar e n a  o f  n a t i o n a l  
p o l i t i c s  i n  g e n e r a l  were  to remove him  to some extent  
from the C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s ,  he t r i e d ,  n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  to 
r e t a i n  h i s  i n f l u e n c e  i n  the p r o v in c e  by c o n t r o l l i n g  
p o l i t i c s  from b e h in d  the scenes .  One such a c t i v i t y  was 
h i s  e s ta b l is h m e n t  o f  a m i n i s t r y  i n  the C e n t r a l  P r o v in ce s  
i n  I 9 2 7 . M o o n j e ' s  f i r s t  step was to u n i t e  a l l  the 
r e s p o n s i v e  c ooperators  into  a s i n g l e  p a r t y  to p r o v id e  a 
base  o f  support  for  the m in i s t r y  i n  the l e g i s l a t u r e .  On 
26  November 1 9 2 6 ,  soon a f t e r  the e l e c t i o n s ,  Moonje  wrote
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this  time we have  to be v e r y  c a r e f u l . . . .The  
Swaraj  p a r t y  s h a l l  be th e re  to m agnify  our  
m istakes  and even  to m is r e p r e s e n t  u s .  We 
cannot be too c a u t i o u s ,  and u n l e s s  we form a 
compact whole  even  at the cost o f  much 
p e r s o n a l  i n c o n v e n ie n c e  and h o p e s ,  we may 
i n v o l v e  o u r s e lv e s  i n  r i d i c u l e . 1
I n  less  than  a month Moonje  and Rao had  formed ' a  compact 
w h o l e * . On 19 December 1926  members o f  the R e s p o n s iv e  
C o o p e r a t io n  p a r t i e s  o f  Nagpur  and B e ra r  and members o f
the In d e p e n d e n t  Congress  ' p a r t y 1 o f  the H i n d i  r e g i o n
2
formed the U n it e d  N a t i o n a l i s t  ' p a r t y ' .  The  ' p a r t y ' ,  
however ,  had  a s t r e n g t h  o f  o n ly  20  members, and could  be 
e a s i l y  overwhelmed by  a c o m b in a t io n  o f  the Congress  p a r t y  
and oth er  groups i n  the C o u n c i l .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  Moonje  
b e g a n  n e g o t i a t i o n s  to e f f e c t  a u n i o n  b e t w e e n  the U n it e d  
N a t i o n a l i s t  ' p a r t y '  and the In d e p e n d e n t  ' p a r t y ' ,  w h ich  
i n c l u d e d  the non-Brahmans. T h e se  n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  too ,  
were s u c c e s s f u l ,  and on 9 J a n u a r y  1927  a n  e n la r g e d
3
N a t i o n a l i s t  ' p a r t y '  c o m p r is in g  33 members came into  b e i n g .
To s a f e g u a r d  the u n i t y  o f  the N a t i o n a l i s t  ' p a r t y ' ,
Dr  Moonje  nominated  the le a d e r s  o f  i t s  c o n s t i t u e n t  ' p a r t i e s '  
to important  p o s i t i o n s  i n  the l e g i s l a t u r e  and the m in i s t r y .
to Rao u r g i n g  that
1
N L I , Moonje  MS, L e t t e r  Pad 3 6 , B . S .  Moonje  to E . R .  R a o ,
26  November 1 9 2 6 .
2
H i t a v a d a , 23  December 1 9 2 6 ,  p . 6.
3
I b i d . ,  6 J a n u a r y  1 9 2 7 ,  p . l ;  13 J a n u a r y  1 9 2 7 ,  P *9 j  
23  Ja n u a r y  1 9 2 7 ,  P » 8 ;  C P L C , v o l . I ,  11 J a n u a r y  1 9 2 7 ,  
p p .20- 1 .
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He secured  the P r e s i d e n t s h i p  o f  the C oun ci l  f o r  the
le a d e r  o f  the In d e p e n d e n t  ’ p a r t y ' , S .M .  C h i t n a v i s .  To
do so,  he had  to w ith d r aw  the no m inat io n  o f  Y . M .  K a l e ,
a R e s p o n s i v i s t  from B e r a r ,  to whom he had o r i g i n a l l y
promised  the post.'*'  R ag havend ra  Rao , o f  the In d e p e n d e n t
Congress  ’ p a r t y ’ , was e l e c t e d  le a d e r  o f  the N a t i o n a l i s t
’ p a r t y ’ , and also  r e c e i v e d  Dr M o o n j e ’ s endorsement as the
c h i e f  p a r t n e r  i n  the m i n i s t r y  w h ic h  the ’ p a r t y ’ d e s i r e d
to form. Dr  Moonje  a l l o c a t e d  the other  m i n i s t e r s h i p
to Ramrao Deshmukh o f  the R e s p o n s iv e  C o o p e r a t io n  p a r t y
2
o f  B e r a r .  As  Moonje  was l a r g e l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  for  
fo rm in g  the c o a l i t i o n  and the m i n i s t r y ,  h i s  R e s p o n s iv e  
C o o p e r a t io n  p a r t y  i n  the d i v i s i o n  o f  Nagpur  had to r e s t  
content  w i t h  the S e c r e t a r y s h i p  o f  the N a t i o n a l i s t  ’ p a r t y ’
W it h  these  p r e p a r a t i o n s  com plete ,  the stage  was set 
fo r  the fo r m a t io n  o f  the m i n i s t r y .  On 11 J a n u a r y  1927  
the C o u n ci l  voted  the m i n i s t e r s ’ s a l a r i e s ,  and on  the 
f o l l o w i n g  day ,  the G ov ern or ,  S i r  Montagu B u t l e r ,  c a l l e d  
Rao to Government House  and e n t r u s t e d  him w i t h  the
4
fo r m a t i o n  o f  a m i n i s t r y .  Rao nominated  Deshmukh as h i s  
c o l le a g u e  and the Governor  paved  the way for  t h e i r  
as s u m p tio n  o f  o f f i c e  by r e s t o r i n g  the reformed  
c o n s t i t u t i o n .  T h i s  took p l a c e  on 31  J a n u a r y  1927*  On
1
H i t a v a d a , 13 J a n u a r y  1927»  P *9 j  23 Ja n u a r y  1 9 2 7 ,  p . 8 .
2
See NML, Rao MS, T . S .  P a t e r s o n  to E . R .  Rao ,  11 J a n u a r y  
1 9 2 7 ;  N A I , K hap ard e  MS,  D i a r y ,  13 J a n u a r y  1 9 2 7 ;  H i t a v a d a ,
13 Ja n u a r y  1927 , p . 7*
3
The S e c r e t a r y  was K . P .  V a i d y a ,  the member fo r  Nagpur  
D i s t r i c t  E a s t .
4
CPLC, v o l . I ,  11 J a n u a r y  1 9 2 7 ,  p p . l 7 “ 5 1 ;  H i t a v a d a ,
13 Ja n u a r y  1927»  P *7 *
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1 F e b r u a r y ,  Rao and Deshmukh took o f f i c e  - the former as 
C h i e f  M i n i s t e r  and M i n i s t e r  f o r  E d u c a t i o n ,  and the l a t t e r  
as M i n i s t e r  f o r  L o c a l  S e l f  Government.'*"
A l t h o u g h  Dr Moonje  t r i e d  to u n i f y  the d i s p a r a t e
elements  that  comprised  the N a t i o n a l i s t  ' p a r t y 1 , i t
appeared  l i k e l y  that c o n f l i c t s  b e tw e e n  them would  im p e r i l
the s t a b i l i t y  o f  m i n i s t r y .  The  R e s p o n s i v i s t s  o f  B e r a r ,
s t a u n c h / n a t i o n a l i s t s  as they  w e r e ,  s t r o n g l y  r e s e n t e d  the
g o ve rnm e nt 's  f a i l u r e  to r e a c h  the Sim  r a t i o  or to suspend
2
the land  settlem ent  i n  B e r a r .  C o n s e q u e n t ly ,  they  could  
be expected  to put p r e s s u r e  on  t h e i r  m i n i s t e r  to d e a l  
w i t h  those i s s u e s  to the s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  B e r a r .  A n y  
e f f o r t s  on h i s  part  to do so ,  h owever ,  would  c u r t a i l  
the flow  o f  revenue  from B e r a r  into  the C e n t r a l  P r o v in c e s ,  
and t h i s  c o u ld  h a r d l y  meet w i t h  the ap p r o val  o f  the 
H i n d i  members who came into  the C o u n c i l
d e e p ly  c o n s c io u s  o f  many genuine  g r ie v a n c e s  w i t h  
r e g a r d  to our treatment  i n  the p r o v i n c e . . . .They  
b e g i n  w i t h  the c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  a l l  h i g h e r  and 
t e c h n i c a l  s t u d i e s  at Nagpur  to the detr im ent  of  
the e d u c a t i o n a l  growth  o f  our p ar t  o f  the 
p r o v i n c e . . . . ( I n  a d d i t i o n )  a l l  government 
a c t i v i t i e s  are  c o n c e n t r a t e d  at Nagpur  w i t h  the 
advantage  that money and  patrona ge  are  
d i s t r i b u t e d  i n  a much g r e a t e r  p r o p o r t i o n  i n  
spheres  round  about and the n o r th e r n  d i s t r i c t s  
are  n e g l e c t e d  and s t a r v e d  and thus have  s t u n t e d  
g r o w t h . ^
1
N A I , Home P o l l ,  F-32 ,  1 9 2 7 ,  F R , Second  H a l f  o f  Ja nua ry
1 9 2 7 ,  P . l .
2
C P L C , v o l . 2 ,  5 March  1 9 2 7 ,  p . 1 3 4 ;  8 March I 9 2 7 , 
p p . 457-8.
3
H i t a v a d a , 26  J u l y  1 9 2 8 ,  p . 3*
Sh ri  R .M .  Deshmukh
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Sen tim ents  such as the se  c r e a t e d  t e n s i o n  b e tw e e n  
the H i n d i  and M a rath i  m i n i s t e r s ,  and r e s u l t e d  i n  the 
c o l l a p s e  o f  the m i n i s t r y .  Deshmukh attem pted  to secure  
the i n t e r e s t s  o f  B e r a r ,  w h i l e  Rao r e s i s t e d  M a r a th i  
e f f o r t s  to c o n t r o l  the m i n i s t r y  and promote the i n t e r e s t s  
o f  the M a r a th i  r e g i o n .  He d i d  so by at te m p t in g  to 
e n la r g e  the sphere  o f  h i s  own r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  as C h i e f  
M i n i s t e r ,  thus f u r t h e r  e x a c e r b a t i n g  h i s  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  
Deshmukh.  The  s t r u g g l e  f o r  power i n  the m in i s t r y  was 
e v ide n t  f i r s t  i n  the f a i l u r e  o f  Rao and Deshmukh to 
observe  the p r i n c i p l e  o f  j o i n t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i n  d e a l i n g  
w i t h  t h e i r  p o r t f o l i o s .  Both  m i n i s t e r s  were d i s s a t i s f i e d  
w i t h  the group o f  p o r t f o l i o s  they  r e c e i v e d  under  the 
reform ed  c o n s t i t u t i o n . ^  Rao r e c e i v e d  the group o f  
p o r t f o l i o s  h eaded  by E d u c a t i o n ;  and Deshmukh the group 
he ad e d  by  L o c a l  S e l f  Government .  T h e s e  two p o r t f o l i o s  
i n  p a r t i c u l a r  gave the m i n i s t e r  i n  charge  the power to 
make appointments  and a l l o c a t e  f i n a n c e s  - a dangerous  
p ower ,  should  he use  i t  to fa v o u r  one r e g i o n  at the 
expense  o f  a n o th e r .  To p r e v e n t  th is  Deshmukh s u g g e s te d  
to Rao that they  should  j o i n t l y  a d m in is t e r  a l l  p o r t f o l i o s
’ I  s h a l l  look to work i n  B e r a r  and Nagpur  d i v i s i o n ,  and
2
you would  look to the r e s t  o f  the C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s * .
T he  two m i n i s t e r s ,  h ow e ve r ,  fo u n d  that jo i n t  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  was un w orkable  i n  p r a c t i c e .  I n  A p r i l  
1928  one p o l i t i c a l  commentator r e p o r t e d  that
1
NML, Rao MS,  R .M .  Deshmukh to E . R .  R a o ,  2 k  J a n u a r y  
1 9 2 7 ;  i b i d . ,  R .M .  Deshmukh to E . R .  R a o ,  22 A p r i l  1 9 2 8 .
2
I b i d . ,  R . M .  Deshmukh to E . R .  R a o ,  2k  J a n u a r y  1927*
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the so c a l l e d  j o i n t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  has  become 
more or le ss  a mere f i c t i o n . . . . T h e re  i s  
a p p a r e n t l y  more fr e q u e n t  j o i n t  c o n s u l t a t i o n  
b e tw e e n  the r e s e r v e d  and t r a n s f e r r e d  h a l v e s  o f  
the government than  there  i s  b e tw e e n  the two 
m in i s t e r s  t h e m s e l v e s . ^
J o i n t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  i n  f a c t ,  could  not work  w h i l e
the H i n d i  and M a r a th i  r e g io n s  were engaged  i n  a s t r u g g le
fo r  dominance i n  the C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s .  One as p e c t  of
th is  s t r u g g l e  was r e f l e c t e d  i n  the d i f f e r e n c e s  b e tw e e n
Rao and Deshmukh.  As m i n i s t e r  f o r  P u b l i c  W orks ,
Deshmukh e nsured  that  B e r a r  r e c e i v e d  38 p er  cent o f  the
d i v i s i b l e  re ve nue s  o f  the p r o v i n c e  as de te rm ine d  by  the
2
Sim Committee.  T h i s  r e d u c e d  the amount o f  money 
a v a i l a b l e  f o r  p u b l i c  works i n  the H i n d i  r e g i o n  and
3
c r e a t e d  a great  d e a l  o f  resentm ent  the r e .  As a r e s u l t ,  
Rao to ld  Deshmukh that  fI  am s o rry  (b u t )  I  cannot share 
the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  your  p o l i c y  and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n  
. . . P u b l i c  Works D e p a r t m e n t ' ; and H i n d i  members o f  the
b
l e g i s l a t u r e  demanded that Rao take  over  the p o r t f o l i o .  
Rao also  d i f f e r e d  w i t h  Deshmukh over  h i s  appointm ents  to 
l o c a l  b o d ie s  as M i n i s t e r  f o r  L o c a l  S e l f  Government .  I n
1
H i t a v a d a , 8 A p r i l  1 9 2 8 ,  p . 2 .  The  ' r e s e r v e d  h a l f  of  
the Government r e f e r s  to the Department  o f  J u s t i c e ,  
P o l i c e  and Land Revenue  that rem ained  i n  the hands  o f  
B r i t i s h  o f f i c i a l s .  The  ' t r a n s f e r r e d  h a l f  com prised  
those  Departm ents  that  were p l a c e d  un der  m i n i s t e r i a l  
contro 1.
2
I b i d . ,  8 J u l y  1 9 2 8 ,  p . 2 .
3
C P L C , v o l . 2 ,  7 March  1 9 2 7 ,  p . 2 2 8 .
4
NML, Rao MS,  E . R .  Rao to R . M .  Deshmukh,  23  A p r i l  1 9 2 8 ;  
H i t a v a d a , 8 J u l y  1 9 2 8 ,  p . 2 .
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making c e r t a i n  a p p o in tm e n t s ,  Deshmukh a p p a r e n t l y
d i s s e n t e d  from the a d v i c e  tend ered  by the Commissioners
and Deputy  Commissioners  o f  the d i s t r i c t s  i n  w hich  the
appointments  o c c u r r e d .  Rao a t t a c k e d  Deshmukh f o r  d o in g
so ,  c o m p la in in g  to him  that he c ould  not ’ share  the
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  the l i k e l y  consequences  o f  the a d v ic e
1
te nd e re d  by you®. R a o ' s com plaint  was grounded  i n  the
b e l i e f  that Deshmukh was not g i v i n g  s u f f i c i e n t
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  i n  the l o c a l  b o d ie s  to M us l im s ,  non
Brahmans and members o f  the D e p r e s s e d  community - three
groups from w hich  Rao was d raw ing  i n c r e a s i n g  support
2
i n s i d e  and o u t s id e  the l e g i s l a t u r e .  D i f f e r e n c e s  also
o c c urre d  b e tw e e n  Rao and Deshmukh as to the a t t i t u d e  o f
the m i n i s t r y  towards the I n d i a n  S t a t u t o r y  Commission ,  a
committee o f  p o l i t i c i a n s  led  by  Lord  Simon who were to
come to I n d i a  i n  1930  to r e v iew  the q u e s t i o n  o f  g i v i n g
a f u r t h e r  in s ta lm e n t  o f  s e l f  government to that country .
T he  Government o f  I n d i a  r e q u i r e d  each  p r o v i n c i a l
government to submit i t s  v iew s  on  the s u b j e c t  to the
Commission .  Rao took the view  that the m in i s t e r s
s hould  not a s s o c i a t e  them selves  w i t h  the p r e p a r a t i o n  of
3
such a c a s e .  A c c o r d i n g  to the H i t a v a d a , how ever ,  the 
v iews  o f  Deshmukh and K hap a rd e  on R a o 1s prop osed  boycott
4
o f  the Commission  were more e q u i v o c a l .  Rao also  
b e l i e v e d  that  Deshmukh f a v o u re d  making  some approach  to
1
NML, Rao MS,  E . R .  Rao to R .M .  Deshmukh,  6 May 1 9 2 8 .
2
See C P L C , v o l . 3» 21  A u g u s t  1 9 2 8 ,  p p . 265- 8 .
3
NML, Rao MS, E . R .  Rao to B . S .  M o onje ,  5 A ug ust  1 9 2 8 .
4
H e r e a f t e r ,  K hap ard e  r e f e r s  to B . G .  K h a p a r d e ,  the e l d e r  
sor o f  G . S .  K h a p a rd e .
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D i f f e r e n c e s  b e tw e e n  H i n d i  and M a r ath i  members of  
the N a t i o n a l i s t  ' p a r t y '  h e i g h t e n e d  the d i s c o r d  w i t h i n  the 
m in i s t r y  and h a s t e n e d  i t s  c o l l a p s e .  R e s p o n s i v i s t s  from 
the M a rath i  r e g i o n  f r e q u e n t l y  a t t a c k e d  the budget  grants
un de r  the care  o f  the m i n i s t e r s ,  c o n c e n t r a t i n g  t h e i r
2
a t t e n t i o n  on those  o f  R a g h av e n d r a  R a o . R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
o f  the H i n d i  r e g i o n ,  f o r  t h e i r  p a r t ,  c r i t i c i s e d  the 
atta inm ent  o f  the Sim form ula  i n s i d e  and o u t s id e  the 
l e g i s l a t u r e  and once a g a i n  condemned the government for
3
n e g l e c t i n g  the i n t e r e s t s  o f  the H i n d i  r e g i o n .  By mid-
1928  H i n d i  resentm ent  on th is  i s s u e  had grown to such an  
exten t  that  members o f  the In d e p e n d e n t  Congress  ' p a r t y ' ,  
I n d e p e n d e n t s  and Congressmen  a l i k e  urged  the s e p a r a t i o n
4
o f  the H i n d i  r e g i o n  from the rem ain der  o f  the p r o v i n c e .  
T h i s  provoked  an  immediate  r e a c t i o n  from the R e s p o n s i v i s t s  
o f  Berar  who t a b l e d  a r e s o l u t i o n  i n  the C o u n c i l  that  
' im m ed iate  steps  should  be ta k e n  to c o n s t i t u t e  a 
sub-province  on l i n g u i s t i c  b a s i s  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  Berar  and
the S t a t u t o r y  Commission .
1
NML, E . R .  Rao to R . M .  Deshmukh,  2 4  A p r i l  1 9 2 8 ;
H i t a v a d a , 20  May 1 9 2 8 ,  p . 3*
2
See C P L C , v o l . 2 ,  10 March  1 9 2 7 ,  P P * 5 9 3 _ 8 ;  i b i d . ,  v o 1 . 2 ,
9 March  1 9 2 8 ,  p p . 2 5 7 -6 l ;  H i  t a v a d a , 13 March  1927 , p . 8 .
3
CPLC,  v o l . 2 ,  5 March  1 9 2 7 ,  p . l 4 2 ;  i b i d . ,  2 1  March  1 9 2 7 ,
P P •97 7 - 8 ;  H i t a v a d a , 10 June  1 9 2 8 ,  p . 3 ;  i b i d . ,  26 J u l y  1 9 2 8 ,  
P . 3-
4
I b i d . ,  29  Septem ber  1 9 2 7 ,  P*7?  26  A p r i l  1 9 2 8 ,  p . 5 ;
20  May 1 9 2 8 ,  p . 3 ;  22 J u l y  1 9 2 8 ,  p . l ;  28 J u l y  1 9 2 8 ,  p . 3 ;
5 A u g u st  1 9 2 8 ,  p . 2 ;  9 August  1 9 2 8 ,  p . 2 ;  16 A u g u s t  1 9 2 8 ,  
p . 5 .
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M a rath i  C P * . The movement to s e p arate  the M a r ath i  from
the H i n d i  r e g i o n  had the s t r o n g e s t  support o f  Ramrao
2
Deshmukh. At  the h e ig h t  o f  the q u a r r e l  b e tw e e n  the two 
r e g i o n s ,  Dr Moonje  i n t e r v e n e d  i n  an  attempt to h e a l  the 
b r e a c h .  W r i t i n g  to one o f  the sponsors  o f  the 
r e s o l u t i o n  f o r  the s e p a r a t i o n  o f  the H i n d i  and M arath i  
r e g i o n s ,  Dr  Moonje  d e c l a r e d
You have  g i v e n  n o t ic e  o f  moving a r e s o l u t i o n  i n  
the next s e s s i o n  o f  your  l e g i s l a t i v e  c o u n c i l  
a s k i n g  f o r  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  B e rar  and CP M a r a th i  
from the CP H i n d i . . . . 1  do not know what 
p r o v o c a t i o n  our B e rar  f r i e n d s  have  r e c e i v e d  to 
i n s p i r e  them to move f o r  s e p a r a t i o n .  I  may on 
the other  hand  as s u r e  you that none o f  us here  
i n  CP M a r a t h i  as f a r  as I  know d e s i r e s  f o r  such 
s e p a r a t i o n .  We have  l i v e d  to ge th er  i n  
f r i e n d l i n e s s  from the days  o f  the B h o n s la  R a j a s  
and we do not welcome such  a m o v e . . . . ( i  must) 
req uest  you to r e c o n s i d e r . ^
As  a r e s u l t ,  the r e s o l u t i o n  was w ith d r a w n ,  and one source 
o f  danger  to the m in i s t r y  a v e r t e d .
Dr  M o onje ,  how ever ,  was p ow e r le s s  to p r e v e n t  the 
H i n d i  and M a r a th i  m i n i s t e r s  from attempts  to fo r c e  each 
ot h er  out o f  o f f i c e .  By 1928  the R e s p o n s i v i s t  s e c t i o n  o f  
the N a t i o n a l i s t  'p a r ty *  had  had  enough o f  R a o ' s attac k s  
on  Deshm ukh 's  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  the Departm ents  o f  P u b l i c  
Works and L o c a l  S e l f  Government .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  i n  March
1
H i t a v a d a , 20  May 1 9 2 8 ,  p . 3 ;  22  J u l y  1 9 2 8 ,  p . l ;  5 A ugust
1 9 2 8 ,  p . 2 ;  9 A u g u s t  1 9 2 8 ,  p . 2 .
2
I b i d ^ ,  9 A u g u s t  1 9 2 8 ,  p . 2 .
3
N L I , Moonje  MS, B . S .  Moonje  to D . D .  R a j u r k e r ,  9 A ug ust  
1928  .
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o f  that y ea r  they brought  a vote  o f  c ensure  a g a in s t  Rao
at a m eeting  o f  the N a t i o n a l i s t  'p ar ty *  i n  Nagpur."*"
The vote  f a i l e d ,  how ever ,  and Deshmukh had  to content
h i m s e l f  w i t h  c a r r y i n g  on  a p r e s s  cam paign  a g a i n s t  Rao
2
from A m r a v a t i .  I n  A u g u s t ,  the R e s p o n s i v i s t s  launched  
another  attempt to remove Rao from the m i n i s t r y  by  
t a b l i n g  a m otion  o f  no c o n f i d e n c e  a g a i n s t  him i n  the 
C o u n c i l .  Rumour s t r o n g l y  a s s o c i a t e d  the Home Member ’ s 
name w i t h  th is  move. W r i t i n g  to S i r  F r a n k  S l y ,  th en  i n  
E n g l a n d ,  S i r  G .M .  C h i t n a v i s  s t a t e d  that
there  i s  some i n t e n t i o n  on  the p art  o f  some 
o f  the m e m b e r s . . .to  move a vote  o f  no c o n f id e n c e  
i n  the p r e s e n t  m i n i s t r y .  The Governor  seems to 
be very  concerned  about  t h i s .  The  n o t ic e s  
w h i c h  g o ve r n  such a move have  t h e i r  b i r t h  i n  a 
s p i r i t  o f  envy ,  and that  too m ain ly  i n s i d e  the 
e x e c u t i v e  c o u n c i l  i t s e l f . . . .T h e r e  i s  a well- 
e x p r e s s e d  f e e l i n g  that  Mr Tambe has  a hand  i n  
th i s  a f f a i r  o f  no c o n f i d e n c e  and that  h i s  
f r i e n d s  are  w o r k in g  f o r  i t  and c a n v a s s i n g  
m a t t e r s .3
I n  e a r l y  A u g u s t ,  Dr Moonje  a lso  t r i e d  to p e rs u a d e  Rao 
to r e s i g n  from the m i n i s t r y  on  the grounds  that  the 
government had  s e c r e t l y  draw n  up a case  f o r  the
1
H i t a v a d a , 19 A p r i l  1 9 2 8 ,  p . 2 ;  20  May 1 9 2 8 ,  p .3>
20  September  1 9 2 8 ,  p . l .
2
I b i d . ,  20  May 1 9 2 8 ,  p . 3 .
3
NML, Rao MS,  E . R .  Rao to R . M .  Deshmukh,  2 k  A p r i l  1 9 2 8 ;  
C h i t n a v i s  MS,  S i r  G .M .  C h i t n a v i s  to S i r  F r a n k  S l y ,
21  J u l y  1 9 2 8 ( ? ) ;  I n d i a n  A n n u a l  R e g i s t e r , n o . 2 ,  18 Aug ust
1928, p.255.
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R a o , how ever ,  s u r v i v e d  a l l  attempts  to remove him,
and at the same time lau nch ed  a campaign  a g a in s t
Deshmukh w i t h  the aim o f  f o r c i n g  him to leave  the
2
m i n i s t r y  a l t o g e t h e r .  At  f i r s t  Rao t r i e d  to persuad e  
Deshmukh to accept  a r e s h u f f l e  o f  the p o r t f o l i o s  i n  
fa v o u r  o f  the H i n d i  r e g i o n .  And  as R a o ' s com plaints  
a g a i n s t  h i s  c o l l e a g u e  r e l a t e d  m ainly  to the Departments  
o f  P u b l i c  Works and L o c a l  S e l f  Government ,  i t  was 
l i k e l y  that  he d e s i r e d  to secure  c o n t r o l  over  those  
p o r t f o l i o s  i n  p a r t i c u l a r .  To compel Deshmukh to 
s u r r e n d e r  these  key  p o r t f o l i o s ,  Rao t h r e a te n e d  to hand 
i n  h i s  r e s i g n a t i o n  to the Governor  and thus b r i n g  about
3
Deshmukh*s  own r e s i g n a t i o n .  Deshmukh r e f u s e d  to submit 
to R a o ’ s t h r e a t ,  how ever ,  and coun tered  by  i n f o r m in g  him 
i n  May 1928  that
i t  i s  about time fo r  me to p r o t e s t  a g a i n s t  your 
m enacing  a t t i t u d e  and a g a i n s t  the i m p l i c a t i o n s  
i n  your  statem ents  about my L o c a l  S e l f  
Government p o l i c y .  I  am not u se d  to th r e a ts  or 
b u l l y i n g  from a n y b o d y . . . . 1  have  t r i e d  my best  
not to g iv e  any cause  to you to c om pla in  and I  
have t r i e d  my b e s t  to keep  the m in i s t r y  g o ing  
by such support  to you as lay  w i t h i n  my power 
to g i v e .  I f  you are  bent  on b r e a k i n g  the 
m i n i s t r y ,  the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  fo r  the a c t i o n  and
S t a t u t o r y  Commission.
1
NML, R ao ,  B . S .  Moonje  to E . R .  R a o ,  5 A u g u s t  1 9 2 8 ;  i b i d . ,  
K . P .  V a i d y a  and V. K a l i k e r  to E . R .  R a o ,  9 A u g u s t  1 9 2 8 ;  
i b i d . ,  E . R .  Rao to K . P .  V a i d y a ,  9 August  1 9 2 8 .
2
H i t a v a d a , 20  May 1 9 2 8 ,  p . 3*
3
NML, Rao MS,  E . R .  Rao to R . M .  Deshmukh, 23  A p r i l  1 9 2 8 ;  
i b i d . , 6 May 1 9 2 8 .
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the consequences  i s  y o u r s .  You must d e c i d e  fo r  
y o u r s e l f  and  take such  course  i n  the matter  as 
you see f i t .  Any  a d v i c e  from me at th is  stage  
w o u l d . . . b e  o f  no a v a i l .
Rao r e t a l i a t e d  by f o r c i n g  Deshmukh from o f f i c e ,  and by 
form ing  a government i n  w h ic h  the H i n d i  r e g i o n  h e l d  the 
major share  o f  power .  He d i d  so by  w i t h d r a w i n g  the 
In d e p e n d e n t  Congressmen from the N a t i o n a l i s t  'p ar ty *  and
by b u i l d i n g  a p e r s o n a l  f o l l o w i n g  among the M usl im ,  non-
2
Brahman and D e p r e s s e d  members o f  the C o u n c i l .  T h is
f o l l o w i n g  gave Rao a base  o f  support f o r  manoeuvres
a g a i n s t  Deshmukh. Rao knew ,  too ,  that i n  any  move
a g a in s t  h i s  c o l l e a g u e ,  he c o u ld  count on the support o f
the Congress  p a r t y  w h ich  had  v i g o r o u s l y  opposed  the
3
m in i s t r y  ever  s in c e  i t  came to power .  As  a r e s u l t ,  by
mid-August R a o ' s p r e p a r a t i o n s  f o r  the e j e c t i o n  o f
Deshmukh from the m i n i s t r y  were com plete .  He in te n d e d
that h i s  s up p orters  w ould  move a vote  o f  no c o n f id e n c e
i n  Deshmukh on  18 August  1 9 2 8 .  But Deshmukh f o r e s t a l l e d
the motion  and r e s i g n e d  b e f o r e  the House  met f o r  the
b u s i n e s s  o f  the day .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  the m otion  a g a in s t
4
him  la p s e d .  The f o l l o w i n g  day Rao also  te nd e re d  h i s
1
NML, R . M .  Deshmukh to E . R .  R a o ,  11 May 1 9 2 8 .
2
See C h i t n a v i s  MS, S i r  G .M .  C h it n a v is  to S i r  F r a n k  S l y ,
21  J u l y  1 9 2 8 ( ? ) ;  H i t a v a d a , 2 4  June  1 9 2 8 ,  p . 2 ;  19 J u l y
1928 , p . 7 ;  9 A ugust  1928 , p . 2 ;  30 August  1928 , p . 7 ;  
I n d i a n  A n n u a l  R e g i s t e r , n o . 2 ,  18 A ug ust  1 9 2 8 ,  p . 2 5 4 .
3
CPLC,  v o l . 2 ,  14  March  19 2 7 , p p . 6 8 7 - 7 14 ;  i b i d . ,  v o l . l ,  
2 0  Ja n u a r y  1 9 2 8 ,  p p . 195- 236 .
4
CPLC, v o l . 3» 18 A u g u s t  1928, p . 222.
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r e s i g n a t i o n  to the G o v er n o r ,  i n t i m a t i n g  h i s  r e a d i n e s s  to 
a s s i s t  him i n  f a c i l i t a t i n g  the ' r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  the 
m i n i s t r y 1 ."*" A t  the same t im e ,  Rao formed the Democratic
' p a r t y 1 from h i s  sup p orters  i n  the H o u s e ,  and a w a it ed
2
B u t l e r ' s  next move. On 25  A ug ust  S i r  Montagu  B u t l e r  
i n v i t e d  Rao and K haparde  to Government House  to d is c u s s  
the fo r m a t i o n  o f  a m i n i s t r y .  K haparde  was u n w i l l i n g  to 
a s s i s t  i n  form in g  a m i n i s t r y  w i t h  R a o ,  p o s s i b l y  because  
he f e a r e d  a r e c u r r e n c e  o f  the c o n f l i c t s  o f  the p r e v io u s  
m i n i s t r y .  The  Governor  t h e r e f o r e  i n v i t e d  Rao to form 
a m i n i s t r y  and to propose  a c o l l e a g u e .  Rao r e a d i l y  
ac c e p te d  B u t l e r ' s  o f f e r  and  chose as h i s  c o l l e a g u e ,  the 
v o l a t i l e  Tukaram Ja ir a m  K e d a r ,  the R e s p o n s i v i s t  member 
f o r  the D i v i s i o n  o f  Nagp ur .  Rao completed  h i s  v i c t o r y  
over  the M a ra th i  p o l i t i c i a n s  by  assum ing  fo r  h i m s e l f  the 
p o r t f o l i o s  o f  E d u c a t i o n ,  L o c a l  S e l f  Government and P u b l i c  
W orks ,  l e a v i n g  K e d a r  the l e s s  important  p o r t f o l i o s  o f
3
A g r i c u l t u r e  and E x c i s e .  On  25  A ugust  1928  Rao b e ga n  
h i s  second m i n i s t r y .
I I
The r i s e  o f  the H i n d i  r e g i o n ,  e v id e n t  i n  R a o ' s
1
NML, Rao MS,  E . R .  Rao to S i r  Montagu B u t l e r ,  19 August  
1 9 2 8 ;  i b i d . ,  20 August  1 9 2 8 .
2
H i t a v a d a , 26  A ug ust  1 9 2 8 ,  p . l ;  30  A u g u s t  1 9 2 8 ,  p . 7*
3
I n d i a n  A n n u a l  R e g i s t e r , n o . 2 ,  1 9 2 8 ,  p p . 263- 4 ;  N A I , 
Khap ard e  MS,  D i a r y ,  29  A ug ust  1 9 2 8 ;  H i t a v a d a , 13 
Septem ber  1 9 2 8 ,  p . 2 .
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a c t i v i t i e s  as  C h i e f  M i n i s t e r ,  was a c c o m p a n i e d  b y  a 
d e c l i n e  i n  the  p o l i t i c a l  f o r t u n e s  o f  the  M a r a t h i  r e g i o n .  
T h i s  was  s e e n  to g r e a t e s t  e f f e c t  i n  D e s h m u k h ' s  e x c l u s i o n  
fro m  the  go v e r n m e n t  a t  the  h a n d s  o f  R a o . I t  was  a l s o  to 
b e  s e e n  i n  the  c a r e e r  o f  D r  M o o n j e  b e t w e e n  1 9 2 7 “ 9*
D u r i n g  t h a t  p e r i o d ,  D r  M o o n j e  em erg e d  a s  a s t a u n c h  
d e f e n d e r  o f  H i n d u  i n t e r e s t s  i n  the  C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s ,  
a n d ,  to a n  i n c r e a s i n g  d e g r e e ,  i n  I n d i a  as  a w h o l e .  M an y  
o f  h i s  a c t i v i t i e s  to f u r t h e r  t h e s e  i n t e r e s t s ,  h o w e v e r ,  
f a i l e d  to a c h i e v e  t h e i r  o b j e c t i v e .  T h i s  f a i l u r e  was  not 
du e  to M o o n j e 1s l a c k  o f  e n t h u s i a s m  f o r  the  i n t e r e s t s  o f  
H i n d u s ;  b u t  to t h e  f a c t  t h a t  the  p r o b l e m s  to w h i c h  he  
g a v e  h i s  a t t e n t i o n  w e r e  d e e p - s e a t e d  a n d  c o m p l e x ,  and  
b e y o n d  the  a b i l i t y  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  to r e s o l v e .
One  o f  M o o n j e 1s more s u c c e s s f u l  v e n t u r e s  w as  h i s  
w o r k  i n  the  C e n t r a l  L e g i s l a t i v e  A s s e m b l y ,  w h e r e  h e  t o o k  
a n  a c t i v e  i n t e r e s t  i n  m i l i t a r y  a f f a i r s .  T h i s  i n t e r e s t ,  
a s  the  H i t a v a d a  r i g h t l y  o b s e r v e d  was  a ' n e c e s s a r y  
c om ple m e nt  o f  h i s  l a r g e r  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  
t h e  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  a n d  c o n s o l i d a t i o n  o f  t h e  H i n d u s ' .  A s  
e v i d e n c e  o f  t h i s  i n t e r e s t ,  M o o n j e  p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  the  
d e b a t e s  o n  the  m i l i t a r y  b u d g e t  i n  1 9 2 8 ,  an d  i n  1929 he
moved a r e s o l u t i o n  o n  c o m p u l s o r y  m i l i t a r y  t r a i n i n g  i n
2
a p p r o v e d  s c h o o l s  an d  c o l l e g e s .  He  t h u s  a c q u i r e d  a 
r e p u t a t i o n  f o r  b e i n g  a n  ' e x p e r t  o n  m i l i t a r y  s u b j e c t s '
1
H i t a v a d a , 15 A u g u s t  1 9 2 9 ,  p . l .
2
C e n t r a l  L e g i s l a t i v e  A s s e m b l y  P r o c e e d i n g s  1928-9 , v o 1 . 2 ,
p p . 1511-8 ; i b i d .  , v o 1 . 3 > p p . 29^-5 > 820-31 ; H i t a v a d a ,
5 A p r i l  1928, p . l ;  I n d i a n  A n n u a l  R e g i s t e r , n o . 1 , 1929, 
p . 1 5 .
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a n d  i n  1 9 2 9 the  V i c e r o y  n o m i n a t e d  h im  as  n o n - o f f i c i a l  
member o f  the  I n t e r v i e w  a n d  R e c o r d  B o a r d  f o r  the  Arm y  
a n d  A i r  F o r c e  e n t r a n c e  e x a m i n a t i o n . ^  But  the  G o v e r n m e n t  
o f  I n d i a  w o u l d  a l l o w  M o o n j e  to go no f u r t h e r ,  f o r  i n
1929 i t  r e f u s e d  h im  p e r m i s s i o n  to i n t r o d u c e  i n t o  the
A s s e m b l y  a b i l l  p r o v i d i n g  f o r  p h y s i c a l  a n d  m i l i t a r y
2
t r a i n i n g  i n  I n d i a n  s c h o o l s .
Dr  M o o n j e  a l s o  h a d  to f a c e  t h e  f a i l u r e  o f  h i s  
a t t e m p t  to w e l d  the  H i n d u  c om m unity  t o g e t h e r  to e n a b l e  
i t  to a c h i e v e  i t s  p o l i t i c a l  o b j e c t i v e s .  T h e  p r o b l e m  
f a c i n g  D r  M o o n j e  was  s e e n  to b e s t  e f f e c t  i n  the  M a r a t h i  
r e g i o n  o f  t h e  C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s ,  w h e r e  d e v e l o p m e n t s  
l a r g e l y  p a r a l l e l e d  t h o s e  i n  o t h e r  p a r t s  o f  I n d i a .  D u r i n g  
t h e  t w e n t i e s  a c l a i m  b y  members  o f  the  D e p r e s s e d  
c om m unity  t h a t  t h e y  s h o u l d  e n j o y  e q u a l  r i g h t s  w i t h  o t h e r  
H i n d u s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  members  o f  the  B r a h m a n  c o m m u nit y ,  
c a u s e d  s e r i o u s  c o n f l i c t  i n  H i n d u  s o c i e t y .  From  1 9 2 0  
o n w a r d s  th e  D e p r e s s e d  c o m m u nity  i n  the  C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s  
a n d  I n d i a  as  a w h o l e  t o o k  p a r t  i n  a c t i v i t i e s  to 
e s t a b l i s h  t h a t  c l a i m .  L e a d e r s  o f  the  D e p r e s s e d  com m unity  
h e l d  c o n f e r e n c e s  a t  the  p r o v i n c i a l  an d  d i s t r i c t  l e v e l  at  
w h i c h  t h e y  cond em ned  the  B ra h m a n s  f o r  p e r p e t u a t i n g  
u n t o u c h a b i l i t y , a n d  e n u n c i a t e d  means b y  w h i c h  the  
D e p r e s s e d  c om m unity  c o u l d  e s c a p e  t h a t  s t a t u s  a n d  a t t a i n
1
H i t a v a d a , 5 A p r i l  1 9 2 8 ,  p . l ;  N L I , M o o n j e  M S ,  A s s o r t e d  
L e t t e r s ,  T e l e g r a m  d .  28  M ay  1929*
2
H i t a v a d a , 22  September  1929> P*_______ •
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s e l f - r e s p e c t .  One  o f  t h e s e  means was t h r o u g h  c o n v e r s i o n
2
to I s l a m .  A n o t h e r  c o n s i s t e d  o f  c h a l l e n g i n g  the  s o c i a l  
c usto m s  t h a t  p r e s e r v e d  u n t o u c h a b i l i t y . A s  a r e s u l t  b y
1 9 2 9  some D e p r e s s e d  p e o p l e  h a d  becom e  M u s l i m s ;  more common, 
h o w e v e r ,  w ere  t h e i r  a t t e m p t s  to d r i n k  f ro m  p u b l i c  w e l l s
3
o r  e n t e r  H i n d u  t e m p l e s .  To r a i s e  t h e i r  s o c i a l  s t a t u s ,
the  l e a d e r s  o f  t h e  D e p r e s s e d  com m u nit y  i n  the  C e n t r a l
P r o v i n c e s  a l s o  e n t e r e d  p o l i t i c s .  T h e y  d i d  not  s u b m it  to
n a t i o n a l i s t  l e a d e r s h i p ,  h o w e v e r ,  b u t  e s t a b l i s h e d  t i e s
w i t h  the  p r o v i n c i a l  g o v e r n m e n t  o n  the  g r o u n d s  t h a t  ' u n t i l
we a r e  a c t u a l l y  g i v e n . . . l i b e r t y  a n d  e q u a l i t y ,  we s h o u l d
f i g h t  to m a i n t a i n  t h e  B r i t i s h  g o v e r n m e n t  w h i c h  s e e s  no
4
d i f f e r e n c e s  a n d  k n o w s  no u n t o u c h a b l e s ' .  T h e  D e p r e s s e d  
l e a d e r s  h o p e d  t h a t  t h e i r  l i n k  w i t h  the  g o v e r n m e n t  w o u l d  
r e s u l t  i n  the  p r o v i s i o n  o f  e d u c a t i o n a l  f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  
members  o f  the  c o m m u n it y ,  a n d  i n  n o m i n a t i o n s  o f  D e p r e s s e d  
members to l o c a l  b o d i e s .
Dr  M o o n j e  a t t e m p t e d ,  a l b e i t  w i t h  l i t t l e  s u c c e s s ,  to
1
S e e  H i t a v a d a , 1 S e p t e m b e r  1 9 2 7 ,  P * 3 ,  22  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 2 7 ,  
p . 5 .
2
I b i d . ,  2 0  F e b r u a r y  1 9 2 4 ,  p . 3*
3
N A I , Home P o l l ,  F - 1 1 2 ,  1 9 2 6 ,  F R , F i r s t  H a l f  o f  F e b r u a r y
1 9 2 6 ,  p . 8 ;  H i t a v a d a , 11  M a r c h  1 9 2 6 ,  p . 3* One  o f  the  
e a r l i e s t  a t t e m p t s  b y  t h e  D e p r e s s e d  com m unity  to f o r c e  
e n t r y  to H i n d u  t e m p le s  w as  t h e  S a t y a g r a h a  to g a i n  e n t r y  to 
the  fam ous  Am ba  T e m p l e  i n  A m r a v a t i  i n  19 2 7 «
4
H i t a v a d a ,  7 M a r c h  1 9 2 3 ,  p . 3 *
5
I b i d . ,  29  A p r i l  1 9 2 6 ,  p . 8 ;  17 F e b r u a r y  1 9 2 7 , P *3 j
18 November 1 9 2 8 ,  p . l ;  28 March  1 9 2 9 , P *3 *
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w e l d  the  c a s t e  H i n d u s  a n d  the  D e p r e s s e d  c l a s s e s  i n t o  a 
s i n g l e  com m unity .  D u r i n g  the  t w e n t i e s ,  M o o n j e  c o n c e d e d  
t h a t  u n t o u c h a b i l i t y  h a d  p r e v e n t e d  the  D e p r e s s e d  com m unity  
fr o m  c u l t i v a t i n g  a n y  ' s e n s e  o f  d i g n i t y  as  c i t i z e n s  o f  
the  l a n d ' ; an d  as  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  H i n d u  M a h a s a b h a  
f r o m  1927 h e  s u p p o r t e d  r e s o l u t i o n s  c o n d e m n i n g  
u n t o u c h a b i l i t y , a n d  a d v o c a t i n g  t em p le  e n t r y  and
i n t e r d i n i n g  b e t w e e n  c a s t e  H i n d u s  a n d  members o f  the
2
D e p r e s s e d  c om m u nity .  D e s p i t e  M o o n j e ' s  s u p p o r t ,  h o w e v e r ,  
t h e  D e p r e s s e d  c om m unity  i n  the  C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s  a n d  
B e r a r  c o n t i n u e d  to a t t a c k  the  c a s t e  H i n d u s  i n  a n  e f f o r t  
to a c h i e v e  s o c i a l  e q u a l i t y  w i t h  them.  T h e y  a l s o  
p e r s i s t e d  i n  t h e i r  s e p a r a t i s t  p o l i t i c a l  m ovem ent ,  a n d  
i n  1 9 2 8  f o u n d  a v a l u a b l e  a l l y  i n  R a g h a v e n d r a  R a o . I n  
r e t u r n  f o r  R a o ' s a d v o c a c y  o f  the  c a u s e  o f  the  D e p r e s s e d  
c o m m u n it y ,  the  D e p r e s s e d  members o f  the  C o u n c i l  j o i n e d  
th e  D e m o c r a t i c  ' p a r t y '  to a i d  h i s  a s s a u l t  o n  the
3
R e s p o n s i v i s t s  o f  the  M a r a t h i  r e g i o n .
D r  M o o n j e  was  a l s o  u n a b l e  to h e a l  the  g u l f  b e t w e e n  
members  o f  the  B r a h m a n  a n d  non- Brahm an  c o m m u n i t i e s  i n
1
N L I , M o o n j e  M S ,  D i a r y  1 ,  17  M a r c h  19 2 7 .
2
I n d i a n  A n n u a l  R e g i s t e r , n o . 1 ,  1 9 2 7 ,  p p . 4 l 6 - 2 2 ;  H i t a v a d a ,
2 1  A p r i l  1 9 2 7 ,  p . 6 .  S e e  a l s o  N L I ,  M o o n j e  M S ,  L e t t e r  P ad  
2 3 ,  B . S .  M o o n j e  to D r  D e s h m u k h ,  4 J u l y  1 9 2 4 ,  i b i d . ,
L e t t e r  P a d  2 5 ,  B . S .  M o o n j e  to B . R .  D e s h m u k h ,  1 1  O c t o b e r  
1 9 2 4 .
3
S e e  p p . 1 7 9 , 1 8 4 . H i  t a v a d a , 2 9  N o ve m b e r  1 9 2 8 ,  p . 7 j  16  
D e c e m b e r  1 9 2 8 ,  p . 1 3 . A  c o n f e r e n c e  o f  the  D e p r e s s e d  
c o m m u nit y  i n  A m r a v a t i  i n  1 9 2 8  t h a n k e d  the  g o v e r n m e n t  f o r  
n o m i n a t i n g  members o f  the  c o m m u n it y  to M u n i c i p a l  C o u n c i l s ,  
D i s t r i c t  C o u n c i l s  a n d  T a l u q  B o a r d s  i n  the  C e n t r a l  
P r o v i n c e s  a n d  B e r a r .  S e e  a l s o  the  s t a t e m e n t  b y  R . M .  De sh m uk h  
o n  h i s  r e s i g n a t i o n  as  M i n i s t e r  i n  C P L C , v o 1 . 3 ,  2 1  A u g u s t
1 9 2 8 ,  p p . 2 6 5 - 7 1 .
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the  M a r a t h i  r e g i o n .  D u r i n g  the  t w e n t i e s  the  movement by
non-Brahmans  to w i n  s o c i a l  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  e q u a l i t y  w i t h
the  B ra hm ans  o f  t h a t  r e g i o n  grew  r a p i d l y ,  a n d  b y  1929
h a d  a s s u m e d  t h r e a t e n i n g  p r o p o r t i o n s . 1 T h i s  movement
c a u s e d  M o o n j e  g r a v e  c o n c e r n  b e c a u s e  i t  d e s t r o y e d  H i n d u
u n i t y ,  a n d  h e  t r i e d  i n  a l i m i t e d  way  to rem ove  the
2
g r o u n d s  f o r  the  non- Brahm an  r e v o l t .  M o o n j e  c o n s i d e r e d  
i t  i m p e r a t i v e  t h a t  the  B r a h m a n  c om m unity  o f  M a h a r a s h t r a  
s h o u l d  make a d e c l a r a t i o n  o f  r i g h t s  to a s s u r e  t h e  non- 
Bra hm ans  t h a t  t h e y  h a d  e q u a l  s o c i a l  s t a n d i n g  w i t h  the  
B r a h m a n s .  I n  t h i s  r e g a r d ,  o n  17 J u l y  1927  M o o n j e  s t a t e d  
t h a t
the  n o n  B r a h m i n s  o u g h t  to b e  s a t i s f i e d  i f  s u c h  
a p u b l i c  d e c l a r a t i o n  i s  made o f  e q u a l i t y  o f  
r i g h t s ,  s o c i a l  a n d  r e l i g i o u s ,  b e t w e e n  c a s t e s . . . .
T h i s  e r a  o f  i n t e r c a s t e  e q u a l i t y  a n d  c o o p e r a t i o n  
s h o u l d  be  u s h e r e d  i n  b y  a p r e l i m i n a r y  r o u n d  
t a b l e  c o n f e r e n c e . . . . W i t h o u t  t h i s  l e a p  o f  s e l f -  
a b n e g a t i o n  fro m  o u r  l o n g - e s t a b l i s h e d  v e s t e d  
i n t e r e s t s  a n d  r i g h t  o f  c a s t e - s y s t e m ,  we a r e  
doomed to i g n o m i n i o u s  e x t i n c t i o n .
T h e  B r a h m a n s ,  i n  f a c t ,  made s u c h  a d e c l a r a t i o n ,  a n d  M o o n j e  
t u r n e d  to h e a l  the  b r a n c h  b e t w e e n  the  B ra h m an s  and  the  
non-Brahm ans  i n  the  p o l i t i c a l  f i e l d .  H e r e  he  a c h i e v e d
1
Se e  N A I , I n d i a n  P a p e r s ,  n o . 3 8 , 1 9 2 4 ,  p . 4 6 0 ,  B h aw ani  
T a r w a r  ( N a r k h e d ) , 10 A u g u s t  1 9 2 4 ;  P i o n e e r » 28 M ay  1925»  
p . 8 ; H i t a v a d a t 12 A u g u s t  1 9 2 6 ,  p . 3» N A I ,  Home P o l l ,  F - l ,
1 9 2 7 ,  F R ,  S e c o n d  H a l f  o f  F e b r u a r y  1 9 2 8 ,  p . l j  N A I ,  J a y a k e r  
M S ,  F i l e  3 6 , L e t t e r  2 3 ,  E x t r a c t  f ro m  J D M ( ? ) ,  26  No ve m ber  
1 9 2 9 .
2
S e e  N L I , M o o n j e  M S ,  D i a r y  1, 23 May  1926$  D i a r y  2 ,
22  D e c e m b e r  I 929 .
3
H i  tavada  t 17 J u l y  19 2 7 , P *9*
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l i t t l e .  I n  1 9 2 8 ,  at  h i s  s u g g e s t i o n ,  the  H i n d u  S a b h a  o f
N a g p u r  a p p o i n t e d  a C o m m it t e e  to s t u d y  the  p r o b l e m . 1 I n
1 9 2 8 ,  t o o ,  M o o n j e  g a v e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  to a p l a n  to adm it
no n-Brahm ans  to the  R a s h t r i y a  M a n d a l , w h i c h ,  a l t h o u g h
f a r  l e s s  p o w e r f u l  t h a n  i n  p r e v i o u s  y e a r s ,  s t i l l  r e t a i n e d
2
i t s  B r a h m a n  c o m p o s i t i o n .
D e s p i t e  t h e s e  m oves ,  h o w e v e r ,  D r  M o o n j e  w as  u n a b l e  
to h e a l  the  b r e a c h  b e t w e e n  B ra h m a n s  and  non- Brahm ans  i n  
the  M a r a t h i  r e g i o n .  T h r o u g h o u t  the  t w e n t i e s ,  the  non- 
B ra h m a n s  c o n t i n u e d  to h o l d  d i s t r i c t  an d  p r o v i n c i a l  
c o n f e r e n c e s ,  a n d ,  i f  a n y t h i n g ,  the  no n- Bra hm an  a t t a c k  o n  
t h e  B r a h m a n  co m m u nity  i n c r e a s e d  r a t h e r  t h a n  d e c r e a s e d .  
T h i s  was  p a r t i c u l a r l y  e v i d e n t  i n  the  a t t e m p t s  b y  non- 
B r a h m a n s  to w r e s t  c o n t r o l  o f  the  l o c a l  b o d i e s  o f  the
3
M a r a t h i  r e g i o n  f r o m  t h e  B r a h m a n s .  To do so the  non- 
B r a h m a n s  f o u g h t  v i g o r o u s  e l e c t o r a l  c a m p a i g n s ,  i n  w h i c h  
t h e y  made e x t e n s i v e  u s e  o f  ta m a s h a s  to c r a c k  B r a h m a n  
o p p o s i t i o n .  A c c o r d i n g  to o ne  r e p o r t  i n  the  H i t a v a d a , 
t h e s e  t a m a s h a s  w e r e  i n t r o d u c e d  by
n o n  B r a h m i n  p o l i t i c i a n s . . . i n  B e r a r . . . to c a t c h  the  
n o n  B r a h m i n  v o t e  at  the  p o l l s .  F rom  B e r a r  t h e y  
w e r e  i n t r o d u c e d  at  W a r d h a  a n d  f ro m  W a r d h a  t h e y  
w en t  to N a g p u r .  R e c e n t l y  t h e y  w e r e  a v a i l e d  o f  
a t  the  l o c a l  b o a r d  e l e c t i o n s  at  B h i v a p u r ,  a n d  t h e y  
a r e  now b e i n g  u s e d  b y  some n o n  B r a h m i n  c a n d i d a t e s
1
H i  t a v a d a , 18 D e c e m b e r  1927>  P • 1 2 ;  N L I , M o o n j e  M S ,  L e t t e r  
P a d  4 5 ,  9 A u g u s t  1 9 2 8 .
2
I b i d . ,  L e t t e r  P a d  4 8 ,  12 N o ve m b e r  1 9 2 8 .
3
S e e  f o r  i n s t a n c e  H i  t a v a d a , 9 D e c e m b e r  1 9 2 6 ,  p . 8 ; N A I , 
Home P o l l ,  F - l ,  1 9 2 8 ,  F R , F i r s t  H a l f  o f  J u l y  1 9 2 8 ,  p . l .
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to f i g h t  out  the  m u n i c i p a l  e l e c t i o n s  at  N a g p u r  
. . . . ( T h e i r )  o b j e c t  i s  to r e p r e s e n t  B r a h m i n s  as  
the  m o r a l  w r e c k s  o f  h u m a n i t y , . . . ( a n d )  most 
v u l g a r  and  im m o ral  s c e n e s  a r e  e n a c t e d  b e f o r e  a n  
i g n o r a n t  and  u n t h i n k i n g  a u d i e n c e . . . ( t o ) c r e a t e  
i n t e n s e  f e e l i n g s  o f  c on te m p t  a n d  h a t r e d  f o r  the  
B r a h m i n  c l a s s .
T h e  e l e c t o r a l  c a m p a i g n s  i n v a r i a b l y  r e s u l t e d  i n  the
e l e c t i o n  o f  non-Brahm ans  to th e  l o c a l  b o d i e s  i n  l a r g e
n u m b e r s .  A s  a r e s u l t  the  l o c a l  b o d i e s  t h e m s e l v e s  becam e
2
a r e n a s  f o r  the  c l a s h  o f  B r a h m a n  a n d  no n- Bra hm an .  E v e n
th e  H i n d u  S a b h a  o f  N a g p u r  w as  not  s a f e  f r o m  s u c h  t e n s i o n s
- a s i t u a t i o n  w h i c h  c a u s e d  M o o n j e  to d e c l a r e  i n  1 9 2 8  t h a t
fI  am g r i e v e d  to f i n d  t h a t  o u r  w h o l e  p u b l i c  l i f e  i n  N a g p u r
3
i s  a f f e c t e d  w i t h  m u t u a l  d i s t r u s t ’ . L i k e  t h e  D e p r e s s e d
l e a d e r s ,  the  no n- Brahm an  l e a d e r s  a l s o  s u p p o r t e d  the
g o v e r n m e n t ,  e i t h e r  to w i d e n  the  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r
em ploym ent  o p e n  to n o n - B r a h m a n s ,  o r  to p e r s u a d e  i t  to
a d v o c a t e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m s  t h a t  w o u l d  f a v o u r  the
4
n o n- B ra hm an  co m m u nit y .  B e t w e e n  1 9 2 7 - 8  the  no n- Brahm an  
p o l i t i c a l  movement r e c e i v e d  the  w e lc o m e  s u p p o r t  o f  
R a g h a v e n d r a  R a o . A s  C h i e f  M i n i s t e r ,  Rao  t o o k  u p  the  
c a u s e  o f  the  n o n - B r a h m a n s ,  a n d  i n  r e t u r n  many no n- Brahm an
1
H i t a v a d a , 2 F e b r u a r y  1 9 2 8 ,  p . 2 .
2
S e e  i b i d . ,  2 4  J u n e  1 9 2 8 ,  p . 3 ;  1 J u l y  1 9 2 8 ,  p . 9 j  17  
F e b r u a r y  1 9 2 9 ,  p . l .
3
N A I , Home P o l l ,  F - l ,  1 9 2 8 ,  F R , S e c o n d  H a l f  o f  F e b r u a r y
1 9 2 8 ,  p . l ;  N L I , M o o n j e  M S ,  L e t t e r  P a d  4 5 ,  B . S .  M o o n j e  to 
M r  P r a d h a n ,  3 1  J u l y  1 9 2 8 .
4
M P S , GA D ,  2 4 - 2 1 ,  1925 , R e s o l u t i o n s  P a s s e d  a t  the  
C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s  a n d  B e r a r  no n- Bra hm an  C o n f e r e n c e  h e l d  
a t  W a r d h a  o n  21- 2  M ay  1925 , p p . 2- 9 .
193
members o f  the  l e g i s l a t u r e  t o o k  R a o ' s  s i d e  i n  h i s  q u a r r e l  
w i t h  D e sh m uk h .  A n d  w h e n  Rao b r o k e  w i t h  D e sh m ukh  a n d  
fo r m e d  h i s  s e c o n d  m i n i s t r y ,  the  non-Brahm ans  c o n t i n u e d  
to s u p p o r t  h im  a s  members o f  h i s  D e m o c r a t i c  ' p a r t y 1 . 1
Dr  M o o n j e  a l s o  a t t e m p t e d  to d e a l  w i t h  the  c o n f l i c t  
b e t w e e n  H i n d u s  a n d  M u s l i m s  i n  t h e  C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s  a n d  
B e r a r  a n d  i n  I n d i a  as  a w h o l e .  H e  a c h i e v e d  g r e a t e r  
s u c c e s s  i n  the  f o r m e r  t h a n  i n  the  l a t t e r .  I n  the  C e n t r a l  
P r o v i n c e s  an d  B e r a r ,  the  p r o b l e m ,  as  Dr  M o o n j e  saw i t ,  
was  one  o f  u n i t i n g  the  H i n d u  co m m u nit y  a n d  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  
i t  to d e f e n d  i t s e l f  w h e n  a t t a c k e d  b y  M u s l i m s  d u r i n g  
p e r i o d s  o f  communal  t e n s i o n .  To  a c h i e v e  t h o s e  e n d s ,
D r  M o o n j e  c o n t i n u e d  to h o l d  m e e t i n g s  a n d  c o n f e r e n c e s ,  
u r g i n g  H i n d u s  to s e e ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,
t h a t  e v e r y  b o y  a n d  g i r l  b e t w e e n  12 to 2 0  to the  
l o w e s t  u n t o u c h a b l e  g o e s  to the  a k h a d a  to r e c e i v e  
p h y s i c a l  t r a i n i n g  a n d  to a c q u i r e  s k i l l  i n  
w i e l d i n g  a l a t h i  a n d  d a g g e r  to p r e v e n t  b r e a c h e s  
o f  p u b l i c  p e a c e . 2
3
T h e s e  a p p e a l s  a p p e a r  to h a v e  met w i t h  some r e s p o n s e .
M o o n j e  w as  not  so s u c c e s s f u l ,  h o w e v e r ,  i n  
c h a l l e n g i n g  the  M u s l i m s  at  t h e  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l .  T h e  
p r o b l e m  f a c i n g  M o o n j e  t h e r e  was  c a u s e d ,  not  b y  communal
1
S e e  p p . 1 7 9 » 1 8 4 . H i t a v a d a , 15  D e c e m b e r  1 9 2 7 ,  P * 4 ;  i b i d . ,  
18 D e c e m b e r  1 9 2 7 > P » 6 ;  C P L C , v o l . 3 ,  2 1  A u g u s t  1 9 2 8 ,  
p p . 2 6 5 - 7 1 ;  N L I , M o o n j e  M S ,  D i a r y  2 ,  22  D e c e m b e r  1 9 2 9 *
2
H i t a v a d a , 17 J u l y  1 9 2 7 , P-9*
3
N L I ,  Moonje  M S , L e t t e r  Pad  39» P r e s s  S t a te m e n t ,  11 J u l y  
1 9 2 7 ;  N A I , Home P o l l ,  F - 3 2 , I 9 2 7 , F R , F i r s t  H a l f  o f  
Septem ber  1 9 2 7 ,  p . l .
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t e n s i o n ,  b u t  b y  the  dem ands  o f  M u s l i m  l e a d e r s  t h a t  t h e y  
p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  d i s c u s s i o n s  o n  the  new c o n s t i t u t i o n  w h i c h  
B r i t a i n  was  to p r e p a r e  f o r  I n d i a .  D u r i n g  1 9 2 7 ,  the  
l e a d e r s  o f  the  M u s l i m  c o m m u nit y  met i n  D e l h i  u n d e r  the  
p r e s i d e n t s h i p  o f  M . A .  J i n n a h  an d  drew  up  a l i s t  o f  
dem ands  t h a t  t h e y  b e l i e v e d  s h o u l d  be  i n c l u d e d  i n  the  
p r o p o s e d  c o n s t i t u t i o n .  T h e s e  dem ands  w e r e  k n o w n  as  the  
Ik  p o i n t s .  T h e  e n u m e r a t i o n  o f  t h e s e  p o i n t s  g r e a t l y  
a l a r m e d  D r  M o o n j e ,  c r e a t i n g  a s  t h e y  d i d  f o r  h im  the  
p r o s p e c t  o f  ' t h e  w h o l e  o f  I n d i a  f r o m  P e s h a w a r  to K a r a c h i  
. . . f o r m e d  i n t o  a t r a c t  o f  o v e r w h e l m i n g  M o s l e m  m a j o r i t y ' . *  
To  D r  M o o n j e  t h i s  t h r e a t e n e d  t h e  i n t e g r i t y  o f  the  I n d i a n  
n a t i o n ,  a n d  r a i s e d  the  a d d i t i o n a l  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  
M u s l i m s  i n s i d e  I n d i a  w o u l d  u n i t e  w i t h  t h o s e  o u t s i d e .  He  
f e a r e d  t h a t  s u c h  a u n i o n  w o u l d  f a c i l i t a t e  a n  i n v a s i o n  o f
3
the  c o u n t r y  b y  the  l a t t e r .  I t  w as  f o r  t h i s  r e a s o n  t h a t
D r  M o o n j e  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  the  ' M u s l i m  p e r i l  i s  not  a
t e m p o r a r y  p h a s e ;  i t  i s  a i m e d  at  the  r o o t  o f  the  e n t i r e
k
H i n d u  r e l i g i o n  a n d  c u l t u r e  i n  I n d i a ' . To  meet t h i s
1
T h e s e  p o i n t s  i n c l u d e d  d em an ds  f o r  the  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  
S i n d  f r o m  Bom bay ;  the  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  the  R e f o r m s  i n t o  
the  N o r t h  W e st  F r o n t i e r  P r o v i n c e  a n d  B a l u c h i s t a n ;  the  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  i n  B e n g a l  a n d  the  P u n j a b  to be  a c c o r d i n g  
to p o p u l a t i o n ;  th e  g r a n t  to M u s l i m s  o f  o n e - t h i r d  o f  the  
s e a t s  o f  the  C e n t r a l  L e g i s l a t i v e  A s s e m b l y .
2
N L I , M o o n j e  M S ,  L e t t e r  P a d  kk , B . S .  M o o n j e  to 
M . R .  C h o l k a r ,  5 M a r c h  1 9 2 8 .
3
H i t a v a d a ,  2k N o ve m b e r  1 9 2 7 ,  p . 1 0 .
k
N L I ,  Moonje  MS,  D i a r y  1 ,  23  A p r i l  1927*
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p e r i l ,  Moonje  encouraged  H in d u s  i n  the C e n t r a l  P r o v in ce s  
and Berar  and throughout  I n d i a  to take p a r t  i n  m i l i t a r y  
t r a i n i n g . 1 He also  attem pted  to e s t a b l i s h  the H i n d u  
M ahasabha ,  r a t h e r  than  the I n d i a n  N a t i o n a l  Congress  as 
the r i g h t f u l  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  the H i n d u  community i n  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d i s c u s s i o n s  w i t h  the M u s l im s .  Between
1927-8 Dr  Moonje  b e g a n  d i s c u s s i o n s  w i t h  J i n n a h  on  the
2
prop osed  c o n s t i t u t i o n  f o r  I n d i a .  At  the same time he 
r e q u e s t e d  the le a d e r s  o f  the I n d i a n  N a t i o n a l  Congress
to r e c o g n i s e  ( t h a t )  Hindu-Moslem d i f f e r e n c e s  
p o l i t i c a l  and r e l i g i o u s  are  matters  e s s e n t i a l l y  
f o r  settlem ent  i n  f i r s t  i n s t a n c e  b e tw e e n  M uslim  
League  and H i n d u  M ahasabha .  I f  however  any 
s e ttle m e nt  i s  made b e h in d  b ack  o f  H i n d u  
M ah asabh a ,  H in d u s  w i l l  not accept  and f r e s h  
n e e d l e s s  i n t e r n e c i n e  c o n t r o v e r s y  may a r i s e  i n  
C o n g r e s s . 3
Moonje  f a i l e d ,  how ever ,  to r e a c h  more th an  a small  
measure o f  agreement w i t h  J i n n a h .  M o re o ve r ,  the Congress  
showed that i t  had  no i n t e n t i o n  o f  a l l o w i n g  the Mahasabha  
to m onopolise  d i s c u s s i o n s  on  the prop osed  c o n s t i t u t i o n .  
D u r i n g  1928  the Congress  a s s i s t e d  by  ot h er  p o l i t i c a l  
p a r t i e s  set about the t a s k  o f  d r a w in g  up a c o n s t i t u t i o n
1
N L I , 20  M a r c h  1 9 2 7 ;  i b i d . ,  L e t t e r  P a d  4 l ,  D r  M o o n j e ’ s 
B i l l  f o r  C o m p u l s o r y  M i l i t a r y  T r a i n i n g ,  28 A u g u s t  1 9 2 7 ;
H i t a v a d a , 9 O c t o b e r  1 9 2 7 , P * 5 *
2
N L I ,  M o o n j e  M S ,  L e t t e r  P a d  38 , B . S .  M o o n j e  to the  
P r e s i d e n t ,  I n d i a n  N a t i o n a l  C o n g r e s s ,  15  M ay  1 9 2 7 ;  L e t t e r  
P a d  k 3 9 B . S .  M o o n j e  to M . A .  J i n n a h ,  3 D e c e m b e r  1 9 2 7 *
3
I b i d . ,  L e t t e r  P a d  4 2 ,  B . S .  M o o n j e  to S r i n i v a s  I y e n g a r ,
2 6  O c t o b e r  I 927 .
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and by  A ugust  had produced  a document w hich  ’ i n d i c a t e d  
the w i l l  o f  the n a t i o n  as to the main p r i n c i p l e s  o f  the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n  a c c e p t a b l e  to i t ' . 1 T h u s ,  a l t h o u g h  the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n  c o n t a in e d  p r o v i s i o n s  w hich  the Mahasabha
o r i g i n a l l y  op posed ,  there  was l i t t l e  that Moonje  could
2
do but accept  i t .
I l l
Between  1928  and 1 9 3 1  the M a r a th i  n a t i o n a l i s t s
launched  a s e r i e s  o f  b o ld  moves to r e v i v e  the R e s p o n s i v i s t
cause  and r e s t o r e  the M a r a t h i  r e g i o n  to i t s  former
p o s i t i o n  o f  prominence  i n  the p r o v i n c e .  T h e s e  moves
c o n s i s t e d  o f  the removal  o f  the second m in i s t r y  o f
Rag havend ra  R a o , and i t s  replacem ent  by a R e s p o n s i v i s t
m in i s t r y  led  by R .M .  Deshmukh o f  B e r a r ;  the l a u n c h in g  o f
a R e s p o n s i v i s t  cam paign  o f  c i v i l  d i s o b e d i e n c e ;  and the
e x p a n s io n  o f  the R a s h t r i y a  Swayam Sewak S a n g h , a s o c i e t y
formed i n  1925  to i n s p i r e  H i n d u s  to serve w i t h  love and
3
d i s c i p l i n e  the c ountry  o f  t h e i r  b i r t h .  T h e s e  a c t i v i t i e s  
were each  d e s ig n e d  to r e a c h  d i f f e r e n t  s e c t io n s  o f  the 
p o p u l a t i o n .  The f o r m a t io n  o f  a m in i s t r y  i n  w h ic h  the 
M a r a th i  r e g i o n  h e l d  the major  share  o f  power was 
c a l c u l a t e d  to ap p e a l  to the v o t i n g  p o p u l a t i o n ,  w hich
1
I n d i a n  A n n u a l  R e g i s t e r , n o . 1 ,  1 9 2 8 ,  p . l 4 2 .
2
N L I , Moonje  MS,  L e t t e r  Pad 4 9 ,  Press  S tate m e n t ,
2 1  December 1 9 2 8 .
3
R a s h t r i y a  Swayam Sewak Sangh  means N a t i o n a l  V o lu n te e r s
As  so c i a t i o n .
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l a r g e l y  b e lo n g e d  to the m iddle  c l a s s ;  the campaign  of  
c i v i l  d i s o b e d i e n c e  was aimed at the lower c l a s s e s  o f  the 
town and c o un try ;  and the R a s h t r i y a  Swayam Sewak Sangh 
t r i e d  to a t t r a c t  w i t h i n  i t s  f o l d  ’ the lower and middle  
economic and s o c i a l  g r o u p s ' , and ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  the 
student  c o m m u n ity .1
The moves to d i s p l a c e  Rao from o f f i c e  came at a 
time when B e rar  was e x p e r i e n c i n g  a mood o f  deep 
i n s e c u r i t y .  T h i s  mood stemmed from the growing  
im portance  o f  the H i n d i  r e g i o n  i n  the l i f e  o f  the 
p r o v i n c e ,  and was r e f l e c t e d  i n  the volume o f  c r i t i c i s m  
o f  the government that  f lo w e d  from B e rar  d u r in g  the 
m i n i s t r i e s  formed by R a g h a v e n d r a  Rao .  B etw een  1928-9 
the le ad e r s  o f  B e rar  b i t t e r l y  a t ta c k e d  the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
p r o v i s i o n s  w h ich  p r e v e n t e d  l e g i s l a t i o n  a f f e c t i n g  Berar  
from coming b e f o r e  the p r o v i n c i a l  C o u n c i l .  The  
immediate  o c c a s i o n  fo r  t h i s  outb urst  was the governm ent 's  
a c c e p tan ce  o f  the B e r a r  Land  Revenue  Code and i t s
2
p r o v i s i o n  f o r  the enhancement o f  land  r evenue  i n  B e r a r .
A t  the same time ,  the l e a d e r s  o f  B e rar  c o n t in u e d  t h e i r  
condem nation  o f  the government f o r  f a i l i n g  to implement 
the Sim r a t io  and f o r  c o u n t e n a n c in g  the d r a i n  o f  revenue
1
J . A .  C u r r a n ,  M i l i t a n t  H i n d u i s m  i n  I n d i a n  P o l i t i c s ;  A 
S tud y  o f  the R a s h t r i y a  Swayamsewak Sangh  (New Y o r k , 1 9 5 1 ) »
J7K 6.
2
NAI , Home P o l l ,  F- l ,  1 9 2 8 ,  F R , F i r s t  H a l f  o f  October
1 9 2 8 ,  p . l ;  i b i d . ,  F- l ,  1 9 2 8 ,  F R , Second  H a l f  o f  November
1 9 2 8 ,  p . l ;  H i t a v a d a , 20  December 1 9 2 8 ,  p . 9 ;  i b i d . ,
4 A p r i l  1929»  p . 5 .
f r o m  B e r a r  to the  C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s . 1 T h e  y e a r s  o f  R a o * s 
m i n i s t r i e s  a l s o  w i t n e s s e d  a r e v i v a l  o f  the  rum ours  t h a t
t h e  N i z a m  o f  H y d e r a b a d  was  a b o u t  to r e - e s t a b l i s h  h i s
^  2 
o w n e r s h i p  o f  B e r a r .
B e t w e e n  1 9 2 8 - 9  t h e  l e a d e r s  o f  B e r a r  a t t e m p t e d  to
rem ove  the  c a u s e s  o f  t h e i r  r e g i o n *  s i n s e c u r i t y .  A s  a
f i r s t  s t e p  t o w a r d s  t h i s  e n d ,  o n  2 8  O c t o b e r  1 9 2 8  the
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  a l l  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  i n  B e r a r
met at  A k o l a  to h o l d  w hat  b ec am e  k n o w n  as  the  A l l -
P a r t i e s  C o n f e r e n c e .  T h e  m a i n  a c h i e v e m e n t  o f  t h i s
C o n f e r e n c e  w as  a m o t i o n  u r g i n g  the  g o v e r n m e n t  to f o r m
3
a  s e p a r a t e  L e g i s l a t i v e  C o u n c i l  f o r  B e r a r .  K h a p a r d e  
a l s o  a t t e m p t e d  to e a s e  t h e  mood o f  i n s e c u r i t y  i n  B e r a r  
w h e n  h e  moved a r e s o l u t i o n  i n  t h e  C o u n c i l  o n  2 4  J a n u a r y  
1 9 2 9 ,  c a l l i n g  f o r  t h e  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  t h e  H i n d i  a n d
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1
H i t a v a d a , 10  M a r c h  1 9 2 9 ,  P*lj i b i d . ,  4 A p r i l  1 9 2 9 ,  p . l .  
I n  1927-8 , B e r a r  r e c e i v e d  3 7 * 8  p e r  c e n t  o f  h e r  s h a r e  o f  
t h e  d i v i s i b l e  r e v e n u e s .  I n  1 9 2 8 - 9 ,  a f t e r  D e s h m u k h * s  
i n f l u e n c e  made i t s e l f  f e l t  B e r a r  r e c e i v e d  38 p e r  c e n t .  
T h e r e a f t e r  B e r a r * s  s h a r e  o f  the  d i v i s i b l e  r e v e n u e s  
d e c l i n e d .  I n  1 9 2 9 - 3 0  i t  w as  3 5 * 2  p e r  c e n t ,  a n d  i n  
1 9 3 0 - 1  3 4 . 3  p e r  c e n t .  S e e  C P L C , v o l . l ,  10  M a r c h  1 9 3 0 ,  
A p p e n d i x  E ,  p . 9 ^ 1 .
2
H i t a v a d a , 2 9  M a r c h  1 9 2 9 »  p . 6 .
3
I b i d . , 8 N o ve m b e r  1 9 2 8 ,  p . 1 1 .  B e c a u s e  B e r a r  was  not  a 
p a r t  o f  B r i t i s h  I n d i a ,  no b i l l  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  t e r r i t o r y  
c o u l d  come b e f o r e  t h e  L e g i s l a t i v e  C o u n c i l  o f  the  C e n t r a l  
P r o v i n c e s .  F rom  the  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  the  M ontagu-  
C h e l m s f o r d  R e f o r m s ,  the  members o f  t h e  p r o v i n c i a l  
l e g i s l a t u r e  r e p r e s e n t i n g  B e r a r  f o r m e d  the  B e r a r  
L e g i s l a t i v e  C o m m i t t e e .  T h i s  C o m m it t e e  d i s c u s s e d  p r o p o s e d  
l e g i s l a t i o n  f o r  B e r a r  s e n t  to i t  f r o m  the  p r o v i n c i a l  
g o v e r n m e n t .  I t  t h e n  r e t u r n e d  the  m e a s u r e  to the  
p r o v i n c i a l  g o v e r n m e n t  who d e c i d e d  the  f i n a l  f o r m  o f  the  
l e g i s l a t i o n  a n d  s e n t  i t  to the  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  I n d i a .  T h e  
l a t t e r  r a t i f i e d  the  l e g i s l a t i o n  a n d  a p p l i e d  i t  to B e r a r .
199
M a r a t h i  r e g i o n s  and  the  c r e a t i o n  o f  a s e p a r a t e  M a r a t h i  
p r o v i n c e . 1 K h a p a r d e  d o u b t l e s s  r e a l i s e d ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  
t h i s  was  a l o n g  term o b j e c t i v e ;  a n d  t h a t  p r e s e n t  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  c a l l e d  f o r  a m i n i s t r y  t h a t  w o u l d  s e c u r e  the  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  B e r a r  a n d  t h e  M a r a t h i  r e g i o n  as  a w h o l e ,  a n d  
at  the  same tim e  a d v a n c e  t h e  c a u s e  o f  s e l f  g o ve rnm e nt  
f o r  I n d i a .
T h u s ,  a lm o s t  i m m e d i a t e l y  a f t e r  Rao  f o r m e d  h i s  s e c o n d  
m i n i s t r y ,  the  R e s p o n s i v i s t s  l a u n c h e d  a c a m p a i g n  to remove  
i t  f r o m  o f f i c e  a n d  r e p l a c e  i t  w i t h  a R e s p o n s i v i s t  
m i n i s t r y .  W i t h i n  f i v e  m onths  t h e y  h a d  a c h i e v e d  t h e i r  
o b j e c t i v e .  T h e  R e s p o n s i v i s t  c a m p a i g n  a g a i n s t  the  m i n i s t r y  
t o o k  p l a c e  i n s i d e  a n d  o u t s i d e  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e .  O u t s i d e  
the  l e g i s l a t u r e ,  the  M a r a t h i  p r e s s  l e d  the  a t t a c k  o n  R a o .  
A c c o r d i n g  to one  g o v e r n m e n t  r e p o r t
T h e  M a r a t h i  p r e s s  . . .  a c c u s e ( s )  the  H o n o u r a b l e  
Mr Rao  o f  h a v i n g  b r o k e n  up  t h e  m i n i s t r y  f o r  
p e r s o n a l  e n d s .  H i s  a c c e p t a n c e  o f  H i s  E x c e l l e n c y ' s  
o f f e r  to f o r m  a new m i n i s t r y  h a s  g i v e n  o f f e n c e  
t o . . . t h e  B e r a r  p a p e r s ,  who r e g a r d  t h i s  as  a n  
a f f r o n t  to B e r a r  a n d  t h e  M a h a r a s h t r i a n s .  T h e y  
a c c o r d i n g l y  a d v o c a t e  a v i g o r o u s  c a m p a i g n  f o r  
b r i n g i n g  a b o u t  h i s  d o w n f a l l . 2
I n  the  l e g i s l a t u r e ,  K h a p a r d e  made p r e p a r a t i o n s  f o r  a t e s t  
o f  s t r e n g t h  b e t w e e n  the  new D e m o c r a t i c  ' p a r t y 1 an d  the  
O p p o s i t i o n .  F o r  t h i s  t e s t ,  K h a p a r d e  w o n  the  s u p p o r t  o f  
t h r e e  g r o u p s ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  to t h a t  o f  the  R e s p o n s i v e  
C o o p e r a t i o n  p a r t y  o f  B e r a r .  T h e s e  w e r e  t h e  R e s p o n s i v i s t s
1
C P L C , v o l . l ,  24-5  J a n u a r y  1 9 2 9 ,  p p . 3 1 2 “ 8 0 .
2
N A I , Home P o l l ,  F- l ,  1 9 2 8 ,  F R , Second  H a l f  o f  August
1 9 2 8 ,  p . l
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o T  N a g p u r ,  who w e r e  r e p o r t e d  to be  ’ f u l l  o f  s o u n d  an d  
f u r y  at  Rao  b e c a u s e  h e  r e f u s e s  to be  t h e i r  c r e a t u r e ' .
T h e y  w e r e  a l s o  f u r i o u s  w i t h  K e d a r  f o r  a c c e p t i n g  a 
m i n i s t e r s h i p  w i t h o u t  the  ' k n o w l e d g e  a n d  c o n s e n t '  o f  the  
R e s p o n s i v e  C o o p e r a t i o n  p a r t y . 1 K h a p a r d e  a l s o  s e c u r e d  
t h e  s u p p o r t  o f  the  C o n g r e s s  p a r t y ,  w h i c h  was  o n l y  too 
r e a d y  to u p s e t  the  g o v e r n m e n t ,  a n d  p a r t i c u l a r l y  one  
f o r m e d  b y  t h e i r  c h i e f  o p p o n e n t  i n  the  H i n d i  r e g i o n ,  
R a g h a v e n d r a  R a o .  F i n a l l y ,  K h a p a r d e  t u r n e d  the  t a b l e s  o n  
Rao  b y  p e r s u a d i n g  the  M u s l i m s  to d e f e c t  f r o m  t h e  
D e m o c r a t i c  to the  N a t i o n a l i s t  ' p a r t y ' . H e  d i d  so by  
p r o m i s i n g
to g i v e  one  o f  them  a m i n i s t r y  i f  t h e y  j o i n e d  
them i n  t u r n i n g  out  o p e n l y  K e d a r  a n d  
c l a n d e s t i n e l y  Rao  f r o m  o f f i c e . . . . T h r e e  o r  f o u r  
M u s l i m s  a r e  r e p o r t e d  to h a v e  j o i n e d  o r  ( a r e )  
a b o u t  to j o i n  the  N a t i o n a l i s t  p a r t y  o n  g e t t i n g  
a s s u r a n c e  t h a t  one  o f  th e m  w i l l  be  n o m i n a t e d  
f o r  m i n i s t e r s h i p . 2
T h e  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  R e s p o n s i v i s t s , C o n g r e s s m e n  a n d  M u s l i m s  
was  s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  K h a p a r d e ' s p u r p o s e ,  a n d  o n  17  J a n u a r y
1929 the  t e s t  o f  s t r e n g t h  b e t w e e n  the  m i n i s t r y  a n d  the  
O p p o s i t i o n  t o o k  p l a c e .  O n  t h a t  d a y ,  G . S .  G u p t a ,  the  
C o n g r e s s  member f o r  D u r g ,  moved c e r t a i n  am endm ents  to
1
H i t a v a d a , 20  Septem ber  1 9 2 8 ,  p . 5? 8 November 1 9 2 8 ,  p . l ;
20  December 1 9 2 8 ,  p . l .
2
I b i d . ,  2 4  J a n u a r y  1 9 2 9 ,  p . 2 .
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the  a m e n d m e n t s ,  a n d  as  a r e s u l t ,  K e d a r ,  th e  M i n i s t e r  f o r
2
I n d u s t r i e s ,  r e s i g n e d .  Rao  a l s o  r e s i g n e d  a n d  o n  
18  J a n u a r y  1 9 ^ 9  he  i n f o r m e d  S i r  M o n t a g u  B u t l e r  t h a t
the  am endm ents  w h i c h  th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  C o u n c i l  
c a r r i e d . . . t o  the  S t a t e  A i d  to I n d u s t r i e s  b i l l  
h a s  ( s i c )  p r e c i p i t a t e d  a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  c r i s i s  
. . . . 1  n e e d  h a r d l y  comment o n  the  u n w i s d o m  o f  
the  am endm ents  c a r r i e d  b y  th e  c o u n c i l .  A s  I  
am j o i n t l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  w i t h  my c o l l e a g u e ,  I  
h a v e  no o p t i o n  b u t  to s t a n d  b y  h im .  I n  the  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  we s h a l l  b e  g r a t e f u l  i f  Y o u r  
E x c e l l e n c y  a c c e p t s  o u r  r e s i g n a t i o n .  I  know 
t h i s  w i l l  c a u s e  g r e a t  i n c o n v e n i e n c e  to 
G o v e r n m e n t . . .  b u t  we a r e  h e l p l e s s . ^
B u t l e r  a c c e p t e d  the  r e s i g n a t i o n s  o f  Rao  a n d  K e d a r .  T h e
same d a y  h e  n o t i f i e d  the  C o u n c i l  t h a t  h e  was  t e m p o r a r i l y
t a k i n g  c h a r g e  o f  the  t r a n s f e r r e d  s u b j e c t s  a n d  t h a t  he
4
w o u l d  a t t e m p t  to f o r m  a n o t h e r  m i n i s t r y .
A f t e r  the  c o l l a p s e  o f  R a o ' s  m i n i s t r y ,  p o l i t i c a l  
p o w e r  i n  th e  p r o v i n c e  s w u n g  b a c k  to t h e  M a r a t h i  r e g i o n  
w i t h  the  f o r m a t i o n  o f  a m i n i s t r y  l e d  b y  Ramrao  D e s h m uk h  
o f  B e r a r .  D e s h m u k h * s  m i n i s t r y ,  h o w e v e r ,  w as  f o r m e d  w i t h
the St ate  A i d  to I n d u s t r i e s  B i l l .  The  House  acc e p te d
1
S e e  C P L C , v o l . l ,  17  J a n u a r y  1 9 2 9 »  p p . 4 0 ~ 5 0 .  T h e  
am endm ents  i n c l u d e d  t h e  e n l a r g e m e n t  o f  the  s c o p e  o f  the  
w o r d  ' i n d u s t r y *  to i n c l u d e  ’ e n t e r p r i s e  s u b s i d i a r y  to o r  
d i r e c t l y  b e n e f i t i n g  a g r i c u l t u r e * ;  the  i n c l u s i o n  o f  
l i v e s t o c k  i n  the  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  th e  w o r d  ' m a c h i n e r y * ;  a n d  
the  a d d i t i o n  o f  s p i n n i n g  to t h e  l i s t  o f  c o t t a g e  i n d u s t r i e s .  
2
I b i d . ,  p . 6 5 •
3
N ML ,  Rao  M S ,  E . R .  Rao to S i r  M. B u t l e r ,  1 9 ( ? )  J a n u a r y
1 9 2 9 .
4
CPLC, v o l . l ,  18 J a n u a r y  1929?  P *6 5 *
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c o n s i d e r a b l e  d i f f i c u l t y .  D e s p i t e  the  m om entary  e c l i p s e  
o f  R a o , K h a p a r d e , the  l e a d i n g  R e s p o n s i v i s t  i n  the  C o u n c i l ,  
f o u n d  i t  a l m o s t  i m p o s s i b l e  to s e c u r e  c a n d i d a t e s  f o r  the  
m i n i s t r y  who w e r e  a c c e p t a b l e  to the  members o f  the  
N a t i o n a l i s t  c o a l i t i o n  a n d  th e  G o v e r n o r  a l i k e .  H e  h i m s e l f  
h a d  p r o m i s e d  the  f o r m e r  M u s l i m  D e m o c r a t s  a m i n i s t e r s h i p .  
Bu t  i n  so d o i n g  he  met w i t h  d e t e r m i n e d  o p p o s i t i o n  fro m  
D r  M o o n j e ,  who d e c l a r e d  t h a t
o u r  p e o p l e  s h o u l d  not  c o m b in e  w i t h  the  M o sle m s  
f o r  the  f o r m a t i o n  o f  a n o t h e r  m i n i s t r y . . . . I  
w o u l d  h a v e  no m i n i s t r y . . . . 1  r e g a r d  i t  a s  a s i n  
to c o m b in e  w i t h  the  M o s l e m s  i n  the  f o r m a t i o n  o f  
a n o t h e r  m i n i s t r y .  ^
A g a i n ,  many no n- Bra hm an  N a t i o n a l i s t s  s t r o n g l y  o p p o s e d
K h a p a r d e ' s i n c l u s i o n  i n  a m i n i s t r y ,  d e s p i t e  B u t l e r ' s
d e s i r e  to h a v e  h im  i n  the  g o v e r n m e n t .  O t h e r  non- Brahm an
N a t i o n a l i s t s  s u p p o r t e d  K h a p a r d e ' s n o m i n a t i o n  b u t  r e f u s e d
2
to a c c e p t  t h a t  o f  Ramrao  D e s h m u k h .  M a t t e r s  w e r e  f u r t h e r  
c o m p l i c a t e d  i n  M a r c h  1 9 2 9  w h e n  f o u r  H i n d i  D e m o c r a t s  
p r o m i s e d  t h a t  t h e y  w o u l d  s u p p o r t  t h e  N a t i o n a l i s t  ' p a r t y '  
o n  the  c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  K h a p a r d e  g a v e  them  a m i n i s t e r s h i p .  
A c c o r d i n g  to t h e  H i t a v a d a
t h e y  b a s e ( d )  t h e i r  c l a i m  to a p l a c e  i n  the  
c a b i n e t  o n  the  g r o u n d  t h a t  t h e r e  was  s c a r c i t y  
i n  the  J u b b u l p o r e  d i v i s i o n  a n d  t h a t  someone 
f r o m  t h o s e  d i s t r i c t s  s h o u l d  t h e r e f o r e  be  t a k e n  
a s  a m i n i s t e r .
1
N L I , M o o n j e  M S ,  L e t t e r  P a d  5 0 ,  18 J a n u a r y  1929*  
B . S .  M o o n j e  to M . R .  C h o l k a r ,  18 J a n u a r y  1929-
2
H i t a v a d a , 10  M a r c h  1 9 2 9 ,  P *l?  14  M a r c h  1 9 2 9 ,  p . 2 .
3
I b i d . ,  10 March  1 9 2 9 ,  p . l .
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I n  M a r c h ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  K h a p a r d e  h a d  t h r e e  g r o u p s  - the
R e s p o n s i v i s t s , the  M u s l i m s ,  a n d  the  H i n d i  d e f e c t o r s  -
f r o m  w h i c h  to f o r m  a m i n i s t r y .  A n d  w h e n  B u t l e r  r e q u e s t e d
h i m  to do so i n  the  same m o n t h ,  i t  a p p e a r e d  l i k e l y  th at
h e  w o u l d  s u c c e e d .  W h e n  K h a p a r d e  s u b m i t t e d  h i s  n o m in e e s
to the  G o v e r n o r ,  h o w e v e r ,  the  l a t t e r  r e j e c t e d  them  -
p o s s i b l y  o n  the  g r o u n d s  t h a t  h i s  p a r t y  ' h a d  k e p t  i t s
most p r o m i n e n t  men  out  a n d  p u t  f o r t h  the  names o f
c e r t a i n  d e s i g n i n g  men to whom t h e y  w e r e  d r i v e n  b y  s h e e r
1
n e c e s s i t y ' . K h a p a r d e  d i d  not  make the  same 
m i s t a k e  i n  J u l y ,  w h e n  B u t l e r  a g a i n  i n v i t e d  h im  to fo r m  
a m i n i s t r y .  T h i s  t i m e ,  h e  s u b m i t t e d  a  l i s t  o f  n o m in e e s  
to the  G o v e r n o r  a n d  p l a c e d  t h e  o n us  o f  s e l e c t i n g  the  
m i n i s t e r s  o n  h im .  T h e  two men B u t l e r  c h o s e  w e r e  Ramrao  
D e s h m u k h  a n d  the  f o r m e r  D e m o c r a t ,  P . C .  B o s e ,  a p l e a d e r  
f r o m  J a b a l p u r .  O n  1 A u g u s t  1 9 2 9  th e  m i n i s t r y  t o o k  o f f i c e ,  
w i t h  D e s h m u k h  as  C h i e f  M i n i s t e r  a n d  M i n i s t e r  f o r
2
A g r i c u l t u r e ;  a n d  B o s e  a s  M i n i s t e r  f o r  E d u c a t i o n .
D u r i n g  i t s  e a r l y  m onth s  i n  o f f i c e ,  D e s h m u k h * s  
m i n i s t r y  d i d  much to r e s t o r e  t h e  d e c l i n i n g  p o l i t i c a l  
f o r t u n e s  o f  t h e  M a r a t h i  r e g i o n .  D e s h m u k h  s e c u r e d  the
1
H i t a v a d a , P * l ;  1 4  M a r c h  1 9 2 9 »  P « 2 ;  3 1  M a r c h  1 9 2 9 ,  p . 2 .  
K h a p a r d e  s u b m i t t e d  to B u t l e r  t h e  names o f  H i f a z a t  A l i  
a n d  K . P .  P a n d e  - b o t h  d e f e c t o r s  f r o m  the  D e m o c r a t i c  
p a r t y .
2
I b i d . ,  7 J u l y  1 9 2 9 ,  p p . l ,  8 ;  Ik  J u l y  1 9 2 9 ,  p . 8 ;  M P S , G A D ,  
5 - 5 2 ,  1 9 2 9 ,  A p p o i n t m e n t  o f  R a i  B a h a d u r  P . C .  B o s e ,  B . A . ,  
L L . B . , a n d  R . M .  D e s h m u k h ,  b a r  a t  l a w ,  as  M i n i s t e r s  o f  the  
G o v e r n m e n t  o f  th e  C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s ;  H i t a v a d a 9 k A u g u s t
1 9 2 9 ,  P . 3 .
2 0 4
C h i e f  M i n i s t e r s h i p ,  an d  h e  a c q u i r e d  a H i n d i  c o l l e a g u e  who 
was  r e p o r t e d  to be  ’ v i r t u a l l y  u n d e r  the  thumb o f  the  
B e r a r  g r o u p ’ . 1 T h e  M a r a t h i  r e g i o n  a l s o  w o n  b a c k  
S i r  M o n t a g u  B u t l e r  to i t s  s i d e .  S o o n  a f t e r  D e s h m uk h  t o o k  
o f f i c e ,  B u t l e r  w e n t  out  o n  t o u r  i n  B e r a r ,  a n d  a c c o r d i n g  
to one  o b s e r v e r
he  m a n a g e d  the  t a s k  q u i t e  w e l l .  A  l i t t l e  
f l a t t e r y  o f  B e r a r  a n d  B e r a r i s ( ; )  some h o m e l y  
w o rd s  o f  w i s d o m ( j )  some p e r s o n a l  t o u c h e s  ( a n d )  
a p r o m i s e  to e x a m i n e  a l l . . . ( p r o b l e m s )  
s y m p a t h e t i c a l l y  at  N a g p u r . 2
D e s h m u k h 1s m i n i s t r y  a l s o  s h o w e d  t h a t  i t  w as  s t r o n g
e n o u g h  to w i t h s t a n d  the  a t t e m p t s  to o v e r t h r o w  i t .  I t s
most c o n s i s t e n t  o p p o n e n t s  w e r e  t h e  O p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s
c o n s i s t i n g  o f  the  C o n g r e s s  p a r t y  a n d  the  D e m o c r a t i c  rump.
O n e  month  a f t e r  the  m i n i s t r y  t o o k  o f f i c e ,  i t  a p p e a r e d
l i k e l y  t h a t  members  o f  t h e  R e s p o n s i v e  C o o p e r a t i o n  p a r t y
f r o m  the  d i v i s i o n  o f  N a g p u r  m ig h t  a l s o  j o i n  w i t h  the
O p p o s i t i o n  to d e f e a t  the  m i n i s t r y .  L e a d e r s  o f  t h a t  p a r t y ,
am ong  them D r  P a r a n j p e  a n d  D r  C h o l k a r ,  o p p o s e d  th e
m i n i s t r y  b e c a u s e  i t  w as  u n a b l e  to a c t  ' i n d e p e n d e n t l y . . .
o f  t h e  r e s e r v e d  h a l f  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  o f  th e
3
o f f i c i a l  b l o c * .  T h e y  t h u s  s u p p o r t e d  th e  moves f o r  a
1
H i t a v a d a , 1 4  N o v e m b e r  1 9 2 9 ,  p . l
2
I b i d . ,  4 A u g u s t  1 9 2 9 ,  p . l .
3
I b i d . ,  2 2  A u g u s t  I 929 , P * 3 j  N L I , M o o n j e  M S ,  D i a r y  2 ,
1 1  A u g u s t  1 9 2 9 ;  i b i d .  L e t t e r  P a d  5 5 »  D r a f t  S t a t e m e n t ,  
1 4  A u g u s t  1929 .
2 05
m o t i o n  o f  n o - c o n f i d e n c e  i n  the  m i n i s t r y  w h i c h  w e r e  b e i n g  
c a n v a s s e d  b y  i t s  o p p o n e n t s  i n  the  C o u n c i l .  T h e  y o u n g e r  
s e c t i o n  o f  the  p a r t y ,  h o w e v e r ,  who a c t u a l l y  s a t  i n  the  
l e g i s l a t u r e ,  s u p p o r t e d  the  m i n i s t r y ,  a n d  w h e n  t h e  C o n g r e s s  
p a r t y  moved the  v o t e  o f  n o - c o n f i d e n c e  o n  23  A u g u s t
1929 , t h e s e  members j o i n e d  w i t h  o t h e r  members o f  the  
N a t i o n a l i s t  c o a l i t i o n  to m a i n t a i n  the  m i n i s t r y  i n  p o w e r . 1 
T h i s  t e s t  o v e r ,  B e r a r  w o n  f u r t h e r  l a u r e l s  i n  J a n u a r y  1 9 3 0 *  
I n  t h a t  m onth ,  S i r  M o n t a g u  B u t l e r  w e n t  o n  l e a v e  b e f o r e  
r e t u r n i n g  to s e r v e  a s e c o n d  term  as  G o v e r n o r  o f  the  
C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s .  D u r i n g  h i s  a b s e n c e ,  the  Home M e m be r ,  
S . B .  Tam be  o f  B e r a r ,  w as  a p p o i n t e d  to s e r v e  as  A c t i n g  
G o v e r n o r .
By J u l y  1 9 3 0 ,  the  R e s p o n s i v i s t s  h a d  l e f t  the  m i n i s t r y  
to f o l l o w  t h e  e x a m p le  o f  t h e  C o n g r e s s  i n  l a u n c h i n g  a 
c a m p a i g n  o f  c i v i l  d i s o b e d i e n c e  a g a i n s t  the  g o v e r n m e n t .
T h i s  c a m p a i g n  fo r m e d  t h e  s e c o n d  o f  t h e i r  moves to 
r e s t o r e  the  p o l i t i c a l  f o r t u n e s  o f  the  R e s p o n s i v e  
C o o p e r a t i o n  p a r t y  a n d  r e v i v e  t h e  p r e - e m i n e n c e  o f  the  
M a r a t h i  r e g i o n  i n  p r o v i n c i a l  p o l i t i c s .  A t  f i r s t  many 
R e s p o n s i v i s t  l e a d e r s  w e r e  s t r o n g l y  o p p o s e d  to the  i d e a  o f  
c i v i l  d i s o b e d i e n c e ,  m a i n l y  b e c a u s e  i t  w as  d e v i s e d  by
3
M a h a t m a  G a n d h i  a n d  not b y  L o k a m a n y a  T i l a k .  T h e  most
1
H i  t a v a d a » 15  A u g u s t  1929 , p . l j  C P L C ,  v o l . 2 ,  2 3  A u g u s t
1 9 2 9 ,  p p . 1 2 0 - 1 9 3 .
2
H i  t a v a d a , 1 4  N o v e m b e r  1929 , p . 8 .
3
S e e  N L I , M o o n j e  M S ,  D i a r y  2 ,  1 6- 17  J u l y  1 9 3 0 .  Dr  M o o n j e  
b e l i e v e d  t h a t  w o r k  i n  the  C o u n c i l s  w as  ' the  one  l i n k  
w h i c h  b o u n d  u s  to the  m e t h o d s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  a g i t a t i o n  o f  
the  g r e a t  L o k a m a n y a 1 .
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p e r s u a s i v e  a d v o c a t e  f o r  a R e s p o n s i v i s t  c a m p a i g n  o f  c i v i l  
d i s o b e d i e n c e  was  M . S .  A n e y .  I n  a d v o c a t i n g  t h a t  c a m p a i g n ,  
h o w e v e r ,  A n e y  h a d  not s u r r e n d e r e d  h i s  f a i t h  i n  T i l a k  and  
R e s p o n s i v e  C o o p e r a t i o n  i n  f a v o u r  o f  G a n d h i  a n d  n o n ­
c o o p e r a t i o n ;  b u t  as  he  l a t e r  c o n f e s s e d  ' c i r c u m s t a n c e s  
f o r c e d  h i s  h a n d  an d  h e  c o u l d  not  do o t h e r w i s e ' . 1 A n e y  
made h i s  f i r s t  move i n  s u p p o r t  o f  c i v i l  d i s o b e d i e n c e  i n  
J a n u a r y  1 9 3 0 *  I n  th at  m o n t h ,  w h e n  C o n g r e s s m e n  a l l  o v e r  
I n d i a  r e s i g n e d  t h e i r  s e a t s  i n  the  l e g i s l a t u r e s  i n  
p r e p a r a t i o n  f o r  c i v i l  d i s o b e d i e n c e ,  A n e y ,  t o o ,  l e f t  the  
C e n t r a l  L e g i s l a t i v e  A s s e m b l y .  T h r e e  m onth s  l a t e r  he  
j o i n e d  the  B e r a r  W ar  C o u n c i l  - a b o d y  f o r m e d  i n  p l a c e  o f
the  P r o v i n c i a l  C o n g r e s s  C o m m it t e e  to c o n d u c t  the
2
c a m p a i g n  o f  c i v i l  d i s o b e d i e n c e  i n  B e r a r .  T h e  K h a p a r d e s
- f a t h e r  a n d  s o n  - a n d  Ram rao  D e sh m uk h  d i d  not s u p p o r t  
A n e y 1s move .  A t  a m e e t i n g  o f  the  R e s p o n s i v e  C o o p e r a t i o n  
p a r t y  o f  B e r a r  i n  A m r a v a t i  o n  19  A p r i l  1 9 3 0 ,
D e sh m uk h  s a i d  t h a t  o n l y  i f  he  a n d  B o s e  w e r e  
a l l o w e d  to c o n t i n u e  a s  m i n i s t e r s  f o r  one  y e a r  
m o r e ,  t h e y  w o u l d  s u c c e e d  i n  s e c u r i n g  d o m i n i o n  
s t a t u s  f o r  I n d i a . . . . G . S . K h a p a r d e  and  
B . G .  K h a p a r d e  a l s o  s u p p o r t e d  the  i d e a  o f  w o r k  
i n  the  c o u n c i l s .  . . . A n e y  w as  p r e s e n t  a n d  i t  i s  
r e p o r t e d  t h a t  t h e r e  w e r e  d i f f e r e n c e s  o f  o p i n i o n  
b e t w e e n  the  c o u n c i l  w o r k e r s  a n d  t h o s e  who 
d e s i r e d  to l e a v e  the  c o u n c i l s . ^
Dr  M o o n j e , t o o ,  was f i r m l y  o f  the  o p i n i o n  t h a t  the
1
N A I , K h a p a r d e  M S ,  D i a r y ,  2 1  A u g u s t  1 9 3 0 .
2
N L I , M o o n j e  M S ,  D i a r y  2 ,  1 F e b r u a r y  1 9 3 0 ;  M i s h r a ,  
o p . c i t . ,  p . 3 8 5 •
3
N L I ,  M o o n j e  M S ,  D i a r y  2 ,  1 F e b r u a r y  1 9 3 0 ;  M i s h r a ,  
o p . c i t . ,  p . 3 8 5 •
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R e s p o n s i v i s t s  s h o u l d  r e m a i n  i n  th e  c o u n c i l s ,  r e g a r d l e s s  
o f  what  the  C o n g r e s s  d e c i d e d  to d o ,  a n d  he  r e f u s e d  to 
r e s i g n  fro m  the  A s s e m b l y . 1 M o r e o v e r ,  i n  J a n u a r y  1 9 3 0 »  
the  same month  i n  w h i c h  A n e y  l e f t  the  A s s e m b l y ,  M o o n j e  
t r i e d  to fo r m  a n  a l l - I n d i a  H i n d u  p a r t y  to c o n t e s t  the  
b y - e l e c t i o n s  f o r  the  A s s e m b l y  s e a t s  l e f t  v a c a n t  b y  the  
C o n g r e s s  p a r t y .  Dr  M o o n j e  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  s u c h  a p a r t y  
c o u l d  a d v a n c e  the  c a u s e  o f  s e l f  g o v e r n m e n t ,  an d  f e a r e d  
th a t
i f  we a r e  not  s u f f i c i e n t l y  a c t i v e  a n d  b o l d  i n  
t h i s  e m e r g e n c y ,  the  w h o l e  i n i t i a t i v e  a n d  the  
p o s i t i o n  a n d  the  h o n o u r  o f  o p p o s i t i o n  w o u l d  go 
to Mr J i n n a h . . . . T h i s  w o u l d  be  a n  h u m i l i a t i o n  to 
u s  H i n d u s . . . .We  s h a l l  n e v e r  h a v e  a more 
f a v o u r a b l e  o c c a s i o n  t h a n  t h e  p r e s e n t  one  to make 
o u r  mark  a n d  r e g a i n  th e  p o s i t i o n  o f  l e a d e r s h i p  
i n  the  l e g i s l a t u r e . 2
I n  s p i t e  o f  h i s  c o n v i c t i o n ,  h o w e v e r ,  M o o n j e  f a i l e d  to 
a r o u s e  a n y  e n t h u s i a s m  f o r  h i s  H i n d u  p a r t y ,  a n d  h e  h a d  to 
c o n t e n t  h i m s e l f  w i t h  r e t a i n i n g  h i s  s e a t  i n  the  A s s e m b l y
3
a n d  s p u r n i n g  the  p r e s s u r e s  o n  h i m  to r e s i g n .
By  A u g u s t  1 9 3 0 ,  h o w e v e r ,  most o f  the  R e s p o n s i v i s t s  
h a d  f o l l o w e d  A n e y  fro m  the  l e g i s l a t u r e s  a n d  D e sh m uk h  h a d  
r e s i g n e d  h i s  m i n i s t r y .  O f  a l l  the  r e a s o n s  f o r  t h i s  
c h a n g e  o f  f r o n t ,  the  R e s p o n s i v i s t s ' l o s s  o f  f a i t h  i n  the
1
N L I , M o o n j e  M S ,  D i a r y  2 ,  3 0  M a r c h  1 9 3 0 .
2
I b i d . ,  A s s o r t e d  L e t t e r s ,  B . S .  M o o n j e  to M . R .  J a y a k e r ,  
13  J a n u a r y  1 9 3 0 ;  B . S .  M o o n j e  to V i j a y a r a g h a v a c h a r i a r ,
13  J a n u a r y  1 9 3 0 .
3
I b i d . , D i a r y  2 ,  18 J a n u a r y  1 9 3 0 ;  H i t a v a d a , 23 Ja n u a r y
1 9 3 0 ,  p . l .
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v a l u e  o f  h o l d i n g  o f f i c e  was  one  o f  the  more i m p o r t a n t .  
T h i s  l o s s  o f  f a i t h  was  p a r t i c u l a r l y  e v i d e n t  i n  t h e i r  
a t t i t u d e  to T a m b e .  I n  A p r i l  1 9 3 0 »  i n  h i s  c a p a c i t y  as  
A c t i n g  G o v e r n o r ,  Tam b e  w a r n e d  the  n a t i o n a l i s t s  t h a t  the  
g o v e r n m e n t  w o u l d  b e  ’ c o m p e l l e d  to t a k e  d r a s t i c  a c t i o n ’ 
a g a i n s t  t h o s e  who b r o k e  t h e  law  d u r i n g  a c a m p a i g n  o f  
c i v i l  d i s o b e d i e n c e . 1 I n  h i s  c a p a c i t y  as A c t i n g  G o v e r n o r ,  
Tam b e  a l s o  c e r t i f i e d  the  c u t s  w h i c h  the  N a t i o n a l i s t s  made 
i n  the  b u d g e t  g r a n t s  f o r  1 9 3 0 - 1 .  H i s  a c t i o n  i n  so d o i n g  
d r ew  a s t i n g i n g  r e t o r t  f r o m  t h e  N a t i o n a l i s t  member f o r  
W e s t  B e r a r :
T h e  r e c e n t  r e s t o r a t i o n  o f  t h e  c u t s  p a s s e d  b y  the  
l e g i s l a t i v e  c o u n c i l  b y  H i s  E x c e l l e n c y  h a s  
d i s i l l u s i o n e d  ( u s ) . . . . H i s  E x c e l l e n c y ,  who was  
o n c e  a d i s c i p l e  o f  L o k a m a n y a  T i l a k  a n d  w a s  o n ce  
a S w a r a j i s t  . . h a s  f a i l e d  to c a t c h  the  p u b l i c  
i m a g i n a t i o n . . . . H e  i s  n o t h i n g  more t h a n  a  mere  
B a b u  i n  o f f i c e ,  who w h o l l y  d e p e n d s  u p o n  the  
a d v i c e  h e  g e t s  f r o m  the  g o v e r n m e n t  members  i n  
t h e  c o u n c i l . 2
A n d  w h e n  i n  J u n e  1 9 3 0  B . G .  K h a p a r d e  f i n a l l y  r e s i g n e d  h i s
s e a t  i n  the  l e g i s l a t u r e ,  h e  d i d  so i n  p r o t e s t  a g a i n s t  the
g o v e r n m e n t ' s  a t t i t u d e  t o w a r d s  t h e  ’ p o l i t i c a l  p r o p a g a n d a
3
a n d  a g i t a t i o n  i n  t h i s  p r o v i n c e ' .
W h i l e  the  R e s p o n s i v i s t s  d e s i r e d  to p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  
c i v i l  d i s o b e d i e n c e  as  a means o f  a t t a c k i n g  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ,
1
H i t a v a d a , 2 7  A p r i l  1 9 3 0 ,  p . 9*
2
I b i d . ,  27  March  1 9 3 0 ,  p . 8 .  The  member was T . S .  D ig h e .
3
I b i d . , 26  June  1 9 3 0 ,  p . 8 .
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t h e y  a l s o  d e s i r e d  to w i n  p o p u l a r  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e i r  p a r t y .
T h e  R e s p o n s i v i s t  l e a d e r s  w e r e  a w a r e  t h a t ,  b y  s e e m i n g  to
s u p p o r t  the  g o v e r n m e n t  at  a t im e  w h e n  C o n g r e s s m e n  w e re
s t o r m i n g  the  b a r r i c a d e s  a g a i n s t  i t ,  t h e y  c o u l d  s e r i o u s l y
2
e n d a n g e r  t h e i r  s t a n d i n g  w i t h  the  p e o p l e .  T h e  l e a d e r s
t h u s  d e c i d e d  to f o l l o w  the  e x a m p l e  o f  the  C o n g r e s s  an d
b e g i n  a g i t a t i o n .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  the  g o v e r n m e n t  w as  o f  the
o p i n i o n  t h a t  i n  r e s i g n i n g  f r o m  the  C o u n c i l  to p a r t i c i p a t e
i n  c i v i l  d i s o b e d i e n c e ,  the  R e s p o n s i v i s t s  w e r e  c a n v a s s i n g
f o r  the  s u p p o r t  o f  v o t e r s  i n  the  e l e c t i o n s  to the  C o u n c i l
to be  h e l d  i n  N o ve m b e r  1 9 3 0  - the  l a s t  s u c h  u n d e r  the
M o n t a g u - C h e l m s f o r d  r e f o r m s .  T h e r e  was  some t r u t h  i n  t h i s
3
o p i n i o n .  W h a t e v e r  t h e  i n t e n t i o n s  o f  the  R e s p o n s i v i s t s , 
b e t w e e n  M ay  a n d  J u l y  1 9 3 0  t h e y  r e s i g n e d  f r o m  the  C o u n c i l  
a n d  the  m i n i s t r y  i n  p r e p a r a t i o n  f o r  c i v i l  d i s o b e d i e n c e .
1
N L I , M o o n j e  M S ,  D i a r y  2 ,  3 0  M a r c h  1 9 3 0 .  A n e y ' s  i d e a  
w as  t h a t  b y  r e s i g n i n g  f r o m  t h e  C o u n c i l s ,  the  R e s p o n s i v i s t s  
w o u l d  ' s t r i k e  the  i m a g i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  p e o p l e ' .
2
H i t a v a d a , 2 7  A p r i l  1 9 3 0 ,  p . 9*
3
M P S , P o l i t i c a l  an d  M i l i t a r y  D e p a r t m e n t  (P & M )  3 0 2 / C D M ,
1 9 3 0 ,  N o t e  o n  C i v i l  D i s o b e d i e n c e  i n  the  C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s  
a n d  B e r a r ,  p . 6 .  T h i s  N o t e  g i v e s  a s h r e w d  a n a l y s i s  o f  the  
many r e a s o n s  t h a t  p r o m p t e d  th e  R e s p o n s i v i s t s  to u n d e r t a k e  
c i v i l  d i s o b e d i e n c e .  H i  t a v a d a , 19  J u n e  1 9 3 0 ,  p . l ;  N L I ,  
M o o n j e  M S ,  D i a r y  2 ,  2 1  M ay  1 9 3 0 .  A n e y  t o l d  the  m i n i s t e r s  
to r e s i g n  ' a n d  t h u s  w a s h  a w a y  t h e i r  s i n s ,  so t h a t  t h e y  
may h a v e  some l u c k  d u r i n g  t h e  n e x t  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n s ' .
N A I , K h a p a r d e  M S ,  D i a r y ,  16  J u l y  1 9 3 0 .  G . S .  K h a p a r d e  
t h o u g h t  t h a t  the  r e s i g n a t i o n s  o f  the  R e s p o n s i v i s t s  w e r e  
' d u e  to e l e c t i o n  n e c e s s i t i e s  a n d  n o t h i n g  e l s e ' .  I b i d . ,  
D i a r y ,  3 1  A u g u s t  1 9 3 0 .  K h a p a r d e  t o l d  the  C o m m i s s i o n e r  
o f  B e r a r  t h a t  h i s  s o n  was  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  c i v i l  
d i s o b e d i e n c e  ' to b r i n g  b a c k  the  p e o p l e  to r e s p o n s i v e  
c o o p e r a t i o n ' .
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T h e  R e s p o n s i v i s t s  w o n  c o n s i d e r a b l e  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t
a n d  s u p p o r t  i n  l a u n c h i n g  t h e i r  c a m p a i g n  o f  c i v i l
d i s o b e d i e n c e .  M u c h  o f  t h i s  was  due  to the  n a t u r e  o f
t h e  c a m p a i g n ,  w h i c h  c o n s i s t e d  o f  c u t t i n g  wood  a n d  g r a s s
i n  g o v e r n m e n t  f o r e s t s  i n  d e f i a n c e  o f  the  r e g u l a t i o n s  i n
f o r c e  t h e r e i n .  T h e  l e a d e r  o f  the  c a m p a i g n  or  F o r e s t
S a t y a g r a h a ,  as  i t  w as  n am e d ,  w as  M . S .  A n e y .  A s  e a r l y  as
M ay  1 9 3 0 ,  A n e y  c o n c e i v e d  the  i d e a  o f  l a u n c h i n g  a
S a t y a g r a h a  a g a i n s t  the  r e g u l a t i o n s  r e l a t i n g  to the  u s e
o f  g o v e r n m e n t  f o r e s t s . 1 H e  was  a w a r e  t h a t  i n  so d o i n g
h e  w o u l d  h a v e  the  s u p p o r t  o f  many o f  the  p o o r e r  p e o p l e
i n  the  v i l l a g e s  o f  B e r a r  who c o n s i d e r e d  the  r e g u l a t i o n s
2
u n d u l y  r e p r e s s i v e .  D r  M o o n j e ,  h o w e v e r ,  b e g a n  c i v i l  
d i s o b e d i e n c e  b e f o r e  A n e y ,  u s i n g  form s  o f  a g i t a t i o n  
s i m i l a r  to t h o s e  a d v o c a t e d  b y  the  I n d i a n  N a t i o n a l  C o n g r e s s .  
I n  May  b o t h  men w e r e  o v e r s h a d o w e d  b y  t h e  a r r e s t s  o f  
A b h y a n k e r  a n d  Wam anrao  J o s h i ;  a n d  M o o n j e  h a d  to f a c e  the  
a d d i t i o n a l  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  some o f  h i s  s u p p o r t e r s  i n
1
H i t a v a d a , 25  M ay  1 9 3 0 ,  p p . l ,  13*
2
S e e  M P S , F o r e s t  D e p a r t m e n t ,  ( F o r e s t ) ,  l - 4 l ,  1 9 3 1 »
O r d e r s  o f  G o v e r n m e n t  t h a t  F o r e s t  G r i e v a n c e s  be  c h e c k e d  
e t c . ,  N o te  b y  Mr  D e ,  C o m m i s s i o n e r  o f  B e r a r ;  M P S ,  F o r e s t ,  
1 - 4 2 ,  1 9 3 1 »  C o r r e s p o n d e n c e  R e l a t i n g  to F o r e s t  G r i e v a n c e s ;  
M S N ,  F o r e s t ,  8 - 5 ,  1 9 3 2 ,  G r i e v a n c e s  A g a i n s t  the  P r o v i s i o n s  
o f  the  W o r k i n g  P l a n ,  Y e o t m a l .  A m o n g  the  g r i e v a n c e s  
l i s t e d  i n  t h e s e  f i l e s  a r e  the  n e e d  f o r  g r a z i n g  p a s s e s ,  
the  r e d u c t i o n  o f  w a t e r i n g  f a c i l i t i e s ,  a n d  r e s t r i c t i o n s  
o n  g r a z i n g .
3
N L I , M o o n j e  M S ,  D i a r y  2 ,  3 M ay  I 93O ;  H i t a v a d a , 1 May
1 9 3 0 ,  p . 7 j  4 M ay  1 9 3 0 ,  p . 1 0 .  D r  M o o n j e  p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  
c i v i l  d i s o b e d i e n c e  b y  p r e p a r i n g  s a l t ,  thus  b r e a k i n g  the  
S a l t  A c t ;  a n d  b y  r e a d i n g  p r o s c r i b e d  l i t e r a t u r e .
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N a g p u r  m igh t  j o i n  f o r c e s  w i t h  the  C o n g r e s s  i n  a t t a c k i n g  
t h e  g o v e r n m e n t . 1 A c c o r d i n g l y ,  M o o n j e  an d  A n e y  c o m b in e d  
to l e a d  a u n i t e d  c a m p a i g n  o f  c i v i l  d i s o b e d i e n c e  t h a t  
drew  i t s  s u p p o r t  f r o m  R e s p o n s i v i s t s  i n  the  d i v i s i o n s  o f  
N a g p u r  and  B e r a r .  T h e  c a m p a i g n  f o l l o w e d  A n e y ' s  o r i g i n a l  
p l a n  f o r  a F o r e s t  S a t y a g r a h a ,  a n d  b e g a n  a m id  g r e a t  
e x c i t e m e n t  a t  P u s a d  n e a r  Y e o t m a l  o n  10  J u l y  1 9 3 0 .  A s  
D r  M o o n j e  r e c o r d s :
H a v i n g  f i n i s h e d  my m o r n i n g  e x e r c i s e ,  b a t h  an d  
t e a ,  I  w a s  a t  the  m e e t i n g  i n  the  b e d  o f  the  
r i v e r  e x a c t l y  at  6 . 3 0  a . m .  T h e  a u d i e n c e  was  
l a r g e  a n d  i n c l u d e d  s e v e r a l  women.  T h e  t r i ­
c o l o u r e d  f l a g  was  w o r s h i p p e d  a n d  A n e y  an d  10  
v o l u n t e e r s  w e r e  p r e s e n t e d  w i t h  s c y t h e s ,  one  
e a c h .  B e s i d e s  a s c y t h e ,  Mr  A n e y  was  p r e s e n t e d  
w i t h  a n  a x e  a l s o  f o r  c u t t i n g  wood i n  t h e  f o r e s t .
T h e  w h o l e  f u n c t i o n  w as  most i m p o s i n g .  T h e n  
s t a r t e d  the  p r o c e s s i o n  o f  v o l u n t e e r s  u n d e r  the  
l e a d e r s h i p  o f  Mr A n e y ,  f o l l o w e d  b y  the  mass o f  
women a n d  men who h a d  a s s e m b l e d  f o r  t h e  m e e t i n g  
. . . . T h e  v o l u n t e e r s  t h e n  e n t e r e d  the  f o r e s t  an d  
b e g a n  to cut  g r a s s . 2
F o l l o w i n g  t h i s  i n c i d e n t ,  t h e  p o l i c e  a r r e s t e d  A n e y  a n d  h i s  
v o l u n t e e r s .  A n d  w h e n  D r  M o o n j e  a n d  o t h e r  l e a d e r s  an d  
v o l u n t e e r s  f r o m  N a g p u r  a n d  B e r a r  t o o k  p a r t  i n  the  
S a t y a g r a h a ,  t h e  p o l i c e  a r r e s t e d  them a l s o .  O n  2 4  J u l y
1 9 3 0  the  S a t y a g r a h a  at  P u s a d  c o n c l u d e d ,  a n d  the  s c e n e  
s h i f t e d  to A m r a v a t i , w h e r e ,  a c c o r d i n g  to G . S .  K h a p a r d e , 
h i s  s o n  h a d  ' c o n c e i v e d  th e  mad i d e a  o f  f o l l o w i n g  i n  the
1
H i t a v a d a , D i a r y  2 ,  15  J u n e  1 9 3 0 ;  H i t a v a d a , 8 J u n e  1 9 3 0 ,  
p .  8 .
2
N L I , M o o n j e  M S ,  D i a r y  2 ,  10  J u l y  1 9 2 0 .
3
I b i d . ,  D i a r y  2 ,  10 J u l y  1 9 3 0 ;  D i a r y  2 ,  11 J u l y  1 9 3 0 .
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s t e p s  o f  A n e y  a n d  M o o n j e ' . T h e  f a t h e r ,  h o w e v e r ,  seems 
to h a v e  d i s s u a d e d  the  s o n  f r o m  d o i n g  s o ,  a n d  b y  the  end  
o f  J u l y  the  R e s p o n s i v i s t  S a t y a g r a h a  was  v i r t u a l l y  at  a n  
e n d .
I r o n i c a l l y ,  D e s h m u k h  r e s i g n e d  f r o m  the  m i n i s t r y  j u s t  
as  the  S a t y a g r a h a  was  d r a w i n g  to a c l o s e .  De sh m uk h  
b e l i e v e d  t h a t  the  R e s p o n s i v e  C o o p e r a t i o n  p a r t y  c o u l d  h o l d  
o f f i c e  an d  a t t a c k  the  g o v e r n m e n t  at  the  same t im e .  
C o n s e q u e n t l y  h e  was  r e l u c t a n t  to r e s i g n  h i s  m i n i s t e r s h i p .  
H o w e v e r ,  p r e s s u r e  f r o m  p o l i t i c a l  c o l l e a g u e s  i n  B e r a r  an d
t h e  H i n d i  s u p p o r t e r s  o f  h i s  c o l l e a g u e  B o s e  c o m p e l l e d  h im
2
to t a k e  t h a t  s t e p .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  o n  12  J u l y  1 9 3 0 ,  two
d a y s  a f t e r  A n e y  h a d  l a u n c h e d  t h e  F o r e s t  S a t y a g r a h a  at
P u s a d ,  D e sh m uk h  i n f o r m e d  B u t l e r  t h a t  h e  p r o p o s e d  to
r e s i g n ,  b u t  a t  the  l a t t e r ' s  r e q u e s t  h e  a g r e e d  to c o n t i n u e
3
i n  o f f i c e  u n t i l  the  e n d  o f  t h e  m onth .  H e  t h u s
r e m a i n e d  i n  o f f i c e  d u r i n g  the  h e i g h t  o f  the  S a t y a g r a h a .
O n  3 0  J u l y  1 9 3 0  D e s h m u k h  r e s i g n e d  f r o m  t h e  m i n i s t r y ,  and
t h e  G o v e r n o r  a p p o i n t e d  h i s  c o l l e a g u e  B o se  to a d m i n i s t e r
k
h i s  p o r t f o l i o s  o n  a t e m p o r a r y  b a s i s .
One  o t h e r  d e v e l o p m e n t  i n  the  M a r a t h i  r e g i o n ,  w h i l e  
not  d i r e c t l y  p o l i t i c a l ,  a i d e d  t h e  R e s p o n s i v i s t  c a u s e  an d
1
H i t a v a d a , 2k J u l y  1 9 3 0 ,  p . 8 ; N A I , K h a p a r d e  M S ,  D i a r y ,
16  J u l y  1 9 3 0 .
2
S e e  N L I , M o o n j e  M S ,  D i a r y  2 ,  8 J u l y  1 9 3 0 ;  H i t a v a d a ,
2k May  1 9 3 0 ,  p p . l ,  8 ; 6 J u l y  1 9 3 0 ,  p . 1 ;  2 0  J u l y  1 9 3 0 ,  p . l .
3
I b i d . ,  17 J u l y  1930 , p . 9 ;  20 J u l y  1 9 3 0 ,  p . l .
k
I b i d . ,  31  J u l y  1 9 3 0 ,  p . 7-
213
h e l p e d  r e s t o r e  the  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  t h e  M a r a t h i  r e g i o n  i n
the  l i f e  o f  the  p r o v i n c e .  T h i s  d e v e l o p m e n t  c o m p r i s e d
the  f o r m a t i o n  a n d  e x t e n s i o n  o f  the  R a s h t r i y a  Swayam
S e w a k  S a n g h . T h e  S a n g h  was n e i t h e r  a p o l i t i c a l  n o r  a
R e s p o n s i v i s t  o r g a n i s a t i o n .  Y e t  i t s  o b j e c t i v e s  w e r e
i m p l i c i t l y ,  i f  not  e x p l i c i t l y  p o l i t i c a l ,  a n d  many
R e s p o n s i v i s ts  w e r e  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  i t .  T h e  R a s h t r i y a
Swayam  S e w a k  S a n g h  b e g a n  i n  N a g p u r  i n  O c t o b e r  1 9 2 5 * ^
I t s  f o u n d e r  was  K e s h a v  B a l i r a m  H e d g e w a r ,  a B r a h m a n
m e d i c a l  p r a c t i t i o n e r .  H e d g e w a r  h a d  b e e n  p r o f o u n d l y
d i s t u r b e d  b y  the  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  the  K h i l a f a t  movement
b e t w e e n  1920-2 a n d  the  s u b s e q u e n t  w i t h d r a w a l  o f  the
2
M u s l i m s  f r o m  the  I n d i a n  n a t i o n a l i s t  m ovem ent .  T h e  
p r e s e n c e  i n  I n d i a  o f  o r g a n i s e d  M u s l i m s  w i t h  p a n - I s l a m i c  
s y m p a t h i e s  a n d  w e a k  a n d  d i s o r g a n i s e d  H i n d u s  was  a m a t t e r  
o f  s e r i o u s  c o n c e r n  to H e d g e w a r ,  a n d  h e  d e t e r m i n e d  to 
fo r m  a g r o u p  o f  men
to c o n s o l i d a t e  the  p r e d o m i n a n t  p o s i t i o n  o f  the  
H i n d u  s o c i e t y  i n  H i n d u s t a n  - the  l a n d  o f  the  
H i n d u s . . . t o  g i v e  s e l f  r e s p e c t  as  a H i n d u . . . t o  
r e s p e c t  a n d  be  p r o u d  o f  o u r  o l d  g l o r y  a n d  
c u l t u r e ,  a n d  c r e a t e  ( t h e )  a m b i t i o n  to r e s t o r e  
H i n d u i s m  to i t s  h i g h  p e d e s t a l  o f  t h e  w o r l d  
t e a c h e r  o f  h i s t o r y . 3
To g i v e  p r a c t i c a l  s h a p e  to t h e s e  a i m s ,  H e d g e w a r  s o u g h t
1
S h r i G u r u j i :  the  M a n  a n d  H i s  M i s s i o n  ( D e l h i ,  1 9 5 6 ) ,  
p . 2 5
2
I b i d . , p . 2 4 .
3
N A I , J a y a k e r  M S ,  F i l e  6 5 ,  L e t t e r  6 7 ,  T h e  R a s h t r i y a  
Sw ayam  S e w a k  S a n g h .
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to b u i l d  a d i s c i p l i n e d  b r o t h e r h o o d  o f  y o u n g  men - t h e i r
b o d i e s  s t r e n g t h e n e d  b y  d a i l y  e x e r c i s e ;  t h e i r  t i e s  w i t h
one  a n o t h e r  f o r g e d  t h r o u g h  f r e q u e n t  m e e t i n g ;  a n d  t h e i r
d e s i r e  to s p r e a d  r e s p e c t  f o r  H i n d u i s m  c o n f i r m e d  b y
w o r s h i p ,  r e g u l a r  i n s t r u c t i o n  a n d  the  p e r s o n a l  e xam p le
o f  t h e i r  l e a d e r s . 1 By  1 9 2 7  H e d g e w a r ' s  p l a n s  h a d  t a k e n
p r a c t i c a l  s h a p e  i n  the  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a s m a l l  number  o f
b r a n c h e s  o f  the  R a s h t r i y a  Sw ayam  S e w a k  S a n g h  i n  the
M a r a t h i  r e g i o n .  I n  1 9 2 7 ,  t o o ,  H e d g e w a r  d e c i d e d  to
e x p a n d  the  S a n g h  t h r o u g h o u t  the  M a r a t h i  a n d  H i n d i  r e g i o n s
a n d  to e s t a b l i s h  b r a n c h e s  o f  the  o r g a n i s a t i o n  i n
2
n e i g h b o u r i n g  p r o v i n c e s .  So f a r  as  the  C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s  
a n d  B e r a r  was  c o n c e r n e d ,  t h i s  d e c i s i o n  r e s u l t e d  i n  a 
g r e a t  e x p a n s i o n  o f  t h e  S a n g h , p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  the  
M a r a t h i  r e g i o n .  T h i s  e x p a n s i o n  w as  e v i d e n t  f ro m  i t s  
m e m b e r s h ip  f i g u r e s ,  w h i c h ,  f r o m  a fe w  h u n d r e d  i n  19 2 7 , 
b y  1931 h a d  g r o w n  to 6 , 0 0 0 .
I V
D e s p i t e  the  R e s p o n s i v i s t s 1 c o u n t e r - a t t a c k ,  f ro m
1930 o n w a r d s  the  p o l i t i c a l  i n i t i a t i v e  am ong  non- 
C o n g r e s s m e n  i n  the  C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s  a n d  B e r a r  r e t u r n e d
1
C u r r a n ,  o p .  c i t . ,  p p . 6 ,  1 4 ,  45- 6 .
2
I b i d . , p . 1 3 .
3
M u ch  o f  t h i s  e x p a n s i o n  seems to h a v e  t a k e n  p l a c e  a f t e r  
t h e  c a m p a i g n  o f  c i v i l  d i s o b e d i e n c e .  S e e  C u r r a n ,  o p .  c i t . ,  
p p . 1 2 ,  1 3 ;  N A I ,  Home P o l l ,  1 8 / X , 1 9 3 1 ,  S e c o n d  H a l f  o f  
O c t o b e r  1 9 3 1 ,  P « l ;  P .  S h y a m n a n d a n ,  R a s h t r i y a  Sw ayam  
S e w a k  S a n g h :  T h e  N a t i o n a l  U r g e  ( P a t n a , 1 9 5 1 ) »  p p . 1 7 - 8 .
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to the  H i n d i  r e g i o n  a n d  R a g h a v e n d r a  R a o . T h e  r e a s o n s  f o r  
t h i s  l a y  i n  R a o * s o u t s t a n d i n g  p o l i t i c a l  s k i l l  an d  i n  h i s  
c l o s e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  the  G o v e r n o r ,  S i r  M o n t a g u  B u t l e r .  
Rao  a l s o  d e r i v e d  c o n s i d e r a b l e  a d v a n t a g e  f ro m  the  f a c t  
t h a t  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  c i v i l  d i s o b e d i e n c e  h a d  f a i l e d  to 
i n d u c e  the  v o t e r s  to r e t u r n  the  R e s p o n s i v i s t  l e a d e r  and  
f o r m e r  m i n i s t e r ,  Ram rao  D e s h m u k h ,  to the  C o u n c i l .  
D e s h m u k h ’ s c o l l e a g u e ,  B o s e ,  a l s o  l o s t  h i s  s e a t .  S o o n  
a f t e r  the  c o l l a p s e  o f  th e  R e s p o n s i v i s t s '  c a m p a i g n  o f  
c i v i l  d i s o b e d i e n c e ,  the  R e s p o n s i v i s t  l e a d e r s  d e c i d e d  to 
c o n t e s t  the  e l e c t i o n s  to t h e  C o u n c i l  to b e  h e l d  i n  
N o v e m b e r  1 9 3 0 .  1 D e sh m uk h  e v i n c e d  no p a r t i c u l a r  d e s i r e  to 
r e t u r n  to the  l e g i s l a t u r e  i n  N a g p u r ,  a s  w as  e v i d e n t  fro m  
the  d i s c u s s i o n s  h e  h a d  w i t h  G . S .  K h a p a r d e  i n  A m r a v a t i  o n
5 A u g u s t  1 9 3 0 *  K h a p a r d e  r e p o r t e d  t h a t
H e  l o o k e d  v e r y  c a r e  w o r n  a n d  t i r e d .  H e  w i s h e s  
to s t a n d  f o r  the  L e g i s l a t i v e  A s s e m b l y .  H e  f e e l s ,  
h e  s a i d ,  t i r e d  o f  N a g p u r  c o u n c i l  a n d  l o c a l  
p o l i t i c s .  H e  d i d  not  s i t  l o n g ,  as  my e l d e s t  
s o n  a n d  h i s  f r i e n d s  w e r e  not h e r e . 2
Some t im e  l a t e r ,  D e s h m u k h  t r i e d ,  b u t  f a i l e d ,  to o b t a i n  
R e s p o n s i v i s t  n o m i n a t i o n  f o r  th e  A s s e m b l y  s e a t  o f  B e r a r .  
C o n s e q u e n t l y  h e  a g r e e d  to s u g g e s t i o n s  fro m  l e a d e r s  o f  
t he  p a r t y  t h a t  h e  s t a n d  o n c e  a g a i n  f o r  the  s e a t  o f  
A m r a v a t i  C e n t r a l  i n  the  p r o v i n c i a l  l e g i s l a t u r e .  H i s  
o p p o n e n t  f o r  the  s e a t  was  P u n j a b r a o  D e s h m u k h ,  a 
b a r r i s t e r  f r o m  A m r a v a t i .  L i k e  h i s  n a m e s a k e ,  P u n j a b r a o
1
N A I , K h a p a r d e  M S ,  D i a r y ,  3 0  J u l y  1 9 3 0 ;  i b i d . ,  2 A u g u s t
1 9 3 0 .
2
I b i d . ,  5 A u g u s t  1 9 5 0 .
2 1 6
D e sh m u k h  was  a M a r a t h a ,  b u t  u n l i k e  Ramrao  Deshmukti,  h e
w as  s t r o n g l y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  the  non- Brahm an  movement .
A n d  i t  was  o n  the  b a s i s  o f  h i s  s u p p o r t  among n o n - B r a h m a n s ,
t h a t  P u n j a b r a o  De sh m uk h  d e f e a t e d  h i s  r i v a l  i n  A m r a v a t i  an d
i n  so d o i n g  w e a k e n e d  the  R e s p o n s i v i s t  p a r t y  i n  the
1
L e g i s l a t u r e .  B o s e ,  the  c o l l e a g u e  o f  D e s h m u k h ,  a l s o  l o s t
2
h i s  s e a t  o f  J a b a l p u r .  T h e  d e f e a t  o f  b o t h  men r u l e d  out  
a n y  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  e i t h e r  w o u l d  make a n  e a r l y  r e t u r n  
to the  m i n i s t r y .
D e s h m u k h ' s  d e f e a t  c o i n c i d e d  w i t h  the  r e - e m e r g e n c e  o f  
R a g h a v e n d r a  Rao as  a c om m a n d in g  f o r c e  i n  p r o v i n c i a l  
p o l i t i c s .  R a o ' s r e - e m e r g e n c e  h a d  a r a t h e r  d r a m a t i c  
q u a l i t y .  T h e  G o v e r n o r ,  S i r  M o n t a g u  B u t l e r ,  h a d  a h i g h  
o p i n i o n  o f  R a o ' s  p o l i t i c a l  a b i l i t y ,  a n d  h a d  l o n g  d e s i r e d
3
to b r i n g  h im  i n t o  the  g o v e r n m e n t .  T h e  d e f e a t  o f  R a o ' s  
m i n i s t r y  i n  1 9 2 9 ,  a n d  T a m b e ' s  o c c u p a n c y  o f  the  Home 
M e m b e r s h i p ,  h o w e v e r ,  made t h i s  i m p o s s i b l e .  I n  O c t o b e r
1
S e e  H i  t a v a d a , 20  A p r i l  1 9 3 0 ,  P • 1 2  ; 1 M ay  1 9 3 0 ,  p . 9 ;
5 J u n e  1 9 3 0 ,  p . 6 ;  N A I , K h a p a r d e  M S ,  D i a r y ,  15 O c t o b e r
1 9 3 0 .  From  A p r i l - J u n e  1930  P . S .  D e sh m uk h  t o u r e d  the  
d i s t r i c t  o f  A m r a v a t i  o n  f o o t  to ' a c q u a i n t  the  v i l l a g e r s  
w i t h  w h a t  i s  h a p p e n i n g  i n  the  c o u n t r y ' . T h i s  t o u r  
u n d o u b t e d l y  h e l p e d  h i m  to w i n  t h e  e l e c t i o n s .
2
H i  t a v a d a , 13 N o v e m b e r  1 9 3 0 ,  p . l j  16 N o ve m be r  1 9 3 0 ,  p . 9* 
T h e  C o n g r e s s  w as  l a r g e l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  the  d e f e a t  o f  
Bo se  .
3
N A I ,  K h a p a r d e  M S ,  D i a r y ,  13 F e b r u a r y  1 9 2 9 ;  H i  t a v a d a ,
27 J a n u a r y  1929, p . 2; 28 F e b r u a r y  1929, p . 1 ; 7 M a r c h
1929 , p . 1; 10 M a r c h  1 9 2 9 ,  p . 2 ;  21  J u l y  1 9 ^ 9 ,  P - 7 -
D . P .  M i s h r a  s t a t e d  t h a t  d u r i n g  1 9 2 9 B u t l e r  'w a s  a v e r s e  to 
the  f o r m a t i o n  o f  a n y  m i n i s t r y  i n  w h i c h  Rao  was  not 
i n c l u d e d ' .
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1 9 3 0  Tambe  r e t i r e d  f ro m  th e  Home M e m b e r s h i p ,  an d  B u t l e r  
s e i z e d  the  o p p o r t u n i t y  to a p p o i n t  R a g h a v e n d r a  Rao  as  the  
new Home M e m be r .  T h e  a p p o i n t m e n t  was  made p e r m a n e n t  i n  
J a n u a r y  1 9 3 1 * ^  R a o 1s a p p o i n t m e n t  as  Home Member  
h e r a l d e d  the  p e r m a n e n t  e l e v a t i o n  o f  the  H i n d i  r e g i o n  to 
a p l a c e  o f  p o w e r  i n  the  g o v e r n m e n t .  I t  a l s o  m arke d  the  
b e g i n n i n g  o f  a n  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  p o l i t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
b e t w e e n  Rao  and  B u t l e r  t h a t  h e l p e d  the  p r o v i n c e  to 
w e a t h e r  the  s t orm s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  i n s t a b i l i t y  a n d  p r e p a r e  
f o r  the  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  t h e  r e f o r m e d  c o n s t i t u t i o n  i n  
1 9 3 7 •  T h e  e x c h a n g e  o f  l e t t e r s  b e t w e e n  Rao  a n d  B u t l e r  at  
the  t ime  o f  the  f o r m e r ’ s p e r m a n e n t  a p p o i n t m e n t  as  Home 
Member  d e m o n s t r a t e  the  q u a l i t y  o f  t h i s  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  O n
25  J a n u a r y  1 9 3 1  B u t l e r  w r o t e  to Rao
I  u n d e r s t a n d  t h a t  a n  a n n o u n c e m e n t  w i l l  be  made 
a n y  moment now t h a t  H i s  M a j e s t y  h a s  b e e n  p l e a s e d  
to a p p o i n t  y o u  p e r m a n e n t l y  to my c o u n c i l  i n  
Mr T a m b e ' s  p l a c e .  A s  I  m e n t i o n e d  to y o u  b e f o r e ,  
y o u  w i l l  not be  l i k e l y  to r u n  the  f u l l  f i v e  y e a r s  
a s  the  new c o n s t i t u t i o n  s h o u l d  be  i n  f o r c e  b e f o r e  
t h e n ,  b u t  I  l o o k  f o r w a r d  to o u r  a s s o c i a t i o n  
t o g e t h e r  f o r  w h a t e v e r  p e r i o d  i t  may b e . 2
F o u r  d a y s  l a t e r ,  o n  r e c e i v i n g  f o r m a l  n o t i f i c a t i o n  o f  the  
a p p o i n t m e n t ,  Rao  r e p l i e d :
1
NML,  Rao  M S ,  T . F .  S e l b y  to E . R .  R a o ,  8 O c t o b e r  1 9 3 0 .
A  m a r g i n a l  n o t e  by  Rao  r e a d s :  R e a c h e d  P a c h m a r h i  at 9 * 3 0  
a n d  was  o f f e r e d  the  H o m e - M e m b e r s h ip , a c c e p t e d  and  
i m m e d i a t e l y  t a k e n  to the  c a b i n e t  m e e t i n g ,  s w o r n  and  
r e t u r n e d  a f u l l - f l e d g e d  e x e c u t i v e  c o u n c i l l o r .  S g d .  E R R ,  
8 -IO-3 O; H i t a v a d a , 1 F e b r u a r y  1 9 31?  p . 8 .
2
NML, Rao MS,  S i r  M. B u t l e r  to E . R .  Rao ,  25 Ja n u a r y
1 9 3 1 .
Dr E. R a g h ave nd r a  Rao
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J u s t  a l i n e  to say  how d e e p l y  I  f e e l  the  
o b l i g a t i o n  I  am u n d e r  to Y o u r  E x c e l l e n c y  f o r  
my p e r m a n e n t  a p p o i n t m e n t  to the  c o u n c i l  by  
h i s  M a j e s t y .  F o r  t h i s  a n d  a l l  y o u r  p e r s o n a l  
k i n d n e s s  to me s i n c e  y o u  j o i n e d  the  p r o v i n c e ,
I  d e s i r e  to t h a n k  y o u  most w a r m l y . 1
T h e  k e y  to R a o 1s p o w e r  l a y  i n  the  L e g i s l a t i v e  
C o u n c i l .  F o r  t h e  g r e a t e r  p a r t  o f  the  p e r i o d  fro m  1 9 3 0 - 7 ,  
Rao  c o u l d  r e l y  o n  the  s u p p o r t  o f  a m a j o r i t y  o f  members 
i n  the  C o u n c i l .  T h e s e  members w e r e  g r o u p e d  t o g e t h e r  
i n t o  the  D e m o c r a t i c  ’ p a r t y ’ , a b o d y  o r i g i n a l l y  f o r m e d  by  
Rao  i n  1 9 2 8 .  Some o f  t h i s  s u p p o r t  Rao  g a i n e d  b y  h i s  own
p o w e r s  o f  l e a d e r s h i p ,  a n d  some b y  the  s k i l f u l
2
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  p a t r o n a g e .  A m o n g  the  g r o u p s  f r o m  w h i c h  
Rao  drew  s u p p o r t  w e r e  the  H i n d i  s e c t i o n  o f  the  D e m o c r a t i c  
’ p a r t y ’ , a n d  some o f  the  H i n d i  members who w e r e  e l e c t e d  
to the  C o u n c i l  i n  p l a c e  o f  t h e  C o n g r e s s m e n  f r o m  t h a t
3
r e g i o n  who h a d  r e s i g n e d  t h e i r  s e a t s  i n  1 9 3 0 .  From  1 9 3 0  
o n w a r d s ,  Rao  a l s o  c o n t i n u e d  to draw  s u p p o r t  fro m  the  
D e p r e s s e d  m em b er s ,  the  M u s l i m s ,  some non- Brahm ans  fro m  
the  M a r a t h i  r e g i o n ,  a n d  the  o f f i c i a l  b l o c  w h i c h  the
1
NML,  E . R .  Rao  to S i r  M.  B u t l e r ,  2 9  J a n u a r y  193-1*
2
S e e  I b i d . ,  T h e  H o n o u r a b l e  E .  R a g h a v e n d r a  Rao  - A P e n  
P o r t r a i t ,  b y  ’ C o v e r  p o i n t ’ ; H i t a v a d a , 2 2  M a r c h  1 9 3 1 »  p . l .
3
T h i s  a n d  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n  o n  t h e  D e m o c r a t i c  
’p a r t y ’ comes f r o m  H i  t a v a d a , 2 7  N o ve m b e r  1 9 3 0 ,  p . l ;
4 D e c e m b e r  1 9 3 0 ,  p p .1  a n d  9? 7 D e c e m b e r  1 9 3 0 ,  p p • 1  an d  8 ;
1 4  D e c e m b e r  1 9 3 0 ,  p . 8 ;  18 D e c e m b e r  1 9 3 0 ,  p . 8 .  I n  the
H i  t a v a d a , 10  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 3 1 »  P * 9 »  K e d a r  r e v e a l s  t h a t  the  
Home Member  a t t e n d e d  m e e t i n g s  o f  the  D e m o c r a t i c  ’ p a r t y ’ to 
d i r e c t  i t s  b e h a v i o u r  i n  the  C o u n c i l .
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G o v e r n o r  b r o u g h t  to T u l l  s t r e n g t h  to r e i n f o r c e  R a o * s 
p o s i t i o n  i n  the  C o u n c i l .  From  t h i s  p o o l  o f  m e m b er s ,  
B u t l e r  an d  Rao fo r m e d  t h e i r  s u c c e s s i v e  m i n i s t r i e s .  T h e  
f i r s t  s u c h  m i n i s t r y  was  t h a t  fo r m e d  fro m  the  D e m o c r a t i c  
a n d  t h e  n o n - B r a h m a n ’p a r t ie s ' »  O n  15  D e c e m b e r  1 9 3 0 ,  the  
G o v e r n o r  a p p o i n t e d  the  D e m o c r a t  G . P .  J a i s w a l ,  a p l e a d e r  
fro m  the  d i v i s i o n  o f  J a b a l p u r ,  a n d  P u n j a b r a o  D e s h m u k h ,  
o f  the  n o n- B ra hm an  ’party ' ,  M i n i s t e r s  f o r  I n d u s t r i e s  and  
E d u c a t i o n  r e s p e c t i v e l y . 1
B e t w e e n  1 9 3 1 “ 3 Rao  d e m o n s t r a t e d  h i s  g r i p  o n  
p r o v i n c i a l  p o l i t i c s  b y  f r u s t r a t i n g  c o n t i n u e d  a t t e m p t s  to 
u n s e a t  t h i s  m i n i s t r y .  I n  d o i n g  so h e  r e t a i n e d  p o l i t i c a l  
i n i t i a t i v e  w i t h  the  H i n d i  r e g i o n  a n d  e n s u r e d  the  
c o n t i n u e d  s t a b l i t y  o f  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  i n  t h e  p r o v i n c e .  
T h e r e  w e r e  two m a j o r  a s s a u l t s  o n  the  m i n i s t r y  f o r m e d  b y  
D e s h m u k h  a n d  J a i s w a l ,  a n d  b o t h  o f  them o r i g i n a t e d  i n  the  
M a r a t h i  s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  C o u n c i l .  T h e  f i r s t ,  i n  1 9 3 1 ,  w as  
l e d  b y  B . G .  K h a p a r d e  a n d  T . J „  K e d a r ,  R a o ' s f o r m e r  
c o l l e a g u e  i n  the  m i n i s t r y ,  who w a s  s t i l l  a member o f  the  
D e m o c r a t i c  ' p a r t y ' .  T h e s e  men o r  t h e i r  s u p p o r t e r s  moved
r e s o l u t i o n s  a g a i n s t  the  g o v e r n m e n t  i n  J a n u a r y  1 9 3 1 ,  a n d
2
a t t a c k e d  t h e  b u d g e t  i n  M a r c h .  I n  A u g u s t  o f  the  same 
y e a r  K e d a r  l a u n c h e d  a n o t h e r  a t t a c k  a g a i n s t  R a o ,  b e c a u s e  
t h e  l a t t e r  h a d  p r e v e n t e d  h im  f r o m  w i n n i n g  the  e l e c t i o n
1
I b i d . ,  18  D e c e m b e r  1 9 3 0 ,  p . 9*
2
F o r  some e x a m p l e s  o f  t h i s ,  s e e  C P L C ,  v o l . l ,  17  J a n u a r y
1 9 3 1 ,  p p . 2 2 3 - 4 5 ;  i b i d . ,  2 7  F e b r u a r y  1 9 3 1 ,  p p . 4 2 0 - 5 1 ,  i b i d . ,
2 8  F e b r u a r y  1 9 3 1 ,  p p . 4 8 6 - 5 4 4 $  i b i d . ,  2 M a r c h  1 9 3 1 ,
p p . 5 7 4 -6 3 5 .
2 2 0
f o r  the  v a c a n t  P r e s i d e n t s h i p  o f  t h e  C o u n c i l .  To  g i v e  
f o r c e  to h i s  a t t a c k ,  K e d a r  f o r m e d  the  P e o p l e ’ s ’ p a r t y ’ 
c o n s i s t i n g  o f  some members o f  the  D e m o c r a t i c  ’ p a r t y ’ 
an d  p l a c e d  t h e  g r o u p  at  the  d i s p o s a l  o f  the  O p p o s i t i o n . 1 
R a o ’ s s k i l l  i n  d e b a t e ,  h i s  f i n e  s e n s e  o f  t a c t i c s  and  
s t r a t e g y ,  a n d  h i s  a b i l i t y  to c o n t r o l  the  D e m o c r a t i c  
’ p a r t y ’ , h o w e v e r ,  c o u n t e r e d  a l l  a t t a c k s .  T h e  H i t a v a d a , 
r e v i e w i n g  R a o ’ s p e r f o r m a n c e  d u r i n g  the  b u d g e t  s e s s i o n  
i n  M a r c h  1 9 3 1  w h e n  the  O p p o s i t i o n  a t t a c k e d  h i s  D e p a r t m e n t s  
o f  Law  a n d  O r d e r ,  c o m m e n t e d %
One  o f  t h e  n o t e w o r t h y  f e a t u r e s  o f  th e  b u d g e t  
s e s s i o n  w as  the  v e r y  e a s y  m an n er  i n  w h i c h  the  
h o n o u r a b l e  Mr  Rao  w a s  a b l e  to c a r r y  t h r o u g h  the  
c o u n c i l  the  b u d g e t s  o f  the  d e p a r t m e n t s  u n d e r  
h i s  c h a r g e .  T h o u g h  t h e r e  w as  much d i s c u s s i o n ,  
t h e r e  w as  l i t t l e  or  no r e d u c t i o n  i n  the  
a l l o t m e n t s  p r o v i d e d  f o r  the  p o l i c e ,  j a i l  an d  
j u d i c i a l  d e p a r t m e n t s s  a u n i q u e  a c h i e v e m e n t .
T h i s  w as  r e n d e r e d  p o s s i b l e  b e c a u s e  t h e  Home 
M em ber  h a d  the  b a c k i n g  o f  the  D e m o c r a t i c  p a r t y  
i n  the  c o u n c i l .
I n  1 9 3 3  a g r o u p  o f  no n - B ra h m an  D e m o c r a t s  l a u n c h e d  
t h e  s e c o n d  a s s a u l t  o n  the  m i n i s t r y .  P . S .  D e s h m u k h ,  
h o w e v e r ,  a n t i c i p a t i n g  d e f e a t ,  r e s i g n e d  f r o m  o f f i c e  and  
h e l p e d  to b r i n g  i n  a new m i n i s t r y  t h a t  r e m a i n e d  l o y a l  to
1
H i  t a v a d a , 7 J u n e  1931» P*7| 12 J u l y  1931» p . 10$
13 A u g u s t  1931> P • 7  5 2 0  A u g u s t  1931» P P • 7  a n d  8 ;
27 A u g u s t  1931* T h e  P r e s i d e n t s h i p  o f  t h e  C o u n c i l  f e l l  
v a c a n t  w h e n  S i r  S . M .  C h i t n a v i s  d i e d  i n  J u n e  1931* K e d a r  
w a n t e d  the  p o s t ,  b u t  Rao o u t m a n o e u v r e d  h i m ,  s e c u r i n g  the  
p o s t  f o r  S . W . A .  R i z v i ,  a M u s l i m  c o u n c i l l o r .  I n  so d o i n g  
Rao  drew  a number  o f  M u s l i m  members i n t o  the  D e m o c r a t i c  
’ p a r t y ’ .
2
Hi  t a v a d a , 21  March 1 9 2 1 ,  p . l .
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the  Home M e m be r ,  R a g h a v e n d r a  R a o . T h e  l e a d e r  o f  the
d i s s i d e n t  no n- Brahm an  D e m o c r a t s  w as  K . S .  N a i d u  o f  W a r d h a ,
who w as  a l s o  l e a d e r  o f  t h e  D e m o c r a t i c  ’ p a r t y '  i n  the
C o u n c i l .  B e t w e e n  1 9 3 1 - 2  N a i d u  g r a d u a l l y  w e a k e n e d  i n
h i s  a l l e g i a n c e  to the  D e m o c r a t i c  ' p a r t y ' , an d  i n  1 9 3 3
l a u n c h e d  a f u l l  s c a l e  a t t e m p t  to u n s e a t  the  m i n i s t r y .
T h e  r e a s o n s  f o r  N a i d u ' s  w i t h d r a w a l  o f  s u p p o r t  f r o m  the
D e m o c r a t i c  p a r t y  a n d  h i s  attack ,  o n  the  m i n i s t r y
c o n c e r n e d  the  no n - B ra h m an  movem ent .  N a i d u  a n d
P . S .  D e sh m uk h  w e r e  b o t h  members  o f  the  no n- Brahm an  p a r t y .
B u t  b e t w e e n  1 9 3 2 - 3  d i f f e r e n c e s  d e v e l o p e d  b e t w e e n  them o n
t h e  g r o u n d s  t h a t  D e s h m u k h  w as  g i v i n g  p r e f e r e n c e  to
members  o f  t h e  M a r a t h a  c om m u nit y  i n  m a k i n g  g o ve rnm e nt
a p p o i n t m e n t s  a n d  n o m i n a t i o n s ;  a n d  t h a t  h e  w as  l e a d i n g
a no n- Bra hm an  a g r i c u l t u r i s t s '  a s s o c i a t i o n ,  the  S h e t k a r i
S a n g h , w h i c h  N a i d u  c o n s i d e r e d  ' h o s t i l e  to the  i n t e r e s t s
2
o f  the  no n- Brahm an  p a r t y ' . T h e  R e s p o n s i v i s t s  o f  B e r a r  
t o o k  i m m e d i a t e  a d v a n t a g e  o f  t h i s  r i f t  to a l l y  w i t h  N a i d u  
a n d  d e f e a t  the  m i n i s t r y .  O n  2 3  A p r i l  1 9 3 3  th e  H i t a v a d a  
r e p o r t e d  t h a t
(R a m ra o )  D e sh m u k h  ( w a s ) . . . n e g o t i a t i n g  a s o r t  o f  
a l l i a n c e  b e t w e e n  the  N a t i o n a l i s t  a n d  D e m o c r a t i c  
p a r t i e s .  C o n s u l t a t i o n s  a r e  s a i d  to be  g o i n g  o n
1
F o r  e v i d e n c e  o f  N a i d u ' s  o p p o s i t i o n  to the  m i n i s t r y ,  
s e e  C P L C ,  vo 1.  2 , 3 1  A u g u s t  1 9 3 1 »  P * 3 0 3 »  i b i d . ,  p . 3 1 6 $  
i b i d . ,  1 S e p t e m b e r  1 9 3 1 »  P * 3 8 7 ?  i b i d . ,  v o 1 . 3 >  1 M a r c h
1 9 3 2 ,  p p . 6 7 3 - 4 .
2
I b i d . ,  v o l . 3» 2 0  J a n u a r y  1 9 3 2 »  p p . l 4 6 - 7 |  H i t a v a d a ,
2 1  J a n u a r y  .1932,  p .  Is 9 M a r c h  1 9 3 3 »  P * 7 »  18  May  19 3 3 »  
p . 5? 15  J u n e  1 9 3 3 »  P-5? 2 2  J u n e  1 9 3 3 »  P-8 .
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b e t w e e n  h im  an d  the  l e a d e r  o f  the  D e m o c r a t i c  
p a r t y . . . . ( T h i s  i s )  v e r y  i n t r i g u i n g . 1
T h e  ru m o u r e d  a l l i a n c e  d i d  m a t e r i a l i s e ,  b u t  b y  t h a t  t ime
P . S .  Deshmukh had  r e s i g n e d  from the m i n i s t r y  a n d ,w i t h  no
v i s i b l e  o p p o s i t i o n  from R a g h a v e n d r a  R ao ,  se c ure d  the
support  o f  the P e o p l e ' s  'party',  the M u s l im s ,  the
D e p r e s s e d  members,  the H i n d i  members and some non-
2
Bra hm ans  f o r  a n o t h e r  D e m o c r a t i c  m i n i s t r y .  T h e  m i n i s t e r s  
p r o p o s e d  b y  D e s h m u k h ,  a n d  p r e s u m a b l y  a c c e p t e d  b y  R a o ,  
w e r e  Muhammad Y u s u f  S h a r e e f ,  a M u s l i m  b a r r i s t e r  from  
N a g p u r ; a n d  V . B .  G h a o b a l ,  a y o u n g  no n- Bra hm an  l a w y e r  
f r o m  A m r a v a t i ,  whom the  H i t a v a d a  d e s c r i b e d  a s  ’ more or  
l e s s  ( D e s h m u k h ' s ) . . .  a l t e r  e g o ' .  T h e  G o v e r n o r ,  a w a re  
p e r h a p s  t h a t  the  c o m b i n a t i o n s  a n d  p e r s o n a l i t i e s  b e h i n d  
t he  p r o p o s e d  m i n i s t e r s  w o u l d  e n s u r e  some c o n t i n u a t i o n  
i n  the  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  a c c e p t e d  the  n o m in e e s  a n d  o n
3
5 A u g u s t  1 9 3 3  h e  i n s t a l l e d  the  new m i n i s t e r s  i n  o f f i c e .
V
T h e  f i r s t  t h r e e  y e a r s  o f  R a o ' s  Home M e m b e r s h ip  
c o i n c i d e d  w i t h  a f u r t h e r  d e c l i n e  i n  the  p o l i t i c a l  
f o r t u n e s  o f  t h e  R e s p o n s i v i s t  p a r t y  a n d  the  M a r a t h i  r e g i o n .  
T h i s  d e c l i n e  was  e v i d e n t  i n  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  the  l e g i s l a t i o n
1
H i t a v a d a  9 2 3  A p r i l  1 9 3 3 »  p . l .
2
I b i d . ,  25  May  1933? p . l ;  30 J u l y  1933? P*7~8$ 3 A u g u s t  
1933? P P • 5 ? 6 an d  8 j 6 A u g u s t  1933? p . 8 .
3
I b i d . , 6 A ug ust  1933? P P •7? 8 and 9*
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s p o n s o r e d  by  the  g o v e r n m e n t ;  i n  the  p o l i c y  i t  f o l l o w e d  
i n  m a k in g  a p p o i n t m e n t s  to the  g o v e r n m e n t  s e r v i c e ;  i n  the  
r u m o u r e d  f a i l u r e  o f  the  g o v e r n m e n t  to d e f e n d  the  i n t e r e s t s  
o f  B e r a r ;  a n d  i n  the  f a i l u r e  o f  M o o n j e  and  the  l e a d e r s  
o f  B e r a r  to s e c u r  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  o b j e c t i v e s  at  the  
d i s c u s s i o n s  o n  t h e  new c o n s t i t u t i o n  f o r  I n d i a  h e l d  i n  
L o n d o n  b e t w e e n  1 9 30- 3*
T h e  R e s p o n s i v i s t s  s u f f e r e d  m a jo r  r e v e r s e s  i n  the
l e g i s l a t i o n  s p o n s o r e d  b y  t h e  g o v e rn m e n t  a n d  i t s  p o l i c y
o n  a p p o i n t m e n t s  to the  g o v e r n m e n t  s e r v i c e  b e t w e e n
19 3 0 - 3 *  T h e  l e g i s l a t i o n  a n d  the  p o l i c y  o n  a p p o i n t m e n t s
b o t h  r e p r e s e n t e d  a n  a t t e m p t  b y  D e s h m u k h  a n d  R a o , who
w e r e  s u p p o r t e r s  o f  the  no n- B ra hm an  movem ent ,  to p u t  the
p r i n c i p l e s  o f  t h a t  movement i n t o  p r a c t i c e .  A s  f o r
l e g i s l a t i o n ,  the  R e s p o n s i v i s t  r e v e r s e  was  most c l e a r l y
e v i d e n t  i n  the  H i n d u  R e l i g i o u s  a n d  C h a r i t a b l e  T r u s t s  A c t
w h i c h  p r o v i d e d  f o r  th e  ' s a t i s f a c t o r y  m a n a g e m e n t '  o f
r e l i g i o u s  a n d  c h a r i t a b l e  e n d o w m e n t s .  I n  so d o i n g  the
A c t  e n c r o a c h e d  u p o n  the  p r i v a t e  managem ent  o f  s u c h
a s s e t s ,  w h i c h  i n  many c a s e s  w e r e  i n  the  h a n d s  o f
B ra h m an s  fro m  whom the  R e s p o n s i v i s t  p a r t y  drew  a g r e a t
d e a l  o f  s u p p o r t . 1 So f a r  a s  a p p o i n t m e n t s  w e r e  c o n c e r n e d ,
o n  2 9  J a n u a r y  1 9 3 2 the  g o v e r n m e n t  i s s u e d  a C i r c u l a r  i n
w h i c h  i t  d e c l a r e d  t h a t  i t s  p o l i c y  i n  m a k i n g  a p p o i n t m e n t s
w as  to ' s e c u r e  a f a i r  a n d  a d e q u a t e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  the
2
v a r i o u s  c o m m u n i t i e s ' .  T h i s  s t a t e m e n t  e n a b l e d  the  
g o v e r n m e n t  to d i s c r i m i n a t e  a g a i n s t  the  B r a h m a n  c om m unity
1
S e e  C P L C , v o 1 . 6 ,  2 4  J u l y  1 9 3 3 ,  P P * 19-37*
2
I b i d . ,  v o l .3 >  19 March  1 9 3 8 ,  A p p e n d ix  A ,  p p . 578-9*
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and to fa v o u r  the non-Brahman community when m aking
appointm ents  - a p o l i c y  that the R e s p o n s iv e  C o o p e r a t io n
p a r t y  f i r m l y  o p p o s e d . 1 One o b s e r v e r  d e s c r ib e d  the
p r a c t i c a l  r e s u l t s  o f  the C ir c u la r s
I t  is  w e l l  known to everyb od y  how Mr K o l t e ,  a 
w e l l  q u a l i f i e d  and l o c a l  non Brahm in  c a n d i d a t e ,  
was p r e f e r r e d  to a s l i g h t l y  b e t t e r  q u a l i f i e d  
Mr Pendse  a Brahm in  f o r  the l e c t u r e s h ip  i n  
M a r a t h i .  I t  i s  a lso  w e l l  known that  he ( i . e .
PS Deshmukh) i s  s t r i v i n g  to g iv e  adeq uate  
number o f  seats  to the non Brahm ins i n  schools  
and c o l l e g e s ,  a p r o p o s a l  w h ich  i t  i s  rumoured 
has  made many Brahmans a n g r y . 2
For  the same r e a s o n ,  the R e s p o n s i v i s t s  could  not have  
welcomed the C ir c u l a r  i s s u e d  by  the government on
15 December 1 9 3 2 9 f o r b i d d i n g  government s e rv an ts  from 
t a k in g  p art  i n  the a c t i v i t i e s  o f  the R a s h t r i y a  Swayam 
S a n g h . For  at the time the Sangh  was a p re d o m in a n tly  
Brahman o r g a n i s a t i o n  whose id e o l o g y  c l o s e l y  resem bled
3
that  o f  the R e s p o n s i v i s t  p a r t y .
The R e s p o n s i v i s t s  a lso  c la im e d  that the m in is t r y  
w h ic h  h e l d  o f f i c e  u n d e r  the p atr o n a g e  o f  Rao had  f a i l e d  
to p r o te c t  the i n t e r e s t s  o f  B e r a r .  As p r o o f  o f  t h is  
c la im ,  the R e s p o n s i v i s t s  com pla in ed  that the government 
had  r e fu s e d  to suspend  the r e v i s e d  land  s e tt le m e n t ,
1
See H i t a v a d a , 2 7  November 1 9 3 2 9 P • 1 ? 2 9  June  1 9 3 3 ?  P * 8 ; 
C P L C , v o l . 2 ,  3 1  A u g u s t  I 9 3 I ? p p . 3 1 5 - 3 7  9 p a r t i c u l a r l y  the 
sp e e ch  by B .G .  K h a p a rd e ,  p p . 3 23 ” 4 ; MPS , Ap p ointm ents  
D ep artm e n t ,  1 5 - 4 8 ,  1 9 3 3 »  N otes  R e g a r d in g  the C o n s t it u t io n  
o f  S e l e c t i o n  Commi1 1 e e s .
2
H i  tavada 9 6 J u l y  1933» P*7*
3
CPLC,  v o l . 5» 23  Ja n u a r y  1933»  A p p e n d ix  D ,  p . 2 36 .
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d e s p i t e  i n s i s t e n t  dem ands  f r o m  the  a g r i c u l t u r i s t s  o f  
B e r a r . 1 T h e  R e s p o n s i v i s t s  a l s o  a t t a c k e d  the  go v e r n m e n t  
f o r  not  g r a n t i n g  r e m i s s i o n s  o r  s u s p e n s i o n s  o f  r e v e n u e  
to h e l p  f a r m e r s  i n . B e r a r  to c u s h i o n  the  e f f e c t s  o f
2
d e p r e s s e d  m arke t  c o n d i t i o n s  a n d  a r u n  o f  p o o r  s e a s o n s .
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  the  R e s p o n s i v i s t s  p o i n t e d  out  t h a t  s i n c e
t h e i r  e x c l u s i o n  f r o m  the  g o v e r n m e n t ,  the  S im  r a t i o  h ad
3
f a l l e n  to i t s  l o w e s t  l e v e l .  F o r  t h i s  d e v e l o p m e n t  t h e y
4
b l a m e d  P . S .  D e s h m u k h ,  t h e  ’ so c a l l e d  B e r a r  m i n i s t e r ' .  
D u r i n g  the  d i s c u s s i o n  o n  t h e  b u d g e t  o n  28  F e b r u a r y  1 9 3 3 ,  
a no n - B ra h m an  f r o m  B e r a r  r e v e a l e d  t h a t
S i n c e  t h e  p r e s e n t  m i n i s t e r  f ro m  B e r a r  h a s  b e e n  
i n s t a l l e d  o n  the  m i n i s t e r i a l  g a d i , we a r e  w a t c h i n g  
how f a r  h e  h a s  p r o v e n  h i m s e l f  to be  a f a i l u r e .  H e  
c o u l d  not  r a i s e  the  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  the  S i m  f o r m u l a  
so f a r .  T h e  p e r c e n t a g e  h a s  s t i l l  go ne  d o w n  t h i s  
y e a r . . . . ( i  d e s i r e )  to b r i n g  to the  n o t i c e  t h a t  
the  g o v e r n m e n t  s h o u l d  g u a r d  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  the  
B e r a r  p e o p l e  who a r e  a h o p e l e s s  m i n o r i t y  i n  t h i s  
h o u s e . ^
1
H i t a v a d a , 2 6  J a n u a r y  1 9 3 0 ,  p . l ;  C P L C , v o l . 2 ,  1 S e p t e m b e r
1 9 3 1 ,  p p . 3 9 0 - 7 ;  v o l . 7 ,  19  J a n u a r y  1 9 3 4 ,  p p . 58-8 7 . 
2
I b i d . ,  v o 1 . 3 ,  2 9  F e b r u a r y  1 9 3 2 ,  p p . 568- 9*
3
I b i d . ,  v o l . 7 ,  2 6  F e b r u a r y  1 9 3 4 ,  p . 4 51 *  I n  1 9 3 0 - 1 ,  the  
p r o p o r t i o n s  o f  d i v i s i b l e  r e v e n u e  s h a r e d  b y  the  C e n t r a l  
P r o v i n c e s  a n d  B e r a r  r e s p e c t i v e l y  w e r e  66  p e r  c e n t  an d  
3 4  p e r  c e n t ;  i n  1931-2 , 70 p e r  c e n t  a n d  30 p e r  c e n t ;  i n  
1932-3 , 69 p e r  c e n t  a n d  31 p e r  c e n t ;  i n  1 9 3 3 - 4 ,  68  p e r  
c e n t  a n d  32 p e r  c e n t ;  a n d  i n  1 9 3 4 - 5 ,  68.5  p e r  c e n t  a n d  
3 1 .5  p e r  c e n t .
4
I b i d . ,  v o l . l ,  2 6  F e b r u a r y  1 9 3 1 ,  P P * 322- 3*
5
I b i d . ,  v o l . 5 ,  28  F e b r u a r y  1 9 3 3 ,  P * 6 6 0 .  T h e  member was  
U . S .  P a t i l ,  a s u p p o r t e r  o f  the  R e s p o n s i v i s t  p a r t y .
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T h e  f a i l u r e  o f  the  g o v e r n m e n t  to s p o n s o r  the  demand 
f o r  a s e p a r a t e  p r o v i n c e  o f  B e r a r  d u r i n g  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n s  
o n  the  p r o p o s e d  c o n s t i t u t i o n  f o r  I n d i a  came as  a m a jo r  
r e v e r s e  to the  R e s p o n s i v i s t  p a r t y  i n  B e r a r .  T h e s e  
d i s c u s s i o n s  d e v o l v e d  a r o u n d  t h r e e  R o u n d  T a b l e  C o n f e r e n c e s  
h e l d  i n  L o n d o n  b e t w e e n  1930-3 • A t  t h e s e  C o n f e r e n c e s ,  
I n d i a n  p o l i t i c i a n s  p r e s e n t e d  t h e i r  v i e w s  o n  the  s u b j e c t  
o f  a c o n s t i t u t i o n  f o r  I n d i a .  T h e  B r i t i s h  g o v e rn m e n t  
c o n t i n u e d  i t s  d e l i b e r a t i o n s  o n  the  s u b j e c t  f o r  a f u r t h e r  
two y e a r s  a f t e r  1 9 3 3» a n d  t h e n  e m b o d i e d  i t s  c o n c l u s i o n s  
i n  the  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  I n d i a  A c t  o f  1935« B e t w e e n  1930-3 
t h e  R e s p o n s i v i s t s  o f  B e r a r  t r i e d  to p e r s u a d e  the  
p r o v i n c i a l  g o v e rn m e n t  to s u p p o r t  the  f o r m a t i o n  o f  a 
s e p a r a t e  B e r a r  u n d e r  t h e  new c o n s t i t u t i o n . 1 T h e  
R e s p o n s i v i s t s 1 demand  f o r  a s e p a r a t e  B e r a r  r e s t e d  o n  the  
c l a i m  t h a t  i n  a u n i t e d  p r o v i n c e  c o m p r i s i n g  th e  C e n t r a l  
P r o v i n c e s  a n d  B e r a r  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  B e r a r  w o u l d  s u f f e r .  
A s  one  R e s p o n s i v i s t  c o m p l a i n e d
I  am a f r a i d  t h e r e  w i l l  be  no d e v i c e  u n d e r  the  
new c o n s t i t u t i o n  s u c h  as  th e  S i m  f o r m u l a . . .  
w h e r e b y  s u r p l u s  B e r a r  r e v e n u e  c a n  be  s p e n t  o n  
B e r a r . . . . I n  t h e  new c o n s t i t u t i o n . . . t h e r e  w i l l  
b e  no g o v e r n m e n t  b l o c k .  T h e r e  w i l l  be  no 
n o m i n a t i o n s .  We know  t h a t  i n  the  p a s t ,  
w h e n e v e r  the  g o v e r n m e n t  w a n t e d  to h e l p  the  
B e r a r  members w i t h  some p a r t i c u l a r  de m and ,  
g o v e r n m e n t  h a d  to u t i l i s e  i t s  o wn  s t r e n g t h  
to s u p p o r t  the  B e r a r  c a s e . . . . U n d e r  t h e  new 
c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  w h a t e v e r  the  w e i g h t a g e  t h e  B e r a r  
members  w i l l  h a v e , . . . t h e y  w i l l  n e v e r  be  a b l e  
to c a r r y  a n y  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e i r s  w i t h  a v ie w
1
S e e  f o r  i n s t a n c e  H i t a v a d a , 8 D e c e m b e r  1 9 3 2 ,  p . 5 ;
2 6  J a n u a r y  1 9 3 3 »  P * l j  1 J u n e  1 9 3 3 »  P * 8 ;  C P L C ,  v o l . 5» 
2 3 - 4  J a n u a r y  1 9 3 3 »  P P * 2 5 9 - 9 9 *
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A s  t h e i r  f i r s t  move to e f f e c t  the  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  
B e r a r  fro m  the  C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s ,  the  R e s p o n s i v i s t s  t r i e d  
to p e r s u a d e  the  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  I n d i a  to a c c r e d i t  them to 
the  S e c o n d  R o u n d  T a b l e  C o n f e r e n c e  i n  1 9 3 1 *  Tam b e  h a d  
a t t e n d e d  the  f i r s t  s u c h  C o n f e r e n c e  i n  1 9 3 0 ,  bu t  
a p p a r e n t l y  the  q u e s t i o n  o f  B e r a r  d i d  not  come up  f o r  
d i s c u s s i o n .  T h e  R e s p o n s i v i s t s  w e r e  thus  u n w i l l i n g  to 
l e t  the  n e x t  C o n f e r e n c e  p a s s  w i t h o u t  p r e s e n t i n g  t h e i r  
c a s e .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  o n  6 M ay  1 9 3 1  Ramrao  D esh m ukh  
p r e s e n t e d  B e r a r ' s  c a s e  f o r  s e p a r a t i o n  fro m  the  C e n t r a l  
P r o v i n c e s  to the  V i c e r o y ,  and  r e q u e s t e d  h im  to g i v e  B e r a r  
a s e a t  at  the  n e x t  R o u n d  T a b l e  C o n f e r e n c e .  T h e  g r o u n d s  
o n  w h i c h  De sh m uk h  made h i s  r e q u e s t  w e r e  t h a t
B e r a r ,  b e i n g  a p e c u l i a r  u n i t  w i t h  a p o s i t i o n  
d i s s i m i l a r  to a n y  o t h e r  i n  I n d i a ,  r e q u i r e s  a 
s p e c i a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o n  the  R o u n d  T a b l e  
C o n f e r e n c e  i f  j u s t i c e  i s  to b e  done  to h e r  
c a s e . . . . ( i )  r e q u e s t  the  name o f  M . S .  A n e y  to 
r e p r e s e n t  B e r a r . ^
A f t e r  D e sh m ukh  h a d  made h i s  r e q u e s t ,  the  R e s p o n s i v i s t s  
f o r m e d  a c o m m itt ee  f r o m  a l l  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  i n  B e r a r ,  
k n o w n  as  the  A l l  P a r t i e s  C o m m i t t e e ,  to n e g o t i a t e  w i t h  the
to get the revenues  o f  B e r a r  spent i n  B e r a r .
1
CPLC , p . 2 9 7 *  T h e  s p e a k e r  was  R . A .  K a n i t k a r .
2
N A I , R e f o r m s  D e p a r t m e n t  ( c i t e d  h e r e a f t e r  as  R e f o r m s ) ,  
3 5 / 3 1 - R  ? KW I I I , R e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  V a r i o u s  I n t e r e s t s  o n  
t h e  R o u n d  T a b l e  C o n f e r e n c e .  L e t t e r  fro m  R . M .  Desh m ukh  to 
the  V i c e r o y ;  H i t a v a d a , 7 M ay  1 9 3 1 ?  p . 1 0 .  L o r d  I r w i n  
c o m p l e t e d  h i s  term  as  V i c e r o y  i n  193 1 ?  a n d  L o r d  W i l l i n g d o n  
s u c c e e d e d  h im  i n  the  same y e a r .
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B r i t i s h  g o ve rnm e nt  o n  the  f u t u r e  o f  B e r a r .  T h e  Com m ittee  
i m m e d i a t e l y  s e t  to w o r k .  By  A u g u s t  1 9 3 1  t h e y  h a d  
p r o d u c e d  a M e m o r i a l  s e t t i n g  out  the  c a s e  f o r  the
s e p a r a t i o n  o f  B e r a r ,  a n d  a p p o i n t e d  R . A .  K a n i t k a r  o f
. . 2 
B u l d h a n a  to t ak e  i t  to L o n d o n  f o r  u s e  as  o c c a s i o n  o f f e r s .
T h e  R o u n d  T a b l e  C o n f e r e n c e  made o n l y  a m a r g i n a l  u s e  
o f  the  R e s p o n s i v i s t s 1 M e m o r i a l  o n  the  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  B e r a r .  
F o r  t h i s  the  p r o v i n c i a l  go v e r n m e n t  was  i n  g r e a t  m e a s u r e  
r e s p o n s i b l e .  O n  the  q u e s t i o n  o f  a new c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  the  
g o v e r n m e n t  t o o k  s i d e s  w i t h  the  C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s  ( w h i c h  
l a r g e l y  c o m p r i s e d  the  H i n d i  r e g i o n )  a n d  u r g e d  t h a t  i f  
B e r a r  b ec am e  a s e p a r a t e  p r o v i n c e ,  the  C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s
3
w o u l d  not b e  a b l e  to f u n c t i o n  a s  a v i a b l e  e c o n o m ic  u n i t .  
M o r e o v e r ,  i n  the  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  w h i c h  the  p r o v i n c i a l  
g o v e r n m e n t  s e n t  to t h e  G o ve r n m e n t  o f  I n d i a  o n  the  i s s u e ,  
i t  b e l i t t l e d  the  R e s p o n s i v i s t s  a n d  t h e i r  i d e a  o f  a
1
B e r a r ' s  p l a c e  i n  the  I n d i a n  F e d e r a t i o n ,  o p .  c i t . ,  p . 2 1 .  
T h e  members o f  the  A l l - P a r t i e s  C o m m it te e  w e r e  M . S .  A n e y ,  
S i r  M . V .  J o s h i ,  R . M .  D e s h m u k h ,  Y . M .  K a l e ,  ¥ .  J o s h i ,
B .  B i y a n i ,  S . V .  G o k h a l e ,  P . B .  G o l e ,  Mrs  D .  J o s h i ,
K . V .  B r a h m a ,  R . V .  M a h a j a n i , B . G .  K h a p a r d e , R . A .  K a n i t k a r ,  
V . B .  C h a o b a l ,  K . S .  S a t a r k a r ,  A .  L a t i f ,  T . L .  D i g h e ,
D r  N . S .  P a r a n j p e ,  S . M .  R a h m a n  a n d  P . C .  J o g l e k a r .
2
I b i d . ,  p . 2 0 ;  H i t a v a d a , 6 A u g u s t  1 9 3 1 »  P*lj N A I , R e f o r m s ,  
5 1 / 3 / 3 3 - R , N o n - o f f i c i a l  E v i d e n c e  B e f o r e  t h e  J o i n t  S e l e c t  
C o m m i t t e e .  L e t t e r  f r o m  G . P .  B u r t o n ,  C h i e f  S e c r e t a r y  to 
t h e  G o ve r n m e n t  o f  the  C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s ,  2 S e p t e m b e r  1 9 3 1 *
3
N A I ,  R e f o r m s ,  1 7 5 / 1 / 3 2 ,  Q u e s t i o n  o f  the  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
o f  the  B e r a r s  u n d e r  t h e  New C o n s t i t u t i o n .  L e t t e r  from  
C h i e f  S e c r e t a r y  to the  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  the  C e n t r a l  
P r o v i n c e s ,  17 F e b r u a r y  1 9 3 2 .
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s e p a r a t e  B e r a r .  I t  u r g e d  the  G o ve r n m e n t  o f  I n d i a  not to 
t a k e  a n y  s e r i o u s  n o t i c e  o f  the  v i e w s  o f  Ramrao  D e sh m uk h ,  
a n d  a t t a c k e d  the  M e m o r i a l  p r e p a r e d  b y  the  A l l  P a r t i e s  
C o m m i t t e e ,  d e c l a r i n g  th a t
i t  p u r p o r t s  to be  s i g n e d  b y  c e r t a i n  members o f  
the  l e g i s l a t i v e  c o u n c i l  who do not b e l o n g  to the 
N a t i o n a l i s t . . .  p a r t y , a n d  who a r e  k n o w n  to b e  out  
o f  sy m p a th y  w i t h  s e p a r a t i o n .  . . . ( T h u s ) d o u b t  
e x i s t s  a b o u t  the  b o n a f i d e s  o f  the  m e m o r i a l i s t s ,  
an d  G o v e r n o r  i n  c o u n c i l  h o p e s  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  
w i l l  be  w a r n e d  t h a t  i t  w i l l  not  be  s a f e  to r e c e i v e  
the  m e m o r ia l  u n t i l  i t  h a s  b e e n  a u t h e n t i c a t e d  
t h r o u g h  the  l o c a l  g o v e r n m e n t .  I t  i s  a l s o  d e s i r a b l e  
t h a t  the  c r e d e n t i a l s  o f  R . A .  K a n i t k a r . . .  s h o u l d  bep
e x a m i n e d  c a r e f u l l y  b e f o r e  h e  i s  h e a r d .
T h u s ,  w h e n  the  R e s p o n s i v i s t s  o f  B e r a r  f o r w a r d e d  t h e i r  
M e m o r i a l  to the  G o v e rn m e n t  o f  I n d i a ,  the  l a t t e r
3
s u p p r e s s e d  the  d o c u m e n t .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  a l t h o u g h  Tambe  
was  a n  a c c r e d i t e d  member o f  t h e  C o n f e r e n c e ,  the  B r i t i s h  
o f f i c i a l s  i n  c h a r g e  o f  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n s  d i d  not r a i s e  the  
i s s u e  o f  B e r a r  at  a l l .  A n d  t h e r e  the  m a t t e r  w o u l d  h a v e  
r e s t e d ,  h a d  not  the  d e l e g a t i o n  fro m  H y d e r a b a d  r a i s e d  i t  
d u r i n g  the  c l o s i n g  h o u r s  o f  the  C o n f e r e n c e .  W h e n  t h e y  
d i d  s o ,  D r  M o o n j e ,  who w as  r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  H i n d u  
M a h a s a b h a  at  the  C o n f e r e n c e ,  u r g e d  Tambe  to make a 
s t a t e m e n t  i n  r e p l y s
1
N A I , R e f o r m s  1 1 8 / 3 0 ,  N o t e s  b y  K . S .  F i t z e  o n  B e r a r ,  p . 19 
i b i d . ,  5 l / 3 / 3 3 >  N o n - o f f i c i a l  E v i d e n c e  B e f o r e  the  J o i n t  
S e l e c t  C o m m i t t e e ,  L e t t e r  f r o m  G . P .  B u r t o n ,  C h i e f  
S e c r e t a r y  to the  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  the  C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s ,
2 S e p t e m b e r  1 9 3 1 *
2
I b i d .
3
H i t a v a d a , 6 December 1931»  P«7*
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X t o l d  Mr Tambe  to make a r e q u e s t  to the  P r i m e  
M i n i s t e r  to make h im  a c o n c e s s i o n  o f  a f e w  
m i n u t e s  to s p e a k  i n  r e p l y . . . o n l y  so f a r  as  the  
q u e s t i o n  o f  B e r a r  i s  c o n c e r n e d .  He  got  the  
c o n c e s s i o n  a n d  t h e n  I  t o l d  h im  to go home at  
o n c e  a n d  w r i t e  o ut  a s m a l l  n o t e  i n  c o n s u l t a t i o n  
w i t h  K a n i t k a r  a n d  come b a c k  an d  r e a d  i t  o u t .
’ Q u i c k ; 1 I  s a i d . . . . ( O n  h i s  r e t u r n )  Mr  Tam be  made 
a s h o r t  s p e e c h  a n d  r e a d  o ut  the  s t a t e m e n t .  T h a t
-I
was  a l l .
T h e  s e c o n d  R o u n d  T a b l e  C o n f e r e n c e  sh ow e d  t h a t ,  so
f a r  as  the  B r i t i s h  a u t h o r i t i e s  w e r e  c o n c e r n e d ,  the
s e p a r a t i o n  o f  B e r a r  w as  not a r e a l  i s s u e .  T h i s  was
c o n f i r m e d  b e t w e e n  1 9 3 2 ” 3 as  the  B r i t i s h  a n d  I n d i a n
g o v e r n m e n t s  t u r n e d  t h e i r  a t t e n t i o n  to p e r s u a d i n g  the
N i z a m  o f  H y d e r a b a d  to a l l o w  B e r a r  to j o i n  a f e d e r a t i o n  o f
I n d i a n  s t a t e s  a n d  p r o v i n c e s  a s  a n  i n t e g r a l  p a r t  o f  the
2
C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s .  By  the  e n d  o f  1 9 3 3  t h e s e  e f f o r t s  
h a d  a c h i e v e d  c o m p l e t e  s u c c e s s .  O n  29  N o ve m b e r  1 9 3 3  the  
V i c e r o y  a d m i n i s t e r e d  a f i n a l  r e b u f f  to the  R e s p o n s i v i s t s  
w h e n  he  a n n o u n c e d  at  a b a n q u e t  i n  H y d e r a b a d  t h a t  the  
N i z a m  was
p r e p a r e d  to a c c e d e  to the  f e d e r a t i o n  i n  r e s p e c t  
o f  h i s  t e r r i t o r i e s  k n o w n  as  the  B e r a r s  and  
d e s i r e s  t h a t  t h e s e  t e r r i t o r i e s  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  
the  C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s  s h o u l d  be  a d m i n i s t e r e d  
t o g e t h e r  as  i f  t h e y  w e r e  one  p r o v i n c e  to be  
k n o w n  b y  the  name o f  th e  C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s  an d  
t h e  B e r a r s . 3
1
N L I , Moonje  MS,  D i a r y  5» 1 4  March 1 9 3 3 *
2
See  N A I , Refo rm s ,  1 7 5 / 1 / 3 2 , Q u es t i  on  o f  the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
o f  the Berars  under  the New C o n s t i t u t i o n ;  i b i d . ,  5 1 / 3 / 3 3 “
R a n d  K W ,  N o n - o f f i c i a l  E v i d e n c e  b e f o r e  t h e  J o i n t  S e l e c t  
C o m m i t t e e ;  i b i d . ,  1 3 3 / 3 3 “  R a n d  KW ,  Q u e s t i o n  o f  the  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  the  B e r a r s  u n d e r  the  New C o n s t i t u t i o n .
3
I b i d . ,  p . 2 2 .
2 3 1
T h e  R e s p o n s i v i s t s  o f  the  M a r a t h i  r e g i o n  s u f f e r e d  a 
f u r t h e r  d e f e a t  at  the  R o u n d  T a b l e  C o n f e r e n c e s  h e l d  i n  
L o n d o n  b e t w e e n  1930- 3*  T h i s  d e f e a t  c o n c e r n e d  the  
r e j e c t i o n  b y  the  B r i t i s h  g o v e r n m e n t  o f  the  c l a i m s  w h i c h  
M o o n j e  a d v a n c e d  at  the  C o n f e r e n c e s  o n  b e h a l f  o f  the  H i n d u  
M a h a s a b h a .  M o o n j e ' s  o v e r r i d i n g  c o n c e r n  i n  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  
i n  the  d i s c u s s i o n s  was  t h a t  the  B r i t i s h  go v e r n m e n t  s h o u l d  
not  g r a n t  the  M u s l i m s  s t a t u t o r y  m a j o r i t i e s  i n  B e n g a l ,  
the  P u n j a b ,  a n d  o t h e r  a r e a s  i n  n o r t h - w e s t e r n  I n d i a ,  as  
h e  f e a r e d  t h a t  s u c h  p r o v i s i o n s  w o u l d  s e r i o u s l y  e n d a n g e r  
the  u n i t y  o f  I n d i a . 1 A s  h e  w r o t e  i n  A u g u s t  1 9 3 0 :
I  h a v e  a l r e a d y  l o n g  ago  t h o u g h t  o v e r  the  m a t t e r  
a n d  made up  my m i n d . . . . 1  c a n n o t  l e t . . . H i n d u s  o f  
the  C o n g r e s s  s c h o o l  o f  t h o u g h t ,  o r . . . H i n d u s . . .  
l i k e  P a n d i t  M a l a v i a y a . . . o r  the  L i b e r a l s  g o . . . to 
b a r t e r  aw ay  the  w h o l e  f u t u r e  d e s t i n y  o f  I n d i a  
a n d  the  g r e a t  H i n d u  c o m m u n i t y . . . a t  the  c o s t  o f  
t r u e  n a t i o n a l i s m  a n d  the  e v o l u t i o n  o f  I n d i a  as  
a s o l i d  u n i t e d  n a t i o n  w i t h  s e v e r a l  s e c t s  a n d  
c o m m u n i t i e s  w e l d e d  i n t o  o n e .  I  must h a v e  my 
p r o t e s t  r e c o r d e d  a n d  c a r r y  the  m e s s a g e  o f  the  
m i s s i o n  o f  the  M a h a s a b h a  r i g h t  up  to the  h e a r t  
o f  the  B r i t i s h  E m p i r e . ^
M o o n j e  i n d e e d  c a r r i e d  the  m e s s a g e  o f  the  M a h a s a b h a  to 
L o n d o n ,  b u t  o t h e r w i s e  he  a c h i e v e d  p r a c t i c a l l y  no r e s u l t .  
T h e  B r i t i s h  g o v e r n m e n t  a g r e e d  to c r e a t e  s e p a r a t e  
e l e c t o r a t e s  f o r  H i n d u s  a n d  M u s l i m s ,  a n d  g r a n t e d  the  l a t t e r  
s t a t u t o r y  m a j o r i t i e s  i n  B e n g a l ,  the  P u n j a b  a n d  o t h e r
1
I n d i a n  A n n u a l  R e g i s t e r , n o . 2 ,  1 9 3 0 ,  p . 3 2 4  ( b - d ) ; N L I , 
M o o n j e  M S ,  L e t t e r  P a d  61 ,  B . S .  M o o n j e  to M . R .  J a y a k e r ,
4 S e p t e m b e r  1 9 3 0 ;  L e t t e r  P a d  6 5 ,  B . S .  M o o n j e  to
M r  V i j a y a r a g h a v a c h a r i a r , 18  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 3 0 ,  B . S .  M o o n j e
to G e n e r a l  S e c r e t a r y ,  H i n d u  M a h a s a b h a ,  2 O c t o b e r  1 9 3 0 .
2
I b i d . ,  D i a r y  2 ,  29  A u g u s t  1 9 3 0 .
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newly  cre ate d  p r o v i n c e s  i n  n o r th e r n  I n d i a .
V I
W h i l e  M a r a t h i  p o l i t i c i a n s  a n d  the  M a r a t h i  r e g i o n  
d e c l i n e d  i n  i m p o r t a n c e ,  b e t w e e n  193^-7  the  p o l i t i c a l  
f o r t u n e s  o f  Rao  a n d  the  H i n d i  r e g i o n  r o s e  to new h e i g h t s .  
D u r i n g  t h i s  p e r i o d ,  Rao  p r o c e e d e d  f r o m  t r i u m p h  to 
t r i u m p h ,  ’ l i k e  a p e r p e t u a l  f i l m  r e e l ’ , as  one o b s e r v e r  
r e m a r k e d .  R a o ’ s f i r s t  t r i u m p h  o c c u r r e d  i n  1 9 3 ^ ,  w h e n  
h e  f o r e s t a l l e d  a n  a t t e m p t  b y  the  R e s p o n s i v i s t s  to re m o ve  
S h a r e e f  an d  C h a o b a l  f r o m  the  m i n i s t r y .  H e  d i d  so b y  
r e m o v i n g  them h i m s e l f ,  a n d  c a l l i n g  i n t o  b e i n g  a m i n i s t r y  
o f  h i s  own  c h o o s i n g  w h i c h  a g r e e d  to w o r k  u n d e r  h i s  
l e a d e r s h i p .  T h e  m i n i s t r y  o f  S h a r e e f  a n d  C h a o b a l  h a d  many 
w e a k n e s s e s .  A m ong  t h e s e  w e r e  the  d i v i s i o n s  b e t w e e n  i t s
3
s u p p o r t e r s .  T h e  O p p o s i t i o n ,  t o o ,  w as  a f o r c e  to be  
r e c k o n e d  w i t h .  I n  1 9 3 ^  N a i d u  c o n t i n u e d  h i s  a l l i a n c e  w i t h  
t h e  R e s p o n s i v i s t s ,  w h i l e  the  l a t t e r  g r i m l y  d e t e r m i n e d  to
4
r e t r i e v e  l o s t  g r o u n d  and  r e i n s t a t e  t h e m s e l v e s  i n  o f f i c e .
1
N L I , L e t t e r  P a d  6 4 ,  B . S .  M o o n j e  to M . S .  A n e y ,  19  O c t o b e r  
1 9 3 1 j  D i a r y  4 ,  1 D e c e m b e r  1 9 3 1 ;  D i a r y  5 ,  19  A u g u s t  1 9 3 2 ;  
D i a r y  5» 28  A u g u s t  1 9 3 2 ;  L e t t e r  P a d  67 ,  B . S .  M o o n j e  to 
Mr  K e l k e r ,  18 O c t o b e r  1 9 3 2 .
2
NML,  Rao  M S ,  T h e  H o n o u r a b l e  E .  R a g h a v e n d r a  Rao  - A P e n  
P o r t r a i t ,  b y  ’ C o v e r - p o i n t ’ , p . 2 .
3
H i t a v a d a , 28  J a n u a r y  1 9 3 3 »  P * l ;  3 A u g u s t  1 9 3 3 »  P * 6 ;
2 3  N o ve m b e r  1 9 3 3 »  P » l ;  2 2  F e b r u a r y  1 9 3 ^ ,  p . l .
4
I b i d . ,  2 9  O c t o b e r  1 9 3 3 »  P * 9 ;  19  N o v e m b e r  1 9 3 3 »  P * 5 ;  N L I ,  
M o o n j e  M S ,  D i a r y  6 ,  2 7  N o ve m b er  1 9 3 3 *  I n  the  l a t t e r  
e x t r a c t ,  M o o n j e  n o t e s  t h a t  N a i d u  was  r e p o r t e d l y  ’ c o m in g  
r o u n d  to the  v i e w s  o f  the  M a h a s a b h a ’ .
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T h e  R e s p o n s i v i s t s  r e c e i v e d  a n  o p p o r t u n i t y  to do so 
i n  1 9 3 3  w h e n  the  g o v e r n m e n t  i s s u e d  a M em orandum  w a r n i n g  
l o c a l  b o d i e s  a g a i n s t  a l l o w i n g  t h e i r  e m p lo y e e s  to p a r t i c i p a t e  
i n  the  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  the  R a s h t r i y a  Swayam  S e w a k  S a n g h .
D u r i n g  the  t h i r t i e s ,  the  S a n g h  c a u s e d  th e  g o v e r n m e n t  some 
c o n c e r n  o w i n g  to the  i n c r e a s i n g  t e n d e n c y  o f  i t s  l e a d e r s  
to t a k e  p a r t  i n  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s . 1 T h i s  c o n c e r n  was  
r e f l e c t e d  i n  a go v e r n m e n t  r e p o r t  o n  the  d e m o n s t r a t i o n  
o r g a n i s e d  b y  the  S a n g h  i n  N a g p u r  at  D a s s e r a  1 9 3 2 , w h e n  
1 , 0 0 0  u n i f o r m e d  v o l u n t e e r s  m a r c h e d  p a s t  the  R a j a  o f  
N a g p u r ,  D r  H e d g e w a r  a n d  o t h e r s .  T h e  r e p o r t  r a n  t h u s :
T h e  d r i l l  i s  r e p o r t e d  to h a v e  b e e n  g o o d .  T h e  
c h i e f  s p e a k e r s  at  the  c e l e b r a t i o n s  w e r e  M u n j e  
a n d  H e d g e w a r ,  the  s e c o n d  o f  whom g a v e  a n  
o b j e c t i o n a b l e  a n d  p r o v o c a t i v e  a d d r e s s ,  the  m a in  
g i s t  o f  w h i c h  was  t h e  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  th e  p o l i t i c a l  
f u t u r e  o f  I n d i a  was  f o r  t h e  H i n d u s  a l o n e  to 
d e c i d e .  No i n t e r f e r e n c e  b y  f o r e i g n e r s  o r  b y  n on  
H i n d u  r e s i d e n t s  o f  I n d i a  s h o u l d  be  b r o o k e d . 2
By  the  e nd  o f  1.932 ,  the  S a n g h 1 s a c t i v i t i e s  so c o n c e r n e d  
the  g o v e r n m e n t  t h a t  i t  i s s u e d  a C i r c u l a r  p r o h i b i t i n g
3
go v e r n m e n t  s e r v a n t s  f r o m  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  i t s  a c t i v i t i e s .  
D u r i n g  1 9 3 3  th e  g o v e r n m e n t  d i s c o v e r e d  th a t  some t e a c h e r s  
i n  the  s c h o o l s  c o n t r o l l e d  b y  D i s t r i c t  C o u n c i l s  w e r e  
members  o f  th e  R a s h t r i y a  Swayam  S e w a k  S a n g h . A c c o r d i n g l y ,
1
S e e  C P L C ,  v o l . 5» 2 3  J a n u a r y  1 9 3 3 »  A p p e n d i x  D ,  p . 2 36 ;
H i t a v a d a , 2 N o v e m b e r  1 9 3 3 »  p . 6 .
2
N A I , Home P o l l ,  1 8 / 1 3 ,  FR , F i r s t  H a l f  o f  O c t o b e r  1 9 3 2 ? 
p . l .  F o r  o t h e r  i n f o r m a t i o n  o n  the  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  the  
S a n g h ,  see  N A I ,  Home P o l l ,  F - 8 8 ,  1933>  A c t i v i t i e s  o f  the  
R a s h t r i y a  Swayam  S e w a k  S a n g h .
3
See p . 2 2 4 .
2 3 4
i n  December .1933» i t  i s s u e d  a Memorandum through  the 
Department o f  L o c a l  S e l f  Government w a r n in g  l o c a l  b o d ie s  
a g a i n s t  a l l o w i n g  1 t h e i r  se rvan ts  to be a s s o c i a t e d  w ith  
any  p r i v a t e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  a communal n a t u r e . * 1
I n c e n s e d  by the Memorandum, the R e s p o n s i v i s t s  made
2
a determ ined  e f f o r t  to overthrow  the m i n i s t r y .  One 
important  r e a s o n  fo r  t h e i r  c h a g r i n ,  apart  from the 
Memorandum’ s threat  to the R a s h t r i y a  Swayam Sewak S a n g h , 
was that i t  was the M usl im  M i n i s t e r  fo r  L o c a l  S e l f  
Government ,  M . Y .  S h a r e e f ,  who had  s ig n e d  the document. 
I n t e n s e  a c t i v i t y  among the R e s p o n s i v i s t s  and other  members 
o f  the N a t i o n a l i s t  ' p a r t y '  f o l l o w e d  the p u b l i c a t i o n  o f  
the Memorandum. The le a d e r  o f  th i s  a c t i v i t y  was Dr M o onje ,  
who urged  that  the R e s p o n s i v i s t s  must e i t h e r  as k  S h a r e e f
3
' t o  w ithdraw  the c i r c u l a r  or t u r n  him  o u t ' .  R . M .  Deshmukh, 
N a id u  and the le a d e r  o f  the D e p r e s s e d  members i n  the
4
C o u n c i l  a lso  h e l d  th is  v ie w .  The  governm ent ,  however ,
stood  f i r m l y  by the Memorandum, whereupon  Moonje  and h i s
5
f o l l o w e r s  i n i t i a t e d  moves to d e f e a t  the m i n i s t r y .  They
1
C P L C , v o l . 7» 3 M a r c h  1 9 3 4 ,  A p p e n d i x  B ,  p . 7 0 9 *
2
T h e  C i r c u l a r  o f  1 9 3 2  c a u s e d  a f l u r r y  i n  R e s p o n s i v i s t  
c i r c l e s ,  b u t  n o t h i n g  came o f  i t .  Se e  N L I , M o o n j e  M S ,
D i a r y  5» 8 J a n u a r y  1 9 3 3 j 10  J a n u a r y  1 9 3 3 ;  18  J a n u a r y  
1 9 3 3 ;  2 0  J a n u a r y  1 9 3 3 ;  2 1  J a n u a r y  1933>  7 M a r c h  1 9 3 3 ;
1 4  M a r c h  1 9 3 3 *
3
N L I ,  M o o n j e  M S ,  D i a r y  6 ,  15  J a n u a r y  1 9 3 4 .
4
I b i d . , 15  J a n u a r y  1 9 3 4 ;  2 0  J a n u a r y  1 9 3 4 ;  2 2  J a n u a r y  1 9 3 4 .
5
F o r  F a o ' s d e f e n c e  o f  the  g o v e r n m e n t ' s  a c t i o n ,  see  C P L C ,  
v o l . 7 ,  3 M a r c h  1 9 3 4 ,  p p . 6 9 5 - 7 0 2 .
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t r i e d  f i r s t  to w i n  t h e  s u p p o r t  o f  the  D e m o c r a t s ,  t h e  
P e o p l e ' s  ' p a r t y ’ , a n d  a s m a l l  g r o u p  o f  H i n d i  c o u n c i l l o r s  
who h a d  b r o k e n  aw ay  f r o m  t h a t  ’ p a r t y ' . 1 But  t h e s e  
e f f o r t s  w e r e  u n s u c c e s s f u l ,  a n d  the  R e s p o n s i v i s t s  n e x t  
a t t e m p t e d  to d e f e a t  a n d  d e m o r a l i s e  the  m i n i s t e r s  a n d  
t h e i r  s u p p o r t e r s  o n  the  f l o o r  o f  t h e  H o u s e .
Rao  c o u n t e r e d  t h e s e  t a c t i c s  w i t h  a b r i l l i a n t  move 
t h a t  f u r t h e r  s t r e n g t h e n e d  h i s  p o s i t i o n  i n  the  g o v e r n m e n t .  
E v e n t s  i n  the  l e g i s l a t u r e  d u r i n g  M a r c h  1 9 3 4  r e v e a l e d  the
p r e c a r i o u s  p o s i t i o n  o f  the  m i n i s t r y  a n d  the  D e m o c r a t i c
2
' p a r t y ' .  T im e  a n d  a g a i n  the  O p p o s i t i o n  c h a l l e n g e d  the  
m i n i s t r y  i n  d i v i s i o n s  a n d  c o m p e l l e d  the  g o v e rn m e n t  to 
u s e  a l l  the  means at  i t s  command to s a v e  the  m i n i s t r y  
fr o m  d e f e a t .  T h i s  was  e v i d e n t  i n  a d i v i s i o n  o n  2 M a r c h  
1 9 3 4 ,  w h e n  a member r e p o r t e d  s e e i n g
some o f f i c i a l s  a n d  n o n  o f f i c i a l s  e m b r a c i n g  e a c h  
o t h e r  i n  the  l o b b i e s . . . . I t  may be  c a l l e d  b y  the  
p r o s a i c  name o f  w r e s t l i n g . . . ( a n d )  i t  s h o u l d  be  
p r e v e n t e d . . . . I n  p l a i n  a n d  s i m p l e  l a n g u a g e ,  i t  
so h a p p e n e d  t h a t  some o f  o u r  v o t e r s  w e r e  
p h y s i c a l l y ,  b o d i l y  a n d  f o r c i b l y  re m ov e d  f r o m  u s  
. . . . O n e  was  i n  t h e  g r i p s  o f  one  o f  the  h i g h e s t  
o f f i c i a l s  i n  t h i s  h o u s e .  I  t r i e d  to e x t r i c a t e  
the  g e n t l e m a n  a n d  the  o f f i c i a l  w as  a n g r y . . . . T h e  
w h i p p i n g  i s  b e i n g  a c t u a l l y  c a r r i e d  out  a n d  a 
b i t  too h a rd .3
1
Se e  N L I , M o o n j e  M S ,  D i a r y  6 ,  2 2  J a n u a r y  1 9 3 4 ;  i b i d . ,
2 6  J a n u a r y  1 9 3 4 ;  D i a r y  7» 7 M a r c h  1 9 3 4 ;  i b i d . , 8 M a r c h  1 9 3 4 .
2
S e e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  C P L C , v o l . 7» 2 M a r c h  1 9 3 4 ,  p p . 6 4 4 - 6 1 ;  
i b i d . ,  p p . 6 6 l - 8 ;  i b i d . ,  3 M a r c h  1 9 3 4 ,  7 1 1 - 7 5 3 ;  i b i d . ,
5 M a r c h  1 9 3 4 ,  p p . 8 2 2 - 6 3 ;  i b i d . ,  7 M a r c h  1 9 3 4 ,  p p . 9 3 5 - 4 4 .
3
I b i d . ,  v o l . 7» 3 M a r c h  1 9 3 4 ,  p p . 7 1 0- 1*  T h e  member was  
B . G .  K h a p a r d e .  K h a p a r d e  l a t e r  d e n i e d  t h a t  the  w o r d s  
’ o ne  o f  the  h i g h e s t  o f f i c i a l s  i n  t h i s  h o u s e '  r e f e r r e d  to 
Rao  .
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T h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  d i v i s i o n  p r o v e d  i n c o n c l u s i v e ,  b u t  i n  
s u b s e q u e n t  d i v i s i o n s  the  go v e r n m e n t  was  d e f e a t e d . 1 
D e s p i t e  t h i s ,  t h e  m i n i s t r y  r e f u s e d  to r e s i g n .  T h i s  so 
i n f l a m e d  the  O p p o s i t i o n ,  t h a t  o n  9 M a r c h  1 9 3 4  t h e y  
b r o u g h t  a v o t e  o f  n o - c o n f i d e n c e  a g a i n s t  S h a r e e f .  T h e r e  
w e r e  f r e n z i e d  s c e n e s  i n  the  H o u s e  w h e n  the  m o t i o n  was  
p u t ,  b u t  the  P r e s i d e n t  s a v e d  S h a r e e f  b y  h i s  c a s t i n g  v o t e .
I t  was  c l e a r  to Rao  t h a t  the  g o v e r n m e n t  c o u l d  not
o p e r a t e  f o r  l o n g  u n d e r  s u c h  c o n d i t i o n s .  A l r e a d y  he  h a d
3
b e e n  c o m p e l l e d  to a b a n d o n  i m p o r t a n t  l e g i s l a t i o n .  H i s  
own p o s i t i o n  as  the  l e a d i n g  member o f  the  g o v e r n m e n t  was  
a l s o  i n  d a n g e r .  C o n s i d e r a b l e  t e n s i o n  e x i s t e d  b e t w e e n  
Rao a n d  some o f  the  s e n i o r  B r i t i s h  c i v i l i a n s ,  p o s s i b l y  
o w i n g  to the  p o w e r  t h a t  Rao  h a d  a c q u i r e d  d u r i n g  the
4
r e g i m e  o f  S i r  M o n t a g u  B u t l e r .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  a l t h o u g h
Rao  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  S h a r e e f s  m i n i s t r y  o u g h t  to g i v e  way
to a more s t a b l e  m i n i s t r y ,  the  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  d e c i d e d  to
1
See  C P L C , v o l . 7» 2 M a r c h  1 9 3 4 ,  p . 6 6 5 ;  i b i d . ,  5 M a r c h  
1 9 3 ^ ,  p p . 8 2 2 - 6 3 ;  i b i d . ,  9 M a r c h  1 9 3 4 ,  p p . 1104- 5*
2
I b i d . ,  v o l . 7» 9 M a r c h  1 9 3 4 ,  p p . 1 1 0 4 - 5 0 .
3
I b i d . ,  v o l . 7» 19  J a n u a r y  1 9 3 4 ,  p p . 1 3 - 1 6 ;  i b i d . ,
22 J a n u a r y  1 9 3 4 ,  p p . 121-8;  130-2;  i b i d . ,  23 J a n u a r y  1 9 3 4 ,
p p . 147- 67*
4
N L I , M o o n j e  M S ,  L e t t e r  P a d  6 8 ,  B . S .  M o o n j e  to Mr D i c k ,
3 0  N o v em b e r  1 9 3 3 ;  i b i d . ,  D i a r y  7» 8 M a r c h  1 9 3 4 ;  NML,
Rao  M S ,  M rs  P . J . H .  S t e n t  to E . R .  R a o ,  15  J u l y  1 9 3 7 *  T h e r e  
w as  f r i c t i o n ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  b e t w e e n  Rao  a n d  E y r e  G o r d o n ,  
the  R e v e n u e  M e m b e r ,  p o s s i b l y  o w i n g  to R a o 1s a s p i r a t i o n s  
to the  R e v e n u e  p o r t f o l i o .  Se e  NML ,  Rao  M S ,  E . R .  Rao to 
S i r  M.  B u t l e r ,  5 J u l y  1 9 3 2 ;  i b i d . , S i r  M.  B u t l e r  to
E . R .  R a o ,  9 J u l y  1 9 3 2 .  T h e r e  was  a l s o  f r i c t i o n  b e t w e e n  
Rao  a n d  H y d e  G o w a n ,  who i n  1 9 3 2  w a s  a member o f  the  
E x e c u t i v e  C o u n c i l  o f  the  C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s .
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s u p p o r t  the t o t t e r i n g  m i n i s t r y .  I n  so d o i n g ,  t h e y  a im e d  
to ' h u m i l i a t e  Rao  and  t e a c h  h i m  a l e s s o n ' . 1 Rao  ' s 
p o s i t i o n  was  f u r t h e r  w e a k e n e d  b y  the  f a c t  t h a t  i n  1933» 
H y d e  G o w a n ,  the  f o r m e r  C h i e f  S e c r e t a r y  to the  g o v e r n m e n t ,  
h a d  s u c c e e d e d  B u t l e r  as  G o v e r n o r  o f  the  C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s .
G o w a n  l a c k e d  B u t l e r ' s  p o l i t i c a l  f l a i r ,  a n d  f o u n d  i t
2
d i f f i c u l t  to w o r k  w i t h  R a o .  T h e  l a t t e r  t h u s  d e c i d e d
to r e - a s s e r t  h i s  p o w e r  a n d  c r e a t e  the  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r
s t a b l e  g o v e r n m e n t  at  the  same t im e .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  d u r i n g
M a r c h  1 9 3 4  Rao  a b a n d o n e d  S h a r e e f  a n d  C h a o b a l  f o r  a
3
m i n i s t r y  o f  h i s  own  c h o o s i n g .  T h e  i m m e d ia t e  f r u i t s  o f  
t h i s  d e c i s i o n  w ere  e v i d e n t  i n  the  s u c c e s s f u l  v o t e  o f  
n o - c o n f i d e n c e  a g a i n s t  C h a o b a l  i n  the  C o u n c i l  o n  9 M a r c h  
1 9 3 4 .  A  w e e k  l a t e r  B . G .  K h a p a r d e  becam e  c h i e f  m i n i s t e r ,
5
b r i n g i n g  i n  as  h i s  c o l l e a g u e  i n  the  m i n i s t r y  K . S .  N a i d u .
1
N L I , M o o n j e  M S ,  D i a r y  7» 8 M a r c h  1 9 3 4 .
2
NML,  A I C C ,  P - 1 3 ,  1 9 3 7 - 8 ,  N o t e  b y  S . D .  M i s h r a ,  member 
o f  the  B i l a s p u r  E n q u i r y  C o m m i t t e e ,  17  M a r c h  1 9 3 7 *  T h e r e  
w e r e  rum ours  t h a t  Rao was  g r i e v e d  at  not  b e i n g  a p p o i n t e d  
G o v e r n o r  w h e n  B u t l e r ' s  term  e x p i r e d .  T h i s  was  p o s s i b l y  
a n o t h e r  s o u r c e  o f  the  f r i c t i o n  b e t w e e n  h i m s e l f  a n d  G owan .
3
N A I , K h a p a r d e  M S ,  D i a r y ,  4 A p r i l  1 9 3 4 .  K e d a r  and  
S h a r e e f  w ent  to D e l h i  to p e r s u a d e  the  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  I n d i a  
to dem ote  R a o .  Se e  a l s o  C P L C , v o l .  8 ,  18 A u g u s t  .1934,  
p p . 1 4 5 - 7 ,  1 7 0 - 2 ;  i b i d . ,  2 0  A u g u s t  1 9 3 4 ,  p p . 2 5 7 - 8 .  T h i s  
e x t r a c t  r e l a t e s  to the  c h a r g e s  w h i c h  S h a r e e f  b r o u g h t  
a g a i n s t  Rao  i n  h i s  j o u r n a l ,  the  P e o p l e ' s  V o i c e , o n  14  a n d
2 8  M a r c h  1 9 3 4 .
4
C P L C ,  v o l . 7 ,  9 M a r c h  1 9 3 4 ,  p p . 1 1 5 0 - 2 ;  H i t a v a d a , 11  M a r c h  
1 9 3 4 ,  p . 9 .
5
T h e  C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s  a n d  B e r a r  1 9 3 3 - 4 ,  A R e v i e w  o f  the  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  the  P r o v i n c e  ( N a g p u r , 1 9 3 5 ) , P • 2 ; N M L , 
R a o  M S ,  N . A .  D r a v i d  to E . R .  R a o ,  18  M a r c h  1 9 3 4 .
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So b ega n  a f u r t h e r  three  y ears  o f  triumph fo r  
R a g h avend ra  Rao and the H i n d i  r e g io n .  D u r in g  th is  p e r io d ,  
the m in is t r y  came u n d e r  constant  a t t a c k ,  but R a o 1s t a c t i c a l  
s k i l l  av erte d  any d e f e a t . 1 K h a p a r d e , too,  a s s i s t e d  the 
p r o v in c e  to r e t u r n  to s t a b le  and e f f i c i e n t  governm ent, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  by h i s  work i n  the S e c r e t a r i a t ,  where he won 
a good r e p u t a t io n  from  those  who a s s o c i a t e d  w ith  him . As  
h i s  a g in g  f a t h e r  i n  A m ra v ati  r e c o r d ed  w ith  some p rides
The  h o n o u ra ble  S i r  M. Dadabhoy  turned  up w it h  a 
com panion and we sat t a l k i n g  fo r  a good w h i l e . . . .
He s a id  my e ld e s t  son Baba i s  g a t h e r i n g  g o ld e n  
o p in io n s  about h i m s e l f  and a l l  the o f f i c e r s  and 
p e o p le  speak  v e ry  h i g h l y  o f  him . I  am n a t u r a l l y  
very  g la d  to h e a r  i t . 2
D e s p it e  K h a p a r d e 1s i n c l u s i o n  i n  the governm ent, 
h o w ever , i t  was the H i n d i  r e g i o n  and not B erar  that 
b e n e f i t e d  from the f i n a l  d e c i s io n s  a f f e c t i n g  the p ro v in c e  
un der  the new c o n s t i t u t i o n .  T h e se  d e c i s i o n s ,  made i n  
1934-5 , r e p r e s e n t e d  a v i c t o r y  fo r  the view s  o f  
R a g h avend ra  R a o . The  d e c i s i o n s  concerned  the u t i l i s a t i o n  
o f  the revenues  o f  B e r ar  i n  the u n it e d  p r o v i n c e ,  and the 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  to be g iv e n  to B e rar  i n  the new 
l e g i s l a t u r e .  A s  f o r  the r e v e n u e s ,  the R e s p o n s iv i s t s  h e ld
3
that  they  's h o u l d  be spent w h o lly  or m a in ly '  i n  B e r a r .
The  governm ent , h ow ever , m a in ta in e d  that the revenues  
sh ou ld  be spent i n  the u n i t e d  p r o v in c e ,  as they  had b een
1
H i t a v a d a , 13  M a r c h  1 9 3 2 » P * l >  1 S e p t e m b e r  1 9 3 2 ,  p . l .
2
N A I , K h a p a r d e  M S ,  D i a r y ,  2 8  A u g u s t  1 9 3 ^ ;  i b i d . ,
12 Octob er  1935*
3
CPLC, v o 1 . 7 y 18 J a n u a r y  1 9 3 4 ,  p . 4.
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i n  the  f o r m e r  C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s .  T h i s  w as  a l s o  the  v ie w  
o f  the  J o i n t  Com m itte e  o n  I n d i a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  R e f o r m  
w h i c h  i s s u e d  i t s  r e p o r t  i n  N o ve m b e r  1 9 3 4 .  I n  t h e  s e c t i o n  
d e v o t e d  to the  r e v e n u e s  o f  B e r a r ,  the  C o m m it te e  
a d v o c a t e d  the  p o o l i n g  o f  r e v e n u e s  f ro m  the  C e n t r a l  
P r o v i n c e s  a n d  B e r a r ,  a n d ,  i n  p l a c e  o f  the  S i m  r a t i o ,  
s u g g e s t e d
t h a t  the  G o v e r n o r  m ig h t  a p p r o p r i a t e l y  be  d i r e c t e d  
i n  h i s  i n s t r u m e n t  o f  i n s t r u c t i o n s  to c o n s t i t u t e  
some i m p a r t i a l  b o d y  to a d v i s e  h im  o n  the  
p r i n c i p l e s  w h i c h  s h o u l d  b e  f o l l o w e d  i n  the  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  r e v e n u e s . 2
T h i s  ju d g e m e n t  r e p r e s e n t e d  a v i c t o r y  f o r  Rao  a n d  t h e  l e s s  
w e a l t h y  H i n d i  r e g i o n ,  a n d  a c r u s h i n g  d e f e a t  f o r  the  
R e s p o n s i v i s t s  and  B e r a r .
T h e  R e s p o n s i v i s t s  a l s o  l o s t  h e a v i l y  to the  H i n d i  
r e g i o n  i n  t h e i r  a t t e m p t  to s e c u r e  a w e i g h t a g e  o f  s e a t s  
f o r  B e r a r  i n  the  new l e g i s l a t u r e .  T h e y  s o u g h t  w e i g h t a g e  
to p r e v e n t  the  c o n t i n u e d  d e f e a t  o f  members f r o m  B e r a r
3
b y  the  more numerous  members f r o m  the  C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s .  
H i n d i  l e a d e r s ,  h o w e v e r ,  r e j e c t e d  the  n o t i o n  o f  w e i g h t a g e ,  
a n d  a s s e r t e d  t h a t  the  s t r e n g t h  i n  num bers  was  t h e  o n l y
1
T h i s  i s  the  l o g i c a l  d e d u c t i o n  fro m  the  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s 
v i e w  t h a t ,  w e r e  B e r a r  s e p a r a t e d  f r o m  the  C e n t r a l  
P r o v i n c e s ,  the  l a t t e r  w o u l d  becom e  a d e f i c i t  p r o v i n c e .
S e e  a l s o  I n d i a n  D e l i m i t a t i o n  C o m m i t t e e , v o l . l ,  R e p o r t  
( S i m l a ,  1936) ,  p . 7 5 .
2
J o i n t  Co m m it te e  o n  I n d i a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  R e f o r m  ( 1 9 3 3 “ 
1 9 3 4  S e s s i o n )  , Vo 1 .  1 ,  p a r t  1^ R e p o r t  ( L o n d o n ,  1 9 3 4 )  , 
p p . 46-7•
3
S e e  H i t a v a d a , 1 4  J u l y  1 9 3 5 »  P * l 6 ;  D e l i m i t a t i o n  C o m m itte e  
R e p o r t ,  op .  c i t . ,  p p . 7 3- 4 .
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a c c e p t a b l e  b a s i s  o n  w h i c h  to a s s e s s  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  i n  the
C o u n c i l . 1 I n  1 9 3 3  the  p r o v i n c i a l  go v e r n m e n t  e s t a b l i s h e d
a c o m m itte e  to d e c i d e  the  i s s u e ,  b u t  the  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s
o f  B e r a r  and  the  H i n d i  r e g i o n  m a i n t a i n e d  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e
2
p o s i t i o n s  a n d  a d e a d l o c k  e n s u e d .  A c c o r d i n g l y  the  
g o v e r n m e n t  p u t  f o r w a r d  a c o m p r o m ise  scheme w h i c h  the
3
G o v e r n m e n t  o f  I n d i a  a p p r o v e d  i n  1 9 3 5 *  T h i s  scheme g a ve  
B e r a r  a l a r g e r  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  i n  the  new l e g i s l a t u r e  t h a n  
the  t e r r i t o r y  w o u l d  h a v e  o b t a i n e d  o n  the  b a s i s  o f  i t s  
p o p u l a t i o n ,  b u t  i t  c o m p l e t e l y  r e j e c t e d  t h e  c l a i m  f o r
4
w e i g h t a g e  ' o n  the  s c a l e  c l a i m e d  b y  B e r a r ' .
Rao  c a p p e d  t h e s e  v i c t o r i e s  b y  a f u r t h e r  s e r i e s  o f  
p o l i t i c a l  t r i u m p h s .  B e t w e e n  1 9 3 ^ - 6  he  was  r e s p o n s i b l e  
f o r  the  e n a c t m e n t  o f  i m p o r t a n t  l e g i s l a t i o n  d e s i g n e d  to 
l i f t  the  p r o v i n c e  out  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  d o l d r u m s  an d  
p r e p a r e  i t  to e n t e r  the  p e r i o d  o f  p r o v i n c i a l  autono m y
1
H i t a v a d a , 2 1  J u l y  1 9 3 ^ ,  p . 7 ;  2 5  J u l y  1 9 3 5 »  P * l 4 ;  
D e l i m i t a t i o n  Co m m it te e  R e p o r t ,  o p .  c i t . ,  p - 7 ^ ;  N L I ,
M o o n j e  M S ,  D i a r y  7» 2 6  J u l y  1 9 3 5 *
2
H i  t a v a d a , 4 A u g u s t  1 9 3 5 »  P * 5 j  D e l i m i t a t i o n  C o m m itte e  
R e p o r t ,  o p .  c i t . ,  p p . 7^-5*
3
N A I , R e f o r m s ,  KW to 8 2 / 3 3 »  1 9 3 3 »  C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s  
D e l i m i t a t i o n  R e p o r t ;  D e l i m i t a t i o n  C o m m itte e  R e p o r t ,  
op .  c i t . ,  p p . 7 1 -6 .
4
I b i d . ,  p . 75?  u n d e r  the  f i n a l  a r r a n g e m e n t s  B e r a r  s e c u r e d
2 2  g e n e r a l  r e s e r v e d  a n d  s p e c i a l  s e a t s ;  the  f o u r  M a r a t h i  
d i s t r i c t s  o f  the C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s  18  s e a t s ;  a n d  the  H i n d i  
r e g i o n  49  s e a t s .  T h e r e  w e r e  i n  a d d i t i o n  1 4  M u s l i m  an d  
9 s p e c i a l  s e a t s ,  the  l a t t e r  a l l o t t e d  to the  C e n t r a l  
P r o v i n c e s .
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un der  the new c o n s t i t u t i o n . 1 Perhaps  the most s i g n i f i c a n t
ac ts  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  were those  r e l a t i n g  to the
e s ta b l is h m e n t  o f  the H i g h  Court o f  the C e n t r a l  P r o v in c e s
and B e r a r .  T h i s  was a p r o j e c t  on  which  Rao had  1 set  h i s
2
h e a r t * . But he was not m erely  content  to r a i s e  the
e x i s t i n g  Court o f  the J u d i c i a l  Commissioner  to that  o f  a
H i g h  Court o f  J u d i c a t u r e .  He  a lso  d e s i r e d  to house  the
Court i n  a b u i l d i n g  w h ich  would  * go down to p o s t e r i t y  as
3
a f i n e  specim en  o f  c l a s s i c a l  a r c h i t e c t u r e * .  The  b i l l  to
e s t a b l i s h  the C o u r t ,  the t a x a t i o n  measures to f i n a n c e  the
p r o j e c t ,  and R a o ' s v i s i o n  o f  a s p l e n d id  b u i l d i n g
d o m in at in g  the c i v i l  l i n e s  o f  Nagpur  drew s tron g
4
c r i t i c i s m  i n s i d e  the C o u n c i l .  T h i s  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  
e v id e n t  d u r i n g  the debate  on  the Court Fees  Amendment 
b i l l ,  w h ich  e s t a b l i s h e d  the H i g h  C ourt .  The  H i t a v a d a  
r e p o r te d  that
The N a t i o n a l i s t  p a r t y  showed i t s  te e th  and 
e x p r e s s e d  i t s  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  to f i g h t  the b i l l  
tooth  and n a i l . . . .The  Home Member was 
f e v e r i s h l y  c a n v a s s i n g  a l l  a v a i l a b l e  s t r e n g t h  
i n  fa v o u r  o f  the b i l l  though  some o f  the 
government members were d e s p o n d e n t . . . . Rao 
a g a i n  s u c c e s s f u l l y  f o i l e d  the e f f o r t s  o f  the
1
T h i s  l e g i s l a t i o n  i n c l u d e d  t h e  f o l l o w i n g s  the  M o t o r  
V e h i c l e s  T a x a t i o n  A c t  1 9 3 ^ ;  t h e  Games A c t  1 9 3 ^ ;  a n d  the  
C o u r t  F e e s  Am endment  A c t .
2
H i  t a v a d a , 2 8  M a r c h  1 9 3 5 »  p . l .
3
T h e  p h r a s e  w as  t h a t  o f  K . P .  P a n d e , the  member f o r  
J a b a l p u r  N o r t h .  C P L C , v o l . 9»  2 4  F e b r u a r y  1 9 3 6 ,  p . 5 3 0 .
4
S e e  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  i b i d . ,  v o l . 9» 7 M a r c h  1 9 3 5 »  p p . 1 1 1 8 = 7 5 »  
i b i d . ,  8 M a r c h  1 9 3 5 »  p . 1 1 9 6 ;  i b i d . ,  25  M a r c h  1 9 3 5 »  
p p . 1 2 1 6 - 6 5 ;  i b i d . ,  v o l . 9» 2 4  F e b r u a r y ,  p . 5 3 0 »  i b i d . ,
2 5  F e b r u a r y  1 9 3 6 ,  p p . 6 0 3- 31*
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o p p o s i t i o n  to d e l a y  the  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  the  
b i l l . . . . H e  kno w s  h i s  c h e s s b o a r d  a n d  moves h i s  
men w e l l . 1
A s  t h e  H i t a v a d a  i n t i m a t e d ,  Rao p r o v e d  m a s t e r  o f  the  
s i t u a t i o n ,  a n d  the  t a x a t i o n  m e a s u r e s  a n d  the  C o u r t  F e e s  
b i l l  p a s s e d  i n t o  la w .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  o n  2 J a n u a r y  1 9 3 6 ,  
the  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  i s s u e d  l e t t e r s  p a t e n t  f ro m  L o n d o n  
c o n s t i t u t i n g  the  H i g h  C o u r t  o f  the  C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s  an d  
p 2 B e r a r .
One  f u r t h e r  h o n o u r ,  more b r i l l i a n t  p e r h a p s  t h a n  the  
c r e a t i o n  o f  the  H i g h  C o u r t ,  a w a i t e d  Rao b e f o r e  h e  
c o m p l e t e d  h i s  term  as  Home M e m be r .  E a r l y  i n  1 9 3 6  i t  
b ec am e  k n o w n  t h a t  S i r  H y d e  G o w a n  w as  to p r o c e e d  o n  l e a v e  
f o r  f o u r  months  p r i o r  to the  i n a u g u r a t i o n  o f  the  u n i t e d  
C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s  a n d  B e r a r .  To  g o v e r n  t h e  p r o v i n c e  i n  
h i s  a b s e n c e ,  G o w a n  n o m i n a t e d  Rao
a s  some s m a l l  r e t u r n  f o r  the  i n v a l u a b l e  w o r k  
w h i c h  y o u  h a v e  d o n e  f o r  the  p r o v i n c e ,  a n d  i n  
g r a t i t u d e  f o r  t h e  u n f a i l i n g  h e l p  a n d  s u p p o r t  
w h i c h  y o u  h a v e  g i v e n  to me,  an d  w h i c h  h a v e  
r e n d e r e d  my t a s k  f a r  l i g h 't e r  t h a n  I  e v e r  
d r e a m e d  i t  c o u l d  b e . 3
T h e  B r i t i s h  go v e r n m e n t  a p p r o v e d  t h e  n o m i n a t i o n ,  a n d  o n
1 A p r i l  1 9 3 6 ,  the  K i n g  i s s u e d  a w a r r a n t  a p p o i n t i n g  Rao 
a s  A c t i n g  G o v e r n o r  o f  t h e  C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s .  T h e  p e r i o d  
o f  th e  a p p o i n t m e n t  w as  f r o m  16  M a y  u n t i l  11  S e p t e m b e r
T —  “
H i t a v a d a , 10  M a r c h  1 9 3 5 »  P * 9 »  2 8  M a r c h  1 9 3 5 »  p . l .
2
M P S , GAD ,  3 2- 31»  1 9 3 5 »  L e t t e r s  P a t e n t  C o n s t i t u t i n g  a 
H i g h  C o u r t  o f  J u d i c a t u r e  at  N a g p u r ,  p .  37*
3
NML, Rao MS,  S i r  Hyde Gowan to E . R .  Rao ,  2 A p r i l  1 9 3 6 .
2 h j
1 9 3  6 .  I t  was  a p r o u d  d a y  f o r  Rao  w h e n  h e  t o o k  th e  o a t h
at  P a c h m a r h i  o n  16  M a y  a n d  a s s u m e d  t h e  o f f i c e  w h i c h
B u t l e r ,  h i s  p o l i t i c a l  m e n t o r ,  h a d  o n c e  o c c u p i e d .  *1
f e l t  a t r i f l e  e m b a r r a s s e d ' ,  h e  l a t e r  c o n f e s s e d  to B u t l e r ,
' ( b u t )  the  sh o r t  p e r i o d  p a s s e d  aw ay  w i t h o u t  a h i t c h  a n d
2
I  w as  a b l e  to h a n d  b a c k  t h e  p r o v i n c e  i n t a c t ' . But  
t h e r e  was  a g r e a t  d e a l  more to R a o ' s G o v e r n o r s h i p  t h a n  
h i s  own  u n d e r s t a t e m e n t  w o u l d  i n d i c a t e .  A  l e t t e r  w r i t t e n  
by  a s e n i o r  o f f i c i a l  to Rao  a f t e r  h e  h a d  r e t u r n e d  to h i s  
d u t i e s  as  Home Mem ber  i n d i c a t e s  how one  I n d i a n  G o v e r n o r  
a c q u i t t e d  h i m s e l f :
Y e s t e r d a y  most p e o p l e  who c o u n t  h a d  o n l y  one  
t h o u g h t  - the  r e g i m e  o f  the  l a s t  f o u r  m o n t h s .
B y  common c o n s e n t  a l l  w e n t  o f f  so w e l l  t h a t  the  
name o f  M o t h e r  I n d i a  s t o o d  f a r  h i g h e r  t h a n  i t  
d i d  o n  15 May!  O n e ' s  t h o u g h t  n a t u r a l l y  w en t  to 
Mr  T a m b e ' s  g o v e r n o r s h i p .  H e  came a n d  w ent  
u n n o t i c e d  a n d  w i t h o u t  l e a v i n g  a n y  i m p r e s s i o n . . . .  
C h i t h a m  s a i d ,  a n d  I  h e a r d  someone  ( e l s e )  a l s o ,  
b u t  I  c a n ' t  r e c o l l e c t  h i s  name j u s t  at  p r e s e n t ,  
t h a t  H i s  E x c e l l e n c y  h a s  d o ne  m a r v e l l o u s l y  i n  
t h e s e  f o u r  m o n t h s .  E x t e n s i v e  t o u r i n g ,  l a v i s h  
e n t e r t a i n m e n t ,  j u d i c i o u s  m i x i n g  o f  p a r t i e s ,  
t h o u g h - p r o v o k i n g  s p e e c h e s ,  a n d  i n  s p i t e  o f  
N a g p u r - d i r e c t e d  C o n g r e s s  p r o p a g a n d a ,  s p o n t a n e o u s  
a n d  c o r d i a l  w e lc o m e  a l l  r o u n d ,  h a v e  i m p r e s s e d  a n d  
b e e n  n o t e d  i n  a l l  q u a r t e r s ,  f r i e n d l y  a n d  
o t h e r w i s e .  F o r  u s ,  g e n e r a l l y ,  no l e s s  t h a n  
i n d i v i d u a l l y  G o v e r n m e n t ) H ( o u s e )  no m ore .  We
1
M P S ,  G A D ,  1-7» 1 9 3 6 ,  A p p o i n t m e n t  o f  th e  H o n o u r a b l e  
Mr E .  R a g h a v e n d r a  Rao  as  A c t i n g  G o v e r n o r  o f  the  C e n t r a l  
P r o v i n c e s  d u r i n g  the  A b s e n c e  o n  L e a v e  o f  H i s  E x c e l l e n c y  
S i r  H y d e  G o w a n ,  p p . 2 7 - 8 .
2
NM L ,  Rao  M S ,  E . R .  R a o  to S i r  M.  B u t l e r ,  13  D e c e m b e r
1936 .
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now r e v e r t  to n o r m a l  t i m e s . . . . S o r r y  to w r i t e  
s u c h  r u b b i s h  a n d  so l o n g . 1
R a o 1s f i n a l  m onths  i n  N a g p u r  w e r e  a s t r a n g e
a n t i c l i m a x  to h i s  c a r e e r  as  Home Member  a n d  A c t i n g
G o v e r n o r .  I n  F e b r u a r y  1 9 3 7  the  f i r s t  e l e c t i o n s  to the
new L e g i s l a t i v e  A s s e m b l y  o f  the  C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s  a n d
B e r a r  t o o k  p l a c e .  A t  t h e s e  e l e c t i o n s  the  C o n g r e s s  w on
a n  o v e r w h e l m i n g  v i c t o r y  o v e r  i t s  o p p o n e n t s ,  among whom
w a s  R a g h a v e n d r a  R a o .  A s  the  n a t i o n a l  l e a d e r s h i p  o f  the
C o n g r e s s  at  f i r s t  r e fu s e d ,  to a l l o w  i t s  members to t a k e
o f f i c e  u n d e r  the  new c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  o n  28  M a r c h  1 9 3 7
2
S i r  H y d e  Go w a n  i n v i t e d  Rao  to fo rm  a m i n i s t r y .  Rao
a g r e e d  to do s o ,  a l t h o u g h  he  h a d  the  s u p p o r t  o f  a s m a l l
m i n o r i t y  i n  the  A s s e m b l y ,  a n d  w i t h i n  a fe w  d a y s  h a d
3
as s u m e d  o f f i c e  as  P r e m i e r .  R a o ' s P r e m i e r s h i p  l a s t e d  
f o r  t h r e e  months  - ' a n  a w f u l  t h r e e  m o n t h s '  h e  l a t e r  
d e s c r i b e d  i t  - i n  w h i c h  h e  was  ' p a i n t e d  i n  the  p r e s s  an d  
o n  the  p l a t f o r m  as  p u b l i c  enemy number  1 '  f o r  a s s u m i n g
4
o f f i c e  w i t h o u t  a m a n d a t e  fro m  the  e l e c t o r a t e .  D e s p i t e
1
NML,  Rao  M S ,  C . C .  D e s a i  ( ? )  to E . R .  R a o ,  12  S e p t e m b e r  
1 9 3 6 . S i r  C h a r l e s  C h i t h a m  w as  I n s p e c t o r  G e n e r a l  o f  P o l i c e .
2
I n d i a n  A n n u a l  R e g i s t e r , n o . l ,  1937>  p p . 2 4 0 - 1 ;  H i t a v a d a ,
3 1  M a r c h  1 9 3 7 »  p . l .
3
R a o ' s s u p p o r t e r s  n u m b e r e d  25- H i s  m i n i s t e r s  w e r e
B . G .  K h a p a r d e  an d  S . W . A .  R i z v i .
4
NML, Rao MS, E . R .  Rao to S i r  M. Ahmad S a i d  K h an ,
12 J u l y  1 9 3 7 .
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t h i s  c r i t i c i s m ,  Rao  h u n g  o n  u n t i l  1 4  J u l y  1 9 3 7 * ^  O n  t h a t  
d a t e  a m i n i s t r y  f o r m e d  b y  members o f  the  I n d i a n  N a t i o n a l  
C o n g r e s s  t o o k  o f f i c e ,  a f t e r  r e c e i v i n g  p e r m i s s i o n  to do so 
f r o m  the  n a t i o n a l  e x e c u t i v e  o f  t h a t  o r g a n i s a t i o n .  B e f o r e  
t h i s  e v e n t ,  h o w e v e r ,  Rao  s l i p p e d  a w ay  f r o m  N a g p u r ,  to 
the  p l a u d i t s  o f  some I n d i a n  a n d  B r i t i s h  o f f i c i a l s ,  b u t  
u n n o t i c e d  e i t h e r  b y  G o w a n  o r  b y  the  g e n e r a l  p u b l i c ,  who
2
w e r e  r e j o i c i n g  a t  the  p r o s p e c t s  o f  r u l e  b y  the  C o n g r e s s .  
But  f o r  some at  l e a s t ,  n e i t h e r  the  G o v e r n o r ' s  s l i g h t  nor  
the  p r o s p e c t  o f  a p o p u l a r  g o v e r n m e n t  c o u l d  rem ove  t h e
3
w o r k  o f  ' o n e  w ho se  w o r d  w as  law  f o r  n e a r l y  t e n  y e a r s ' . 
W i t h  B u t l e r ' s  h e l p ,  Rao  h a d  a n c h o r e d  p o l i t i c a l  p o w e r  i n  
the  C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e s  f i r m l y  i n  the  H i n d i  r e g i o n ;  b r o u g h t  
p o l i t i c a l  s t a b i l i t y  to a n  u n s t a b l e  p r o v i n c e ;  a n d  s e c u r e d  
the  p a s s a g e  o f  s i g n i f i c a n t  l e g i s l a t i o n .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  
B u t l e r  a n d  Rao  h a d  c o n v i n c e d  the  B r i t i s h  c i v i l i a n s  o f  
the  p r o v i n c e  t h a t  I n d i a n s  w e r e  a b l e  to r u l e  t h e m s e l v e s .  
T h e  f o l l o w i n g  l e t t e r  w r i t t e n  b y  a B r i t i s h  c i v i l i a n  to 
Rao  o n  the  o c c a s i o n  o f  h i s  d e p a r t u r e  f r o m  N a g p u r  p r o v i d e s  
c l e a r  e v i d e n c e  o f  t h i s :
1
NML,  E . R .  Rao  to S i r  H y d e  G o w a n ,  9 J u l y  1 93 7 j S i r  H y d e  
G o w a n  to E . R .  R a o ,  10 J u l y  1937*
2
I b i d . ,  M rs  P . J . H .  S t e n t  to E . R .  R a o ,  15 J u l y  1937>
C . C .  D e s a i  ( ? )  to E . R .  R a o ,  16 J u l y  1937-
3
I b i d .
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That  we s h a l l  miss you t e r r i b l y  goes w ithout  
s a y in g ;  but I  don* t know i f  you r e a l i s e  the 
a d m ir a t io n ,  r e s p e c t  and a f f e c t i o n  w i t h  w hich  
the s e r v ic e s  re g a r d  you .  I  know that the 
s e n io r  men i n  a l l  s e r v ic e s  have  r e a l i s e d  that 
they could  count on you ,  not only  f o r  j u s t i c e  
and f a i r  d e a l i n g ,  but  f o r  r e a l  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  
o f  t h e i r  p o in t  o f  v ie w .  What i s  more, we 
knew that i n  you ,  the p r o v i n c e  has  a r e a l  
statesm an ,  a man w i t h  a v i s i o n ,  i m a g i n a t i o n  
and f o r e s i g h t ,  such as i s  r ar e  i n  any country  
a n y w h e r e . . . . I t  i s  not the e n try  o f  Congress  
into  o f f i c e  that  dismays most o f  u s ,  but the 
loss  o f  your  g u ida n c e  and c o n t r o l .  The s e r v ic e s  
have t r u s t e d  and do trust  you ,  and they  do not 
g iv e  t h e i r  trust  e a s i l y .  ^
1
NML, Rao MS, P . J . H .  S t e n t ,  Commissioner  o f  Nagpur  
to E . R .  R a o ,  13  J u l y  1937-
THE RE-ASSERTION OF THE CONGRESS: NATIONALIST 
AGITATION AND SOCIAL REFORM IN THE CENTRAL 
PROVINCES AND BERAR, 1927-1934
Despite the achievements of Raghavendra R a o , between 
1927-34 the leaders of the Indian National Congress 
re-established their leadership over the nationalist 
movement in the Central Provinces and Berar. They did so 
through two campaigns of civil disobedience against the 
government and though a movement to remove the stigma of 
untouchability from the Depressed community. The 
campaigns of civil disobedience rested for support on a 
wide range of social groups in town and country and 
involved far greater numbers of people than the movement 
of non-cooperation in 1921. They thus offered a far more 
serious challenge to the government's ability to maintain 
law and order than the agitation ten years beforehand. 
Following these campaigns, nationalist leaders in the 
Central Provinces and Berar followed Gandhi in attempting 
to ameliorate the conditions of the Depressed community.
In so doing, they established their claim to the political 
leadership of that section of the population. Next, as 
the defenders of nationalist honour among all classes of 
people, the leaders of the Congress turned their attention 
to the elections for the Central Legislative Assembly in 
1934. At these elections, the Congress candidates 
soundly defeated the responsive cooperators, thus 
indicating that they had re-established the nationalist
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leadership of the province which they lost to the latter 
in 1 9 2 6 .
I
In 1930 the Indian National Congress launched a 
campaign of civil disobedience against the Government of 
India. It did so because the British government 
refused to accept the constitution for India drawn up by 
the Congress and other Indian political parties in 1928. 
The Indian National Congress sounded its first note of 
agitation against the government in the same year. In 
December 1928, Congressmen at the annual session of their 
organisation held in Calcutta warned the government that 
they would launch a campaign of non violent non­
cooperation against it if the British government refused 
to accept the constitution. Furthermore, the Congressmen 
decided to prepare for this campaign during 1 9 ^ 9 by 
implementing the various items of the constructive 
programme. Despite this warning, however, the British 
government showed no signs of accepting the constitution, 
and in December 1929 Congressmen gathered expectantly for 
the annual session of their organisation at Lahore. At 
that session Jawarhalal Nehru, the son of Motilal Nehru 
and President of the Congress for the ensuing year, 
sounded the note of war against the government. In his 
presidential speech, Nehru declared that
I feel that the step the Congress took some years 
ago to permit Congressmen to enter the councils 
was an inevitable step, and I am not prepared to 
say that some good has not resulted from it. But 
we have exhausted that good, and there is no
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middle course left today between boycott and full 
cooperation. ... Our workers are limited in number 
and we can have no mass movement unless they 
concentrate on it and turn their backs to the 
palatial council chambers of our legislatures....
The boycott...will release energy and divert 
attention to the real struggle which must take 
the shape of non-payment of taxes.!
Nehru's speech was a fitting prelude to the main
resolution of the session, which was moved by Gandhi.
The resolution stated that, because the British government
had refused to grant self-government and Dominion status
to India, Congressmen would thereafter give their
'exclusive attention to the attainment of complete
2independence for India'. To achieve this goal the 
resolution requested Congressmen to leave the councils, 
and, with other members of the organisation, to 
implement the constructive programme. The resolution 
also authorised the All-India Congress Committee 
'whenever it deems fit, to launch upon a programme of
3civil disobedience, including non-payment of taxes'.
At the beginning of 19^9 the Congress organisation 
in various parts of the Central Provinces and Berar was 
ill prepared to launch civil disobedience against the 
government. The activities of the small group of 
Congressmen in the legislature formed the major exception 
to this. According to the Hitavada
1
Indian Annual Register, no.2, 19 2 9 , p . 295«
2
Ibid., p .300.
Ibid., p .300.
3
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(this) small, -well-disciplined regiment of 
Congressmen....was a standing menace to the 
peaceful existence of any ministry in our 
province.... Throughout the members conducted 
themselves as soldiers, simply obeying their 
all-India leaders, and not asking the reason 
why. 1
But the councillors aside, the activities of the Congress
in general were at a low ebb. In the Marathi region,
the Congress was unpopular with the voters, and appeared
disinterested in retaining the sympathies of the lower
2classes of the population. In addition, there were
disturbing signs of inefficiency in the Provincial
3Congress Committees of Nagpur and Berar. Again, 
although relative harmony prevailed in the Congress 
organisation in Nagpur, where Abhyanker had come to 
power, in Berar two factions were engaged in a struggle
4for leadership. These factions were, on the one hand,
1
Hitavada, 16 January 1930, p.l; see pp.184; 200-1.
2
Mishra, op. cit., p.362; NAI, Home Poll, F-32, 1927»
F R , First Half of April 1 9 2 7 , p.l; ibid., Second Half of 
April 1937» p.l; Hi tavada, 5 June 1927, PP • 9 , H *  In 
1927 Awari, the populist leader, began a Satyagraha by 
organising armed processions in defiance of the Arms Act, 
but Abhyanker and other Congress leaders refused to 
support the Satyagraha. In June 19^7 the government 
imprisoned Awari lest the movement get out of control.
3
Hitavada, 31 October 1929, p.2.
4
Hi tavada, 5 December 1926, p.5; 23 December 1926, p.5;
6 November 1 9 2 7 , P*5; 18 October 1928, p.3; 8 November
1 9 2 8 , pp.l, 7; NML, AICC, G-57, 1928, M.V. Abhyanker,
S.P. Ranka to Secretary Indian National Congress, 18 
November 1927; NLI, Moonje MS, Letter Pad 47, B.S. Moonje 
to Mr Kelkar, 11 October 1928; Letter Pad 48, Press 
Statement, 6 November 1928; Assorted Letters, J. Nehru 
to H.K. Joshi, 20 November 1928.
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a group of orthodox Congressmen led by P.B. Gole, a 
Brahman pleader and member of the Legislative Council; 
and on the other hand, a group of Responsivists, led by 
Aney, who held office in Congress organisations . 1 The 
struggle between the two factions prevented the Congress 
from engaging in purposeful activity.
Inefficiency and factional conflict were also
prominent features of the Congress organisation in the
Hindi region. The factional.conflict resulted from
Ravi Shankar Shukla's attempt to return to power in the
Congress following his defection to the Independent
Congress 'party’ in 1926 and his defeat at the elections
2in the same year. In attempting to return to power in 
the Congress, Shukla met with the determined opposition 
of Seth Govind Das and D.P. Mishra. The conflict 
between the leaders and the lack of any active challenge 
to the government took its toll of the Congress 
organisation in the Hindi region. According to one 
observer
Of late...for want of a suitable dynamic 
programme of mass movement, the fountain head 
of energy and power of the congress organisations 
became stagnant, with the result that signs of
1
NML, AICC, G-19, 1929-30, P.B. Gole to General Secretary 
AICC, 22 July 1929; NAI, Khaparde MS, Diary 30 December
1929. Aney, who was President of the Berar PCC, opposed 
the resolution on complete independence and civil 
disobedience at Lahore in 1929*
2
Hitavada, 2 0  February 1 9 2 7 »  p .1 0 ;  17  March 1 9 2 7 ,  P * 7 ;
2 4  April 1 9 2 7 ,  p.7 ;  5 May I 9 2 7 , p.8 ; 2 2  December 1 9 2 7 ,
p.5; 5 February 1 9 2 8 ,  p.
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disintegration and disorganisation in the rank 
and file of the congress organisation began to 
be visible even to the man in the street . 1
During 1929 this picture changed dramatically as 
Congress leaders in the Central Provinces, with the 
possible exception of Berar, prepared for an attack on 
the government. In the division of Nagpur the leaders 
of the Congress set out with determination to win 
popular support for constructive work and civil 
disobedience, and appear to have succeeded in their task. 
In doing so, the leaders divided into two groups - one 
taking the message of civil disobedience mostly to the 
educated middle classes, and the other to the commercial 
and lower classes of the towns.
The leaders mostly concerned with preparing the 
educated middle classes for civil disobedience were 
Abhyanker and his foremost lieutenant, Narayan Bhaskar 
Khare, a medical practitioner of Nagpur. Khare was born 
of Brahman parents in 1884 at Nere in the district of 
Kolaba in the province of Bombay. He received his 
secondary and college education in Jabalpur, and 
graduated from the Lahore Medical College in 1907* After 
a short spell in government service, Khare qualified as 
a Doctor of Medicine, and in 1916 set up private practice 
in Nagpur. There he came under the influence of Moonje 
and Abhyanker and entered politics as a member of the 
Rashtriya Mandal. Like many other nationalists in Nagpur, 
Khare took part in the movement of non-cooperation under 
protest, and in 1923 revolted against Gandhi to become a
1
Hitavada, 31 October 1929, p.2.
Dr N.B. Khare
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Nagpur.
The Gandhian populists prepared other sections of 
the population for civil disobedience. Prominent among 
the leaders of the populists were Jamnalal Bajaj and his 
fellow Marwari, Seth Poonamchand Ranka, who in 1929 was 
Secretary of the Provincial Congress Committee. Bajaj 
and Ranka both had strong connections with the merchant 
community in the division of Nagpur and in 1929 both 
tried to interest members of that community in the
spinning and wearing of khadi and in the boycott of
2foreign cloth. Ranka, too, went among the people of the 
city, 'visiting different parts...daily for one and 
half hours, collecting foreign clothes and exhorting
3people to take khadi'. Bajaj and Ranka also played a
1
Hitavada, 12 September 1929, P*5j 13 October 1929, P * 8 ;  
20 October 1929, P P •3, 13; 7 November 1929, p.10. The 
total number of members of the Congress in the division 
of Nagpur in December 1929 was 11,651-5065 more than the 
quota fixed by AICC. Prominent members of the PCC 
included Abhyanker as President, Bajaj as Treasurer,
Ranka as Secretary, and Dharmadikari as Joint Secretary; 
and as members N.B. Khare, Bhagwandin, N.R. Deshmukh,
N.M. Ghatwai, Seth Khusulchand, A.R. Tijare, M.P. Damle, 
B. Pingarkar, A.N. Udhoji, G. Sharma, M. Joglekar,
R.V. Dangare, T. Lodhi, S.R. Palsule and R.R. Pathak.
The Presidents of the four District Congress Committees 
were G.S. Thekar (Nagpur), N.Y. Deotale (Chanda),
N.R. Deshmukh (Wardha), and D.A. Tankhiwale (Bhandara).
Dr Khare was President of the Nagpur Congress Committee.
2
Hitavada, 14 March 1929, P*3; 21 April 1 9 2 9 , P*5;
16 May, I9 2 9 , p.11; 27 June 1929, p.2. Bajaj also 
persuaded a number of local bodies to encourage khadi.
See Indian Annual Register, no.2, 1 9 2 9 , P*273*
3
Hitavada, 23 May 1929, p.2.
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leading part in arousing support for two other aspects 
of the constructive programme, namely, the prohibition of 
liquor and the drive against untouchability. Of the two, 
Ranka seems to have been more prominent in the campaign 
against liquor, preaching in those ’parts of the city 
where there are liquor shops ’ . 1 It was Bajaj, however, 
who dominated the campaign against untouchability.
During 1929 Bajaj toured extensively in the division of 
Nagpur where he
collected information, discussed the problem 
..., met municipal members, trustees, owners 
of temples (and) wells, and exhorted 
sympathisers to throw open temples, wells and 
schooIs . 2
Bajaj and Ranka achieved only limited results in their
3drive against liquor and untouchability. Despite this, 
with Abhyanker, Khare, and their many helpers they took 
the message of the Congress to wide sections of the 
community, and awakened anew their interest in the Indian 
National Congress.
In the Hindi region, the leaders of the Congress 
prepared for action against the government by repairing 
the ravages caused by inefficiency and factionalism.
1
Hitavada, 18 July 1929j p.2.
2
Indian Annual Register, no.2, 1 9 2 9 , p.2 7 6 . Bajaj threw 
open his own Shri Laxmi Narayan temple to untouchables in 
Wardha in July 1928.
3
So far as the liquor campaign was concerned, Ranka 
reported that ten meetings and six demonstrations were 
held, and 1000 pledges taken. Bajaj secured the opening 
of wells in Wardha, Tumsar and Gondia, and the opening 
of one temple in Tumsar.
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The constructive programme seems to have aroused little
enthusiasm in the region during 1 9 2 9 , and, where
Congressmen were active in this regard, they mostly
attempted to popularise khadi and launch the boycott of
foreign cloth in the towns.1 There was a great deal of
activity on other fronts, however. In mid-1929,
D.P. Mishra ’took over’ the Provincial Congress Committee,
and devoted himself with ’untiring zeal’ to ’reorganising
the almost tottering Congress committees in the province
(and)...to infusing a new life into the movement’.
Congress leaders in the Hindi region also achieved a
notable success in enrolling members of the Congress,
far exceeding the quotas set by the All-India Congress
3Committee. Jabalpur and Raipur recorded the highest 
number of enrolments, but the figures were also high in 
rural areas, as the following report from Durg 
demonstrates;
As per (the) resolution of the Working Committee 
...the minimum number of congress members that 
were required to be enrolled in this district 
by the end of August 19^9 was 19^0. There are 
three tahsils in this district, namely Drug,
1
Hitavada, 14 February 1929, P-3; 23 March 1929, P*5j 
16 May 1 9 2 9 , p.13; 26 May 1 9 2 9 , p.2. Bajaj persuaded 
the owners of a number of temples in Jabalpur to open 
them to the Depressed community. See Indian Annual 
Regis ter, no.2, I9 2 9 , p.279* He also persuaded certain 
local bodies in the Hindi region to encourage the use of 
khadi. See ibid., p.273*
2
Hitavada, 31 October 1929, P*2; 26 December 1929, P*5*
3
Indian Annual Register, no.2, 1929, p.265» The AICC 
set a quota of 20,505 members, but the Hindi leaders 
enrolled some 28,827 members.
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Bemetara and Sanjari Balod....By the end of 
August, 5888 congress members have been 
enrolled in this district, and in Drug,
Bemetara and Sanjari Balod tahsils 121, 109 
and 1 7 0 villages respectively have been 
represented. Thus this district has been able 
to furnish about three times its quota.
In addition, Govind Das temporarily stilled the conflict
between himself and Shukla by accepting the Presidentship
of the Provincial Congress Committee in December 1929*
As a result, it was not surprising that Congressmen in
the Hindi region approached the year of civil disobedience
2with confident expectation.
The unity and vigour evident among Congressmen in 
the Central Provinces were all but absent in Berar.
There the Responsivists led by Aney controlled the 
Provincial Congress Committee and many of its subsidiary 
organisations, and as they did not subscribe to Gandhi's 
political philosophy, refused to participate in the
3constructive programme. Consequently, the only areas 
where nationalists implemented that programme were areas 
where orthodox Congressmen dominated the Congress 
organisation. Such an area was the district of Akola, 
the home of Gole and his Marwari colleague, Brijlal 
Biyani. Under the leadership of these two men, Akola 
became the scene of a successful campaign to popularise
1
Hitavada, 18 August 1 9 2 9 , P*9j 3 October 1 9 2 9 , p.11.
2
Ibid., 26 December 1929, P*5*
3
Ibid., 10 February 1927, p.5; NML, AICC, G-19, I9 2 9-3 O, 
N.R. Bamangaonkar to General Secretary AICC, 24 July
1929.
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khadi and to boycott foreign cloth. In addition, Bajaj 
persuaded the owners of temples in Akola and Ellichpur,
in the district of Amravati, to open the buildings to
2members of the Depressed community. Other than this, 
however, little activity took place in Berar in 
preparation for civil disobedience. A report issued by 
the Indian National Congress on the situation in Berar 
substantiated this. Commenting on the enrolment of 
Congressmen in Berar, the Report of the All-India Congress 
Committee for 1929 complained that
although they claimed to have fulfilled their 
quotas, (they) have sent no detailed figures.
The inspection report(s) of Berar...show that 
the work done there is not satisfactory.3
In 1930, after a year of intensive preparation, the 
Indian National Congress launched a campaign of civil 
disobedience against the Government of India. Neither 
the British government nor the Government of India 
satisfactorily answered the demand by the Congress for 
self-government for India. Consequently, in January
1930 the leaders of the Congress appointed Gandhi 
dictator of the organisation and authorised him and 
'others holding non-violence as an article of faith to
1
Hitavada, 19 May 1 9 2 9, p.11; 29 September 1929» p.11.
2
Indian Annual Register, no.2, 1929> PP*277» 279* The 
temples opened were the Maruti temple in Akola and the 
large Datta Durbar temple at Ellichpur.
3
Ibid., p.266. Berar's quota of members to be enrolled 
in 1 9 2 9 was 7 6 8 8 .
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start civil disobedience as and when they decide'.
Gandhi decided to begin the campaign by breaking the 
Salt Law, and on 5 March 1930 he began a long march 
from Sabarmati, in Gujarat, to the sea coast for that 
purpose. On his arrival at the coast Gandhi broke the 
Salt Law by preparing salt. Within a few days he had 
committed other acts of civil disobedience, and as a 
result the Government of India ordered his arrest and 
imprisoned him at Yeravda, near Poona. When the All- 
India Congress Committee heard the news of Gandhi's 
arrest, it called on Congressmen all over the country to 
throw themselves into movements of boycott and 
disobedience to the laws of the land. And when the 
government promulgated ordinances to suppress these 
movements, the Committee ordered Congressmen to prepare 
for a campaign to persuade agriculturalists to withhold 
their land revenue.
In the Central Provinces and Berar, as in other 
parts of India, large numbers of people responded to the 
All-India Congress Committee's call to arms. In so doing 
they severely challenged the government's ability to 
maintain law and order. There were three campaigns of 
civil disobedience in the Central Provinces and Berar 
in 1930 - in the division of Nagpur, in Berar, and in 
the Hindi region. In each area alike, an agricultural 
and trade depression assisted in preparing a suitable 
ground for agitation against the government. In the 
Marathi region, low prices and a reduced demand for
1
Indian Annual Register, no.1, 1930, p.26.
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cotton adversely affected agriculturists and urban or 
rural workers who depended for their livelihood on the 
cotton industry. In the Hindi region poor harvests 
created famine conditions in the countryside, while a 
sharp decline in agricultural prices affected the 
purchasing power of tenants and malguzars alike . 1
In 1930, the leaders of civil disobedience in the 
division of Nagpur provided an effective challenge to 
the government and at the same time re-established the 
Congress as the leading political party in the area.
They did so by mounting successive waves of agitation 
against the government and by drawing large numbers of 
people from all classes of society into the campaign.
There were five waves of agitation. The first was a 
preliminary phase, between January and March 1930» 
when the leaders of the Congress contacted many different 
groups of people with a view to drawing them into the 
agitation. The leaders used various means to arouse the 
enthusiasm of the people for the projected attack on the 
government. Among these were the withdrawal of 
Congressmen from the legislature in Nagpur; the 
celebration of Independence Day on 2 6 January 1930; and 
the organisation of processions, meetings and conferences.
1
MPS, P & M, 302/CDM, 1930, 1930, pp.12, 24; NML, AICC, 
248, 1931» Annual Report of Mahokoshal; CPLC, vol.I,
25 February 1930, pp.354-7» CPLC, vol.l, 12 January 1931» 
p.2; NAI, Home Poll, 36/111, 1 9 3 2, Appreciation of the 
Economic Situation as They (sic) Affect the Indian 
Political Situation, Enclosure in D.O. from H.A.F. Lindsay 
to J.A. Woodhead, Secretary to Government of India, 
Department of Commerce.
2
Hitavada, 9 January 1930, p.l; MPS, P & M, 302/CDM,
1930, p.3; NAI, Home Poll, 18-IV, 1930, F R , Second Half 
of March 1930, p.l.
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These activities aroused the interest of widely differing 
sections of the population and paved the way for the 
launching of civil disobedience . 1 On 4 March 1930 the 
Provincial Congress Committee appointed a committee
to find out places where civil disobedience was 
possible in the province and to make all 
necessary arrangements to carry it on in 
consultation with the working committee . 2
By 16 March the necessary arrangements were complete.
In Nagpur the Provincial Congress Committee had given
way to a War Council, and that body had despatched Ranka
and the populists to the countryside to enrol volunteers
and preach the message of non-violent revolt against the
3government.
Many different groups of people in the division of 
Nagpur participated in the second phase of civil 
disobedience - the agitation proper. The agitation began 
in early April when the War Council called on people to 
prepare salt in defiance of the Salt Law. There was an 
immediate response to this call. On 9 April 1930, the 
first satyagrahis, drawn from all walks of life, left 
Nagpur for Dahihanda in the district of Akola where they
1
M PS, P & M, 302/CDM, 1 9 3 0,p.3; The Central Provinces and 
Berar: Administration Report for" 1929-1930 (Nagpur, 1931), 
p.l; Indian Annual Register, no.1, 1930, p.27* Those 
affected by the activities of the Congress were the 
councillors, students, railway workers, and ’the less 
responsible elements of the population'.
2
Ibid., p .28.
3
Hitavada, 20 March 1930, pp.l, 7j 13 April 1930, p.7*
The members of the War Council were M.V. Abhyanker,
J. Bajaj, N.B. Khare, N.R. Deshmukh, Bhagwandin and 
Poonamchand Ranka.
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were to prepare salt. Four days later, Abhyanker 
himself inaugurated the salt agitation in Nagpur by 
auctioning
one tola of salt from Akola in Berar...for 
Rs 225....In obedience to the mandate of the 
Congress Committee, some merchants closed their 
businesses and participated in the demonstration 
....(There was) a mammoth gathering in the town 
hall grounds,...(and) a procession of congress 
volunteers went around the principal streets of 
Nagpur with National flags in the evening....
Then Abhyanker did the salt auction, (but)... 
before doing so, he made a passionate appeal to 
all to follow the banner of Mahatma Gandhi . 2
A week later, Abhyanker, Ranka and the populists set off 
to launch the campaign of civil disobedience in the rural 
areas. There, Abhyanker shed his role of 'landlord' for 
that of a 'professional breaker of laws', and, with all 
his ability to command an instant response, sparked off 
a round of rural agitation similar to that taking place
3in Nagpur. The 'mass awakening in the province', 
however, did not unduly disturb the government. It 
resolved to maintain 'control with the minimum
4interference', and met the new situation merely by
1
Hitavada, 10 April 1930, p.9* The satyagrahis were 
V.G. Sahasrabudhey, a member of the Nagpur Municipal 
Committee; Ranade, a first year student; Bagre, a 
municipal employee; and Dokh and Waghmale of the Tilak 
Vidyalaya.
2
Ibid., 17 April 1930, p.9.
3
Ibid., 13 April 1930, p.7; 17 April 1930, p.13; 20 April 
1930, p.10; 24 April 1930, p.7; 27 April 1930, p .10.
4
Ibid., 20 April 1920, p.10: M P S , P & M, 302/CDM, 1930,
p . 6 .
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giving additional powers to the police and by promulgating, 
though not implementing, a press ordinance . 1
To draw the government more fully into the fray, 
Congressmen in the division of Nagpur launched a further 
round of agitation in urban and rural areas. This 
constituted the third phase of the campaign of civil 
disobedience. During this phase the nationalists 
hurled every available weapon into the attack, 
disrupting the rule of law and making heavy inroads into 
the provincial revenues. The major reason behind the 
nationalists' success was their ability to inflame many 
people from different social groups against the 
government, and so to organise the first truly mass 
agitation in the division of Nagpur.* This phase of 
civil disobedience, which lasted for four months, began 
on 9 May 1930* On that day Abhyanker again led the 
attack on the government by reading passages from a 
proscribed book to a huge gathering in Nagpur. As the 
Hitavada reported:
Before the meeting, a procession of volunteers 
with many others in attendance passed through 
the town hall grounds where it formed itself 
into a huge mass meeting....(There were) shouts 
of Mahatma Gandhi ki jai and national slogans 
....The meeting commenced with prayers at 8 .30 
....Abhyanker (was) given a great ovation....
1
MPS, P & M, 302/CDM, 1930, p.17; Hitavada, 2k April 
1930, p.2.
*
Mass agitation in this thesis refers to agitation 
drawing in large numbers of people from different strata 
of society, and occurring on a sufficiently widespread 
scale to constitute a serious threat to law and order.
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(He) read from Bharat Me Angrezi R a j . ...These 
passages were later repeated amidst great 
excitement by the whole audience....Abhyanker 
challenged the government to arrest him (and)
...appealed to the audience to join the fight 
without respect of creed, caste or colour.^
Following this demonstration, Congressmen took the
2agitation out into the countryside.
As the government still refrained from joining the 
combat, the Congress leaders intensified their campaign 
against it. During M a y  they launched bitter attacks on 
the government at meetings throughout the division. This 
verbal onslaught appears to have achieved its objective, 
for on 15 May 1930 the government reported that
the tone of speeches in the Marathi districts 
has changed for the worse. There has been 
increasing vehemence in the abuse of government 
servants, especially the police; and an appeal 
to government servants to be disloyal to their 
duty is now a marked feature of these harangues.
This tendency is causing some anxiety to the 
government.3
As a result, the government decided to seize the leaders 
of the agitation, hoping that, deprived of their 
inspiration, it would wither and die. Accordingly, on
1
H i t a v a d a , 11 May 1930, p.9* Bharat Me Angrezi Raj 
means 'English Rule in I n d i a ' .
2
I b i d . , 18 May 1930, p.9*
3
NAI, Home Poll, 18/VI, 1930, F R , First Half of May
1930, p.l.
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29 May 1930 the police arrested Abhyanker at A m r a v a t i .
But before the arrest took place, the War Council issued
a call to the people to boycott British cloth and other
2goods. This call met with a ready and widespread 
response. Merchants in Nagpur agreed not to indent 
these commodities; lawyers in Wardha 'changed their head 
gear (and were) found spinning in the b a r ' ; students and 
others picketted the shops of merchants who refused to 
observe the boycott; educated ladies marched through 
Nagpur 'wearing white khadi (a n d ) ... singing national 
songs; and small boys of the city collected and burnt
3foreign c a p s ' . On 29 June 1930 the War Council
unleashed a further attack on the government by urging
people to boycott liquor. In response volunteers
picketed liquor warehouses and shops in the division,
and in Nagpur held meetings 'at the premises of different
liquor shops to arouse the conscience of people against
4the evils of d r i n k ' . Then, just as the students were 
returning to their schools and colleges at the end of 
the summer vacation, the nationalists decided to disrupt 
the educational system. In early July the government 
reported that
1
N A I , Second Half of May 1930, p.l; M P S , P & M, 272/CDM, 
1930, Proceedings of a Meeting Held in the Honourable 
Revenue Member's Bungalow on 23 November 1930.
2
See H i t a v a d a , 19 May 1 9 3 0 ,  p . 9 ;  18 May 1 9 3 0 ,  p . 1 0 .
3
Ibid., 1 June 1930, p . 7; 26 June 1930, p . 1 5 j 3 July
1930, p .7 j 10 July 1930, p.2.
4
Ibid., 3 July 1930, p.8; 10 July 1930, p.7 .
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The Government colleges had r e o p ened...after the 
vacation, and congress at once started a policy 
of making appeals to the students. Discipline 
quickly became at a discount, and hartal followed 
hartal on any pretext, and students absented 
themselves from the studies at will. Schoolboys 
also broke all discipline and roamed the streets 
insulting the police. One party entered Hislop 
coliege... and after breaking a number of windows, 
hoisted the congress flag.^
Two other attacks on the government occurring at
the same time as the disturbances in the schools and
colleges compelled the authorities to bare their teeth.
One of these attacks was launched by the Congress, and
the other by the Responsive Cooperation party. As for
the attack by the Congress, on 12 July 1930 the War
Council decided to begin intensive agitation in the rural
2areas of the division. As a beginning, the Council 
launched a Forest Satyagraha in Arvi taluq in the district 
of Wardha on 1 August 193 0 .  Long before that date, 
however, nationalists had seriously weakened the 
government's position in Arvi. According to the District 
Superintendent of Police in Wardha, by 20 July
the idea...(was) fairly generally accepted in the 
Arvi tahsil that government..,(had) really 
ceased to exi s t . ...The Circle Inspector of Arvi 
found that persons collecting money for the 
Congress purposes had now merely to enter a 
village and demand a subscription in order to 
have their demands met immediately....About 
12000 palm trees have been cut so far in the
1
MPS, P & M, 302/CDM, 1930, pp.7-8; Hitavada, 17 July
1930, p.9: 24 July 1930, p.9-
2
Ibid., 20 July 1930, p.2.
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district and the present position is that the 
volunteers merely go and direct villagers to 
cut the trees and their orders are complied 
w i t h .1
Meanwhile, the Responsivists had already begun their 
Forest Satyagraha at Pusad. To prevent the situation 
from getting out of hand, the government swung into 
action. Early in July it extended the Prevention of 
Intimidation Ordinance to Nagpur and enforced it
vigorously to combat the hold which the Congress had
2obtained against the liquor trade. Next, to remove
those responsible for the many-sided attack against it,
the government proceeded to 'round u p ...Congress leaders
in the south of the p r o v i n c e ' . A m ong the Congressmen
caught in the round-up were Dr Khare, who had replaced
Abhyanker as President of the War Council, and Ranka, who
3was also a member of the Council. In addition, on
4 August the government closed down the Government and
4Engineering and Medical Colleges in Nagpur. Then,
as it was no longer possible for government to 
retain in its own hands the direction of all 
prosecutions,...(it delegated) responsibility 
for dealing with the movement in their 
divisions...to all commissioners, who from this 
time forward directed the conduct of operations.5
1
M P S , P & M, 272/CDM, 1930> Proceedings of a Meeting 
held at Nagpur at the Honourable the Home Member's 
Bungalow on 20 July 1930.
2
MPS, P & M, 302/CDM, 1930, pp . 6, 8.
3
I b i d ., p .8.
4
I b i d ., p .8.
5
Ibid., p .13•
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So far from quietening the situation, however, these 
measures formed a prelude for a further round of 
agitation in urban and rural areas, much of it 
accompanied by violence. This round of agitation, which 
occurred between August and September 1930, constituted 
the fourth phase in the campaign of civil disobedience 
in the division of Nagpur. A major feature of this 
phase of the agitation were the Forest Satyagrahas 
launched in the districts of Wardha, Chanda and Bhandara. 
Thousands of people participated in these Satyagrahas, 
and in many places violence attended the agitation.1 A 
typical incident occurred in Chanda on 2k August 1930, 
when
25 youths, who had cut and stolen trees from 
Government forests in obedience to the order of 
Congress, were arrested in Chanda. The small 
police party carrying out the arrest was almost 
overwhelmed by the mob. Stones were freely 
thrown and many officers, including the Circle 
Inspector, were hit.2
A proclivity to violence was also evident in the anti­
liquor campaign which spread through the towns of the 
division of Nagpur during the fourth phase of civil 
disobedience. This violence was due to the use of 
pickets who were not trained in the spirity of non­
violence, as were many of those who had long since been
1
H i t a v a d a , 2k August 1930, p.l; 7 September 1930, p . 7;
11 September 1930, p.______ ; 14 September 1930, p . 2;
CPLC, vol.l, 27 February 1931, Appendix A, pp.398-400.
2
Ibid., p.398.
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arrested and imprisoned. Violence also threatened when 
the War Council organised a demonstration in Nagpur on
8 August in defiance of an order by the District
2Magistrate. In addition, during August many students
in the division of Nagpur exhibited a ’total lack of
discipline1 , and the government was compelled to close
3eight high schools. But despite this restlessness, by
the end of August 1930> the main campaign of civil
disobedience in the division was over. The leading
Congressmen were in jail; the anti-liquor campaign
continued but on a much reduced scale; and the Forest
Satyagrahas were well under control. Accordingly the
government decided to administer a death blow to the
dying campaign. On 28 August 1930 it declared the War
4Council of Nagpur an unlawful association.
The methods used by the government to control civil 
disobedience in the division of Nagpur proved extremely 
effective. From September 1930 onwards, the agitation 
gradually subsided until a truce was declared between 
the Government of India and the Indian National Congress 
in February 1931* This period of declining agitation 
constituted the fifth phase of the movement. During 
this phase, nationalists mostly continued the forms of
1
H i t a v a d a , 14 August 1930,  p.l.
2
N A I , Home Poll, 18 /lX ,  1930, FR, First Half of August
1930 , p . 24.
3
I b i d ., p .2 5 .
4
Hitavada, 4 September 1930, p .12.
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agitation used in the earlier phases of civil 
disobedience, but due to lack of leadership and manpower 
these agitations offered little challenge to the 
government. There was one major exception to this, 
namely, the boycott of the elections to the provincial 
legislature on 10 November 1930* This boycott was 
astonishingly successful in urban and rural electorates 
alike.1 As for Nagpur, according to the H i t a v a d a , the
10 November
was a day of victory for the congress as over 
ten thousand congress voters out of a total of 
eleven thousand and odd did not go within a 
furlong of any polling station....Some were 
genuine Congressmen, some professing platonic 
sympathy with the Congress (;) some did not 
take any interest in the ... candidates .... Some 
did not like to cause annoyance to the woman 
picketers, while many did not like to be 
hooted out and booed by the vigilant crowds 
that kept on waiting all the time in front of 
every po l l i n g . ..booth.2
Following the boycott of the elections. Congressmen 
organised a number of small demonstrations in Nagpur, 
but these petered out in the face of speculation, which 
soon gave way to a certainty, that the Government of 
India and the Indian National Congress had agreed upon
1
See MPS, P & M, 302/CDM, 1930, p p . 11-12. In one rural 
and one urban electorate in the district of Nagpur less 
than 3 per cent and 7 per cent of voters exercised the 
franchise respectively.
2
Hitavada, 13 November 1930, p.l.
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a truce. The first move towards the truce came from the 
British Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald. MacDonald 
desired the Congress to participate in the Round Table 
Conferences in London. Accordingly, on 19 January 1931 
he declared that under the new constitution for India 
the British government would transfer all powers except 
those of finance and defence to Indian ministers. The 
Viceroy, Lord Irwin, followed this gesture a week later 
by releasing Gandhi and 19 members of the Working 
Committee from jail. The Viceroy's act paved the way for 
discussions between himself and Gandhi during February 
1931* As a result of these discussions, Gandhi agreed to 
suspend civil disobedience. The Viceroy, for his part, 
agreed to withdraw the ordinances promulgated in 1930; 
release from jail those prisoners who were convicted of 
civil disobedience; and permit picketing within the 
limits imposed by the ordinary law. During March 1931 
the Working Committee of the Congress ratified the 
agreement and the campaign of civil disobedience came to 
an end.
The campaign of civil disobedience in Berar was 
similar to the campaign in the division of Nagpur in that 
it threatened the government's ability to maintain law
1
See H i t a v a d a , 16 November 1930, p . 7; 20 November 1930, 
p. 7; 18 December 1930, p.7; 25 December 1930, p.l;
Indian Annual R e g i s t e r , n o .2, 1930, p .43; N A I , Home Poll, 
18/XIII, 1930, FR, Second Half of December 1930, p p . 1-2; 
NAI, Home Poll, F-18, 1931, F R , First Half of January
1931, P.2.
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and order. Also like the campaign in Nagpur, the 
movement in Berar restored the Congress to a dominant 
position in the political life of the region. The broad 
outline of the campaign in Berar was similar to that in 
the division of Nagpur. In both regions there was a 
preparatory phase, followed by a Salt Satyagraha; next, 
a period of intensive agitation in town and country; 
and finally a phase during which the level of agitation 
declined and the situation returned to normal.
The preparatory phase of civil disobedience was seen 
to best effect in the Congress stronghold of Akola.
There the dominant figures were P.B. Gole and Brijlal 
Biyani. In January 1930 the two leaders resigned from 
the provincial legislature, and through public meetings 
and the celebration of Independence Day prepared the 
people of the district for ’the coming f i g h t 1.1 The 
preparatory phase also witnessed a change in the 
composition of some Congress Committees in Berar. The 
Respo n s i v i s t s , who were strongly entrenched in the 
Provincial and some District Congress Committees,
declined to support the proposed campaign of civil
2disobedience. Accordingly, as the moves to launch the 
campaign gathered strength, they resigned their seats on 
these Committees leaving orthodox Congressmen in
1
H i t a v a d a , 9 November 1930, p . 8 ; 12 January 1930, p .12;
19 January 1930, p .13•
2
See NML, A I C C , G-I 36 (KW l ) , 1930, T.S. B a p a t , Secretary 
District Congress Committee Yeotmal to Secretary Working 
Committee, 29 January 1930.
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’possession of the field'. The way was thus open for 
the introduction of civil disobedience in Berar. 
Consequently, on 16 March 1930 the Provincial Congress
Committee formed itself into a War Council and resolved
2to 'organise Berar for satyagraha'.
The fruits of this decision were evident in the
Salt Satyagraha which began on 12 April 1930. The
Satyagraha lasted until the end of April and comprised
the second phase of the campaign in Berar. The agitation
was concentrated mostly in the towns and rural areas of
Amravati and Akola. Volunteers prepared the salt from a
saline well at Dahihanda, a village in Akola, and then
distributed it for sale in towns throughout the Marathi
3region. During April nationalist leaders also moved 
about persuading people in the towns and villages to 
support the agitation, and urging that by 'disobeying the
4salt laws, they would be nearer to independence'.
'Crowds of people from (the)...v i l l a g e s ' and towns heard
this message, and many of these volunteered to assist in
5the agitation. In the towns, too, ladies prepared salt
1
H i t a v a d a , 30 January 1930, P»9j N A I , Home Poll, 18-111, 
1930, F R , Second Half of February 1930, p.l.
2
H i t a v a d a , 20 March 1930, p.7» The members of the War 
Council consisted of W.R. Joshi, B. B i y a n i , Patwardhan, 
Sahasrabuddhe, Vaidya, Joshi, H.R. Deshpande, Ambulkar, 
Purshottam, Zunzunwalla, Krishnarao, and Gadargaonker.
3
Ibid., 13 April 1930, p . 7; 17 April 1930, p . 10; NAI, 
Home Poll, 18/V, 1930, F R , First Half of April 1930, p.l; 
MPS, P & M, 302/CDM, 1930, p . 4.
4
Hi t avada, 17 April 1930, p . 6.
5
Ibid., 17 April 1930, pp .6, 10; 20 April 1930, P«9;
24 April 1930, p.7.
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in public, merchants organised hartals to coincide with 
the agitation, and 'an appreciable number of people... 
signed the satyagraha pledge'.1
To avert the loss of their own political leadership, 
the Responsivists also participated in the Salt Satyagraha.
In April 1930 A ne y  joined the War Council and 'offered
2himself for satyagraha at the earliest opportunity'.
In doing so, however, he was careful to explain that this
did not mean any change of opinion on my part on 
the fundamental points which unfortunately 
compelled us to sever our connections with the 
old Swaraj party and form ourselves into a new 
group styled as the Responsive Cooperation party.3
With the same qualification other prominent Responsivists 
followed Aney's lead, and on 19 April 1930 at a meeting 
in Amravati declared that the 'civil disobedience 
campaign started by Mahatma Gandhi is quite legitimate 
and has (our)...full support'. Accordingly 
Responsivists joined Congressmen in breaking the Salt 
Law in the district of Amravati, and were among the
bands of Congress volunteers that left Amravati to go to
5Dahihanda to prepare salt.
1
Hi t avada, 17 April 1930,' p p . 6 , 10; 24 April 1930, p . 7*
2
Ibid., 13 April 1930, p . 7.
3
N A I , Jayaker MS, File 207, Letter 11, M.S. Aney to 
K.F. Nariman, 21 April 1934.
4
H i t a v a d a , 24 April 1930, p.9*
5
Ibid., 20 April 1930, p.10; 24 April 1930; 1 May 1930,
p.7.
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As the government was unwilling to repress the Salt 
Satyagraha, Congressmen in Berar followed the example of 
their colleagues in the Central Provinces by launching a 
more intensive round of agitation. This lasted from 
May until September 1930 and constituted the third phase 
of civil disobedience in Berar. Large numbers of people 
from widely differing groups in the towns and rural areas 
participated in this phase of agitation and in doing so 
effectively challenged the rule of law in Berar. This 
agitation thus formed what may be described as the first 
truly ’mass' agitation ever launched in the territory.
The agitation between May and September was concentrated 
in two areas. One consisted of the districts of Akola 
and Buldhana where orthodox Congressmen predominated; 
and the other of the districts of Amravati and Yeotmal 
where Responsivists predominated. Orthodox Congressmen 
opened the campaign in Akola on 10 May 1930 by reading 
proscribed literature.1 During the ensuing week,
Biyani, accompanied by Mrs Durgatai Joshi, a leading 
nationalist from Akola, toured the district to whip 
up large scale opposition to the government. The tour 
was completely successful. According to one observer
the large assemblage of over ten thousand that 
gathers at these meetings over which the workers 
like Brijlal Biyani and Mrs Joshi speak is 
really a sight to see as to how this movement 
is now permeating the m a s s e s ... .The organizers 
know that unless there is a mass agitation and 
mass awakening government would not yield to 
even reasonable demands of the educated few.2
1
Hitavada, 15 May 1930, p.2.
2
Ibid.
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During May 1930 Akola was also the scene of an intensive 
campaign against the liquor trade. Prominent among those 
who picketed liquor shops in Akola were the ladies of 
the town, assisted by pleaders, merchants and volunteers 
from ’other responsible quarters'. The ladies also 
'delivered lectures and sang songs on the evils of drink 
at the ale houses'.1
At the same time agitation began to intensify in
Amravati and Yeotmal. In Amravati town Wamanrao Joshi
and Abhyanker both delivered 'bad speeches which made no
2pretence to conceal their appeal to v i o l ence'. The 
government immediately swooped on the two leaders and 
put them in jail. Despite their arrest, however, the 
situation in Amravati worsened. During June the 
merchants of the town organised a boycott of foreign
3cloth, and Congressmen held a number of demonstrations. 
The government immediately arrested the leaders 
responsible for these demonstrations, and the centre of 
agitation swung away from Amravati to the Responsivist 
stronghold of Yeotmal, where Aney and his followers
4inaugurated the Forest Satyagraha on 10 July. But Aney, 
t o o , was a marked man. Members of the government 
believed that
1
H i t a v a d a , 25 May 1930, p . 15*
2
N A I , Home Poll, 1 8 / V I , 1930, FR , Second Half of May 
1930, p.l.
3
MPS, P & M, 302/CDM, 1930, p.8; H i t a v a d a , 12 June 1930, 
p . 11; 22 June 1930, p . 7; 22 June 1930, p . 9-
4
See p p .210-2.
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he was more dangerous than Biyani because he 
was preaching in the rural areas chiefly on the 
subject of the breach of forest laws. In view 
of Mr Aney's well known influence, this was bound 
in time to have a bad effect. It was the general 
opinion, however reluctant, that there was no 
alternative but to proceed against him.^
Accordingly, on 13 July 1930 the police arrested Aney, 
and on succeeding days, the leaders who replaced him.
As a result, the seat of agitation shifted once more to 
Amravati and west Berar.
The decline of the Responsivist Satyagraha in
Yeotmal enabled Congressmen to regain the political
initiative which they had temporarily lost to Ane y  and
his supporters. Congressmen in Berar had had some
misgivings about the decision of the Responsivists to
2participate in civil disobedience. To re-assert their 
own leadership of the campaign, therefore, they decided 
to launch a rival Congress Forest Satyagraha at Wadali 
in Amravati on 17 July 1930. The Satyagraha was an 
immediate success, and quickly spread to other villages 
in the district, accompanied by violence and ’outbursts
3o f ...destruction of government fore s t s ’. At the same 
time serious unrest broke out among the students of the
1
M P S , P & M, 272/CDM, 1930, Proceedings of a Meeting 
held at the Honourable the Home M e m b e r ’s Bungalow on
30 May 1930, p p . 14-15.
2
See N L I , Moonje MS, Diary 2, 10 July 1930; N A I , Home 
Poll, 18/VII, 1930, FR, First Half of July 1930, p.25 (?).
3
H i t a v a d a , 17 July 1930, p.9; 24 July 1930, p.8; NAI, 
Home Poll, 18/VIII, 1930, F R , First Half of July 1930, 
p . 25; Home Poll, 18/lX, 1930, F R , First Half of August 
1930, p.24.
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King Edward College in Amravati. During July and August 
1930» Congressmen also launched Forest Satyagrahas and 
urban agitations in the districts of Akola and Buldhana. 
The Satyagrahas, in particular, provided an effective 
challenge to the government. During August observers 
reported that ’people of all castes and creeds and 
status (were)...vieing with one another to break the 
forest laws’, and that ’thousands...(w e r e ) ready to go 
to jail'.1 The urban agitations were also effective, 
as the following description of the scene in one of the 
principal towns of Buldhana during July demonstrates:
In Khamgaon, the incident of the national flag 
in the government high school worked up...public 
enthusiasm....In close succession came the civil 
disobedience of forest laws, and public meetings 
in Khamgaon attracted thousands....Hartals were 
often spontaneously observed by Hindus and 
Muslims. Khadi came to adorn the most 
fashionable....Against this background, ^
Dr Parasnis decided to break the forest laws.
The government, however, took effective measures to crush 
these activities and by October the agitation in Amravati, 
Akola and Buldhana had contracted to the urban areas,
3and had declined considerably in intensity.
1
H i t a v a d a , 24 August 1930, p . 6; N A I , Home Poll, 18/lX,
1930, FR, Second Half of August 1930, p.71.
2
Hi tavada, 3 August 1930, p . 5* Dr M.N. Parasnis was a 
medical practitioner and a prominent Congressman in 
Khamgaon.
3
See A Compilation of Important Political Trials, op. cit., 
p . 21; H i t a v a d a , 17 July 1930, p . 7; NAI, Home Poll, 18/VIII, 
1930, FR, Second Half of July 1930, p.88; Home Poll, 18/lX, 
1930, F R , First Half of August 1930, p.24; Home Poll,
1 8 / X I , 1930, F R , First Half of October 1930, p.l.
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The shift of agitation to the towns marked the 
beginning of the fourth phase of civil disobedience in 
Berar. This phase lasted from October 1930 to February 
1931* The campaign of civil disobedience during this 
period consisted of vigorous agitations in Akola and 
Amravati which demonstrated the return of the Congress 
to a dominant place in the political life of Berar.
These agitations were aimed at prominent supporters of 
the Responsivist cause. The first of these was a 
campaign of abuse against Tambe for agreeing to 
represent the provincial government at the first Round 
Table Conference in London.1 The second agitation 
consisted of a boycott of the elections to the provincial 
legislature in November. While the agitation against 
Tambe did not prevent him leaving Berar on 2 October 1930 
'by a night train to Bombay enroute to England', the 
boycott of the elections was most successful, one of its
foremost victims being Ramrao Deshmukh, the former
2Minister for Agriculture. Following the boycott of the 
elections, Congressmen organised a boycott of the excise 
auctions which, like the elections, also took place in 
November. In Amravati, ladies threw themselves 
enthusiastically into the boycott. As the government
1
N A I , Khaparde MS, Diary, 2 October 1930; 4 October 1930.
2
Ibid., 2 October 1930; ibid., 11 November 1930; NAI, 
Home Poll, 18/X, 1930, F R , Second Half of October 1930, 
p.l; Home Poll, 18/XII, 1930, F R , First Half of November 
1930, p.l. The latter document relates that 'there was 
picketting at Headquarter towns in Berar... 50-60 per cent 
of Muslims in Berar voted; but not more than 20 per cent 
of the rest of the electorate'.
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The Congress arranged to picket the auctions on 
the first d a y . ..by women; and it was found 
necessary to arre s t . . .Mrs J o s h i . ..and a number 
of other women picketers who flung themselves 
prostrate in front of motor vehicles conveying 
bidders to the auctions.-*-
Such arrests ultimately had their effect, however, and the
anit-liquor agitation subsided, to be followed by
meetings at which Congressmen advocated a boycott of
2British goods and the non-payment of taxes. But with 
the signing of the truce between Gandhi and the Viceroy, 
all activity ceased and the campaign of civil disobedience 
came to an end.
reported, in Amravati
The campaign of civil disobedience in the Hindi 
region followed a similar course to the campaign in the 
Marathi region, with the addition of a rural phase during 
the latter part of 1930* As in the Marathi region,
Hindi leaders made use of a preparatory phase between 
January and March 1930 to arouse popular support for the 
impending attack on the government. The first phase 
opened on 17 January 1930, when the Hindi Congressmen
3absented themselves from the Council Chamber in Nagpur.
1
NAI, Home Poll, 18 / X I I , 1930, F R , First Half of 
November 1930, p.l. In Amravati, the boycott secured a 
decline of 4-9 per cent in the revenue under country 
liquor compared with the previous year.
2
NAI, Home Poll, 18/XIII, 1930, F R , Second Half of 
December 1930, p.l.
3
NML, AICC, G-125(ii) 1930, D.P. Mishra to President, 
Indian National Congress, 1 March 1930.
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Nine days later, on 26 January 1930, those who had 
vacated their seats in the Council and others took the 
message of agitation to people all over the Hindi region. 
On that day - Independence Day -
in far away villages and hilly areas in the 
forest regions of Bilaspur and M a n d l a ,...not 
to speak of the more accessible parts of the 
...(region), groups of men, women and children 
gathered in an open place in the early hours of 
the morning, hoisted the tricolour flag, sang 
the national song and listened to the Message 
of Independence.
In February, to spread that message even more widely 
through the Hindi region, Govind Das and Mishra founded
a Hindi daily, the L o k m a t , in Jabalpur, and the former
2set off on a whirlwind tour of the region. District
Congress leaders supplemented these activités by holding
tahsil conferences, or by using the educational staff of
the District Councils to spread the message of civil
3disobedience. The activation of the Hindi region 
reached a climax on 30 March 1930 when the Provincial
1
Mishra, op. cit., p . 379; N M L , AICC, G-I 36 (KW-l), 1930, 
D.P. Mishra to Secretary AICC, 29 January 1930. For the 
Message of Independence referred to, see Mishra, op. cit., 
pp . 379-81.
2
H i t a v a d a , 16 January 1930, p . 3; 26 January 1930, p p •9, 
11; 2 February 1930, p.7; 6 February 1930, p . 11;
13 February 1930, p . 11.
3
Ibid., 23 February 1930, p . 11; MPS, LSG, 1-94, 1930, 
Dissolution and Suspension of the District Council Betul, 
G.C. Turner, Commissioner Narmada Division to Chairman 
District Council Betul, 29 March 1930; Report on the 
State and Progress of Education in the Central Provinces 
and Berar for 1930 (Nagpur, 1931)> p .44.
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Congress Committee met in Jabalpur to constitute the 
first Hindi War Council, and to authorise it to 
'formulate a scheme of civil disobedience and organise 
an effective campaign in the p r o v i n c e ' ! 1
Almost immediately, the War Council splashed the
message of civil disobedience across the Hindi districts
by organising a Salt Satyagraha in the towns and
villages of the region. This Satyagraha formed the
second phase of civil disobedience, and during its
course attracted the attention of ’thousands of eager
2spectators'. The centre of the Satyagraha was 
Jabalpur, and there on 6 April 1930
a huge procession...organised...(and) led by 
Seth Govind Das and D.P. M i s h r a ... wended its 
way to the historic Samadhi of the warrior- 
queen Rani Durgavati, about thirteen miles 
from the city. There the assembled multitude 
took a solemn vow to carry the struggle for 
independence to a successful conclusion.
Batches of volunteers went forth and 
symbolically broke the salt l a w ....S i h o r a ,
Katni, Mandla and Damoh witnessed the same 
spectacle. In hundreds of villages the ritual 
was performed with solemnity.3
On 15 April 1930 the agitation took place in Raipur where 
it coincided with the opening of the Political Conference 
of the Hindi region.
1
H i t a v a d a , 3 April 1930, p . 3* The Hindi War Council 
comprised Seth Govind Das, D.P. Mishra, R.S. Shu k l a ,
M. Chaturvedi, K.R. Khandekar, G.S. Gupta and B. Patel.
2
Ibid., 13 April 1930, p . 7.
3
Mishra, op. cit., p.385*
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At this Conference the leaders of the Congress 
decided to step up the tempo of agitation in the Hindi 
region in view of the government’s refusal to suppress 
the Salt Satyagraha.1 This decision marked the 
beginning of the third phase of civil disobedience in 
the Hindi region. There were other reasons why the 
nationalists who attended the Conference were inspired 
to new heights of opposition to the government. On
14 April .1930 the British authorities arrested 
Jawarhalal Nehru in Allahabad as he was about to leave 
for Raipur. Shukla, who was President of the Conference 
'declared that the arrest of...Nehru had suddenly
transformed the political conference into a war
2conference’. At the Conference, too, Hindi leaders 
revived the ancient name of the Hindi region - Mahakoshal. 
I n  so doing, they aroused in those who heard the name a 
’host of sacred memories, legends and stories’, and
3spurred them to restore the region to freedom and glory.
As a result, the leaders of the Conference decided to 
supplement the salt agitation with the reading of 
proscribed literature, a Forest Satyagraha, and other
4forms of civil disobedience. This decision taken, the 
spotlight shifted back to Jabalpur, where, on 20 April
1930 all prominent Hindi leaders gathered to launch the 
intensive phase of civil disobedience:
1
H i t a v a d a , 20 April 1920, p . 9*
2
I b i d . , 20 A p r i l . , 20 April 1930, p.9; 24 April 1930, P*5*
3
Ibid., 20 April 1930, p.l; 24 April 1930, p . 5*
4
Ibid., 24 April 1930, p.8 .
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From Raipur came Ravi Shankar S h u k l a , from Drug 
came G.S. Gupta; from Khandwa came Makhanlal 
Chaturvedi; from Seoni came D.K. Mehta.
Khandekar came from Saugor, and Agnihotri from 
Mandla to tell that the whole province was behind 
the people of Jubbulpore in their resolve to 
fight the battle of freedom to the fini s h . ...
With Seth Govind Das (and) D.P. Mishra was 
V. Bhargava pleader, P. Jain a merchant, L. Kalve 
a cultivator, (who all)...read passages from a 
proscribed book.^
This meeting marked the beginning of a series of
agitations in the northern Hindi districts during April
and May. The government, however, replied by arresting
Govind Das, Shukla and others, and the movement there
died away to reappear in a more intense form in
2Chhat ti sgarh.
The swing of nationalist agitation to Chhattisgarh 
marked the beginning of the fourth phase of civil 
disobedience in Mahakoshal. This phase of the campaign, 
which took place between May and June 1930, was 
distinguished from those that preceded it in that, 
although it began in the towns, during its course it 
also penetrated deep into the countryside and was often
1
H i t a v a d a , 27 April 1930, P*5*
2
The government arrested Govind Das, Mishra, Shukla, 
Chaturvedi and V.D. Bhargava on 29 April 1930; and all 
except the latter were awarded sentences of two 'years' 
rigorous imprisonment. Bhargava received a sentence of 
one year. For the agitations see Mishra, op. cit., p.406; 
Hi tavada, 24 April 1930, P«9j 1 May 1930, p . 7; 4 May 
1930, pp.7, 10: 8 May 1930, p.9; H  May 1930, p . 7; 15 May 
1930, p.l; 25 May 1930, p. 13,* 29 May 1930, p.9;
15 June 1930, p.9.
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accompanied by violence. Again, this round of agitation 
drew for support on distinct social groups in contrast 
with the general support by townsfolk that had marked 
the previous phases of civil disobedience.
Of all the agitations launched in Chhattisgarh
between May and June 1930» perhaps the most successful
was the boycott of foreign cloth. It was certainly so
in Raipur, the main centre of nationalist agitation in
the division. There the merchants refused to sell
foreign cloth, the ladies announced their readiness to
spin, and ’almost all the labouring classes and artisans
1...decided to boycott foreign c l o t h ’. In addition, 
volunteers picketed the shops of those merchants who 
refused to support the boycott. Volunteers also
boycotted liquor shops in Raipur and other towns in
2Chhattisgarh. And in Raipur the campaign of civil 
disobedience in Mahakoshal showed its first proclivity 
to violence. The government ascribed this new development 
to the increasingly violent tone of political speeches 
in the division. On 9 June 1930, for instance, the 
government reported that
Government servants are openly attacked and the 
police especially abused and threatened.
Speaking at Raipur on 29 May, Purushottam Das 
urged his audience to buy arms and ammunition, 
and on 2 June said it would be easy to kill off 
the handful of British in the country....There 
have been instances in Raipur city itself of
1
Hitavada, 25 May 1930, p.15; 1 June 1930, p.9»
8 June 1930, p.2.
2
Ibid., 1 June 1930, p. 9*
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deliberate hampering of investigations. In 
Raipur, with the crowds which move in the 
streets day and n ight...becoming troublesome, 
police are insulted on every possible occasion, 
and European passers-by are jeered and shouted 
at. There are frequent demonstrations in the 
vicinity of the police lines.1
According to the government, the activities of the
District Council considerably aggravated the situation
in Raipur. This estimation was correct. The Council
played a vital part in the campaign of civil disobedience,
urging people in urban areas to participate in agitation,
and through its teachers, spreading the message of civil
2disobedience to the rural areas. By June 1930 the 
government considered the Council too great a danger to 
law and order in Raipur to go unchecked, and it decided
3to take immediate action. Accordingly, on 12 June the 
government dissolved the District Council of Raipur, and 
ten days later rounded up four of Shukla's lieutenants 
in Raipur. These measures achieved the desired effect, 
and by July a 'definite lull' descended on Raipur and
1
N A I , Home Poll, 253/30, 1930, The Civil Disobedience 
Movement in the Central Provinces, Extract from the 
Central Provinces Summary for the week ending 9 June 
1930, Raipur district, p . 4.
2
H i t a v a d a , 19 June 1930, p . 9; M P S , LSG, 1-95, 1930, 
Dissolution of the District Council Raipur, E. Gordon to 
Commissioner Chhattisgarh, n.d., pp.92-5; MPS, LSG, 1-95, 
1930, Dissolution of District Council, Betul, K.L.B. 
Hamilton to Secretary to Government, 24 May 1930, p p . 101-2.
3
For agitation in Durg, see Hi tavada, 26 June 1930, p . 15; 
and in Bilaspur, ibid., p.9*
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During this lull, agitation similar to that in 
Chhattisgarh flared up in the northern districts of
Mahakoshal. In the towns the agitation was sharp but
2brief. The police pounced on suspected ringleaders, 
and by early August the situation in Jabalpur, the 
centre of the movement, was ’much quieter than it (had)
3...been for some mon t h s ' . As the situation in Jabalpur 
and other northern towns quietened down, however, 
disturbances broke out in rural areas adjacent to the 
towns. Between June and July 1930 villagers and 
aboriginals in several districts raided government 
forests, invaded forest auctions and interfered with 
irrigation facilities. But once again the government 
swiftly suppressed the agitation, and in so doing brought 
the fourth phase of civil disobedience in Mahakoshal to
the division of Chhattisgarh.1
1
M P S , LSG, 1-95» 1930, Dissolution of the District Council 
Raipur, Resolution n o .CS 97» 12 June 1930, p p . 114-5j 
H i t a v a d a , 26 June 1930, p.8. Those arrested included 
W.R. L a k h e , Seth Sheodas D a g a , Abdul Rauf, and Thakur 
Pyarelal Singh; N A I , Home Poll, 18/VII, 1930, F R , Second 
Hal f  of June 1930, p.79*
2
Hi tavada, 5 June 1930, p . 5; 12 June 1930, p p .6, 12;
19 June 1930, p . 7; 29 June 1930, p.3; 3 July 1930, p . 7;
20 July 1 9 3 0 , p.7; 24 July 1930, pp.2, 7; MPS, P & M, 
302/CDM, 1 9 3 0 , pp . 5-7; MPS, LSG, 18-6, 1 9 3 2 , Report on 
the Working of Municipal Committees in Jabalpur Division,
p p . 63-4.
3
NAI, Home Poll, 18/VTI, 1930, FR, Second Half of June 
1930, p . 79; Home Poll, 18/VIII, 1930, F R , First Half of 
June 1930, p.25; Home Poll, 18/lX, 1930, F R , First Half 
of August 1930, p.24.
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The forest agitation of July 1930» however, was not 
a passing phenomenon. In reality, it was the prelude to 
a massive wave of forest disturbances that swept across 
Mahakoshal between August and November 1930 to form the 
fifth phase of civil disobedience in the region. These 
disturbances were so extensive in nature and involved 
such huge numbers of people that they offered the 
government its most severe challenge of the entire 
campaign of civil disobedience in the Central Provinces 
and Berar during 1930. Those involved in the campaign 
included villagers and members of the aboriginal tribes 
of Gonds and Korkus. In assessing the causes of the 
Satyagraha, the government had this to say:
The appeal of forest satyagraha...was irresistible. 
T h e s e . ..people have always looked upon the 
restrictions imposed by forest conservation as 
an unjustifiable encroachment on their natural 
rights, and were an easy prey to propaganda 
which told them that forest laws were unjust 
and made only to be broken. Further, in its 
search for recruits, the Congress had recourse 
to the lowest classes of the population, 
ex convicts, the riff raff of the bazaars in 
the towns and the l i k e . ...(The) dangers of the 
situation were obvious.2
a clo se.
1
H i t a v a d a , 5 June 1930, p-5j 6 July 1930, p.3> N A I ,
Home Poll, 253/30, 1930, The Civil Disobedi ence Movement 
in the Central Provinces, Weekly Summary for the week 
ending 19 July 1930, p.l4; NAI, Home Poll, 18/VIII, 1930, 
FR, Second Half of July 1930, p.89; M P S , P & M, 302/CDM,
1930, p.8.
2
MPS, P & M, 302/CDM, 1930, p . 13. See also MPS, Forest, 
1-4-2, 1931» Correspondence Relating to Forest Grievances.
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Apprehending the dangers of the situation, however, 
was one matter; dealing with them was another. The 
government tried to halt the campaign in its early stages 
by arresting its leaders - D.K. Mehta, G.S. Gupta, and 
Seth Dipchand Gothi, a leading nationalist from Betul.1 
But the Satyagrahas only proliferated, springing up on a
large scale and with great rapidity in Betul, Durg, Seoni,
2Chhindwara, Mandla, Raipur and Nimar. In many districts, 
too, the agitation was accompanied by serious violence, 
as in Betul on 19 September 1930* The police had 
arrested some forest Satyagrahis in the district and were 
bringing them to Bordehi. As they halted at village 
Kundara
about 400 persons came armed with lathis and... 
seized the enquiry papers, which they tore up 
on the spot. The District Superintendent of 
Police and the Divisional Forest Officer 
immediately proceeded to the spot with a party 
of police and made 11 arrests. Returning to 
Jambara Railway Station they were overtaken 
by a party of about 400 villagers who intended 
to rescue the arrested men. They, however, 
dispersed as soon as the Police made as if to 
charge. A hour later, about 700 villagers all 
armed with lathis came to the station with the 
same object and hurled stones at the police party.
1
H i t a v a d a , 21 August 1930, P*3j A Compilation of 
Important Political Trials in the Central Provinces and 
Berar, op. cit., p.2.
3
Hi ta v a d a , 21 August 1920, pp.3 - 7 j 28 August 1.930, p. 7;
4 September 1930, p p .9, 13; 7 September 1930, p.9?
14 September 1930, p.5; 2 October 1930, p .10 ; N A I , Home 
Poll, 18/X, 1930, F R , First Half of September 1930, p.l; 
MPS, P & M, 302/CDM, 1930, p p . 10-11.
3
CPLC, vol.I, 27 February 1931, Appendix A, p.400; see
also ibid., pp.398-9*
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The government responded with equal force, and by
30 September 1930 the situation had quietened considerably. 
During October, the incidence of agitation decreased 
still further, and by November had ceased altogether.1
Following the Forest Satyagrahas agitation again
broke out in the urban areas of Mahakoshal, but came to
a halt with the truce between Gandhi and the viceroy in
1931* This period of urban agitation from October 1930
to February 1931 constituted the final phase of civil
disobedience in Mahakoshal. In the towns merchants
observed a boycott of foreign cloth; a 'batch of young
workers, most of them without what is called a liberal
education', conducted an anti-liquor campaign; and a
host of volunteers organised a successful boycott of
2the elections to the legislature during November.
Two district Councils - those of Raipur and Betul - 
also contributed to the attack on the government during 
the last phase of civil disobedience. In October 1930 
the government dissolved both Councils for fomenting 
civil disobedience, and ordered them to elect fresh 
office-bearers. The Councils obeyed this order, but
1
Hitavada, 14 September 1930, P- 5, 2 October 1930, p. 10;
Indian Annual Register, no.2,
p
1930, P- 435.
Hitavada, 11 September 1930, p-5; 5 0 c tober 1930, p.7;
12 October 1930, pp.9, 10; 26 October 1930, p. ii;2 November 1930, pp.7, 9; 9 November 1930, pp.7, 11;
4 December 1930, p.7; Indian Annual Register, no.2, 1930, 
p.145; NAI, Home Poll, 18/X, 1930, FR, Second Half of 
October 1930, p.l; NML, AICC, 248, 1931» Mahakoshal 
Annual Report, 1931j A Congress dummy, Balraj, defeated 
the former Minister for Education, P.C. Bose.
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signified their opposition to the government by electing 
men who were still serving sentences in jail for 
offences committed during civil disobedience. As a 
result, in November 1930 the government pronounced the 
Councils 'incompetent' and suspended them - that of 
Betul for two, and Raipur for three, years - to prevent 
them causing any further trouble.1 Following these 
suspensions, the campaign of civil disobedience in 
Mahakoshal gradually came to a halt, and with the
signing of the truce between Gandhi and the Viceroy,
2ceased altogether.
The achievements of civil disobedience in the Central 
Provinces and Berar in 1930 were many. First, although 
the campaigns occurred in three separate arenas, namely, 
the division of Nagpur, Berar and Mahakoshal, they were 
more alike than the movements of non-cooperation in the 
three areas during 1921-2. This similarity gave the 
campaigns of 1930 greater cohesion and hence made them a 
more effective challenge to the government. The campaigns 
of 1930 also challenged the government's ability to 
maintain law and order to a much greater extent than the 
non-cooperation movement in 1921. They did so by drawing
1
MPS, LSG, 1-9^, 1930, Dissolution and Suspension of the 
District Council Betul, Resolution no.7340-73/1050-DVII, 
Nagpur, 11 November 1930, p.27; MPS, LSG, 1-95, 1930, 
Dissolution of the District Council Raipur, Resolution 
no.7340-A/1014-DVIII, Nagpur, 11 November 1930, pp.153-5*
2
See Hitavada, 13 November 1930, p.6; 21 December 1930,
p.9j 15 February 1931, P*13*
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into sustained agitation large numbers of people from 
all sections of society - rural and urban. Among these 
were members of the urban middle classes, the merchant 
community, the educated ladies of the towns, students, 
the urban lower classes, villagers, and members of the 
aboriginal tribes.
The campaigns of civil disobedience were also more 
effective than those of non-cooperation in that they 
aroused a far greater degree of opposition to the 
government in rural areas. This was partly because the 
campaigns of 1930 were built on the foundations laid 
in 1921; and partly also because the Congress was far 
better organised for rural agitation in 1930 than in 
1921. Whatever the reason, the results of the rural 
movements in 1930 were not in doubt. Those movements 
unleashed a train of 'turbulent lawlessness' in the 
countryside,1 and their latent effects undermined the 
respect for authority on which British rule in the 
province rested. In the government's view:
Of many districts it can be said truthfully that 
apart from those who were actually involved in 
offences, there was an appreciably larger section 
of the public which gave up the traditional 
attitude of friendliness and hospitality to the 
police and adopted one of sullen hostility 
instead.2
The campaigns of civil disobedience in 1930 seriously 
jeopardised the rule of law in the Central Provinces and
1
Hitavada, 25 September 1930, p.8.
2
Report on the Police Administration of the Central 
Provinces and Berar for the Year 1 9 3 0 (Nagpur, 1931), P*5*
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Berar. The extent to which they did so was reflected 
in the changing responses of the government to civil 
disobedience. At first the authorities tried to 
control the agitation by a policy of non interference. 
As the level of agitation increased, however, the 
government arrested and imprisoned the ringleaders of 
the movement. This, too, proved ineffective, and the 
government was compelled to promulgate ordinances; 
arrest volunteers in large numbers; impose fines 
'proportionate to the status and income* of those 
arrested; dissolve local bodies; impose punitive police 
in nine districts; and resort to firing, lathi charges 
and whipping - justifying the latter as the only 
suitable punishment for illiterate hill-folk.1
Congress leaders made two major gains in their 
campaigns of agitation in 1930. First, they 
dislocated the finances of the province at a time of 
economic recession, thus compelling the government to 
suspend many nation-building activities and to 
institute a programme of retrenchment in the government
Report on the Police Administration of the Central 
Provinces and Berar for the Year 1 9 3 0 (Nagpur,1931)» 
p.2; MPS, P & M, 302/CDM, 1930, pp.13-14; Hitavada, 11 
September 1930, p.5; 14 September 1930, p.7; 20 October
1930, p.10.
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services.1 Secondly, through their campaigns, the 
leaders of the Congress re-established themselves as the 
leaders of the people, displacing the responsive 
cooperators who had assumed that role from them in 1926.
II
Scarcely a year after Gandhi and the Viceroy had 
agreed on a truce, the Indian National Congress was once 
more at war with the Government of India. At first the 
Congress and the government made strenuous efforts to 
observe the terms of the truce, but during 1931 each 
side accused the other of breaking those terms. 
Furthermore, despite Gandhi's participation in the second 
Round Table Conference in London, the delegates did not 
reach any agreement on the thorny question of communal 
representation. As a result, relations between the
1
Hitavada, 25 September 1930» P * 8 ;  The Central Provinces 
and Berar, Report on the Administration of the Province 
for the Year 1929-30 (Nagpur, 1931)» pp .15 » 22; MPS,
P & M, 302/CDM, 1930, PP*23-4; Report on the Excise 
Revenue of the Central Provinces and Berar for 1930 
(Nagpur, 1931), P •1j Report on the Forest Administration 
of the Central Provinces and Berar for the Year ending
1931 (Nagpur, 1932), p .18. The government estimated the 
total damage to forests during 1930 at Rs 7»00,000. The 
civil disobedience movement also affected the revenue 
from timber and grazing leases, the loss here being in 
the region of Rs 8 ,8 5,564. The government was also 
compelled to spend an extra Rs 2,00,000 in the Police 
Department, and Rs 1,00,000 in the Jail Department. In 
addition, it had to face the staggering loss of 
Rs 30,00,000 in excise revenue. During the first nine 
months of 1930, consumption of liquor decreased by 27 
per cent on the previous year.
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nationalists and the government worsened. By December
1931 they had deteriorated to such an extent that 
Congressmen in the United Provinces had launched a no­
tax campaign in the rural areas of the province. Early 
in 1932 the Government of India replied by arresting 
Gandhi, Nehru and other national leaders and by 
promulgating ordinances, more far reaching in their scope 
than any it had issued hitherto.
In the Central Provinces and Berar, the period of 
the truce was at first more smooth in the Marathi region 
than in Mahakoshal. But by the end of 1931 Congressmen in 
both regions were equally prepared for a second campaign 
of civil disobedience against the provincial government.
In March 1931 the Government of the Central Provinces 
heartily welcomed the truce. Speaking in the Council on 
6 March, the Finance Member, Sir Arthur Nelson, declared 
that
I need hardly say, sir, both for myself and my 
colleagues, and I am authorised to add on 
behalf of His Excellency the Governor, and I 
feel sure, I may add also on behalf of all the 
officials of the Government, how greatly 
pleased we are at the prospect now held out 
of a return to normal conditions.!
To assist this return, on the same day the government
ordered the release of most of those imprisoned for civil
2disobedience during 1930* Until August 1931»
1
CPLC, vo1.1, 6 March 1931, p.764.
2
MPS, P & M, Confidential, 48/CDM, 1931, H.C. Gowan, 
Chief Secretary to all District Commissioners, Central 
Provinces and Berar, no.154-1, 6 March 1931*
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nationalists in the Marathi region responded to these 
gestures with activités which, while they sustained the 
spirit of popular opposition to British rule, did not 
contravene the terms of Gandhi's agreement with the 
Viceroy.1 However, as relations between the national 
leaders of the Congress and the Government of India 
deteriorated, Congressmen in the Marathi region stepped 
up the enrolment of volunteers and held meetings and
conferences at which speakers anticipated a 'coming fight'
2with the government. Abhyanker, in particular, 
reflected the resurgence of nationalist sentiment in the 
Marathi region. On 2 0  October 1931 he declared in a 
meeting at Nagpur that
all the Indian delegates to the Round Table 
Conference were humbugs except Gandhi: and 
spoke of the necessity of organising new 
volunteers for the renewed struggle, ending 
with a prayer that he might meet his death on 
the battlefield fighting for the freedom of 
India.3
1
For the division of Nagpur see Hitavada, 3 May 1931» 
p.2; 14 June 1931» P •10> 18 June 1931» P*8; 9 July 1931» 
p.5; 13 August 1931» p.5. For Berar, see ibid., 5 April
19 31, p.9; 30 April 1 9 3 1, p.7; 24 May 1931» p.7;
4 June 1931> P •5•
2
For the division of Nagpur see ibid., 2 0  August 1 9 3 1 »
p. 1 0 ;  6 September 1 9 3 1 »  P * 9 »  2 5  October 1 9 3 1 »  P * 7 >
8 November 1931» P»7; 26 November 1931» P*12; 6 December 
1931» PP*2, 7» 10 December 1931» p.12. For Berar see 
ibid., 6 September 1931» P-13» 29 October 1931» P*5»
1 November 1931» P*9> 19 November 1931» P*6; 3 December
1931, P-4; NAI, Home Poll, 18/VIII, 1931» F R , First Half 
of August 1931» p.1; Home Poll, 18/X, 1931» FR, Second 
Half of October, 1931» p.l.
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In keeping with the general decline in relations between 
the national leaders of the Congress and the Government 
of India, Congressmen in the Marathi region also 
prepared to launch a no-tax campaign against the 
government in the countryside.1 Then, following the 
arrest of Nehru and Gandhi, Abhyanker and Wamanrao Joshi 
dissolved the Provincial Congress Committees in Nagpur
and Berar, respectively, and replaced them with War
n • i 2CounciIs.
During the truce in Mahakoshal, nationalists 
adopted a more militant attitude to the government than 
they did in the Marathi region. After their release 
from jail in March 1931» Hindi leaders made strong 
speeches against the government probably because they
suspected that it was not fully implementing the terms
3 4of the truce. Rao intervened to pacify the situation,
but the speeches continued, witness Butler’s reference
to the Sagar Political Conference of June 1931 in a
1
Hitavada, 15 November 1931» p .10; 29 November 1931» P*6;
6 December 1931» P*7j 10 December 1931» p.4.
2
Ibid., 7 January 1931» P P •6, 8. The Nagpur War Council 
consisted of M.V. Abhyanker (President), Ranka (Secretary), 
Bhangwandin (Treasurer), Dharmadikari, Dangre and others. 
Wamanrao Joshi was President, and Brijlal Biyani was 
Secretary, of the Berar War Council.
3
NAI, Home Poll, 18/V, 1931» F R , First Half of May 1931» 
p.l; Home Poll, 18/VI, 1931» F R , Second Half of June 
1931» P-1; NML, Rao MS, D.P. Mishra to E.R. Rao, 12 
April 1931*
4
Ibid., A Note by E.R. Rao on Politics in Jabalpur,
17 April 1931; ibid., an undated Note on Seth Govind Das.
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The speeches of third day at Saugor were bad, 
and the meeting carried a resolution not to 
cooperate at the Round Table Conference. Also 
Govind Das's familiar (D.P. Mishra) made a 
rude attack on the D(istrict) c ( ommissioner) 
Jubbulpore. The Seth also went all out over 
no rent. ^
Furthermore, the Conference at Sagar endorsed candidates
for the forthcoming local government elections with a
view to ’utilise local bodies for organising the future
2fight’. At the same time Hindi Congressmen launched 
boycotts of foreign cloth and liquor in the towns, and 
prepared to institute a no-rent campaign in the
3countryside. This campaign had not begun, however,
before Nehru was arrested and the Hindi Provincial
Congress Committee had dissolved itself into a War
kCouncil under the leadership of Govind Das.
The second campaign of civil disobedience in the 
Central Provinces and Berar offered little real challenge 
to the government compared with the agitation in 1930. 
This was largely due to the prompt and effective action
letter to Raos
1
NML, Sir M. Butler to E.R. Rao, 18 June 1931*
2
Extract from the List of Political and Quasi-Political 
Societies in Central Provinces and Berar (n.d.), p.8.
3
Hitavadat 26 April 1931, P*5; 7 May 1931, P*10; 14 June
1931, p.9; 5 July 1931, P-10; 26 July 1931, PP-10, 11;
1 November 1931, P*7j 8 November 1931, P*lj NAI, Home Poll, 
18/VI, 1931, FR, First Half of June 1931, p.l? Home Poll, 
18/XI, 1931, FR, Second Half of November 1931, p.l.
4
Hitavada, 10 January 1931, P*9*
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taken by the government It was also due to a marked 
unwillingness on the part of the urban and rural populations 
to throw themselves into the agitation to the same extent 
as they had done in 1930 . 1 As a result, the income of the
government suffered little and law and order remained
2intact. However, as in 1930, the Congress led the 
agitation, and thus once again made good its claim to 
espouse the interests of the people.
The provincial government dealt severely with the 
attempts to launch a second campaign of civil disobedience
and quickly brought the movement under control. As for
3the division of Nagpur, early in January 1932 the
1
NAI, Home Poll, 18/1, 1932, FR, First Half of January 
1932, p.2.
2
Report on the Excise Revenue of the Central Provinces 
and Berar for the Year 1932 (Nagpur, 1933)» p .1 .
3
For the sake of clarity, the 'division of Nagpur' 
continues to refer to the four Marathi districts of Nagpur, 
Wardha, Bhandara and Chanda. These four districts 
comprised the Nagpur province of the Indian National 
Congress. In 1931» however, the government reorganised 
the divisions of the Central Provinces and Berar to 
effect economies in government spending. It abolished 
the division of Narmada, and amalgamated the districts 
of Sagar and Damoh; Narsimhapur and Hoshangabad; and 
Chhindwara and Seoni. The government placed the first two 
districts in the new division of Jabalpur, which then 
comprised the districts of Jabalpur, Mandla, Nimar, 
together with the enlarged districts of Sagar and 
Hoshangabad. To the districts of Nagpur, Wardha and 
Chanda, the government added the district of Betul and 
the enlarged district of Chhindwara. These districts then 
constituted the division of Nagpur. In addition the 
government added Bhandara and Balaghat to the districts 
of Raipur, Bilaspur and Durg, and so formed the new 
division of Chhattisgarh. The division of Berar 
remained unchanged.
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and Ranka, and applied an Ordinance to prevent
molestation and boycotting in the district of Nagpur.1
In addition, to deter other leaders from stirring up the
people, the courts imposed severe sentences and fines
2on Abhyanker and Ranka. Next, on 13 January 1932 Butler 
issued a public statement on the government's attitude 
towards the new campaign of civil disobedience, stating 
that
during the last civil disobedience movement, 
government took a lenient view of the 
picketing...and interfered only when it 
became forcible or was such a nuisance that 
the public cried out for intervention....
That policy failed and this time we have 
decided to take all measures necessary to 
secure the right of all members of the public 
to pursue their lawful avocations without 
interference to their liberty....We have the 
will and the power to protect you.3
Butler was true to his word. Within a month the 
government had applied the ordinance against picketing 
to the districts of Wardha, Chanda and Bhandara, and 
under this ordinance arrested large numbers of
4volunteers. As for other measures to nip nationalist
government outlawed the War Council, arrested Abhyanker
1
NAI, Home Poll, 18/1, 1932, F R , First Half of January 
1932, p.l.
2
Both men received three years rigorous imprisonment.
The government also fined Abhyanker Rs 10,000 and 
auctioned his car. It later reduced the fine to Rs 2,500.
3
Hitavada, 14 January 1932, p.7*
4
NAI, Home Poll, 18/4, 1932, F R , Second Half of February 
1932, p.l; Hitavada, 25 February 1932, p.8; 14 July 1932, 
p. 6.
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activity in the bud, during January 1932 the authorities 
seized the property and funds of institutions in Nagpur 
which housed or trained agitators.1 They also prevented 
assembly and prohibited newspapers from publishing any
2matter relating to the campaign of civil disobedience. 
These measures were all extraordinarily effective, and 
the only agitations that survived them were the boycotts 
organised by the merchant community. After an initial 
period of hesitation, the merchants of Nagpur, Chanda 
and Wardha swung behind the Congress to boycott, first
foreign cloth, and later, foreign sugar and household
3articles in common use. However, so heavy was the 
barrage which the government unleashed against the 
nationalists, that by August 1932 these agitations, too,
4were almost at an end.
The campaign of civil disobedience in Berar during
1932 was more aggressive than the campaign in the
1
Hitavada, 14 January 1932, p.5; 17 January 1932, P«7j 
Mishra, op. cit., p.4o4.
2
Ibid., p.4o4; Hi tavada, 21 January 1932, p.5; NAI,
Home Poll, 18/1, 1932, F R , Second Half of January 1932, 
p.l; Indian Annual Register, no.1, 1932, p.2 5.
3
Hi tavada, 10 January 1932, P*7> 24 January 1932, p.95
31 March 1932, p.5; 14 April 1932, pp.5, 8; NAI, Home 
Poll, 18/4, 1932, F R , Second Half of February 1932, p.l; 
Home Poll, 18/10, 1932, F R , Second Half of July 1932, 
p.l; Home Poll, 18/11, 1932, F R , Second Half of August 
1932, p.l.
4
See Hi tavada, 4 August 1932, p.5; H  August 1932, p. 5,
21 August 1932, p.l. In mid-August, the government 
released Abhyanker on grounds of ill-health.
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division of Nagpur. During January the government 
arrested prominent leaders and promulgated ordinances 
to suppress the agitation as it had done in the division 
of Nagpur.1 Despite this, however, the campaign 
persisted longer in Berar than in that division and 
offered a correspondingly greater challenge to the 
government. This was due to two factors. First,
Wamanrao Joshi avoided arrest by making 'studiously
2moderate' speeches, and thus made his leadership
available to Congressmen throughout the course of the
agitation in Berar. Secondly, the nationalist leaders
in Berar seem to have had the use of a more constant
supply of volunteers than their counterparts in Nagpur.
This was particularly the case in Akola, where, with the
assistance of merchants and volunteers, a succession of
3boycotts occurred until June. Similar agitations, though 
on a smaller scale, also took place in Buldhana and 
Amravati. By July, however, as a result of firm action 
by the government, the movement everywhere had
1
Hitavada, 3 January 1932, p.6; 21 January 1932, p.75
31 January 1932, p p .7, 10; 4 February 1937, P*5j 13 March 
1932, p . 10 ; A Compilation of Important Political Trials 
in the Central Provinces and Berar, op. cit., p.5; NAI, 
Home Poll, 18/1, 1932, F R , Second Half of January 1932, 
p.l; ibid., F R , Second Half of January 1932, pp.1-2;
Home Poll, 5/46, 1932, Weekly Telegraphic Reports from 
Local Governments on the Situation arising out of the 
Civil Disobedience Movement, p.22; Home Poll, 18/4, 1932, 
F R , First Half of February 1932, p.l.
2
Ibid., p.l.
3
Hi tavada, 6 March 1932, P*9j 7 April 1932, p.9; 20 March
1932, p.10; 24 March 1932, p.8; 21 April 1930, p.8;
1 May 1932, p.4.
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collapsed.
Civil Disobedience in Mahakoshal, like that in the
division of Nagpur, also occurred on a very limited
scale. The main centres of the agitation were the towns
of Jabalpur, Khandwa, and Sagar in the north, and Raipur
and Durg in the east. In the latter stages of the
campaign Betul also became important owing to a
recurrence there of Forest Satyagraha. In dealing with
these agitations, the government adopted a policy
similar to the one it had employed in the Marathi region.
It first arrested important leaders like Govind Das,
Mishra and Shukla, and then promulgated ordinances to
2enable it to arrest volunteers on a large scale. The 
government also suppressed by ordinances the printing 
of hostile news items, and prohibited meetings and
3conferences scheduled to be held in Jabalpur and Sagar.
As a result, the desultory agitation quickly subsided, 
and the government withdrew ordinances and allowed
1
Report on the Revenue Administration and on the 
Operations of the Land Records and Settlement Departments 
of the Berar Division for the Year 1932 (Nagpur, 1933), 
p.8; NAI, Home Poll, 18/8, 1932, F R , First Half of May
1932, p.l.
2
A Compilation of Important Political Trials in the 
Central Provinces and Berar, op. cit., p.11; Hitavada,
10 January 1932, p.l; 14 January 1932, p.l; 28 January
1932, p.5; 25 February 1932, p.8; 15 May 1932, p. 4;
26 May 1932, p.5.
3
Ibid., 7 February 1932, p .10; 18 February 1932, p.8 ;
21 February 1932, p.9 5 10 April 1932, p.5j 2 June 1932,
PP-5, 6; 30 June 1932, p.5; 31 July 1932, p.9-
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conferences to be held, where it was confident that these 
would not disturb law and order.1
Ill
Between 1932 and 1933 agitation against the 
government diminished perceptibly, and Congressmen 
turned their attention towards a movement to uplift the 
Depressed community. In so doing they strengthened their 
claim to espouse the interests of the common people.
This movement had the additional advantage of swinging 
political interest away from civil disobedience towards 
constructive work, and, as it proved in time, towards 
the legislature. The author of the campaign to uplift 
the Depressed community was Gandhi. He began the 
campaign in 1932, following the publication of the 
Communal Award, a document prescribing separate 
electorates for Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs and the 
Depressed community under the proposed constitution for 
India. Gandhi considered the award of separate 
electorates to the Depressed community as immoral, and 
on 20 September 1932 he began a fast to compel the 
British government to abandon the scheme. Gandhi 
achieved his immediate objective, and at the same time 
set in train a nationwide movement that weakened the 
bastion of untouchability. This movement confirmed the 
claim by the Congress that it espoused the interests of 
the Depressed community in addition to those of other
1
Hitavada, 23 June 1932, p.l; 30 June 1932, p.7j NAI, 
Home Poll, 18/10, 1932, FR, First Half of July 1932, p.l.
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In 1932 Congressmen in the Central Provinces and 
Berar leapt into prominence as the champions of the 
Depressed community. They did so in the wake of Gandhi's 
symbolic fast, which triggered off a movement to remove 
the stigma of untouchability from the Depressed community 
in the province. Swept along by this movement, Congress 
and other leaders opened wells and temples to the 
Depressed community, or Harijans as Gandhi named them, 
and according to observers, 'great cordiality and 
cooperation (was) visible throughout'.1 Nowhere was 
this 'cordiality and cooperation' between Congressmen 
and Harijans more in evidence than in Nagpur. The 
Hitavada described the scene in the city on 20 September
1932 - the day on which Gandhi began his fast:
The 20 September was observed as Gandhi day.... 
(There was) unprecedented support from the 
Nagpur public.... Co lieges and schools were 
for the most part deserted and municipal 
offices closed....Hindu shops observed a 
hartal,...and many Hindus fasted....Dr Khare 
declared four temples open to the depressed 
castes....(There was) a procession with a 
portrait of Gandhi in the evening with both 
touchables and untouchables ... ending in a  ^
mammoth meeting with Dr Khare in the chair.
Similar scenes to the one in Nagpur occurred all over 
the province.
During 1933 Gandhi skilfully blended his political
underprivileged peoples of India.
1
Hi tavada, 18 September 1932, p»7> 22 September 1932,
p.5; 25 September 1932, p.7; 2 October 1932, p.5*
2
Ibid., 22 September 1932, p.5*
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activities with his work on behalf of the Harijan 
community. In this way he inspired further efforts to 
remove untouchability, and at the same time lessened 
the possibility that the Congress would renew its 
campaign of civil disobedience against the government.
On three occasions during 1933 Gandhi focussed the 
attention of the Indian public on the Harijan community. 
In May and August he undertook further symbolic fasts 
on behalf of the Harijans; and in September he announced 
that he would begin a nationwide tour to collect funds 
for the uplift of that community.
Gandhi’s activities in 1933 benefited the Harijans 
and increased the popularity of the Congress in the 
Central Provinces and Berar. His two fasts and the 
Harijan tour coincided with a marked decline in the 
level of agitation, which in some parts of the province 
had lingered on into 19 33* No corresponding decline, 
however, occurred in the prestige of the Congress, for 
by identifying with the Harijan movement, the Congress 
leaders engaged in purposeful activity and at the same 
time maintained public interest in their organisation.
The event which aroused the greatest interest 
amongst people in the Central Provinces and Berar was 
undoubtedly Gandhi’s Harijan tour of the province in 
November 1933- During this tour Congressmen identified 
themselves with the uplift of Harijans. But more 
significantly, as the associates of Gandhi they moved 
to the centre of a crowded and emotion-charged campaign.
In so doing they won tremendous prestige for the Congress. 
The prestige of the Congress in the Central Provinces and 
Berar was never higher than on 8 November 1933» t h e  day
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on which Gandhi arrived in Nagpur on the first stage of 
the Harijan tour. As the Hitavada saw it, it was a day 
of 'warm and enthusiastic welcomes', a day of 'gifts, 
official meetings, and car processions...with surging 
crowds in holiday mood'. At the centre of it all was 
the diminutive Mahatma, wreathed in flowers, and by his 
side his host, Dr Khare.1 It was the same story in the 
towns and villages of Chanda and Wardha, and then in
Berar, where Bajaj and Wamanrao Joshi, respectively,
2were Gandhi's hosts. Following his tour of Berar, 
Gandhi crossed into Mahakoshal, where further honours 
awaited him and his associates. Gandhi's visit to 
Raipur, where he stayed with Ravi Shankar Shukla, was 
one of the highlights of the tour in Mahakoshal. 
According to the Hi tavada
Gandhi's visit and the opening of the swadeshi 
exhibition created great enthusiasm throughout 
the district. People came from long distances 
on foot to have Mahatma's darshan....Raipur 
was illuminated and presented a gala appearance 
at the time of Gandhi's arrival....Huge crowds 
are visiting the exhibition which is the first 
of its kind in Raipur....(There) was a 
monster gathering of about 50000 people.3
Gandhi's visit kindled a similar enthusiasm in the 
northern Hindi districts, where, according to one
1
Hi tavada, 9 November 1 9 3 3 »  P * 5 .
2
Ibid., 1 2  November 1 9 3 3 »  P « 7 >  1 6  November 1 9 3 3 »  P * 7 j  
1 9  November 1 9 3 3 »  P - 7 >  2 3  November 1 9 3 3 »  p . 8 .
3
For Gandhi's tour in Chhattisgarh see ibid., 2 6  November 
1 9 3 3 »  p . 7 ; 3 0  November 1 9 3 3 »  P * 3 >  3  December 1 9 3 3 »  P - 9 *
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observer, his presence created 'a wonderful atmosphere, 
enabling us to breathe full and free air, and feel that 
we belong to the same motherland'.
Although the Harijan tour undoubtedly raised the 
prestige of the Congress in the Central Provinces and 
Berar, it was not without its critics. Some observers
pointed out that the tour had not removed 'tradition
2and conservatism'. Others claimed that 'here and there 
(we find) preparations for some sort of show of Harijan
3work, when in fact nothing is being done'. Others
again were unhappy at the speed with which Gandhi toured
the province, and at his reiterated complaints concerning
4the inadequacy of the donations. Reports that Gandhi
would only visit towns where Congress leaders could
guarantee him a certain sum of money only added to the
5dissatisfaction. But these criticisms could not detract 
from the excitement of Gandhi's tour. Nor could they 
undermine the prestige of the Congress as the sponsor of 
that tour.
1
For the tour in the northern districts see Hitavada,
10 December 1933» P*4; 17 December 1933» P*9*
2
Ibid., 10 December 1933» p.4.
3
Ibid., 16 November 1933» p.10.
4
NAI, Home Poll, 3/^3» 1933» The Harijan Tour, DO, 
328/403-A/1 from N.J. Roughton to Hallett, 4 December 
1933; Home Poll, 18/14, 1933, F R , First Half of December 
1933» p.l. Gandhi received Rs 73»925 for his Harijan 
fund in the Central Provinces and Berar.
5
Hi tavada, 30 November 1933» p.l.
309
Congress leaders in the Central Provinces and. Berar 
turned from the Harijan campaign in 193^ to contest the 
elections to the Central Legislative Assembly. Between 
1933-4 nationalists throughout India urged the Congress 
to permit its members to return to the legislatures. As 
a result, in April 193^ Gandhi suspended civil 
disobedience and during May submitted a resolution to 
the All-India Congress Committee seeking approval for 
Congressmen to enter the legislatures. The Committee 
accepted the resolution. Soon afterwards, Gandhi 
resigned from the Congress to improve the lot of India's 
rural population, and Congressmen prepared to contest 
the elections for the Central Legislative Assembly to 
be held in November.
In the Central Provinces, the campaigns of civil 
disobedience and the Harijan movement placed the Congress 
in a strong position to win the elections for the Central 
Legislative Assembly. The position in Berar was slightly 
different. In 193^ Aney decided to contest the elections 
on behalf of the Congress Nationalist 'party', a 
Responsivist body which he had formed in association 
with Pandit Malaviya. Although the popularity of the 
Congress had grown enormously in Berar since 1930, the 
leaders of the organisation decided not to oppose Aney. 
They did so possibly out of respect for his long 
association with the nationalist cause in Berar, and 
possibly because he had identified himself closely with 
the Indian National Congress during the second campaign 
of civil disobedience.
IV
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No such harmony marked the contest for the Central 
Legislative Assembly either in the division of Nagpur or 
in Mahakoshal. In both areas, the period leading up to 
the actual campaign was characterised by bitter 
factional struggles between members of the Congress party. 
In the division of Nagpur a struggle for power once again 
ensued between the non-Marathi non-Brahman group led by 
Poonamchand Ranka and Awari and the Marathi and 
predominantly Brahman group led by Abhyanker and Dr Khare. 
The struggle between these two groups had a slight 
ideological twist to it, in that the non-Brahman 
populists held that it was they, and not the Brahman 
leaders, who best represented Gandhi and the Congress in 
the division of Nagpur.1
Conflict between the two groups flared up on several 
fronts in 193^. The first difference of opinion between 
them concerned the elections to the Congress organisations 
to be held in the division of Nagpur in that year. In 
August 1934 the Nagpur Nagar Congress Committee led by 
Awari refused to accept the right of the Provincial 
Congress Committee to supervise and frame the rules for 
these elections as directed by the All-India Congress
1
This conflict had a long history, and so far as Awari 
and Abhyanker were concerned, went back to 19^7> when 
the latter refused to recognise his Arms Satyagraha. A 
conflict between the two again broke out in 19 31» when 
Awari captured the Nagar Congress Committee. These 
differences were also evident at the time of Gandhi's 
visit to Nagpur on the Harijan tour. See Hitavada,
28 May 1931, p.5; NAI, Home Poll, 18/V, 1931, FR, Second 
Half of May 1931, p.l; Home Poll, 18/lX, 1931, FR,
Second Half of September 1933, P*lj Home Poll, 3-23, 1933, 
Harijan Tour, pp.17-18.
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Committee. Attempts to reconcile Awari with Abhyanker,
who was President of the Provincial Congress Committee,
failed, and Abhyanker took the dispute to the All-India
Congress Committee. That body awarded a decision in
Abhyanker1s favour . 1 The two groups also differed on
the question of whether Congressmen should return to the
legislatures. The populists, whose sympathies lay mainly
with the merchants and with the uneducated lower classes
2of the city, were opposed to council entry. Abhyanker 
and Dr Khare, by contrast, favoured council entry, 
although Abhyanker believed that the Congress would be 
well advised to wait until the introduction of the 
reformed constitution before committing itself to that
3policy. The Working Committee, however, settled the 
dispute by nominating Abhyanker to contest the Assembly 
for the division of Nagpur, and Ranka agreed to support
4him during the election campaign.
The Congress chose Abhyanker on the grounds that it 
needed a strong candidate to oppose Dr Moonje, who was 
contesting Nagpur for the Congress Nationalist 'party'.
1
NML, AICC, 756, 1934, R. Dangre, secretary Nagpur Nagar 
Congress Committee, to Secretary Provincial Congress 
Committee, 26 August 1934; ibid., M.V. Abhyanker to 
J. Daulatram, General Secretary, All-India Congress 
Committee, 27/8 August 1934; AICC, G-4-9, 1934, R. Dangre 
to Secretary All-India Congress Committee, 1 September 
1934; ibid., V. Patel, 21 September 1934.
2
See ibid., P-10, 1936, N.B. Khare to J. Nehru,
7 December 1936.
3
Indian Annual Register, no.1, 1934, p.293*
4 ’ ~..........
Hitavada, 29 October 1934, p.2.
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Until Moonje filed his nomination papers, however, it 
appeared as if Dr Khare would contest the seat for the 
Congress. Unlike Abhyanker, Khare believed that Congress 
should make an immediate return to the councils, and at 
the end of May 193^ 'well informed quarters' in Nagpur 
stated that he was to represent the Congress in the 
elections for the Assembly.1 The Congress actually 
approved Khare's nomination, but when Moonje nominated 
for the seat, it gave the nomination to Abhyanker. As 
Khare related:
The Congress high command did not like my 
candidature because they thought I would not 
be strong enough a candidate against the 
redoubtable Dr Moonje. The high command, 
therefore, called both Abhyanker and myself to 
Wardha to ask Abhyanker to cancel it (i.e.
Khare's nomination) and to stand himself in 
my place against Dr Moonje. Abhyanker, who 
was a diabetic and whose health was shattered 
in jail in the second satyagraha movement of 
1932, pleaded his inability to accept the 
advice of the high command on the grounds of
ill health. The high command however was 
adamant and virtually ordered Abhyanker to 
carry out their behest and stand as a 
candidate on behalf of Congress....Abhyanker 
who was a great disciplinarian agreed to carry 
out this order in spite of the fact that he 
himself personally was against the council 
entry programme at that time.2
The Congress fielded Abhyanker - its strongest
1
Hitavada, 20 May 193^, p.l.
2
N.B. Khare, History of Central Provinces and Berar 
from 1919-1939» p.6. This is a typed note given to the 
writer in Nagpur in 1967. It will be cited hereafter 
as Khare, Note.
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candidate - against Moonje, because there -was a distinct 
possibility that Moonje might win the elections. In 
I934 Moonje campaigned on his record of work for the 
Hindu Community since 1930. Besides attending the Round 
Table Conferences in London, in India Moonje had 
struggled ceaselessly to achieve an Indian constitution 
to his liking . 1 Since 1930 he had vehemently opposed 
the demands made by Muslims in northern India, and 
strongly condemned the policies which Gandhi had adopted 
towards members of that community. In 193^, he declared 
on this point that Hindus
have no faith, either in his idealism...his 
philosophy or his programme.... We Hindus have 
been ruined in every way by his doctrines of 
non-violence, no swaraj without Hindu-Moslem 
unity and his blank cheques for bringing about 
Hindu Moslem unity . 2
As a result, Moonje insisted that Hindus had to be 
weaned away from Gandhi, and be fired with the 'intense 
ambition of making India a Hindu India as Afghanistan 
is Muslim'. Between 1930-3^ Dr Moonje devoted himself 
to achieving that objective. During this period he 
toured extensively in India speaking at meetings 
organised by the Hindu Mahasabha. On each occasion he 
encouraged his fellow Hindus to unite and strengthen 
their community, and in so doing protect themselves and
1
For Moonje's work at the Conferences in London, see
pp.231-2 .
2
NLI, Moonje MS, Diary 6 , 27 January 193^; ibid.,
Diary 7» 31 March 193^. 
3
Ibid., Diary 2, 19 November 1929; Diary 4, 24 October
1931.
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the unity of India.1 To achieve the goals of Hindu unity 
and strength, Moonje continued to assist the work of the 
Rashtriya Swaryam Sewak Sangh. He also encouraged Hindus
to join akhadas, and in the Central Provinces and Berar he
2founded an association to popularise rifle shooting.
In addition between 1930-4 Moonje began moves to found a 
military school for boys in Maharashtra. As he declared 
in 1931:
I wish to make Maharashtra the centre of the 
military regeneration of the Hindus of India.
The whole Hindu community of India still looks 
up to Maharashtra to take the lead.... Besides 
the past history of Maharashtra, the thing 
that...appeals to them...in their search for 
protection against Muslim aggression is the 
example set by the late Lokamanya Tilak....The 
flag of Shree Shivajee must be held up and it 
cannot be better done under present circumstances 
than by establishing a military school and a 
centre of military training and education.3
In championing Hindu interests, Dr Moonje came into 
headlong conflict with the Indian National Congress.
During 1934 Moonje did his best to avoid such a conflict,
1
Hitavada, 1 January 1931, P-7; NAI, Home Poll, 18/VIII, 
1931, FR , First Half of August 1931, P«l; Indian Annual 
Register, no.2, 1932 , p.328; NLI, Moonje MS, Diary 5,
30 October 1932 ; Hitavada, 25 May 1933, p.11.
2
NLI, Moonje MS, Letter Pad 50, B.S. Moonje to District 
Magistrate Nagpur, 8 January 1929; ibid., Letter Pad 59, 
Press News, 11 April 1930; Hitavada, 31 August 1930, p.6; 
NLI, Moonje MS, Diary 7, 25 June 1934; NAI, Home Poll, 
18/10, 1934, F R , Second Half of October 1934, p.l.
3
NLI, Moonje MS, Letter Pad 63, B.S. Moonje to Maharain 
Sahib, c.9 August 1931; ibid., Diary 6, 13 February 1934. 
For a summary of Moonje1s political views, see Appendix 
A , no . 2 .
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and in April proposed that all 'Hindus should combine and
be united in the Swaraj party'.1 Such a combination,
however, proved impossible. Following the publication of
the Communal Award, the supporters of the Mahasabha and the
former Responsivists condemned the Award's provision for
communal electorates and statutory majorities for Muslims
2in Bengal and the Punjab. The Congress, by contrast,
took a neutral line on the document, and this was the
policy it placed before the electors in 193^. Moonje and
Aney could not subscribe to this policy, and consequently
they formed the Congress Nationalist 'party' to contest
the elections on the basis of opposition to the Communal
3Award. And it was on this issue that Moonje entered 
the lists against Abhyanker in 193^.
The electoral contest between Abhyanker and Moonje 
in 1934 resulted in a convincing win for the Congress.
The contest was a fierce one, representing as it did the 
climax of some ten years of bitter political rivalry 
between the two men. It was fierce, too, because each 
man had a strong political record. However, from the 
beginning of the election campaign, the advantage lay 
with Abhyanker rather than with Moonje. There were 
various reasons for this. Some commentators claimed that 
Abhyanker had a 'hold over the electorate', that was 'due 
to a feeling among the public that his sacrifices for the
1
NLI, Letter Pad 73» B . S .  Moonje to Mr Chatterji,
8 April 1934.
2
Indian Annual Register, no.2, 193^, p.289*
3
Ibid., p .28.
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country require special recognition1. Other commentators 
said that Abhyanker had an advantage over Moonje because
the public at large was with the Congress, moved 
as it was by the consideration that the Congress 
has not had a chance of contesting the elections 
after 1927*..and that it should be given whole 
hearted support when it has reverted to 
constitutional methods.2
Participation by the Congress in nationalist 
agitation and the Harijan movement undoubtedly gave 
Abhyanker a further advantage over Moonje. Abhyanker had 
at his command the entire organisation of the Congress in 
the division of Nagpur - an organisation still fresh from 
the challenge of agitation against the government. He 
also had the assistance of a veritable army of volunteers, 
many of whom were well known to the public through their
3participation in the civil disobedience movement.
Furthermore, Abhyanker was supported by most of the
prominent Congressmen in Nagpur - Khare, Ranka and others
- and he thus secured the support of all those who
regarded these men as their leaders. They included
groups as diverse as the middle classes, the Parsis, the
Christians, the non-Brahman community, the merchants, and
4Harijans and the working class people of the city.
Abhyanker had several other advantages over Dr Moonje,
1
Hitavada, 15 November 193^, p.l.
2
Ibid., 25 November 193^, p.8.
3
Ibid.
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See ibid., 11 October 193^, p.5; 4 November 193^, p.7;
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besides these. The Press of the division of Nagpur was 
reported to be 'solidly behind the Congress.' Again, 
Abhyanker and Khare both expressed ambivalent opinions 
on the Communal Award, thus making it difficult for
Dr Moonje to make political capital out of the official
2views of the Congress on the Award. On the eve of the 
elections, too, the Congress published a pamphlet 
relating to the personal life of Dr Moonje. This 
pamphlet lost Dr Moonje a great deal of support before
3the elections.
All these factors told against Moonje, and although
he put up a stout fight against Abhyanker to make the
contest in Nagpur 'one of the keenest and most exciting...
in the history of the province', Abhyanker emerged the 
4victor. Abhyanker's victory vindicated the nationalist 
views of the Congress and made a fitting climax to his 
own political career until that point. It also made it 
improbable that Dr Moonje would ever confront the 
electorate in Nagpur again.
The period leading up to the elections in Mahakoshal 
was also marked by an intense conflict between two
1
Hitavada, 15 November 1934, p.7*
2
Abhyanker, op. cit., p.134; Hi tavada, 11 October 1934, 
p. 14.
3
Ibid., 15 November 1934, p.7*
4
Ibid., p.6. According to Abhyanker, op. cit., p.474, 
Abhyanker 'won the election against Moonje with a 
thumping majority - 4547 as opposed to 2116 votes'.
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factions within the Congress. These factions were led 
by Govind Das and Mishra from Jabalpur, and by Shukla 
from Raipur. There were no ideological issues involved 
in this conflict: it arose from the desire of each group 
to control the Congress organisation in Mahakoshal.
While the conflict occurred at many levels, it was seen 
to best effect in the elections for the Provincial and 
subsidiary Congress Committees in Mahakoshal held in
1934. As control of the subsidiary Congress Committees 
meant control over the Provincial Congress Committee, 
each faction tried to establish its supremacy over the 
subsidiary Committees. From this struggle for supremacy, 
Shukla emerged victorious, and in September 1934 he 
and his supporters secured control over the Provincial 
Congress Committee and many of the Committees in the 
fourteen districts of the region. In addition, Shukla 
himself replaced Govind Das as President of the 
Provincial Congress Committee.1
But this was only one aspect of Shukla’s conflict 
with Mishra and Govind Das. Additional trouble arose 
when Shukla shifted the office of the Provincial Congress 
Committee to Raipur and tried to enhance his control 
over the organisation by increasing the number of
1
See Hitavada, 20 September 1934, p.8; NML, Files of the 
Mahakoshal Provincial Congress Committee (cited hereafter 
as MPCC), 1931-4, 5, G. Da Silva to President AICC,
22 September 1934, p.2; NML, AICC, P-9, 1934, Secretary 
MPCC to Secretary AICC, 28 September 1934; Hi tavada,
24 January 1935, P»9*
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representatives on the Committee from Chhattisgarh. This 
drew strong protests from Mishra and Govind Das, and 
Shukla was compelled, to abandon the scheme. During 193^ 
Govind Das and Shukla also clashed over the question of 
whether Congressmen should return to the legislatures. 
Early in 193^, Shukla, who had always advocated that 
nationalists should work in the councils, affirmed his 
support for that course of action. In April, at a press 
conference in Raipur, Shukla asserted boldly that
our history of the last few years, teaches us 
that not only should we capture the legislative 
councils but all the local bodies and 
associations through which a strong government 
tightens its grips upon us. They must be made 
to own allegiance to the Congress which should 
be supreme in all national affairs....There is 
no room for no changers.2
Govind Das was not as ardent an advocate of council entry
as Shukla, and he refused to accept the latter's point of
view until the All-India Congress Committee had decided
3the issue.
When the All-India Congress Committee did announce 
its decision, the two factions led by Shukla and Mishra 
again disagreed as to who should comprise the delegation 
from Mahakoshal to the Congress Parliamentary Board, 
which had been formed to supervise the Congress electoral
1
NML, AICC, P-9, 1934, Secretary MPCC to Secretary AICC,
28 September 193^; ibid., D.K. Mehta, et.al. to President 
Indian National Congress, n.d., 193^.
2
Hitavada, 19 April 193^, p.6.
3
Ibid., 20 May 193^, p.9.
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campaign. In August 193^, Shukla and one of his supporters,
G.S. Gupta of Durg, secured two of the three places in
the delegation.1 This made it highly probable that the
Congress Parliamentary Board would nominate men favourable
to Shukla to contest the elections to the Central
Legislative Assembly in Mahakoshal. Later in August 193^
Govind Das and Mishra tried to counter Shukla’s growing
2power in the region by resigning from the Congress.
This move was remarkably successful, for during September 
the Congress Parliamentary Board nominated both men to 
stand for the elections to the Central Legislative
3Assembly. At this point, however, the provincial 
government intervened in the conflict and disqualified
4Mishra from standing for election. The Government’s 
action caused further manoeuvres between the two factions,
1
Hitavada, 2 August 193^. The third member of the 
delegation was D.P. Mishra.
2
Ibid., 9 August 1934, p.l.
3 Ibid., 13 September 193^, p.l; 20 September 193^, p .10.
4
Ibid., 21 October 193^, p.3* The provincial government 
and the Government of India refused to accept Mishra's 
nomination for election to the Central Legislative 
Assembly on the grounds that he had been imprisoned during 
the campaigns of civil disobedience. The governments, 
however, did not invoke that reason for rejecting the 
nominations of Govind Das, Sheodass Daga or Gupta, all of 
whom had served terms of imprisonment since 1930 for their 
nationalist activities. The reason for Mishra's 
disqualification from contesting the elections to the 
Assembly was more probably to be found in his quarrel 
with the government for control of the Jabalpur Municipal 
Committee. See Mishra op. cit., pp.419-20.
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and when the final nominations were made in October,
Shukla's group secured two candidates and Mishra's group
one.1 Once the three candidates were chosen, the
Congressmen of Mahakoshal united to secure their election
2to the legislature.
At the ensuing elections, the three candidates were 
returned in triumph to the Assembly. From the beginning 
of the electoral campaign, it was evident that the 
Congress candidates would be returned 'in an overwhelming 
majority'. It was evident because they possessed 
qualifications that their opponents could not match - 
qualifications they had gained in leading the movements 
of civil disobedience and in spending long terms in jail
4for opposing the government. Further, the Congress 
candidates and their helpers mounted a campaign that 
outshone their opponents' campaigns at every point.
Congress leaders pursued several measures in 
particular that led their party to victory. Govind Das 
and Shukla made long election tours through the rural 
5areas. In the towns Congress leaders issued manifestos, 
or held 'Congress weeks' to publicise the many
1
Shukla's supporters comprised G.S. Gupta and Seth 
Sheodass Daga, a banker from Raipur. The other candidate 
was Seth Govind Das.
2
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worked for the Harijans, too, appealed to the Harijan
2voters to support the Congress. All these measures 
were immensely successful and the three Congress 
candidates won their seats. As one nationalist 
commented later:
With a truly martyr's record of suffering... 
the Congress came out successful(ly) in the 
elections on the crest of immense popularity. 
Everywhere, the nominees of the Congress swept 
the polls.
The night of suffering was over; and the day of the 
Congress was at hand.
achievements of the Congress in Mahakoshal.1 Those who
1
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GOVERNMENT BY MAHAKOSHAL; THE CENTRAL PROVINCES 
AND BERAR, 1935-1939
In 1938 Hindi politicians led by Ravi Shankar Shukla 
formed a ministry in the Central Provinces and Berar. In 
so doing they completed the transfer of power from the 
Marathi region to Mahakoshal begun by Raghavendra Rao.
The setting for this final shift of power was the 
Legislative Assembly established in the province under 
the reformed constitution of 1935* In 1936 the Working 
Committee of the Indian National Congress gave its 
approval to Congressmen to contest the first elections to 
the new Assembly, which were to be held in February 1937* 
Congressmen immediately launched an energetic electoral 
campaign covering the whole province, and secured their 
return in overwhelming numbers to the new legislature. 
Then, after receiving approval from the Working Committee, 
Congress leaders in the Assembly formed a ministry under 
the leadership of Dr Khare of Nagpur. This ministry, 
however, was dominated by representatives of the Marathi 
region.
The formation of the Khare ministry was the prelude 
to a series of constitutional crises which were only 
resolved when the leaders of Mahakoshal assumed control 
of the government. These crises had their origin in a 
complex set of factors. Foremost among these was the 
fact that between 19^7 and 1937 Raghavendra Rao had
Chapter 6
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transferred the reins of government from the Marathi to 
the Hindi region. Yet in 1937» with the formation of 
the Khare ministry, control of the government again 
reverted to the Marathi region. A more immediate cause 
of the crises was that, although the Marathi region 
dominated the cabinet, members from Mahakoshal enjoyed 
a majority in the Congress parliamentary party from which 
the cabinet was drawn. Again, between 1937-38 serious 
agricultural, industrial and communal disturbances 
occurred in the province, and these placed a severe 
strain on the members of Dr Khare1s ministry, most of 
whom had not had any previous experience of office. 
Moreover, serious conflicts developed between the 
members of the cabinet, usually following the lines of 
linguistic division between them.
These conflicts reached a climax in July 1938 when 
Dr Khare resigned his Premiership and formed a second 
cabinet which excluded his Hindi colleagues. To restore 
political stability to the ministry, the Working 
Committee compelled Dr Khare to resign as Premier and 
gave its approval to a ministry led by Ravi Shankar 
Shukla. This ministry remained in office for fifteen 
months,despite serious unrest throughout the province 
and particularly in the Marathi region. Then, with 
Congress ministries in the other provinces of British 
India, Shukla and his ministers resigned from office 
following the declaration of War between Great Britain 
and Germany in 1939*
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In 1936 the Indian National Congress gave permission 
to its members to contest the elections to the legislatures 
established under the new constitution of 1935* Before 
this grant of permission, Congressmen had been deeply 
divided in their attitude to the reformed constitution.
One group of Congressmen led by Jawaharlal Nehru 
believed that the Congress should concern itself, not 
with the constitution, but with improving the condition 
of the masses of India and drawing them into the 
nationalist movement. Another group of Congressmen led 
by Vallabhbhai Patel and Rajendra Prasad, two 
prominent members of the Working Committee from Gujarat 
and Bihar respectively, held that Congressmen should 
contest the elections and enter the new legislatures. A 
resolution passed at the annual session of the Congress 
at Faizpur in 1936 resolved the conflict between the 
two groups. This resolution stressed the need of 
nationalists to associate the masses with the Congress; 
and at the same time directed Congressmen to contest 
the elections to the new councils in 1 9 3 7*
Congressmen in the Central Provinces and Berar 
obeyed this mandate, and won a majority of seats in the 
new Legislative Assembly. An important factor in this 
victory was undoubtedly the Congress party's opposition 
to the government during the campaigns of civil 
disobedience. In addition, the claim by the Congress 
party that it alone was able to represent the interests 
of all people in the province must have won it 
considerable electoral support. The Congress party's 
victory at the elections in 1937 was also closely
I
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related to the emergence of strong leaders who provided 
a focus for the aspirations of the people in each part 
of the province.
These leaders emerged after severe struggles for 
power that, in some cases, were resolved only a short 
time before the elections. The resolution of these 
conflicts then enabled all factions within the Congress 
to present a united front to the electors. One struggle 
for power that was resolved just before the elections 
occurred in the division of Nagpur. Abhyanker, a 
veteran of many campaigns, died in January 1935, and 
Dr Khare succeeded him as leader of the Congress party 
in the division.1 Ranka, Awari and the non-Brahmans, however, 
refused to accept Dr Khare as leader and for several 
years subjected him to constant attack. This attack 
was seen to best effect in the conflict between the 
Provincial Congress Committee and the Nagpur Nagar 
Congress Committee - the former led by Khare, and the 
latter by Ranka and Awari. By April the conflict between 
the two Committees had become so severe that Dr Khare 
took the dispute to the All-India Congress Committee, 
complaining that Ranka, Awari and others were 'persistently 
and consistently defying the organisation of the Indian 
National Congress...and flouting the Provincial Congress 
Committee.
1
Khare, Note, op. cit., p.7« During January 1935, Khare 
was also elected to the Central Legislative Assembly in 
place of Abhyanker.
2
NML, AICC, P-10, 1934, N.B. Khare to R. Prasad,
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The two factions were also divided on the question
of council entry. Like many professional men in the
Congress party, Dr Khare supported the view that
Congressmen should contest the elections and enter the
Legislative Assembly.1 The populists, however, sided
with Nehru and urged that the Congress should arouse
the masses and pursue an aggressive line against the
2government. Ranka, in particular, was strongly 
opposed to work in the legislature, and when asked 
later by Dr Khare
if he would like to stand for election to the 
legislative assembly, he told (him)...that he 
did not want to go to the Legislative Assembly 
because he was an orthodox non-cooperator and 
that he had no faith in council entry.3
During 1935 the two factions formed separate groups, 
each of which claimed to represent the Congress in the 
division of Nagpur. Each group held separate 
demonstrations and meetings, and each indulged in 
physical violence against the other for purposes of
4attack or defence. In November 1935 the Hitavada 
recorded one such display of violences
Rajendra Prasad in an address in the south is 
reported to have descanted at length on the
1
Hitavada, 18 April 1935, P*5*
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328
congress creed of non violence....But we wish 
to draw his attention to the way in which his 
followers are giving effect to the creed in 
Nagpur. Throwing chairs at each other and 
knocking each other in the jaw have become 
recognised methods in the local political 
schedule and we would ask Rajendra Prasad to 
induce his warriors to shed some of their war 
paint and set a personal example in non 
violence.1
The conflict between Ranka and Khare continued into 1936,
and, though both tried to mend the breach, it was not
until April of that year that the two men ' joined their
hands' at the instance of Jawarhalal Nehru and the
2struggle between them temporarily came to an end.
During the early part of the election campaign, 
differences between Khare and Ranka again came to the 
surface and threatened to prevent the Congress party 
from presenting a united front to the electors. As the 
elections drew near, Ranka seems to have changed his 
views on the utility of entering the Assembly and tried3to secure Congress endorsement for the seat of Nagpur.
In doing so he again came into conflict with Dr Khare, 
who also sought, and eventually won, the Congress 
nomination for that seat. Khare did so because the
1
Hitavada, 1 November 1935» p.l.
2
Ibid., 29 April 1936, p.5; NML, AICC, G-49, 193^, 
Pandit Sunderlal to Rajendra Prasad, 29 January 1936. 
Pandit Sunderlal tried to mediate between the two 
factions in January 1936, and found both Khare and Ranka 
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3
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Provincial Congress Committee urged that his services 
were 'absolutely indispensable in this province';1 and 
because the Congress required a strong candidate to 
oppose Dr L.V. Paranjpe who was contesting Nagpur for 
the Congress Nationalist 'party' . The Hitavada believed 
that Ranka would not show up well against Dr Paranjpe, 
and on 6 January 1937 stated the grounds for this belief:
Dr Paranjpe (is) the redoubtable leader of many 
Hindu processions and the emotional orator of a 
hundred meetings at the Town Hall. Congressmen 
are perturbed at the candidature of Dr Paranjpe, 
for apart from being a Hindu Sabha man he has a 
record for work which cannot be ignored....It is 
reported that some of the fabulously rich 
bankers of the city are behind Dr Paranjpe who 
will also get the support of the Moonje group 
....Dr Khare will have to fight for every inch 
of his ground...for Dr Paranjpe will be on the 
battlefield with his vast hordes of Hindu 
Mahasabha men from the city.2
Non-Brahman Congressmen led by Bajaj and Ranka also
clashed with Dr Khare and the Provincial Congress
Committee on a number of other issues connected with the
elections. On 31 October 1936 the Provincial Congress
Committee empowered Dr Khare to select the candidates
to represent the Congress in the constituencies of the3division of Nagpur. In selecting the candidate for the
1
Hitavada, 4 November 1936, p.5*
2
Ibid., 6  January 1937» P * 6 ;  10 January 1937» p.6.
3
Ibid., k November 1936, p.5- The Provincial Congress 
Committees of Nagpur, Berar and Mahakoshal also gave 
Dr Khare the responsibility to select candidates for the 
whole province. In discharging this responsibility, 
Khare selected some 75 candidates.
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seat of Kato1-Saoner, Dr Khare chose a Brahman lawyer, 
P.D. Harkare, in preference to B. Chandak, a strong 
Marwari contender for the nomination. Bajaj and 
supporters of Ranka condemned Khare for attempting to 
'establish Peshwai or Brahman raj by selecting Brahmin 
Congressmen in large numbers®, and took their complaints 
to the Central Parliamentary Board of the Indian 
National. Congress. That body subsequently reversed 
Dr Khare1s decision and substituted the Marwari for the 
Brahman nominee.1
The non-Brahmans also read the signs of a Brahman 
plot in Dr Khare*s attempt to contest the elections in 
coalition with the Congress Nationalist 'party*. That 
'party* had the support of many Brahmans including 
Dr Moonje, and had come into existence to secure the 
rejection of the Communal Award. Thus, to effect a 
coalition between that 'party' and the Congress (which 
took a neutral line on the Award), Dr Khare supported the 
views of the Congress Nationalist 'party' on the 
document. He then had to convince the members of that 
'party' of the sincerity of his stance. This was not a 
difficult matter, for as he himself said on 15 September 
1936,
As far as I am personally concerned, I may tell
you that through my recent electoral tour in the
province, I have condemned the Communal Award
1
Khare, Note, op. cit., pp.7-8; Hitavada, 25 November
1936, p.1-6 and 12.
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and the policy of government behind it in 
unequivocal terms and on every occasion....If 
this is not agitation against the Communal 
Award I don't know what is.l
Dr Khare's stance on the Award facilitated a
coalition between the Congress and the Congress
Nationalist 'party' in the division of Nagpur. During
November 1936, the two parties agreed that 'so far as
the Assembly elections are concerned, there is no
difference... between the congress candidates and those
2of the Congress Nationalist party'. The Congress
Parliamentary Board again intervened, however, and
3refused to acknowledge the agreement. As a result
Dr Paranjpe led the Congress Nationalists against the
Congress during the closing stages of the election
campaign, and contested the seat of Nagpur against
4Dr Khare as he had originally planned to do. But by
this time, the non-Brahman populists had come over 'to
the official side' and were supporting Dr Khare in the
5election campaign.
1
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Tactions in the Congress party of Berar, and enabled
that organisation to present a united front to the
electors. The factions were those in evidence during
1934, namely, the group of orthodox Congressmen led by
Biyani and Gole, and the group of Responsivists led by
Aney and R.M. Deshmukh. A fierce struggle for control
of the Congress organisation in Berar preceded the
reunion of the factions. In 1933 the Responsivists of
Maharashtra replaced the almost defunct Responsive
Cooperation party with a new party known as the
Democratic Swaraj party. The party advertised itself
as a 'thoroughly nationalist, non-communal, radical
group', pledged to win 'political power for the people
in a free India' by responsive cooperation.1 In Berar,
many former Responsivists became members of the new
party, and, to the annoyance of the orthodox Congressmen,
2retained office in the organisations of the Congress.
As a result, between 1935-6 the orthodox Congressmen 
led by Biyani made a determined attempt to purge the 
Democratic Swarajists from the Congress party of Berar. 
The purge took the form of moves to 'exterminate the 
old Responsivist element from the (Provincial Congress) 
Committee', and to transfer the 'strings of power' from
A dramatic reunion also took place between rival
1
Indian Annual Register, no.2, 1933» pp.l6, 253“9j 
Hi tavada, 26 October 1933» P*7j NLI, Moonje MS, Diary 7»
6 April 193^; ibid., 9 May 1934; ibid., 10 May 1934; 
ibid. , 12 May 1934; ibid. , .13 May 1934.
2
Ramrao Deshmukh played a prominent part in setting up 
the new party.
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the old Responsivist centres of Amravati and Yeotmal to 
the town of Akola.1 These moves were extremely 
successful. By January 1936 Biyani had established the 
main office of the Provincial Congress Committee in
Akola, and had 'firmly rooted himself in the Berar
2Congress without a rival'.
The need to protect the interests of Berar, however, 
eventually compelled Biyani to form a coalition with his 
rivals in the Democratic Swaraj party before the 
elections to the Legislative Assembly. Supporters of 
the coalition urged that the members from Berar must 
speak with one voice in the Assembly to compensate in 
some measure for the region's lack of representation 
therein. One of the first to do so was the Congress 
leader, P.B. Gole, who, in an address to a gathering of 
Congressmen in Berar in April 1935» said:
I see no necessity of running a separate and 
rival association when the congress itself has 
thrown its weight in parliamentary activities 
....1 hope that the democrats will cooperate 
with the congress in the coming council 
elections by preserving a solid national front 
against the dummies of government job hunters.3
1
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The leaders of the Democratic Swaraj party, among 
them Aney and Ramrao Deshmukh, welcomed Gole's gesture, 
accompanied as it was by his recognition of the need to 
’safeguard the interests of Berar under the new 
constitution'.1 Aney was also keen to take advantage of 
Gole's offer as he had been soundly defeated in the 
elections to the Provincial Congress Committee in 
January 1936 - a defeat which the Hitavada interpreted 
as a sign
that the congress writ cannot be defied in Berar 
at the present time....The defeat of Aney is a 
pointer to the results of the coming elections 
... to the legislative council. . . .The congress 
holds all four aces in the political game and 
it looks as if anybody who opposes it will go 
to the wall.2
Aney had an additional reason for responding favourably
to the overtures from Gole in that between 1935-6 the
non-Brahmans of Berar made a serious, though
unsuccessful, attempt to ally themselves with the3Congress party. Aney undoubtedly realised that, were 
these moves successful, they could bring about the 
defeat of his party at the elections and its extinction 
as a political force in Berar. Accordingly, at a 
meeting of the Yeotmal District Association in April
1
Hi tavada, 28 April 1935, p.2.
2
Ibid., 12 January 1935, P-2; 15 January 1935, P*l;
24 January 1936, p.5*
3 Ibid., 1 April 1936, p.7; A Review of the Administration 
of the Central Provinces and Berar, 1935~36(Nagpur,
1937), p.i.
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1936 Aney responded warmly to Gole’s gesture by 
declaring that 5 all parties in Berar must join for the 
protection of Berar’s interests, which are opposed to 
the interests of the Central Provinces’.1
Aney’s statement opened some seven months of
negotiations between Congressmen and Democratic
2Swarajists on the subject of a coalition. The two 
parties finally reached an understanding on 6 November
1936. The main terms of this understanding were that 
both parties would support a common list of candidates 
at the elections, and that, if elected to the Assembly, 
both parties would
safeguard the rights and interests of the people 
of Berar in general and will in particular insist 
at least for the continuation of the Sim formula 
till some other settlement agreeable to both 
Central Provinces and Berar members is settled 
....They will (also) vote for the rejection of 
the Communal Award inside the Assembly, and 
outside they will agitate for its rejection 
along with the new Government of India Act.3
And on this common platform, the two parties approached
the elections, despite rumbles of disapproval from the
4Congress Parliamentary Board.
1
Hitavada, 10 May 1936, p.9*
2
See ibid., 4 November 1936, p.5*
3
Ibid., 8 November .1936, p. 9*
4
NML, AICC, P-9(i), 1936, B. Biyani to J. Nehru,
6 December 1936.
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In Mahakoshal, Ravi Shankar Shukla emerged as the 
dominant leader of the Congress after months of bitter 
conflict with D.P. Mishra, who had the assistance of 
Seth Govind Das. The conflict, however, did not merely 
represent a struggle for power in Mahakoshal. On 
Shukla's side there were strong rumours that it also 
formed a prelude to his possible election as Premier of 
the united Central Provinces and Berar. Whether or not 
these rumours were based on fact, from 193^ onwards 
Shukla sought to strengthen his control over the Congress 
organisation in Mahakoshal. Mishra and Govind Das 
strongly resisted such moves. In 193^, when it became 
clear to the two leaders that Shukla would secure control 
of the Provincial Congress Committee, they 'took care to 
create a solid block' within that body to prevent Shukla 
from bending it completely to his will.1 At the same 
time Mishra and Govind Das began a systematic propaganda 
against Shukla, alleging that he
was mixed up with Raghavendra Rao and if power 
were left in his hands he would betray the 
congress to the Home Member for personal ends(;)
...that Shukla wanted to become prime minister 
under the new constitution(;)...that he is 
trying to remove the seat of power of Congress 
to the southern districts from Jabalpur for 
parochial reasons.2
1
Hitavada, 24 January 1935» P*9*
2
NML, AICC, P-9, 1936, Syed Ahmad, Vice-President 
District Congress Committee (DCC) Hoshangabad, to the 
President Indian National Congress, 11 June 1936.
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Shukla countered the activities of his opponents
from Jabalpur with a series of skilful moves designed to
strengthen his leadership over the Congress party in
Mahakoshal. Between 1935“6 he toured the region,
addressing meetings and conferences of various groups.1
Moreover, in 1935 and again in 1936 he outmanoeuvred
his opponents and secured re-election as the President
2of the Provincial Congress Committee. Shukla’s 
re-election to that position in 1935 clearly demonstrated 
his firm grip on the Mahakoshal. His opponent on that 
occasion was D.K. Mehta, the nominee of Mishra and 
Govind Das. According to the Hitavada,
Mehta allowed himself to become a scapegoat and 
oppose Shukla....The result was a foregone 
conclusion. Shukla has got support from almost 
all the districts of the province except 
Jubbulpore, Rewa (and) Seoni. Mehta got only 
five votes from the rest of the province....
The defeat of Mehta is really the defeat of 
Seth Govind Das and D.P. Mishra.3
With the Presidentship in his grasp, Shukla sought 
to place his control of the Committee and its executive 
beyond challenge. In March 1935 he again attempted to
1
See for instance Hitavada, 18 April 1935» P*9>
28 April 1935» p .7; 19 May 1935» p.6. In April 1935» 
Shukla addressed the Betul Political Conference and the 
Mahakoshal Harijan Conference in Jabalpur. In May he 
visited Sagar and Damoh.
2
NML, AICC, P-9, 1936, Syed Ahmed, President DCC 
Hoshangabad to President Indian National Congress,
11 June 1936.
3
Hi tavada 9 24 January 1935» P«9*
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amend the Congress constitution to give Chhattisgarh
greater representation on the Provincial Congress
Committee. The Committee, however, refused to accept
his amendments.1 As the bulk of opposition to Shukla's
amendments came from the northern districts, Shukla
retaliated by disqualifying thousands of Congress
members from that area on the grounds that their
2membership of the Congress was ’irregular*.
Congressmen from Jabalpur immediately complained to the 
All-India Congress Committee that
having failed to get a constitution to his 
liking, (Shukla)... is now trying to reject 
the primary members of District Congress 
Committees which he thinks are opposed to 
him. In this he sees his only hope to 
retain his power.3
The All-India Congress Committee subsequently vindicated 
Shukla by accepting many of the disqualifications, and
1
Hi tavada, 4 April 1935, P*9j 7 August 1935, P*8;
18 August 1935> p.5 ; 4 September 1935» P*8; NML, AICC, 
P-9 > 1934, L.S. Chowhan to President Indian National 
Congress, 4 September 1935* Shukla wanted to amend the 
constitution of the Congress in Mahakoshal by giving 
the Indian States of Chhattisgarh representation on the 
Provincial Congress Committee.
2
Hi tavada, 3 November 1935, P*8; 6 November 1935, P*lj 
8 November 1935, P*8; 10 November 1935, P*5; 15 November 
1935, p .7• Shukla disqualified nearly 6,000 of the 
10,000 preliminary members enrolled by the Jabalpur 
District Congress Committee. He also reduced the 
strength of the Congress Committee from 70 to 45*
3
NML, AICC, P-9, 1934, L.S. Chowhan to President Indian 
National Congress, 4 September 1935*
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thus strengthened his position in Mahakoshal. Shukla
made a determined bid to strengthen his position still
further in January 1936 when he appointed his own
2executive or Working Committee. This, too, drew a storm 
of protest from Govind Das and others, but Shukla answered 
his critics firmly, declaring that the
restoration of peace and harmony in the province 
was the whole object with which I compromised....
No president can work with a majority of members 
who can form a combination at any time to oppose 
him. He must have colleagues who can put up 
team work and not quarrel among themselves. 
Notwithstanding I included Govind Das as a 
member of the Working Committee, and took Mishra 
as one of my secretaries and promised to coopt 
D.K. Mehta....(But) our Jubbulpore friends never 
intended a real compromise.3
In spite of protests, Shukla's Working Committee 
continued in office. Shukla assumed further powers in 
May 1936 when he won control over the Parliamentary 
Board set up to select candidates to contest the
4elections in Mahakoshal on behalf of the Congress.
To strengthen his position Shukla also vigorously
1
Hitavada, 27 November 1935, p .12.
2
Ibid., 5 February 1936, p.7; NML, MPCC, 1934-1936, 7, 
R.S. Shukla to President Indian National Congress,
15 March 1936.
3 Ibid.
4
Hi tavada, 31 May 1936, p. 8. The members of this Board 
were Shukla (President), Govind Das, G. Da Silva,
D.P. Mishra, M. Chaturvedi, G.S. Gupta, T.P.L. Singh,
S.A. Singh, D.K. Mehta and D. Gothi.
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attacked his chief rival for power in the Mahakoshal -
D.P. Mishra. Shukla believed that Mishra was responsible
for the opposition to his plans to amend the Congress
Constitution, and as a result, he struck hard at the
base of Mishra*s power in Jabalpur.1 In 1935 Shukla
worked to prevent Mishra*s election to the Municipal
Committee of Jabalpur, and in 1936 he strove to prevent
Mishra and his supporters from dominating the Congress
2Committees of the town and district. Both these moves
failed, however, as Mishra was elected President of the
Municipal Committee in 1936, and his followers were
returned in strength to the various Congress organisations 
3in Jabalpur.
In his attack on Mishra, Shukla received the 
unsolicited assistance of the provincial government, and, 
in particular, of Raghavendra Rao. Between 1934-6 the 
government prevented Mishra from assuming the 
Presidentship of the Municipal Committee of Jabalpur, 
although he had been elected to that post. In so doing 
the government indirectly aided Shukla, for, while 
engaging Mishra in a never-ending battle of tactics, it 
left Shukla free to pursue the quest of leadership in
1
NML, MPCC, 1934-6, 7, R.S. Shukla to President, Indian 
National Congress, 15 March 1936.
2
NML, AICC, P-9, 1934, L.S. Chowhan to President, Indian 
National Congress, 4 September 1935? ibid., L.S. Bhatt, 
Secretary DCC Jabalpur, to ? , March(?) 1936.
3
Hitavada, 25 December 1935, P* ? ; 24 January 1936,
p.6; 22 March 1936, p.7*
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Mahakoshal.1
Shukla and Mishra continued their struggle for 
power right up to the eve of the elections. At first 
the need for unity in the approaching elections appears 
to have drawn the two leaders together. In August 1936 
the Hitavada reported that
all sections amongst the Congressmen of the 
Mahakoshal composed their differences and 
decided to put up a joint consolidated action 
in the coming elections....The Raipur and 
Jubbulpore groups shook hands and unanimously^ 
agreed to work out a parliamentary programme.
The truce did not last, however, and the remaining 
months of 1936 witnessed a renewal of the bitter struggle 
between Shukla and Mishra. An important aspect of this 
struggle related to the selection of candidates for 
constituencies in Jabalpur and Bilaspur by the provincial
3Parliamentary Board. Shukla was President of the Board,
1
MPS, LSG, 11-308, 1934, Removal of Mishra from the 
Office of President of Jabalpur Municipality, 
Notification, p.6; ibid., Report by District Commissioner 
Jabalpur, p.13; ibid., Note by Revenue Secretary, p .18; 
ibid., Communique issued by the Government of the Central 
Provinces, pp.38-42; Hitavada, 25 November 1934, p.8; 27 
January 1935, P*lj 13 November 1935, P*6; 20 December
1935, P* ? ; 22 April 1936, p.l; 24 April 1936, p.l;
5 June 1936, p .10. Mishra finally took his place as 
President of the Committee in 1936.
2
Ibid., 30 August 1936, p.8.
3
The Board's failure to decide on the candidates for 
these constituencies until November-December 1936 
provided clear evidence of tension. See Hi tavada,
1 November 1936, p .10; 13 November 1936, p .13; Mishra,
op. cit., p .425•
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and in each case that body made decisions in his favour. 
In Jabalpur the Board endorsed known opponents of Mishra 
for the urban and women's constituencies, and nominated 
Mishra to contest a rural constituency in the district.1
Shukla also scored a victory over Mishra and Govind
Das in the choice of a candidate to represent Bilaspur
tahsil - the constituency of Raghavendra Rao. Mishra
and Govind Das demanded that the Congress field a strong
candidate against Rao because they believed that, in
leaving the Congress in 1926, he had betrayed the
2nationalist cause. Mishra also held Rao responsible for 
the government's bid to prevent him from becoming
3President of the Jabalpur Municipality. In addition 
both Govind Das and Mishra suspected that Shukla and 
Rao were in league to further their political ambitions
4m  the province. In selecting a candidate to oppose 
Rao, however, the Mahakoshal Parliamentary Board chose a 
candidate who was suitable to Shukla rather than to
1
Hitavada, 20 November 1936, p.9* The Board nominated 
N.P. Mishra, 'a new Congressman', for the seat of 
Jabalpur Urban; and Shrimati Chowhan, a leading 
nationalist, for the Jabalpur women's constituency.
D.P. Mishra received endorsement for Jabalpur-Pathan 
Rural. See also NAI, Home Poll, 18/11, 1936, F R , First 
Half of November 1936, p.27*
2
NML, AICC, 78-A, 1926, Seth Govind Das to Motilal Nehru, 
21 October 1926.
3
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Mishra and Govind Das. The Hitavada described the 
Board’s nominee as having a 'shaky record as a 
Congressman' and one who did not posses sufficient 
financial resources to match the campaign launched by 
Rao.1 As a result it was likely that Rao would have no 
difficulty in winning the seat. And in view of the 
close relationship between Rao and Shukla, there seems 
little doubt that Shukla approved the nomination for 
that reason.
On the eve of the elections, Shukla scored further
triumphs that placed his leadership of Mahakoshal
beyond any doubt. The first of these triumphs occurred
in November 1936, when the All-India Parliamentary
Board rejected Makhanlal Chaturvedi's nomination for the
seat of Hoshangabad. As Chaturvedi was a political
associate of Mishra and Govind Das, those two leaders
resigned from the Congress in protest and suspended
2their electoral activities. Shukla, by contrast, 
continued to win public acclaim. In November 1936 he 
was elected President of the District Council of Raipur 
for the fifth time in succession, and in the same month 
played host to Jawarhalal Nehru who was paying an
3election visit to Chhattisgarh. The government
1
Hitavada, 13 December 1936, P*7j 27 January 1937, p.l* 
The candidate chosen was Kunj Biharilal Agnihotri.
2
See ibid., 27 November 1936, p.6; 18 December 1936, p.8;
22 December 1936, p p .1, 8; 2 k December 1936, p.8.
3
Ibid., 27 November 1936, p.6.
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Jawarhalal's visit has served to advertise the 
Congress, particularly in areas like Raipur 
district where the tour was stagemanaged by 
Ravishanker Shukla and his associates....The 
direct effect of Jawaharlal’s speeches has been 
almost negligible on the bulk of the people, 
but has stimulated the election fever of the 
Hindu intelligentsia.^
Other gains made by Shukla in the period immediately 
before the elections included his appointment as the 
’sole representative of the Mahakoshal Parliamentary 
Committee’ to the Central Parliamentary Board. As such, 
Shukla became the final arbiter of the Congress
2nominations in all constituencies in Mahakoshal.
Hopelessly outmanoeuvred, Govind Das and Mishra
finally joined forces with Shukla to make a united
appeal to the electorate on behalf of the Congress. They
did so at the instance of Jawaharlal Nehru who visited
Jabalpur early in January 1937 to reconcile the warring
factions. Nehru succeeded admirably in his task, as one
observer recorded:
(Nehru had) a rousing reception in the city...
(and) due to his persuasions petty 
misunderstandings among the Mahakoshal leaders 
were amicably composed. Govind Das, Chaturvedi 
and D.P. Mishra publicly announced their whole
commented on the importance of Nehru* s visit to Shukla:
1
NAI, Home Poll, 4/34, 1936, Appreciation of the 
Speeches of J.L. Nehru in the Central Provinces, DO 393/1, 
N.J. Roughton to R.M. Maxwell, 9 December 1936, pp.21-2.
2
Hitavada, 27 December 1936, p.4.
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hearted cooperation with congress, and Mishra 
agreed to contest the assembly elections from 
the Jubbulpore rural electorate.1
With the struggles for power in all parts of the
province resolved, the Congress leaders in the Central
Provinces and Berar won a brilliant success at the
elections to the Legislative Assembly in February 1937*
There were many factors responsible for this success.
Alone among the parties contesting the elections, the
Congress possessed a 'first class electoral machinery'
and the services of a vast army of 'sincere voluntary
workers'. Among the latter were village officials, the
teachers of rural schools, students, and men and women
volunteers, many of whom had participated in agitation
2against the government. The Congress also scored 
successes by fielding candidates who belonged to the 
same community as the majority of voters in particular 
electorates, and by convincing the people that, if 
elected, it would introduce 'a new order of things'. 
This claim was instantly successful, as one observer 
noted:
We found everywhere a marked enthusiasm for 
the congress. The electorate is of opinion 
that congress will accept office....Everywhere 
we find that the masses will vote for any 
party which promises them release from abject 
poverty and misery. The congress has been
1
Hitavada, 3 January 1937» p.l.
2
Ibid., 5 February 1937» P*lj 10 February 1937» P*6;
7 February 1937» P*7j 17 February 1937» p.l.
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promising the masses on a large scale a new 
order of things and naturally the scales 
have been weighted in its favour.^
The Congress leaders also used Mahatma Gandhi's
name with telling effect during the election campaign.
This was particularly evident in rural areas, where
many folk did not understand what the Congress stood
for. However, they had heard of Gandhi, and when
confronted by prints of Gandhi's photograph at the
polling booths, or large captions urging them to 'vote
for Gandhiji's candidate’, they cast their vote in
2favour of the Congress. The electorate's support of 
Gandhi was especially evident in far-flung Chhattisgarh, 
where one observer reported that
the name of the Mahatma has wrought a miracle.... 
Old women and men, the blind, the deaf and 
maimed trudged miles and miles of the barren 
countryside to vote for the Congress candidate.3
The Congress also had an advantage over other parties 
in that, besides enjoying the support of the vast 
majority of Hindu voters, it also received appreciable 
support from the Depressed classes and, to a lesser
1
Hitavada, 10 February 1937» P P •6, 7» NLI, Moonje MS, 
Diary 9» 12 February 1937* In Nagpur-Umrer Rural where 
the majority of voters were Kunbis, the Congress 
sponsored a Kunbi candidate, Bajrang Thekedar.
2
Hitavada, 14 February 1937» P*l> 17 February 1937» P*6; 
Mishra, op. cit., p.426.
3
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The zeal and determination of Congress campaigners
in all parts of the province was another important
factor in their success. Nowhere were these qualities
more conspicuous than in Nagpur, where Khare flung
himself into a contest in which the reputation of the
2Congress was at stake. Zeal and determination also 
marked the campaign of the Congress in Berar, where the 
recent agreement between Congressmen and the Democratic 
Swarajists made each party confident of success and
3spurred them on to certain victory. The following 
description of the campaign in Yeotmal in January 1937 
reflects something of the spirit with which nationalists 
in Berar approached the elections:
In Yeotmal district the cry 'vote for the 
congress' is in full swing....Public workers
extent, from the Muslim community.
1
Hitavada, 10 January 1937» P •13» 10 February 1937» p.12;
31 January 1937, p.8; 21 March 1937, P-3; NAI, Home Poll, 
4/9, 1937, Secret Report on the 1937 Elections in the 
Central Provinces and Berar; NAI, Reforms, 20/IV/36-F,
1936, Summary of General Results of Primary Election of 
Scheduled Caste Candidates, Letter no.411-281-R,
C.F. Waterfall to Reforms, New Delhi, 3 February 1937*
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in this district are all ranged on the 
side of the Congress keeping aside private 
and other differences of opinion....
M.S. Aney is touring in every nook and 
corner of the district...(and) those who are 
opposing the congressmen are feeling nervous 
about the election prospects.-*-
In Mahakoshal, too, Congressmen threw themselves with
zeal into the electoral fray, exhibiting perhaps their
highest enthusiasm in the contest against Rao in
2Bilaspur tahsi1.
Although the Congress lost that particular seat, 
the enormous advantages it enjoyed over its opponents 
carried it to victory and secured for it 70 out of the
3112 seats in the Legislative Assembly. Further, the 
results achieved by the Congress in different types of 
constituencies fully justified its claim to be 
representative of the people as a whole. The Congress 
candidates secured the nine urban seats; 49 of the 56 
rural seats; 5 of the 20 seats reserved for Harijans; 
two of the three landholding seats; two of the four
1
Hitavada, 27 January 1937» p.11.
2
Ibid., 22 January 1937» P*l» 24 January 1937» P«l4;
29 January 1937» P * 12; 10 February 1937» P*l» 12 February 
1937» P*3* Govind Das and Mishra led the Congress 
campaign in Bilaspur, addressing some 40 meetings, 
attended by an estimated 80,000 people.
3
The Congress polled 62.5 per cent of the votes in the 
Central Provinces and Berar. This result was exceeded 
only in Madras and Bihar, where the Congress polled 
74 per cent and 65 per cent of the votes respectively.
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seats reserved for labour and commercial interests; and
the three women's constituencies.1 These results were a
magnificent climax to the efforts of the Congress
during the previous sixteen years to wrest the initiative
from the British rulers of the Central Provinces and
Berar. Thus, it was not surprising that many people
regarded the results as a mandate for the Congress to
form the first truly Indian government in the province
2under the new constitution.
II
Five months elapsed before Congressmen formed a 
ministry in the Central Provinces and Berar. This 
delay was the result of a protracted dispute within the 
Congress Working Committee as to whether Congressmen 
should take office under the new constitution or not.
The dispute involved two main groups - one led by Gandhi 
and Vallabhbhai Patel, who argued that Congressmen should 
take office; and another led by Jawarhalal Nehru, who 
believed that the main task of the Congress was to
1
Indian Annual Register, no.l, 1937, p.l68. Compared 
with the 70 seats won by the Congress, the Independents 
led by Rao won 17; the non-Brahmans 3; the Hindu Sabha 1; 
the Independent Labour'party' 2; Nationalists 2; Nationalist 
Raja 'party* 1; Ambedkar 'party' 1; Muslim Parliamentary 
Board (Rauf Shah group) 8; Muslim League (Shareef group) 5j 
European 1; Anglo-Indian 1.
2
Hitavada, 24 February 1937» P*3> 26 February 1937, P«lj
5 March 1937» PP• 1, 12. A majority of the newly elected 
Congress members favoured the acceptance of office.
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destroy the new constitution. By March 1937 the dispute 
between the two groups had assumed serious proportions. 
In that month Gandhi saved the situation by focussing 
the attention of the nation on the special powers 
entrusted to the provincial Governors under the new 
constitution. These powers concerned the role of the 
Governor during possible disagreements with the popular 
ministries. During March Gandhi persuaded the Working 
Committee to agree that
ministerships (could)... only be accepted if the 
leader of the Congress party in the Assembly of 
the province is satisfied and is able to declare 
publicly that he has sufficient assurance from 
the Governor that special powers should not be 
used so long as the ministry acts within the 
constitution. ^
The British authorities made various responses to 
this ultimatum, none of which the Congress considered 
satisfactory, and consequently a deadlock ensued. 
However, both Gandhi and the Government of India were 
under pressure to solve the deadlock - Gandhi, from the 
overwhelming number of Congressmen who supported the 
acceptance of office; and the Government of India, from 
its own members who desired to set the reforms in 
motion as quickly as possible. As a result Gandhi 
softened his demands, and the Viceroy responded on
21 June 1937 by asserting that
(the) documents made it clear beyond any 
possibility of question that under Provincial 
Autonomy, in all matters falling within the 
ministerial field...the Governor will
1
Indian Annual Register, no.l, 1937> P-237*
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ordinarily be guided in the exercise of his 
powers by the advice of his ministers and that 
those ministers will be responsible not to 
Parliament but to the provincial legislature.... 
(There is) no vestige of foundation for the 
assertion...that the Governor is entitled...to 
intervene at random in the administration of 
the province.!
Although this assurance was less complete than the 
one originally demanded by the Working Committee, on
8 July 1937 the Committee decided to allow Congressmen 
to accept office. Accordingly, within a week, Dr Khare, 
the leader of the Congress Assembly party, had assumed 
office as Premier of the Central Provinces and Berar 
assisted by a cabinet of six other ministers. Three of 
these, namely Ravi Shankar Shukla, D.P. Mishra and
D.K. Mehta were from Mahakoshal; and three - R.M Deshmukh,
2P.B. Gole and M.Y. Shareef were from the Marathi region.
During the cabinet’s first months in office, it gave 
every promise of justifying the enthusiasm that greeted 
its formation. For several months after the cabinet was 
sworn in at Government House on 14 July 1937> large 
crowds mobbed and feted the ministers at receptions in 
Nagpur or in their places of residence. And after these 
celebrations were over, the ministers went out on tour
1
Indian Annual Register, no.1, 1937» p.268.
2
Dr Khare was Minister for Home Affairs, with 
responsibility for the Appointments, General Administration, 
Jail, and Police Departments; R.S. Shukla was Minister 
for Education; D.P. Mishra, Minister for Local Self 
Government; R.M. Deshmukh, Minister for Public Works;
M.Y. Shareef, Minister for Law; D.K. Mehta, Minister for 
Finance; and P.B. Gole, Minister for Revenue.
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to greet the people. These tours created 'unprecedented 
scenes of activity and enthusiasm'.1
A wave of public acclamation also greeted the
ministers on 30 July 1937 ~ the day of the inauguration
of the first session of the Legislative Assembly of the
Central Provinces and Berar. Large numbers of people
from town and country thronged the streets from
Dr Khare's bungalow in Dhantoli to the Assembly building,
while others crowded into the once forbidden members'
room or packed the galleries to suffocation. For those
outside, it was a sight never to be forgotten when the
procession of Congress members of the Legislative
Assembly, clad in white khadi and Gandhi caps, moved out
of Dr Khare's bungalow into the Wardha road, preceded
2by bands and flags. For, as one witness averred,
the procession of (the) congress members to 
parliament was a demonstration to the public 
that congress raj has been established....
(and) Dr Khare in pyjama was the centre of a 
semi-religious ceremony.3
And as the procession moved, the crowd, estimated at 
20,000, moved too, accompanying it on its way up the 
hill, below the grim fort on Sitabuldi and on to the 
Assembly hall. There another crowd welcomed the
1
See Hitavada, 16 July 1937» P*9» 18 July 1937» P*l4;
4 August 1937» P*10; 11 August 1937» P « 6 ;  15 August 1937» 
p.4; 18 August 1937» P«10; 20 August 1937» P*3»
22 August 1937» pp.5» 7» 8, 11; 22 August 1937» PP•5 , 9-
2
Ibid., 1 August 1927, pp.6, 7» Indian Annual Register, 
no.2, 1937» P.253.
3
Hi tavada, 1 August 1937» P*7.
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procession and its attendants, and the members passed 
inside to be sworn in and take their places on the 
Government benches.1
One of the ministry's first acts was to remove 
certain restrictions which it believed hampered the 
freedom of the people. For this, too, it won popular 
acclaim. Dr Khare figured prominently in the removal 
of these restrictions. Between July and August 1937>
he refunded the press securities of various newspapers, 
and ordered the release of political prisoners and those
imprisoned for complicity in the communal riots in
2Nagpur in 1927- The Premier also rescinded the orders 
banning certain books and films, and directed the 
members of the Criminal Investigation Department 'not 
to go to meetings with tables and chairs, but to take
3as far as possible only mental notes'. In addition,
Gole, the Minister for Revenue, ordered the stay until
the following harvest of all coercive processes employed
4in the collection of land revenue. Mishra, too, as
1
There were hostile demonstrations from the galleries 
when the former interim ministers, Raghavendra R ao,
B.G. Khaparde, and S.W.A. Rizwi took the oaths. Dr Khare 
appealed to the galleries to maintain order, but the 
shouting continued. The President then warned that he 
would clear the galleries, and thereafter quietness 
prevailed.
2
Hitavada, 25 July 1937, p.lj 30 July 1937, P-5;
25 August 1937, P-l; NAI, Home Poll, 18-7, 1937, FR, 
Second Half of July 1937, p.4. Among the securities 
refunded was a sum of Rs. 3,000 deposited by the 
Maharashtra press in 1931*
3
Hitavada, 11 August 1937, P*4; 25 August 1937, P*3*
4
Ibid., 21 July 1937, p.1; 4 August 1937, p-l*
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Minister for Local Self Government foreshadowed a 
similar relaxation of restrictions in August 1937 when 
he promised 'full freedom to local bodies'.1
Besides these immediately popular activities, the
ministers also undertook work of a long term nature,
whose effects were not readily apparent to their
supporters. Of this order was Dr Khare's attempt to
initiate a reform of jails in the Central Provinces and
2Berar during August 1937* At the same time, Shukla as 
Minister for Education began moves to establish a
3system of mass education throughout the province.
Mishra also set his hand to reform, giving his attention 
to a 'radical reorganisation of local bodies in the
4province, including a scheme for village panchayats'.
Again, in the Department of Commerce and Industry, Mehta
worked to foster the growth of indigenous industries;
and in the Forest Department investigated the possibility
of reforming the rules relating to the use of government
5forests.
While all ministers received popular acclaim during 
their first months in office, the adulation accorded to
1 —
Hitavada, 18 August 1937» p.10.
2
MPS, Jails Department (Jails), 1-19, 1938, Introduction 
of Certain Reforms in the Jails of the Central Provinces 
and Berar, Note by Dr Khare, 9 August 1937, p.l.
3
Bombay Chronicle, 6 September 1937, P*7*
4
Indian Annual Register, no.2, 1937, P*289*
5
Ibid., pp.289-90‘
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Shukla outstripped that given to any of his colleagues. 
By 1938 Shukla had won the respect of many people in the 
province for his nationalist zeal and capacity for hard 
work. He had won notice, too, for his 'dignity of 
deportment and unfailing courtesy of conduct and 
expression', - qualities remarkable in a politician who 
was skilled in the manipulation of power.1 The people's 
esteem for Shukla was clearly evident as he moved about 
Mahakoshal during the latter part of 1937, eliciting 
public opinion on the scheme of compulsory primary 
education which he desired to implement. Besides 
discussing the scheme with the leading men in the towns 
and larger villages of the region, Shukla identified 
closely with the common people wherever he went. He 
always travelled in third class railway carriages, and 
in the places on his itinerary he gave interviews,
participated in processions with the National Flag, and
2addressed huge public gatherings. In doing so, Shukla 
generated a degree of popular enthusiasm which, 
according to one observer, was equalled only when Nehru
3visited the region shortly before the elections. 
Something of the warmth and admiration with which the 
people greeted Shukla is reflected in the following 
description of his visit to Sagar in August 1937*
1
Hi tavada, 16 April. 1.939» P»7*
2
Ibid. , 22 August 19.37» p. 11; 25 August 1937» P*5j
1 September 1937» P*6; 3 September 1937» p.8 .
3
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Never before in the history of Saugor has such 
enthusiasm been shown, in which government 
officials, congressmen, the elite of the town 
and masses thus cooperated and accorded a 
common reception, as was evinced this day under 
the congress flag....The minister granted 
interviews to officials, non officials and the 
general public and mixed with them. (At a) 
huge public meeting, (Shukla)...told people 
that they had to keep up their culture, language 
and religion against all odds....(He then) left 
Saugor for Hoshangabad... travelling in the 
popular Gandhi class.
It was thus not surprising, that, as a result of his
tour, Shukla appeared to many as 'a tribune of the
2people who was capable of redressing all wrongs’.
Ill
Although the ministry made a promising start, within 
a year it divided along linguistic lines and the reins 
of government passed from Dr Khare and the Marathi region 
to Shukla and Mahakoshal. Restlessness and tension among 
different sections of the population formed the background 
to the collapse of Dr Khare’s ministry. Between July and 
December 1937 considerable tension developed between 
Hindus and Muslims in the province. This tension 
exploded in a series of disturbances which affected many 
areas, but were particularly severe in Akola, Nagpur and
1
Hitavada, 25 August 1937, P-5*
2
Ibid., 3 September 1937, p.8.
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appealed for calm and promised to hold an enquiry into the
2riots in Jabalpur. In addition, in December 1937 the 
cabinet issued a Memorandum to all District Commissioners 
on the measures they were to take to prevent communal 
disturbances. The Memorandum closed with the following
words:
It appears that there is an impression in the 
public mind that government may not deal firmly 
with communal activities which transgress the law. 
There is no justification whatever for this 
impression....Rest assured that you will be 
supported in any measures you may deem it 
necessary to take to keep or restore the peace, 
provided they are within the law.3
These measures, however, proved ineffective in stilling
the tide of communal tension. During the first half of
1938 a series of disturbances, greater in intensity
than those of 1 9 3 7» swept the province, before declining
Jabalpur. In dealing- with the disturbances Dr Khare
1
See Hitavada, 29 August 1937» p.l4; 20 October 1937» P*l; 
21 November 1937» P*2 ; 28 November 1937» P*l; 24 December 
1937» P*8 ; Mishra, op. cit., pp. 4-34-5; see also NAI, Home 
Poll, 18-9, 1937» FR, First Half of September 1937» P-3; 
ibid., 18-9, 1937» FR , Second Half of September 1937» P*2; 
Home Poll, 18-10, 1937, FR, First Half of October 1937» 
pp.1-2; ibid., 18-10, 1937» FR, Second Half of October 
1937» PP.l, 3» 5; Home Poll, 18-11; 1937, FR, First Half 
of November 1937, pp.2-4; ibid., 18-11, 1937, FR, Second 
Half of November 1937, P-3; Home Poll, 18-12, F R , 1937, 
First Half of December 1937, P*2 ; ibid., 18-12, F R ,
Second Half of December 1937, PP•2, 3*
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See CPBLA, vo1.2 , pp.269-8 8. Dr Khare gave this 
promise in response to a resolution moved in the 
Assembly by N.P. Mishra, the member for Jabalpur City.
3
MPS, GAD, Confidential, 7, 1937, Action to be Taken to 
Prevent Communal Strife, Memorandum to all District 
Commissioners, Central Provinces and Berar, no.624/370-A/ 
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The cabinet, too, was hard pressed to deal with 
unrest among the peasants of the province. During 
1937-8 the peasants, goaded by poor seasons and low 
prices for agricultural products, mounted a campaign 
for the abolition of rural indebtedness, the reduction 
of land revenue, and the exemption from revenue for
2those peasants with an income below a certain level.
This campaign assumed a serious note when the peasants 
withheld their land revenue and refused to cooperate 
with government officials, and when they led a march of
3protest on the Assembly in Nagpur on 13 December 1937- 
Dr Khare, however, managed to calm the excited marchers. 
Addressing the kisans outside the Assembly,
towards the end of the year.
1
Maharashtra, 16 February 1938, p.2; NAI, Home Poll, 
18-1, 1939» FR, Second Half of January 1938, pp.2, 5;
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Home Poll, 18-6, 1938, FR, Second Half of June 1938, 
pp.2-3; Home Poll, 18-8, 1938, FR, First Half of August 
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3 Hitavada, 2 December 1937, p.10; NAI, Home Poll, 18-11,
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Dr Khare dwelt on the limitations under which 
the ministers were working and their desire to 
implement their promises to the electorate.
The speech had a visible effect on the men and 
those who came to frighten the ministry with 
red banner and sickle cheered the premier and 
the unanimous opinion was that Dr Khare had 
won the round.1
But it was only the first round, for during 1938 rural
unrest intensified, and the payments of land revenue to
2the government declined markedly. This compelled the 
government to take action and during February 1938 it 
granted relief from the payment of revenue in districts 
where crops were worst affected by the vagaries of
3climate. The situation, however, continued to be
4critical for the remainder of the year.
Dr Khare1s ministry also had to face considerable 
unrest on the industrial front. The unrest was 
particularly evident among textile workers in Nagpur, 
who complained that wage cuts, introduced in 1933 in
1
Hi tavada, 15 December 1937» p.6.
2
NAI, Home Poll, 18-2, 1938, FR, First Half of February 
1938, p.4.
3 Ibid., Times of India, 4 March 1938, p.12. During 
February 1938, the government passed orders remitting 
by 12^ - per cent rents and revenues of all small holders 
in the province.
4
NAI, Home Poll, 18-4, 1938, FR, First Half of April 
1938, p.4; MPS, P & M, Confidential, 131» 1938, Reports 
on the Unsatisfactory Collections of Land Revenue, 
Extract from the Fortnightly Confidential Report of 
Commissioner, Nagpur Division, First Half of July 1938, 
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response to the economic depression, were still in 
operation four years later.1 To persuade the mill 
owners and the government to restore these cuts, the 
mill workers threatened to go on strike. In January 
and February 1938 the ministers discussed the situation 
with the workers' representatives and assured them
that 'whatever is possible and within our means, we are
2ready to provide'. However, as no practical reforms
eventuated, the workers persisted in their threat to
strike. During March, therefore, the cabinet appointed
a Textile Committee to examine the mill workers'
complaints. The Committee examined these complaints,
and having done so, drew up a Report, which included
a recommendation that the employers reduce the wage cut
by 60 per cent. For some months, however, the
government took no action to implement the recommendation,
and only did so when workers threatened to stage a
4province-wide strike.
Dr Khare and his ministers also had to contend with 
constant opposition from the members of the Congress 
Parliamentary party. One instance of opposition from
1
Hitavada, 24 November 1937» p .12.
2
Maharashtra, 20 February 1938, p.8.
3
Bombay Chronicle, 12 March 1938, p.7» ibid., 8 June
1938, p.16; Maharashtra, 8 May 1938, p . 10; ibid.,
15 June 1938, p.8. The Chairman of the Textile Enquiry 
Committee was N.J. Roughton, Financial Commissioner, 
Central Provinces.
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this quarter occurred during the framing of the budget 
for 1937-8. When drawing up the budget in September
1937, Mehta, the Finance Minister, and his colleagues 
did not reduce rents and revenues as they had promised 
to do during the election campaign. According to the 
Times of India this was not an oversights
A study of the actual state of affairs in the 
province and of the condition of the exchequer 
made (the ministers)...realise that it was 
neither possible nor necessary immediately to 
carry out the extravagant promises to the 
electorate....With a budget that was barely 
balanced and prohibition swallowing up a not 
inconsiderable proportion of the revenue, they 
could not light heartedly sacrifice lakhs of 
land revenue.1
The rank and file members of the Parliamentary party, 
however, did not see the situation in that light, and 
they demanded that the ministers hold to their promise. 
A stormy party meeting took place in September, during 
which the ministers threatened to resign. But when the 
'members asserted themselves' , the minister’s submitted
and agreed to incorporate the promised reduction in the
2budget. The ministers also failed to implement a 
second promise, namely, to reduce the enhanced land 
revenue in Akola and Buldhana. And, as with the 
reduction of land revenue, they only gave way on the
1
Times of India, 15 September 1937» p .10.
2
Hitavada, 12 September 1937» PP•1» 5; CPBLA, 13
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362
issue when members from Berar threatened to revolt 
against them.1
Dissensions within the cabinet itself, however, 
posed the most serious threat to the stability of the 
government. These dissensions were rooted in a complex 
set of factors. Foremost among these was the manner in 
which Dr Khare attained the Premiership. He did not do 
so on the basis of a clear majority in his favour at 
successive meetings of the Parliamentary party, but 
owing to the failure of members from Mahakoshal and 
Berar to agree on a common candidate from either of the 
two regions. Dr Khare thus continually came to the 
fore as a compromise candidate, and in this way became 
Leader of the Congress Parliamentary party and in turn 
Premier of the Central Provinces and Berar.
As a compromise candidate, Dr Khare continually 
displaced his strongest rival for the Premiership,
Ravi Shankar Shukla. Shukla had strong claims for that 
position, in that by 1937 he had emerged as the leader 
of the Congress in Mahakoshal. So far as the Premiership 
was concerned, this was a significant achievement, for 
in 1937 the region contained substantially more than 
half the population of the province. It also returned 
the largest number of members to the Assembly, and
1
CPBLA., 13 December 1937» pp.288-307» ibid., 14 December 
1937» PP•381-402; Times of India, 2 November 1937» P •12; 
Maharashtra, 2 January 1938, p.15; NAI, Home Poll, 18-2,
1938, FR, First Half of February 1938, p.4.
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supplied a majority of members to the Congress 
Parliamentary party.1 Yet despite this, Shukla was not 
elected Premier.
His failure to attain that position was due in 
large measure to his longstanding rival in Mahakoshal, 
D.P. Mishra, and to the preference of the Berar 
Congressmen for a Marathi Premier. Shukla1s first 
elimination in favour of Dr Khare occurred on 19 July
1936 at a meeting of the Committee to coordinate the 
Congress election campaigns in all parts of the Province. 
At the meeting, Mishra, assisted by Mehta, prevented
Shukla from being elected President of the Committee,
2and the post went by default to Dr Khare. Shukla 
suffered a much more serious reverse on 28 February 1937 
when he lost the Leadership of the Congress Parliamentary 
party to Dr Khare. He did so because Dr Khare was the 
only candidate acceptable to Congressmen from Mahakoshal 
and Berar. This was evident from an account of the 
meeting which took place in Dr Khare's bungalow in 
Nagpuri
1
At the 19^1 Census, the Mahakoshal region had a 
population of 9,792,890; the population of the Marathi 
region numbered 7,020,69b. Excluding the Muslim and 
special constituencies Mahakoshal had 49 members in the 
Assembly, and the Marathi region 3 8. The addition of 
the Factory Labour and Northern Landholders' seats gave 
Mahakoshal 51 members; and the addition of the Central 
Provinces Commerce seat, and the two seats representing 
Commercial and landed interests in Berar gave the Marathi 
region 4l. The Congress party secured 43 of the 51 seats 
in Mahakoshal; and 27 of the 4l seats in the Marathi 
region. This figure rose to 28 seats when Shareef joined 
the Congress.
2
Hitavada, 22 July 1936, p.5*
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Shukla's name was suggested first....But this 
was too much for the Jubbulpore group to 
swallow....Then the name of D.P. Mishra.
Berar not to be beaten down by Mahakoshal 
suggested R.M. Deshmukh. To win over D.K. Mehta 
to their side the Chhattisgarh (members) 
suggested his name. Then came the all atoning 
name of Dr Khare....Ramrao Deshmukh withdrew... 
and asked Mehta if he really aspired for 
leadership. What could he say? He withdrew 
....So did Shukla and Mishra....So Dr Khare 
was elected leader...of the Central Provinces 
Assembly party.^
Opposition from Mishra and the Berar members also 
caused Shukla to lose the Premiership of the province 
to Dr Khare. The elections for this post were held on
24 March 1937* During the canvassing which preceded 
the elections, Shukla secured an early lead over other
contenders by winning the support of Biyani and the
2members from Berar. Before the vote was taken, however,
Wamanrao Joshi intervened to see that ’the election of
Dr Khare was not upset'. To do so he withdrew the
promised support of the Berar members from Shukla and
3gave it to Dr Khare instead. Mishra, too, agreed to 
support Dr Khare rather than permit his old rival,
1
Hitavada, 3 March 1937» P*l> N AI, Home Poll, 18-2,
1937> FR, Second Half of February 1937» P P •4-5•
2
Hi tavada, 26 March 1937» p .12. The price Shukla paid 
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include Gole in the ministry; and to give the 
presidentship of the Assembly to a Berar Congressman.
3
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Shukla, to gain the Premiership. As a result of these 
manoeuvres Shukla realised that the combined vote of the 
Marathi members and the Hindi supporters of Mishra was 
sufficient to give Dr Khare a majority. He thus declined 
to contest the election, and as a result Dr Khare was 
elected Premier.^
Certain aspects of the formation of Dr Khare1s
cabinet also contributed to its instability. One of
the more dangerous of these aspects concerned the fact
that, although the Hindi members were in a majority in
the Parliamentary party, the cabinet had a Marathi
Premier and four ministers from the Marathi region as
opposed to only three ministers from Mahakoshal. The
circumstances under which D.P. Mishra became a minister
also contributed to the instability of the cabinet.
When Khare first informed Sir Hyde Gowan of his intention
to include Mishra in his cabinet, Gowan advised him
against it on the grounds that the government had
preferred certain charges of a personal nature against
Mishra. However, when Dr Khare indicated that he was
unwilling to follow this advice, the Governor agreed to
3admit Mishra and the charges against him were dropped.
T
Hitavada, 26 March 1937» p.12.
2
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It was highly likely that Khare was under strong 
pressure to include Mishra in the cabinet, not merely 
because he was a prominent Hindi Congressman, but as 
the man largely responsible for his own election as 
Premier.1 Moreover, during June, rumours circulating
in Nagpur told of a possible reconciliation between
2Shukla and Mishra. It was not improbable that Dr Khare 
included Mishra in the cabinet as a means of staving off 
this reconciliation. For were the two leaders to unite, 
Dr Khare would lose his majority in the Parliamentary 
party.
IV
No less than four recurrent crises engulfed the 
ministry of Dr Khare between 1937 and 1938. These crises 
all concerned the question as to whether the Marathi 
region or Mahakoshal was to control the Government of 
the Central Provinces and Berar. The question was 
finally resolved in favour of Mahakoshal, for in 1938 
the Working Committee compelled Dr Khare to surrender 
the Premiership of the province to Ravi Shankar Shukla. 
This act completed the transfer of political power in 
the province from the Marathi to the Hindi region begun 
by Raghavendra Rao.
The first crisis in Dr Khare*s ministry took the 
form of a dispute between the ministers from Berar and
1
Hitavada, k October 1939» P*5*
2
Ibid., 9 June 1937» 16 June 1937» P*10» NAI, Home
Poll, 18-16, 1937, FR, First Half of June 1937, P-3-
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those from Mahakoshal over the allocation of the 
revenues of Berar.^ The dispute flared up in August
1937 as the ministers were preparing the annual budget. 
Ramrao Deshmukh, the Minister for Public Works, who had 
been elected on the policy of support for the Sim 
Formula, apparently desired to ensure a substantial 
allotment of the Berar revenues to projects in Berar 
under the terms of that Formula. Shukla, however, and 
a majority of the Congress Assembly members from the 
Central Provinces, held the view that the Sim Formula
2'had lapsed with the coming in of the new constitution'. 
The persistent adherence of the two ministers to their 
respective points of view led to an angry scene at a 
cabinet meeting in August 1937* As Deshmukh records:
Hot words were exchanged at a cabinet meeting 
held for the formulation of the budget, and 
...Ravi Shanker Shukla literally threw away my 
note prepared for discussion and clarification 
in respect of the application of the Sim Formula.
On this X...resigned and handed over my 
resignation to Dr Khare.3
Although Dr Khare reconciled the two men, Shukla had
khis way and the government abandoned the Sim Formula.
1
See Appendix A, no.k .
2
From a written statement sent to the writer by 
Shri R.M. Deshmukh, d. 15/16 January 1968, p.3* (This 
statement will be cited hereafter as Deshmukh).
3
Ibid., p .3•
4
CPBLA, 11 September 1937» pp.168-71* In 1937”8, Berar 
received Rs. 36.55 lakhs of divisible expenditure which 
amounted to 31-7 per cent of her quota under the Sim 
Formula.
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This led to further dissension in the cabinet. As a
iresult, the ministers referred the issue to the Congress 
Parliamentary Sub-Committee, a body appointed to handle 
disputes arising from the working of the various Congress 
ministries.1 The Sub-Committee however failed to reach
a solution, and in April 1938 handed the problem over to
2Patel. Patel, in turn, passed it to Aney, but by the 
time Aney began his investigations, the cabinet was on 
the verge of collapse and the dispute over revenues gave
3place to matters of greater moment.
The ministers from Mahakoshal followed up their 
victory on the Sim Formula by moving to the offensive 
in a second crisis involving the Minister for Law,
M.Y. Shareef. From this crisis, however, the Premier and 
the Marathi region emerged triumphant. The crisis began 
in February 1938 when Shareef, in his capacity as 
Minister for Law, released from jail a Muslim prisoner, 
Syed Zafer Husain, long before his prison sentence had
1
Indian Annual Register, no.l, 1938, p.314; Bombay 
Chronicle, 5 April 1938, p.l; NML, AICC, PL-23, 1938, 
Central Provinces and Berar Financial Issue, Report of 
the Sub-Committee, 3 April 1938.
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NML, MPCC, 1921-37, 1, M.S. Aney to D.P. Mishra,
6 June 1937? Bombay Chronicle, 2k June 1938, p.7; NAI, 
Reforms, 82/38-G, 1938, Financial Settlement between 
the Central Provinces and Berar, Governor of the Central 
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expired. Husain, a former Inspector of Schools in 
Berar, had been imprisoned several years beforehand on
charges of a personal nature committed while he was a
2government servant. In releasing Husain, Shareef did 
not inform Dr Khare or his colleagues of his action, 
with the result that they did not hear of the release
3until March 1938. By that time it was too late for 
them to take defensive action, for the Hindu Sabha was 
leading a fierce campaign in the Marathi region for the
4removal of Shareef from the ministry.
In any case, the cabinet found it difficult to take
united action on Shareef. Deshmukh was generally
sympathetic to the views of the Hindu Sabha, and in all
probability found it difficult to oppose the stand it
5adopted on Shareef. Again, none of the Marathi 
ministers could ride rough-shod over the public outcry
1
NAI, Khare MS, 108, iii, Notes and Orders of
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against Shareef in the Marathi region. Divisions -within 
the Parliamentary party also prevented the cabinet from 
taking united action on Shareef. As a result the 
government found itself in a dilemma, as was 
clearly evident from the following report of a meeting 
of the Parliamentary party in March 1938:
(Shareef*s case) came up before a meeting of the 
ministerialist party...when the members gave free 
expression to their strong dissaproval of the 
action of government... .The premier was placed 
in a very awkward position....He could not say 
he supported Shareef; nor could he let down a 
colleague....It is reported that there was a 
walk out and that eventually the party passed 
a vote of no confidence in Shareef....(There 
are) threats of the situation getting out of 
hand. ^
To prevent this from happening, the Hindi ministers
urged that the government take firm action to support
Shareef. Accordingly, the cabinet drafted a report for
Patel, as the member of the Parliamentary Sub-Committee
with responsibility for the Central Provinces and Berar.
In this report, the ministers explained that the passing
of a mercy order did not require the consent of the full
cabinet, and they thus urged the Working Committee to
2show leniency towards Shareef. The Hindi ministers 
also led the cabinet in speaking out boldly in Shareef*s
1
Times of India, 16 March 1938, p.8.
2
NAI, Khare MS, 108, xiii, N.B. Khare to V.J. Patel,
25 March 1938.
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defence at huge public gatherings held in Nagpur. And
it was once again the Hindi ministers who were responsible
for winning a vote of confidence for Shareef from the
2members of the Parliamentary party.
The Hindi ministers, however, were unable to 
forestall Shareef’s resignation from the cabinet. For 
his resignation, they blamed Dr Khare. The Hindi 
ministers’ main contention was that the Premier was not 
as convinced as they were of the need for firmness in 
dealing with the public outburst against Shareef. They 
considered, too, that Dr Khare was unduly sensitive to 
the criticism directed at the minister by people in the
3Marathi region. The Hindi ministers also discovered 
that
Dr Khare made enquiries of the District Commissioner 
of Wardha against minister Shareef and made a 
report to Sardar Patel about the latter which was. 
subsequently denied by the District Commissioner.
In addition, they could not have been unaware that 
Dr Khare had been equivocal as to whether Shareef’s 
action in releasing Husain was a ’fit case for the
1
See Bombay Chronicle, 29 March 1938, p . 12 ; 31 March
1938, p.10; 21 April 1938, p .10.
2
See Khare, op. cit., p.27; Times of India, 28 March
1937, P.9.
3
Hi tavada, 24 December 1939» p.4. This extract concerns
D.K. Mehta’s criticism of Dr Khare’s part in the 
’Shareef affair’.
4
The Central Provinces Ministerial Crisis (Allahabad, 
193?), p.5- (Thi s will be cited hereafter as Ministerial 
Crisis).
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exercise of clemency under the powers conferred by the 
law'.1 The views of the Hindi ministers, however, 
carried little weight with Patel, who, conscious as he 
was of divisions within the cabinet and the Parliamentary 
party on the issue, refused the request for leniency and 
referred Shareef’s case to a noted lawyer. The lawyer 
ultimately found Shareef guilty of a miscarriage of 
justice, and on 21 May 1938 he resigned from the 
cabinet.^
While many people in the Marathi region, including 
Dr Khare, accepted this verdict, the Hindi ministers
1
Indian Annual Register, no.l, 1938, p.255* These were 
Dr Khare's words to a deputation which waited on him 
on 24 March 1938.
2
Ibid., pp.22, 315» 325; Bombay Chronicle, 13 April 1938, 
p.l; NAI, Khare MS, xxii, H. Bomford, Acting Governor, 
Central Provinces and Berar to N.B. Khare, 21 May 1938. 
Shareef’s resignation was accepted by Mr Hugh Bomford,
ICS, who became Acting Governor of the Central Provinces 
and Berar on 3 March 1938. The day before, Sir Hyde 
Gowan who had already resigned with effect from 27 May 
1938, left the province for England. The Times of India 
(3 March 1928, p.ll), said that Gowan had ’not been 
keeping good health. A stage was reached when his 
medical advisers considered that his departure would be 
in the interests of his health....The departure from 
Nagpur was marked by an air of quietness’. One observer 
recorded before his departure from Nagpurs ’I met him 
two months back and was sad to notice that he was a 
tired and worn-out man. Thirty-five years of work in 
the province had told on him, and he longed to be back 
in England’. See Appreciations of the Administration 
of His Excellency Sir Hyde Clarendon Gowan, BA (Oxon.),
LLP (Nagpur), KCSI, CIE, VD , ICS, J.P., Governor of~~the 
Central Provinces and Berar 1933-1938 (Nagpur, 1938),~ 
p .49• Gowan died in London on 1 April 1938. The lawyer 
who reviewed Shareef’s case was Sir Manmatha Nath 
Mukherjee.
tdid not. They held the Premier responsible for what
they described as 'this unfortunate culmination1 / Moreover,
they demonstrated their opposition to Dr Khare and the
judgement alike by calling a meeting at Pachmarhi in
support of Shareef on 24 May 1938. Those present at
the meeting recorded their 'deep sorrow' at Shareef1s
resignation and urged the Working Committee to review
2his case. The Hindi ministers subsequently placed this
request before the Working Committee, but it was
3rejected.
Defeated as they were in the Shareef case, the
Hindi ministers led by Mishra provoked the next
ministerial crisis by refusing to work with Dr Khare.
They did so in protest against the alleged inability of
the Premier to lead either the cabinet or the province.
In making this protest, the Hindi ministers at first
secured the support of Gole, but he later dissociated
4himself from their move. In May 1938 the Hindi 
ministers under Mishra*s leadership drew up a list of 
grievances against Dr Khare in support of their
5contention that he was unfit to continue as Premier.
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Hitavada, 24 December 1939» P*4; Bombay Chronicle,
13 April 1938, p.l.
2
Ibid., 26 May 1938, p.l.
3
Maharashtra, 1 June 1938, p . 4; 5 June 1938, p.8.
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Ministerial Crisis, p.7* Dr Khare himself persuaded 
Gole to dissociate himself from the protest being made 
by the Hindi ministers against him.
5
Ibid., p p .4-5•
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communal riots which took place in Jabalpur in October
1937 and March 1938.^ After the riots in October 1937
Khare and Mishra clashed on the action to be taken by
the government. Dr Khare ordered the police to
investigate the cause of the riots and to launch
2prosecutions against the guilty party. Mishra, however, 
demanded that Khare cancel the orders, for according to 
one member of the cabinet
As an aftermath of these riots, police 
investigations traced certain friends and 
supporters of Mr Mishra to have been involved.
They were interrogated during investigations 
and Mr Mishra claimed that they were harassed 
and molested by the police. He consided it a 
point of his prestige and honour that his 
friends and supporters should receive such 
a treatment. His desire was that all 
investigation in which his friends might be 
found, rightly or wrongly, involved should 
stop at once, otherwise his entire position 
as a politician in Jabalpur would be completely 
undermined . 3
Mishra further charged that, in agreeing to order a
police investigation and to launch prosecutions,
Dr Khare was placing greater reliance on the advice of
his departmental officials than on that of his colleagues
kxn the cabinet.
Their main grievance concerned his handling of the
1
Ministerial Crisis, pp.5-6; Times of India, 13 May 
1938, p.14.
2
Hitavada, 31 October 1937, P*7*
3
Deshmukh, p.8.
4
Ministerial Crisis, p.6; Maharashtra, 22 June 1938, p.4.
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When Dr Khare proceeded with the prosecution of* 
those responsible for the Jabalpur riots, however,
Mishra demanded that he surrender the portfolio of 
Police. During January 1938 Dr Khare went to Jabalpur 
to hold an enquiry based on the evidence supplied by 
the police. As a result of this enquiry, a number of 
people were sentenced and imprisoned.1 Mishra 
thereupon intensified his attack on Dr Khare, claiming 
that he was ’playing into the hands of the bureaucracy' /  
To remedy the situation, Mishra demanded that Dr Khare
3should surrender control over the Police ministry.'
A recurrence of communal unrest in Jabalpur in
March 1938 led directly to moves by Mishra and his
colleagues to compel Dr Khare to give up the Police
portfolio. After the riots, Mishra alleged that
Dr Khare had not taken adequate measures to prevent
4their recurrence. Mishra1s colleagues - Shukla, Mehta 
and Gole - apparently supported this allegation, and 
together the four men launched a move to compel Dr Khare 
to surrender the Police portfolio and to enable them to 
control the communal situation to their own satisfaction. 
The four ministers claimed that Dr Khare was weak and 
incompetent, and they prepared a list of charges to
1
Maharashtra, 19 January 1938, p.2. See also NAX, Home 
Poll, 18-8, 1938, FR, Second Half of August I938, p.3 .
2
Deshmukh, pp.8-9; Ministerial Crisis, p.6 .
3
Deshmukh, pp.8-9 . Deshmukh says that Mishra wanted 
the Police portfolio to go to Shukla.
4
Ministerial Crisis, pp.4-5*
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substantiate this claim.1 Then, on 8 May 1938 they
forwarded the charges to Dr Khare and at the same time
2announced their resignations from the cabinet.
The Hindi ministers, however, lacked adequate 
support within the Congress Parliamentary party to press 
their charges and they were compelled to come to an 
understanding with Dr Khare. Many Hindi members were
3out of sympathy with the ministers' attack on Dr Khare. 
Again, when Gole disassociated himself from their revolt, 
the Hindi ministers lost all chance of winning any 
support from Berar. As a result, there was little that 
they could do but inform Dr Khare on 9 May 1938 that 
they were 'not serious on the question of the break up
4of the ministry'.
1
Ministerial Crisis. The charges made by Mishra, Mehta, 
Shukla and Gole were as follows: Dr Khare's 'handling of 
the Home department was characterised by weakness. In 
the matter of economy and other questions, he gave into 
the department against the advice of his colleagues.
After the two Jabalpur visits, he did not handle the 
police department firmly in spite of the insistence of 
his colleagues. In several other cases mentioned in the 
letter he has been subservient to the secretariat. On 
the basis of a rumour against Gole, on the sale of 
manganese ore, he ordered the District Magistrate of 
Nagpur to enquire into the allegations against him. He 
made enquiries of the District Commissioner Wardha against 
minister Shareef and made a report to Sardar Patel about 
the latter which was subsequently denied by the District 
Commissioner'.
2
Ibid., p.5 J Maharashtra, 12 June 1938, p.4.
3
Ibid., 15 May 1938, p.4. The leaders of the opposition 
to Mishra in the Congress Assembly party were T.P.L. Singh 
of Raipur and K.R. Khandekar of Sagar.
4
Khare, op. cit., p.5*
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Dr Khare was also in a mood to compromise, Tor his own 
position was far from secure. Accordingly, when he met 
the Hindi ministers at Pachmarhi on 9 May, he agreed 
that the crisis in the cabinet be referred to Valiabhbhai 
Patel.1 Having reached a measure of accord, the members 
of the cabinet then travelled to Bombay,where they held 
discussions with Patel that temporarily sealed the truce 
between them. As the Bombay Chronicle noted:
As a result of conversations between Patel, 
Jawarhalal Nehru and the ministers from the 
Central Provinces,...an amicable settlement 
was arrived at on 12th evening. As a result 
of conversations, the ministers are understood 
to have agreed mutually to adjust their 
differences and carry on their work smoothly.
They will therefore withdraw their 
resignations.2
In May 1938 the Hindi ministers made a further move
to displace Dr Khare, but this also failed due to their
lack of support within the Parliamentary party.
Following the agreement of 12 May 1938, the Hindi
ministers requested Patel to place their grievances
3against Dr Khare before the Working Committee. Patel 
did this, but the Committee declared that it had no 
jurisdiction in the matter, and that the problem could
1
Khare, p.5* According to Dr Khare*s opponents, 'an 
understanding was arrived at on 9 May that Dr Khare would 
continue as Premier, but he would give up his portfolios 
and confine himself to coordinating the work of his 
ministers'. See Ministerial Crisis, p.8.
2
Bombay Chronicle, 13 May 1938, p.l.
3
Khare, op. cit., pp.5-6. Dr Khare says that this 
request was made without his knowledge.
only be solved by referring it to the Parliamentary
party itself. Accordingly the Committee directed
Dr Khare to convene a meeting of the party at Pachmarhi
on 24 May 1938 and requested Patel to preside over the
meeting.1 The Hindi ministers spent the time before
the meeting canvassing for support in any show of
strength with Dr Khare, but they were frustrated in
their efforts by the formation of a block of 44 members
of the Parliamentary party drawn from all parts of the
province. The leader of this group was K.R. Khandekar,
a well known opponent of Mishra in the Mahakoshal
2Congress. On 24 May 1938, the day on which the
Parliamentary party was to meet, Khandekar's group
dropped a bombshell by presenting the ministers with two
alternatives - that they should either come to an
3agreement or resign. The ultimatum had the desired 
effect. On 25 May 1938 the ministers announced that 
they had
1
Ministerial Crisis, pp.8-9; Bombay Chronicle, 16 May 
1938, p.l; 17 May 1938, p.l.
2
Khare, op. cit., p.6; Times of India, 19 May 1938, P*9; 
25 May 1938, p.11; 24 May 1938, p.11; Maharashtra,
22 May 1938, p.2; 29 May 1938, p.4; 1 June 1938, p.8;
5 June 1938, p. 4; Bombay Chronicle, 23 May 1938, p.l; 
Owing to the activities of Khandekar, the Hindi ministers 
were unable to win any appreciable support. Only 21 of 
the 43 Hindi members of the Congress Assembly party 
attended the Mahakoshal Political Conference at Katni on 
22 May 1938, and they 'refused to be drawn into any 
discussion' on the crisis.
3
Bombay Chronicle, 25 May 1938, p.l; Ministerial
Crisis, p .9•
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discussed all the...differences amongst 
ourselves, some of them being temperamental, 
some due to differences of outlook and others 
involving questions of procedure regarding the 
internal working of the ministry. We are 
happy to report that we have been able to 
amicably settle all our differences and have 
agreed to work in a spirit of comradeship.^
This assurance rested on an agreement between the 
ministers that Dr Khare would surrender his portfolios 
and remain as Premier and coordinating minister. The 
other members of the cabinet also agreed to surrender 
their portfolios so that a general reshuffle of 
Departments could take place. The ministers further 
agreed to complete the reshuffle by 1 July 1938, and 
that in the event of disagreements the Presidents of
the three Provincial Congress Committees would act as
2arbi trators.
The ministers, however, were unable to implement
the Pachmarhi agreement and a fourth crisis ensued from
which the Marathi region emerged temporarily in control
3of the government. The Hindi ministers and the Premier
1
Bombay Chronicle, 26 May 1938, p.l. See also ibid.,
25 May 1938, p.l; Ministerial Crisis, pp.10-11.
2
Ibid., p.9; Maharashtra, l4 September 1938, p.4; Khare, 
op. cit., p.8. Dr Khare agreed to surrender his 
portfolios on one conditions 'In agreeing to surrender 
the portfolios and throwing them into the common pool,
I . ..definitely stated at Pachmarhi that I would not take 
any step that will cause humiliation to me as Prime 
Minister'.
3
See Appendix A, no.5•
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failed to keep the agreement because each doubted the
bona fides of the other.1 More importantly, however,
Dr Khare and D.P. Mishra disagreed as to who should hold
the Police portfolio after the portfolios were reshuffled.
The Hindi ministers, and Mishra in particular, were
convinced that Dr Khare was unfit to administer the
Police Department, and they demanded that the Department
be placed in their hands. They believed that this would
enable them to rule the restive province more firmly and
with greater independence from the officials than they
2considered Dr Khare had done. Dr Khare, for his part, 
refused to hand the portfolio over to the Hindi ministers 
because he considered it an adjunct to the office of 
coordinating minister and a weapon for possible use
3against the Hindi ministers, particularly Mishra. He 
agreed, however, to transfer it to a Marathi minister, 
Ramrao Deshmukh, but according to Deshmukh, this was 
unacceptable to Mishra:
1
See Khare, op. cit., p p .2, 8, Appendix B, pp.ii-iii; 
Ministerial Crisis, pp.11-12; Maharashtra, 5 June 1938, 
p.4; Bombay Chronicle, 13 June 1938, p.9; 14 June 1938, 
p .10. These references relate to the persistent 
rumours of a crisis in the ministry; to Gole’s 
resignation from the cabinet on 10 June 1938; and to 
Dr Khare’s confidential Police enquiries against his 
colleagues.
2
See ibid., 31 May 1938, p.?; Maharashtra, 5 June 1938, 
p.4; 17 July 1938, p.4. These excerpts reveal that the 
Hindi ministers were still anxious to control the 
Police Department.
3
See ibid., 24 July 1938, p.2; Khare, op. cit., Appendix
A , p. i .
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During the period of the wrangle that ensued,
Dr M.S. Aney, who was then an all-India leader 
of the Responsivist party intervened, and since
I was standing at the half way house and 
treated as such by both wings, it was offered 
as a solution that I should hold the police 
department if that would offer a solution and 
resolve the crisis. Personally I heartily 
abhorred the idea; but yielded if that could 
avert the crisis. This idea was put to 
Dr Khare, who appeared agreeable to it, if that 
solved the crisis, but Shri D.P. Mishra 
interposed by an excuse that even if he 
(ie.Mishra) were agreeable, his friend...Ravi 
Shanker Shukla would not accept it....When 
Mr Mishra, as the most effective and dominant 
member of the combine had rejected it, it was 
scarcely any use putting it to...Pandit Shukla.
So the matter remained dropped there.^
The problem of re-allocating the Police portfolio 
bedevilled all subsequent attempts to solve the 
differences between the ministers. On 29 June 1938 
Dr Khare relinquished his portfolios in the presence of 
Mehta and Gole, but the act had little effect as Mishra 
and Shukla were not present at the meeting, and
presumably still refused to allow Deshmukh to hold the
2contentious portfolio. As a result, the deadline of
1 July 1938, enumerated in the Pachmarhi agreement, 
elapsed, and the Presidents of the three Provincial 
Congress Committees intervened in the dispute as agreed 
on 24 May. On 8 July 1938 they directed Dr Khare to
1
Deshmukh, p.9; Khare, op. cit., p.8.
2
Bombay Chronicle, 30 June 1938, p-7j Khare, op. cit., 
Appendix A, p.i.
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relinquish his portfolios and act as coordinating
Premier.1 In response Dr Khare summoned meetings of the
cabinet between 11-14 July 1938 at which ’everybody
formally relinquished his portfolios, thus making them
2available for fresh redistribution’.
The ministers’ surrender of their portfolios was
the prelude to a division of the cabinet along linguistic
lines. Despite the fact that all ministers relinquished
their portfolios, they were still unable to agree as to
who was to administer the Police Department. Dr Khare,
aware that Mishra had refused to allow Deshmukh to
administer the Department, proposed that he retain the
Department to enable the orders he might have to give as
coordinating Premier to be carried out ’willingly and
3smoothly'. The Marathi ministers supported this
4request. The Hindi ministers, however, rejected it as
Dr Khare had instituted enquiries against each of them
through the Police Department, and had also raised the
question of the case against Mishra, which the government
5had first instituted against him in July 1937« In fact,
1
Leader 9 13 July 1938, p.11; Maharashtra , 17 July 
1938, p.4.
2
Khare, op. cit., Appendix A, p.i.
3
Ibid., Appendix B (i), p.iii, R.M. Deshmukh to 
N.B. Khare, 13 July 1938; Times of India, 18 July 1938«, 
p.5; Ministerial Crisis, p .12.
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Dr Khare's request to retain the Police portfolio so 
annoyed the Hindi ministers that they walked out of the 
cabinet meetings in protest, and Mishra resigned from the 
ministry.1 On 13 July 1938, Gole and Deshmukh also 
resigned from the ministry on the grounds that any
agreement over redistribution of the portfolios was then
2impossible. Two days later Dr Khare informed Patel of 
the impasse and placed the matter in his hands. Dr Khare 
told Patel that
We tried to come to an understanding about 
redistribution after all the portfolios were 
pooled, but I regret very much to report that 
we could not come to any agreement owing to 
marked differences in our respective outlook....
I have no alternative under the circumstances, 
except to place the matter of redistribution of 
portfolios in your hands.3
Within a week, however, Dr Khare had formed a 
government which excluded the leaders of Mahakoshal and 
in which the Marathi region held the reins of power. In 
dealing with the cabinet crisis, Dr Khare had to choose 
between two courses of action. He could either refer the 
dispute to the Working Committee, or deal with the 
situation himself. Dr Khare's opponents believed that 
he chose both alternatives at once. They stated that the
1
Times of India, 18 July 1938, p.5> Bombay Chronicle, 
20 July 1938, p.13.
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Khare, op. cit., Appendix B (i), p.iii, R.M. Deshmukh 
to N.B. Khare, 13 July 1938; ibid., P.B. Gole to 
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day before he placed the crisis in the hands of Patel, he
made contact with Thakur Piare Lai Singh (the leader of
a group of Assembly members from Mahakoshal who opposed
Mishra and Shukla), presumably to win his support if the
cabinet were re-formed.1 Again, Dr Khare's opponents
claimed that at the cabinet meetings between 11-14 July,
the Premier told his colleagues that 'he would resign
2and. . .call upon the other ministers to do so * . Yet, at 
the same time, Dr Khare placed the crisis before Patel, 
apparently content to await the decision of the Working 
Committee, which was to meet at Wardha on 23 July.
Events from 15 July onwards, however, compelled Dr Khare 
to solve the cabinet crisis himself rather than leave it 
to the Working Committee. Three events occurring in 
close sequence influenced him to take this action. On 
16 July 1938 he received a letter from a prominent 
member of the Working Committee informing him that the 
Committee might discontinue its ministry in the Central 
Provinces and Berar, if the dispute remained unsolved.
To Dr Khare
The fear of this province being declared a non 
Congress province began to haunt me. I realised 
that the activities of the three ministers were 
leading us to the brink of a precipice....(Thus)
I decided to see that the Congress existed in
1
Ministerial crisis, p.13* The reference merely states 
that Dr Khare got into telephonic communication with 
Thakur Piare Lai Singh of Raipur.
2
Ibid., pp.12-13. Dr Khare later denied that 'the 
course I adopted on 18 July had... entered my contemplation 
on 15 when I sent the letter to Patel'. See Khare, 
o p . cit., p .5•
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the government, and that it did not perish.
It was intolerable to me that the labours of 
a life time should be wasted in this way. ^
The same day, Dr Khare received another letter from
Congress members of the Assembly requesting him to call
a meeting of the Parliamentary party. This letter must
have also raised fears in Dr Khare's mind about the
future of the ministry and made the need for action seem
2even more urgent. On 17 July, Dr Khare realised that
action was imperative. On that day Shukla visited
Thakur Piare Lai Singh in Raipur and informed him that
' D r Khare was sure to resign and that he should support
3his own premiership1.
To avert the threats to the ministry and his own 
Premiership, Dr Khare resigned from office almost 
immediately and formed a second ministry in which the 
balance of power lay with his own region. In forming a 
new cabinet, Dr Khare first made certain that he had the 
support of a majority of members of the Parliamentary 
party. When he knew he could count on the Marathi 
members, the Hindi group led by Khandekar and Piare Lai 
Singh, and the Harijan Congressmen, Dr Khare set in
1
Khare, op. cit., pp.11-12.
2
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Labour constituency.
3
Khare, op. cit., p.9*
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motion the resignation of the ministry.1 On 18 July 1938
2Dr Khare requested his ministers to resign. On 19 July 
he received replies in the affirmative from the Marathi 
ministers; and in the negative from the Hindi ministers 
3a day later. This came as no surprise to Dr Khare, 
however, and he refused to allow it to thwart his plan 
of action. On 20 July 1938 at 10.30 a.m. he submitted the 
resignation of the entire cabinet to the new Governor,
Sir Francis Verner Wylie, who had taken up his post at
1
Khare knew he could count for support on Deshmukh and 
Gole (See Khare, op. cit., Appendix B (i), p.iii); see 
ibid., p.10, for Piare Lai Singh. As Dr Khare chose a 
Harijan minister, it is reasonable to suppose that he did 
so in return for support from the Harijan Congress 
members of the Assembly.
2
Ministerial Crisis, p.13; Khare, op. cit., p.12.
3
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Ministerial Crisis, pp.13-17* Dr Moonje reported that 
on 19 July 1938 he called on Deshmukh: ’I asked him if 
his move of resignation is a part of any well-thought 
concerted manouvre (sic) and if he had any previous 
consultation with Dr Khare and Aney? He said no. . . .I 
got disgusted and sent in my resignation. That’s all 
....About this time Gole turned up. Unlike Ramrao, he 
appeared concerned and undecided as to whether he has 
acted rightly or wrongly in resigning1. NLI, Moonje MS, 
Diary 10, 19 July 1938.
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the end of May. Wylie immediately accepted the
2resignations of the Marathi ministers. But he deferred 
taking any action on the Hindi ministers in case the 
Working Committee were able to persuade Dr Khare and his 
Marathi colleagues to 'take back their resignations or 
at least defer pressing them’ until after a meeting of
3the Committee at Wardha on 23 July. Dramatic messages
from Patel in Wardha and nocturnal visits by leading
Congressmen failed to move Dr Khare, however, and the
Governor had little alternative but to dismiss his Hindi4ministers in the early hours of 21 July 1938.
The letter of dismissal sent by the Governor to the 
Hindi ministers gave direction to the events of the 
ensuing 24 hours. In his letter Wylie told the ministers 
that
1
Maharashtra, 21 July 1938, supplement. Wylie was a 
comparatively young man and an outsider to boot. 
Consequently, his appointment to the Governorship of the 
Central Provinces and Berar aroused a great deal of 
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he was Deputy-Secretary of the Foreign Department, 
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judgement’. See Times of India, 4 January 1938, p.9«
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The system is that all ministers should give 
their resignations to the chief minister.
Secondly, as long as the provincial legislature 
is with Dr Khare..., and as it is necessary to 
have a ministry and you are not in a mood to 
resign, I have no other alternative but to 
dissolve your authority as ministers. I am sorry 
to say that X have come to this conclusion.^
Accordingly, on 21 July 1 9 3 8 ,  Wylie requested Dr Khare 
to form another ministry. To do so, Dr Khare drew on 
each of the groups supporting him in the Assembly, and 
submitted a list of nominees to the Governor. Within 
hours, the Governor had accepted the nominations and 
sworn in the new ministry at Government House.
The strength of the ministry undoubtedly lay with 
the Marathi region. The Premiership, and with it the 
key Police portfolio, again went to Dr Khare representing 
the division of Nagpur. Berar gained added strength, 
for although still represented by Gole and Deshmukh, the 
latter acquired the important portfolio of Finance, 
formerly held by D.K. Mehta. The Hindi region, by 
contrast, was only weakly represented in the new cabinet. 
Piare Lai Singh became Minister for Education, and 
Rameshwar Agnibhoj, a Harijan, Minister for Agriculture. 
The former, however, did not represent the Congress 
organisation in Mahakoshal, which firmly supported the 
dismissed Ministers; and the latter was a college
2student with little experience of administration.
1
Maharashtra, 2 k July 1938, p.2.
2
Indian Annual Register, no.l, 1938, p.xxix.
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Within a week of its formation, Dr Khare's new 
ministry had fallen and Mahakoshal had assumed control 
of the government with the creation of a ministry by 
Ravi Shankar Shukla. The Working Committee was directly 
responsible for the formation of this ministry. After 
Dr Khare formed his second cabinet, the Working Committee 
compelled him to stand down as Premier and as Leader of 
the Congress Parliamentary party. The Committee took 
this course of action because it believed that the only 
hope for stable government in the bilingual Central 
Provinces and Berar lay in giving the Premiership to the 
region which held a majority in the Assembly and the 
Parliamentary party alike.1 Following Dr Khare*s 
resignation as Premier and party Leader, Shukla secured 
the Leadership of the Parliamentary party, and by 
29 July 1938 was installed in place of Dr Khare as 
Premier of the Central Provinces and Berar.
On 22 July 1938 the Working Committee began moves 
to usher in a ministry dominated by Mahakoshal and thus 
restore political stability to the Central Provinces 
and Berar. As a first move, the Committee summoned 
Dr Khare and his cabinet to Wardha to explain their 
behaviour. For four hours the Committee led by Patel
V
1
Ministerial Crisis, pp*3~4. The authors of this 
official Congress publication asks 'Who is to be blamed 
if the majority of members of the Central Provinces 
Legislative Assembly party elected Ravishanker Shukla as 
leader? The Mahakoshal members outnumber the rest.*
See also Khare, op. cit., p.15.
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subjected the ministers to a gruelling cross-examination 
during which they accused Dr Khare of insubordination in 
forming a ministry without their knowledge or consent.1 
As a consequence of that charge, they demanded that
Dr Khare resign the Premiership immediately. This
2Dr Khare agreed to do. And, although it was then late 
at night, he drafted the necessary letter to the 
Governor and telephoned his resignation to the Governor’s
3Secretary in Nagpur. Dr Khare then left for Nagpur,
where at 2.25 a.m. he handed his resignation to Wylie at
Government House. Soon afterwards returned to Wardha to
4face further action by the Working Committee.
Between 23-7 July 1938 the Working Committee made
their second move to establish a Hindi ministry and so
restore political calm to the Central Provinces and Berar.
In making this move the Committee compelled Dr Khare to
resign permanently from the Leadership of the Congress
Parliamentary party. This was no easy task, for
Dr Khare was naturally unwilling to terminate his own
5political career. On 23 July the Committee told
1
Maharashtra, 24 July 1938, p.4; Khare, op. cit., pp.l, 
1 3 -16.
2
Ibid., p .16.
3
Ibid., pp.16-18. See especially the letter from 
N.B. Khare to Sir F.V. Wylie, 22 July 1938, p .17•
Dr Khare*s impression was that * the Sardar dictated and 
that Rajendra Prasad scribed* the letter of resignation.
4
Maharashtra, 24 July 1938, p.4.
5
See Khare, op. cit., p.22.
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Dr Khare that the 'natural consequence of his resignation 
was that he should resign the leadership of the Assembly 
party*.1 Dr Khare agreed to resign the Leadership, but 
he informed the Committee that he intended to stand for 
re-election on the grounds
that he command(ed) the support of the majority 
of the Congress Assembly party and as such he 
(could) not be expelled from the party unless 
the majority in it... definitely indicated their 
want of support for him.2
Having made his position clear, Dr Khare summoned all 
Congress members of the Assembly to a meeting of the
3parliamentary party on 27 July to elect a new Leader.
As Dr Khare was still determined to contest the 
Leadership, the Working Committee felt compelled to take 
further action against him. On 25 July, two days before 
the meeting of the Parliamentary party, the Committee 
again called Dr Khare to Wardha and requested him to 
make a 'frank statement' admitting his blame in forming 
a ministry without its consent. Dr Khare did so, but 
Gandhi subsequently amended Dr Khare's draft and
1
Ministerial Crisis, p.21.
2
Bombay Chronicle, 23 July 1938, p.l; see also Ministerial 
Crisis, p.21; Khare, op. cit., p .18. Dr Khare claims 
that on 23 July 1938, the Working Committee did not object 
to his re-contesting the Party Leadership.
3
Ministerial Crisis, p.21.
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firmly refused to sign Gandhi's version of the affair,
and there were stormy scenes as members of the Working
2Committee tried to persuade him to do so. Dr Khare, 
however, refused to be browbeaten and returned to Nagpur 
to consult his friends as to the best course of action. 
Those whom he consulted were also opposed to his signing 
the proposed statement, and as a result Dr Khare 
addressed the following letter to the Working Committee 
on 26 July:
I am sorry I cannot see my way to accept the 
draft which I am asked to....1 am not prepared 
to admit that I was guilty of any indiscipline.
I am not prepared to admit that the Congress 
has lost its prestige through my action. The 
draft contains some baseless insinuations about 
fitness to hold positions of trust and 
responsibility in the Congress. I am sorry I 
cannot endorse them.
I must state in addition that I am 
fundamentally opposed to the view that...the 
Ministers should not be primarily responsible
requested him to sign the amended statement. Dr Khare
1
Khare, op. cit., pp.1 8 - 2 3 »  Dr Khare asserts that 
Gandhi amended his draft to include the following: * I 
admit that I was guilty of indiscipline. I as an old 
Congressman should have known the value of discipline;
...1 think it is my duty to relinquish all positions of 
trust in the Congress whose cause I have put in 
jeopardy by my action. I shall be content if I am 
permitted to serve as a camp-follower;...1 shall do 
everything in my power to retrieve the prestige which 
the Congress lost through my action;.. I hope that all 
Congressmen will rally round the Working Committee in 
its endeavour to form a united and stable ministry;... 
There are rumours of a split between Maharashtra and 
Mahakoshal. I shall try my best to prevent a group or 
a split1 .
2
Ministerial Crisis, p.23; Khare, op. cit., pp.22-3*
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to the Prime Minister and further that they 
should be severally responsible to the High 
Command. I hold the view that these ideas are 
a complete negation of democratic government. 
Similarly I am opposed to the further view that 
the Working Committee or the Parliamentary Sub- 
Committee should dictate to the Congress 
Parliamentary Party the choice of its leader.
I hold the opinion that the Parliamentary party 
must be free to choose its own leader....It 
must also be open to the leader to exercise his 
independent judgement in selecting his 
colleagues.^
On receiving this letter, the Working Committee denounced
Dr Khare, and banned him from election to any !office of
2trust and responsibility1 in the Congress organisation.
The Working Committee's ban on Dr Khare facilitated 
the election of Shukla as Premier, and the return of 
Mahakoshal to power in the Central Provinces and Berar.
In its resolution debarring Dr Khare from office, the 
Working Committee congratulated the Hindi ministers for 
their loyalty to the Congress in refusing to resign at
3the instance of Dr Khare. In so doing, the Committee 
indirectly suggested to members of the Parliamentary 
party that Dr Khare's successor could well come from the
4Mahakoshal. A majority of members of the Parliamentary
1
Khare, op. cit., pp.23-4.
2
Ibid., p p .1, 24; Ministerial Crisis, pp.23-4.
3
Ibid., p.24.
4
See also the Working Committee's injunction to members 
of the Parliamentary party to 'rally round the Working 
Committee in its endeavour to form a united and stable 
ministry'. Khare, op. cit., p.22.
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party also held that view. The meeting of the party took 
place at 9 a.m. on 27 July 1938 in an atmosphere of 
considerable tension. Members of the party proposed 
several names for the position of party Leader, but one 
was disqualified and the others withdrew from the 
election to leave two candidates in the field - Ramrao 
Deshmukh and Ravi Shankar Shukla.1 Shukla easily 
defeated Deshmukh for the Leadership of the party as 
most of the members from Mahakoshal (which enjoyed a 
majority in the party) voted for him. In addition, a 
small number of Marathi members remained neutral in 
protest against the ban on Dr Khare, and this further
enabled Shukla to win a substantial majority over his
2rival from Berar.
On 29 July 1938 Ravi Shankar became the Premier of 
the Central Provinces and Berar. Shortly after Shukla1s 
election as Party Leader, the Governor, Sir Francis Wylie, 
summoned him to Government House and requested him to 
form a ministry. On 29 July Shukla submitted a list of 
ministers to Wylie, and at a meeting at 5*30 p.m. that
1
Ministerial Crisis, op. cit., pp.24-7*
2
Ibid., Maharashtra, 31 July 1938, p.2. Those present 
at the meeting nominated six men to the Leadership of 
the party: Jajuji, R.S. Shukla, G.S. Gupta,
K.R. Khandekar, D.K. Mehta and R.M. Deshmukh. Jajuji1s 
name was withdrawn as his consent had not been taken; 
and Gupta, Khandekar and Mehta declined to stand. Of the 
two remaining candidates Shukla received 47 votes, 
presumably those of the Hindi members present; and 
Deshmukh 12 votes. These probably represented the Berar 
members. 13 members, presumably those from the division 
of Nagpur, remained neutral.
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day Wylie accepted Shukla’s nominees. At 7*30 p.m. the 
Governor administered the oaths to the members of the 
new cabinet and later issued a Gazette Extraordinary to 
announce their assumption of office.1
The composition of the new ministry clearly
indicated that control of the government had passed from
2the Marathi region to Mahakoshal. The Premiership lay 
with Mahakoshal and not with the Marathi region, as 
before. Again, it was Mahakoshal and not the Marathi 
region that enjoyed a majority in the cabinet. Of the 
five places in the cabinet, Mahakoshal held three, and 
the divisions of Nagpur and Berar one each. Finally, 
Mahakoshal also held the contentious Police portfolio 
and the portfolio of Law, which had formerly been 
administered by M.Y. Shareef.
1
Bombay Chronicle, 30 July 1938, p.7; Maharashtra,
31 July 1938, p.5.
2
In the new cabinet R.S. Shukla held the Premiership, 
besides the Appointments, General Administration, 
Political and Military, and Police portfolios;
D.P. Mishra was Minister for Local Self Government, and
in addition to that portfolio, held the
Medical, Public Health and Cooperative portfolios;
D.K. Mehta was Minister for Finance and Law, holding, 
besides those portfolios, the Forest, Assembly, Judicial 
and Jail portfolios; S.V. Gokhale as Minister for 
Revenue and Education held the Revenue, Settlement and 
Survey, Land Records, Education and Agriculture 
portfolios; and C.J. Bharuka, Minister for Industries and 
Public Works, who, besides those portfolios, held the 
portfolios of Separate Revenue and Registration.
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Throughout Shukla's term as Premier, Marathi 
politicians ceaselessly tried to undermine Mahakoshal's 
dominant position in the government. They failed, 
however, to disturb the new balance of power, and 
Shukla's ministry held office until November 1939» In 
that month it resigned at the instance of the Working 
Committee in protest against India's entry into the War 
between Britain and Germany.
Between July and October 1938 Dr Khare launched 
the most formidable of the many attacks on the new 
ministry as part of a larger campaign against the 
Working Committee for turning him out of office. The 
campaign took the form of meetings, demonstrations, and 
articles in the columns of the Marathi press - all 
denouncing the ministers and the Working Committee for 
removing Dr Khare from the Premiership. This offensive 
took the Marathi region of western India by storm, and 
aroused much of the latent hostility to the Congress that 
existed among members of the Brahman community in that 
region.1 On 28 September 1938, when the campaign was 
at its height, the Working Committee tried to draw its 
sting by requesting Dr Khare to place his grievances
VI
1
For the campaign see Maharashtra, 31 July 1938, pp .9»
17; 3 August 1938, p.2; 7 August I938, p.18; 25 September
1938, p.5; Bombay Chronicle, 3 August 1938, p.9;
5 August 1938, p.8; N A I , Home Poll, 18-8, 1938, F R ,
First Half of August 1938, pp. 1-3» 5“6; Home Poll, .18-9»
1938, F R , First Half of September 1938, pp.1-2; NLI, 
Moonje MS, Diary 10, 5 August 1938; ib’id., 7 August 
1938; ibid., 17 September 1938.
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insisted that he would only place them before an
2independent tribunal. As a result, the Working Committee 
suspended his membership of the Congress. On 1 October
1938 it passed the following resolutions
The Working Committee disqualifies Dr Khare from 
being a Congress member for the next two years 
from today, i.e. till 1 October 19^0. This 
necessarily involves his immediate resignation 
from all Congress organisations and also from 
the Central Provinces Legislative Assembly. 
Accordingly the Working Committee calls upon 
Dr Khare to resign from the Central Provinces 
Legislative Assembly.3
This ruling drew much of the fire from Khare1s 
attack on the ministry and the Congress during 1938, but 
in 1939 he returned to the fray with renewed zest. In 
that year Khare associated himself with the Forward 
Bloc, a political organisation led by the Bengali 
nationalist Subhas Chandra Bose, which urged the Congress 
to use more aggressive methods of expelling the British 
from India than were permitted by Gandhi and the Working 
Committee. To Dr Khare, Bose was a symbol of revolt
before the Committee itself. Dr Khare, however,
1
NML, AICC, PL-26, 1938, J.B. Kripalani to N.B. Khare,
28 September 1938, Indian Annual Register, no.2, 1938,
pp.276, 279-81.
2
NML, AICC, PL-26, 1938, N.B. Khare to J.B. Kripalani,
29 September 1938. Dr Khare's reply reads as followss 
'Your wire. Having accused WC, I prefer independent 
impartial tribunal. Since WC is contending party, can't 
in fairness sit in judgement over me. Please reply 
Khare' .
3
Ibid., S.C. Bose to N.B. Khare, 3 October 1938.
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against the type of control which Gandhi, Patel and the
Working Committee exercised over the Congress. He thus
supported Bose's Forward Bloc and through it continued
his campaign against the Congress and the cabinet in the
Marathi region.1 In 1939 Dr Khare also strongly
supported the moves to compel Mishra to answer the
charges of a personal nature first made against him in
21937* In addition Khare associated himself with an
agitation by agriculturists to persuade the ministry to
suspend or remit land revenue to mitigate the
3difficulties caused by poor harvests.
The ministry weathered all these attempts to 
undermine its authority. The Forward Bloc collapsed in
1
See Hi tavada, 18 January 1939» P*l» 27 January 1939» 
p.6; 1 March 1939» P«3; 24 May 1939» P*7> 9 June 1939» 
p.3; 14 June 1939» p . 11; 14 July 1939» p . H j  9 August 
1939» p. 4; NAI, Home Poll, 18-2, 1939» F R , First Half of 
February 1939» P*3> Home Poll, 18-5, 1939» F R , First 
Half of May 1939» P P •1, 5-7; ibid., 18-5, 1939» F R ,
Second Half of May 1939» P*3» Home Poll, 18-6, 1939» F R , 
Second Half of June 1939» p.lj Home Poll, 18-7, 1939» F R , 
First Half of July 1939» pp.1-2.
2
For the moves to re-open the charges against Mishra, 
see Hi tavada, 31 March 1939» P * 6 ;  31 March 1939» P*l>
28 May 1939» P*l» 20 August 1939» p.8.
3
NAI, Home Poll, 18-3, 1939» F R , Second Half of March 
1939» p.l; Home Poll, 18-5, 1939» F R , First Half of May 
1939» p.l. Perhaps the most celebrated of the rural 
agitations with which Dr Khare and his followers were 
associated was the so-called Umrer Satyagraha of May 
1939» when kisans picketed the tahsil office demanding 
economic relief. See M P S , Jail Department, 5(a)-l6,
1939» Classification of the Umrer Satyagraha Prisoners 
as Political Prisoners, p p .1, 12.
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the latter part of 1939 when Bose was removed as
President of the Bengal Provincial Congress Committee
and disqualified from holding any office in the Congress
for three years. On the question of the personal charges
against Mishra, the Working Committee considered, but
decided against, holding an enquiry, and in October 1939
Rajendra Prasad issued a statement exonerating Mishra
of all the charges made against him.1 And in the province
itself, the cabinet quietened the agricultural unrest by
granting revenue concessions and by stopping coercive
2processes in the areas badly affected by drought.
Between 1938-9 the Hindu Mahasabha and the Muslim 
League expanded their activities in the Marathi region,thus 
providing a further challenge to the ministry and the 
Congress. The upsurge of activity by the Mahasabha 
occurred partly in response to worsening relations 
between Hindus and Muslims at the national level; and 
partly also to the disenchantment with the Congress in the
1
Hitavada, 27 September 1939» P*l> 4 October 1939»
P P •5, 9•
2
Ibid., 1 February 1939» P*7j 8 February 1939, P*7j 
N A I , Home Poll, 18-1, F R , Second Half of January 1939, 
p.l; Home Poll, 18-4, 1939, F R , First Half of April 1939? 
p.5; Home Poll, 18-5» 1939, FR, Second Half of May 1939? 
p.6; Home Poll, 18-6, 1939, F R , First Half of June 1939, 
p.7* In January the government announced suspensions 
amounting to Rs 14.7^ lakhs, of which Rs 8 .71 lakhs were 
in Berar. The government also announced a rebate of 
8 . V 3 per cent of the enhanced land revenue in the seven 
taluqs of Akola and Buldhana.
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Marathi region following Dr Khare's dismissal as
Premier.1 While the leaders of the Mahasabha directed
many of their activities against the Muslim League (which
was undergoing a similar period of expansion), they also
strongly attacked the ministry and the Congress - the
former on the grounds that it was favouring the Muslims,
and the latter for allegedly encouraging Muslim demands
2for a separate state in the subcontinent of India. The 
Muslim League in turn attacked the Mahasabha, but more 
so the ministry for allegedly propagating Hindu values 
under cover of its scheme of compulsory primary
3education. The antagonism between the Mahasabha and the 
Muslim League and their joint opposition to the ministry 
were accompanied by growing friction between Hindus and
1
See Hitavada, 4 January 1939» P»6; 26 March 1939» p .10.
2
For attacks by the Mahasabha on the Muslim League, see 
Hitavada, December 1939» P*2; NAI, Home Poll, 18-2, 1939» 
F R , Second Half of February 1939» P*l» Indian Annual 
Register, no.2, 1939, pp.31-2, 313-5, 320, 325-39* For 
the Mahasabha1s attack on the Congress and the ministry, 
see Hitavada, 1 January 1939» P*l> 15 February 1939» p.10;
5 July 1939, p.12; NAI, Home Poll, 18-12, 1938, F R ,
Second Half of December 1938, p.l; Home Poll, 18-11, 1939» 
FR, Second Half of November 1939» P*3*
3
See Hitavada, 15 January 1939» P-8 ; 10 February 1939» 
p.8 ; 12 February 1939» P*8 ; 24 September 1939» P*2;
15 November 1939» P*3» 15 December 1939» P«5» 24 December 
1939» p.5; 29 December 1939» P*7j NAI, Home Poll, 18-11,
1938, F R , Second Half of November 1938, p.3» Home Poll, 
18-1, 1939» F R , First Half of January 1939» P»4; Home 
Poll, 18-5, 1939, FR, Second Half of May 1939» P-4; Home 
Poll, 18-7, 1939» FR, Second Half of July 1939» P-3-
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The government took strong measures to deal with the
situation, but despite this, conditions in the province
2remained disturbed.
Marathi politicians made a more direct attack on the 
ministry than was possible under the aegis of the 
Mahasabha by asserting that Shukla's ministry was
3detrimental to the interests of the Marathi region. It 
was openly said for instance, that 'while Maharashtrians 
had the whip hand under the Khare regime,. . .under the
4present dispensation the Hindis have come out on top’.
It was significant that such complaints largely
Muslims that culminated in a series of communal riots.
1
During 1939 disturbances occurred in Nagpur, Katui,
Pusad, Dhamtari, Jabalpur and other places. See N A I ,
Home Poll, 18-2, 1939, F R , First Half of February 1939, 
p.3j ibid., 18-2, 1939, F R , Second Half of February 1939, 
p.3; Home Poll, 18-3, 1939, FR, First Half of March 1939, 
p.3; ibid., 18-3, 1939, FR, Second Half of March 1939, 
pp.2-3; Home Poll, 18-4, 1939, F R , First Half of April,
1939, PP*3“4; Home Poll, 18-6, 1939, F R , Second Half of 
June 1939, P P - 2, 4; Home Poll, 18-8, 1939, F R , First Half 
of August 1939, P •3 ; Home Poll, 18-12, 1939, F R , First 
Half of December 1939, P*3*
2
For the measures used see Hitavada, 22 January 1939, P*l?
2 June 1939» P •105 23 June 1939, P*9; 19 July 1939, P * 6 ;
29 November 1939, P*5* In 1939 the government demanded 
securities from various newspapers, warned leaders 
against making dangerous speeches, and gave wide powers 
to District Magistrates to deal with communal unrest.
See also M P S , P & M, Confidential, 126, 1939, Premier's 
Draft Note, n.d., 1939*
3
See NML, AICC, P-13, Part I, 1938-39, Thakur Chhedilal 
to J.B. Kripalani, 8 October 1938.
4
Hitavada, 19 May 1939, p.4.
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originated in Berar, which by 1939 had lost almost every 
vestige of the influence it had once commanded in the 
administration of the province. Resentment in Berar at 
the region* s loss of power was clearly evident in the 
following attack on the government which appeared in the 
Hitavada during April 1939*
Almost the whole of Berar is on the verge of 
total ruin on account of exploitation of the 
province by Central Provinces administrators 
...(and the) neglect and indifference shown 
by the present government towards the pitiable 
conditions in Berar....A former Congress minister 
in charge of Cooperation told the cooperative 
workers in Berar (that) the movement in Berar 
deserved to die....Bank after bank is closing 
down...(and) even the local bodies in Berar are 
neglected (as)...the government has not made 
nominations .
The frustration of the Marathi region and its fear of 
dominance by Mahakoshal were also evident in the charges 
made by Marathi spokesmen in 1939 that the protagonists
of Hindi were trying to advance their language at the
2expense of Marathi.
During 1939 Marathi members of the Congress 
Parliamentary party openly opposed the ministry and thus 
widened the conflict between the Marathi region and 
Mahakoshal. In party meetings, clashes between ministers
1
Hitavada, 16 April 1939» p.8 . For other complaints of 
the same type see ibid., 16 August 19399 p.2; 20 August
1939, P . 6 .
2
Ibid., 21 April 1939» P«10> 14 May 1939» 16 July 1939? 
p.8. These charges related to the abolition of Marathi 
schools in various districts.
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and party members were common, as Tor instance in 
January 1939? when Marathi members condemned the 
government for doing nothing to alleviate agricultural 
distress in the southern part of the province.1 In the 
Assembly, similar clashes occurred during the debate on 
the budget for 1939“40. The leader of the Marathi 
revolt against the ministry in that debate was Kedar, 
who was then a member of the Congress and a firm 
supporter of Dr Khare. In March 1939? during the budget 
session, Kedar delivered a withering attack on the 
ministry that reflected the prevailing mood of 
frustration in the Marathi region. In his speech on the 
occasion, Kedar declared that
we on this side of the house who come from the 
Marathi districts are placed in a very 
unfortunate position....We are only zeros in 
the political life of our districts. Our use 
is to keep the Ministers in office....We have 
simply to register our votes in the lobby; 
otherwise nobody cares for us. I have seen 
the plight of all the members on this side.
They do not get a hearing. No Minister cares 
for them....The unfortunate part is that in 
the Maharashtra portion of the province it is 
the raj of Biyanis1, Govind Dass’ and 
J amnalals * . 2
It was Kedar, again, who led the Marathi Congressmen in 
their attack on Mishra for his part in the cabinet 
crisis of 1938, and who urged the Working Committee to
1
See ibid., 29 January 1939? P«3? 2 August 1939? p.l.
2
CPBLA, 17 March 1939? p p . 124-5; see ibid., 114-153- 
See also ibid., 24 March 1939? p p . 468-9; 28 March 1939? 
pp.668-690; 5 April 1939? p p . 1001-15.
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investigate the personal charges made against him. A
small section of Hindi members also revolted against the
2ministry, but as with the Marathi attack, party 
discipline prevailed and the ministers completed their
3period in office in firm control of the party.
The attack on Mahakoshal by Marathi politicians 
reached a climax between 1938 and 1939 when the latter 
demanded that the Hindi and Marathi regions be divided 
into separate provinces. The leaders of the demand for 
the linguistic division of the Central Provinces and 
Berar were Dr Khare for the division of Nagpur, and 
Ramrao Deshmukh for Berar. At public meetings, in the 
legislature, and through the columns of the English and 
Marathi press, these men and their supporters urged the 
government to create a Marathi province to be called 
Vidarbha, and they tried to marshal public support for
1
Hitavada, 2 9  March 1 9 3 9 »  P * l >  3 1  March 1 9 3 9 »  P * l >  
1 4  April 1 9 3 9 »  p- 1 ;  2 8  May 1 9 3 9 »  P * l »  H  August 1 9 3 9 »  P * l >
1 5 August 1 9 3 9 »  p.1 ;  2 0  August 1 9 3 9 »  p.8.
2
Ibid., 2 1  April 1 9 3 9 »  P - 7 ;  23 April 1 9 3 9 »  P •9 • The 
revolt of the Hindi members was led by Thakur Chhedilal.
He and his supporters, dubbed the 'faithful nine', 
condemned the ministry for doing nothing for rural 
uplift and for using bureaucratic methods to administer 
the province.
3
The Working Committee expelled T.J. Kedar,
V.M. Jakatdar, and V.V. Subhedar from the Congress for 
three years for their attack on Mishra. In the Assembly, 
the ministers controlled the party by issuing ordinances 
showing which amendments were to be allowed; which bills 
were to be circulated; and which were to be referred to 
Select Committees. See Hitavada, 6 August 1 9 3 9 »  p.l.
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such a move. During the course of the campaign for the 
formation of Vidarbha, the statements made by the Marathi 
leaders revealed only too clearly the frustrations 
caused by their loss of political power to Mahakoshal.
One example of this was the following statement by 
Dr Khare which appeared during May 1939 in Jyo tna , a 
journal circulating in the province of Bombay;
The need for distribution of provinces on (a) 
linguistic basis may not be as keenly felt by 
the Maharashtrians of the Bombay-Poona side as 
those of people residing in the Nagpur and 
Berar districts. These parts, though more 
fertile and richer than the Mahakoshal districts 
of Central Provinces, are at a disadvantage 
politically. There are only 8 districts of 
Nagpur and Berar; whereas the Mahakoshal, 
having eleven districts, gets the advantage due 
to their numerical superiority of holding the 
whip hand in the council and government of the 
province to such an extent that it has become 
unbearable for us to continue as we are any 
lo nger.2
The demand from the Marathi leaders for the division of 
the two regions received strong support from the ministry
1
Maharashtra, 25 September 1938, p.13; CPBLA,
29 September 1938, pp.622-9? 643-5; ibid., 1 October
1938, PP*777“96; Hitavada, 12 April 1939? P*8; .14 April 
1939? P . 7; 23 April 1939? P*6; 17 May 1939? P * H ;  2 June
1939, p.12; 7 July 1939? P.2; NAI, Jayaker MS, 754, 
Letter 1 0 9? Raghavendra Rao on the Reorganisation of 
Provinces; ibid., 736, Letter 10, R.M. Deshmukh to 
M.R. Jayaker, 7 June 19^2.
2
NAI, Khare MS, from M.G. Datar, Speeches and 
Statements of Dr N.B. Khare (Nagpur, 1943)? P-57*
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and the Congress in Mahakoshal, and 1939 closed with 
political leaders in all parts of the province in 
agreement on the issue.1
The outbreak of war between Britain and Germany put
an end to any immediate move to divide the Central
Provinces and Berar along linguistic lines. Following
Britain's declaration of war with Germany, the Viceroy
2declared India a belligerent state. This seriously 
displeased the Working Committee who demanded that the 
British government declare its views on the question of 
self government for India. The government’s reply, 
however, was unacceptable to the Congress, and on 
8 September 1939 the Working Committee called on all 
Congress ministries to resign in protest.
In the Central Provinces and Berar the government 
delayed its resignation until 10 November 1938. The 
need to pass important legislation caused this delay. 
Nevertheless, by 8 November the legislative Assembly had 
dealt with all government business on the notice paper, 
and had passed a resolution opposing the participation
1
See the speech of the Premier on the Resolution re 
Constitution of the Marathi areas of the Province as a 
Separate Province, CPBLA, 1 October 1938, pp.777-80.
2
The Viceroy was Lord Linlithgow, whose term of office 
lasted from 1936 to 19^3 *
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of India in the W a r . 1 On the conclusion of the debate on 
that motion, the Speaker adjourned, the House sine die and
Shukla tendered the resignation of the cabinet to the
2Governor. Two days later, the Governor issued a 
proclamation accepting the c abinet’s resignation and 
acknowledging the ’consideration and assistance’ he had 
enjoyed from its members. In the proclamation, the 
Governor also announced that he had assumed the 
administrative and legislative powers formerly held by 
his ministers, and that he had appointed two senior 
civilians to ’assist (him)...in the discharge of his 
3functions’.
Following the proclamation, the former ministers 
returned to their homes in various parts of the province
1
These measures were the Vidya Mandir Bill, 1939; and 
the Tenancy (Amendment) Bill, 1939« See C P B L A ,
1 November 1939» PP* 3 “46; 2 November 1939» pp.62-92,
93-107 ; 3 November 1939» PP.131“58; 4 November 1939»
p p . 172-216, 216-47; 6 November 1939, pp.264-71, 280-3^3; 
7 November 1939, pp.345“4l4; 8 November 1939, p p . 437-86.
2
H i t a v a d a , 15 November 1939, P*5* 
3
Ibid.; M P S , Appointments, 1-64, 1939, Appointment of 
Advisers to the Governor of the Central Provinces and 
Berar. The two civilians were Sir G.P. Burton and
H.C. Greenfield. Burton was to administer the Departments 
of Finance, Commerce and Industry, Agriculture, Forests, 
Local Self Government, Medical, Public Health, Judicial 
and Law; and Greenfield the Departments of Revenue,
Survey and Settlement, Excise and Registration. Burton 
was formerly Financial Commissioner of the Central 
Provinces and Berar, and Greenfield, Commissioner of 
N a g p u r (?)
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to await further instructions from the Working Committee. 
In so doing, they initiated a new era in relations 
between the various nationalist groups in the Central 
Provinces and Berar and the British government - an era 
which lies outside the scope of this study.
1
Hitavada, 15 November 1939» P*8.
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CONCLUSION
It is possible to draw many interesting conclusions 
from a study of politics in the Central Provinces and 
Berar between 1919 and 1939* One of the more 
interesting of these conclusions concerns the rise of the 
Hindi region from political insignificance in 1919 to 
dominance of the province by 1939* The Hindi region made 
its rise to dominance at the expense of the Marathi 
region. In 1919 the Marathi region dominated political 
life in the Central Provinces and Berar. In that region, 
moderate politicians enjoyed close ties with the 
government, and nationalist politicians actively opposed 
British rule in the province. The Hindi region, by 
contrast, played a negligible part in provincial 
politics in 1919* In that region, the nationalist 
movement was in its infancy; and although a special 
relationship existed between the Hindi malguzars and the 
administration, Hindi politicians exercised far less 
influence on the government than their Marathi 
counterparts. This was mainly due to their small numbers, 
and to the remoteness of the Hindi region from the seat 
of government in Nagpur.
Between 1919 and 1939 the Hindi region ousted the 
Marathi region from its leading position in the political 
life of the province. During the period, the Montagu- 
Chelmsford Reforms and the nationalist movement drew new 
sections of society into politics. So far as the Hindi
4io
region was concerned, these developments led directly to 
attempts by Hindi politicians to acquire control over 
the Government of the Central Provinces and Berar. These 
attempts achieved outstanding success, as was evident 
from the political careers of E. Raghavendra Rao and Ravi 
Shankar Shukla.
Marathi politicians did not yield to the growing 
dominance of the Hindi region without a struggle. 
Important landmarks in this struggle were Tambe's 
acceptance of the Home Membership in 1925» and the moves 
by the leaders of Nagpur and Berar to form ministries 
between 1925 and 1926. The formation of the Responsive 
Cooperation party in 1926 constituted another landmark 
in the struggle by the Marathi region to maintain its 
primacy in provincial politics. The Responsivist party 
permitted its members to accept office in the government, 
and this provided the Marathi politicians with an 
opportunity to advance the cause of self government and 
at the same time to defend the interests of the Marathi 
region. Marathi politicians seized this opportunity 
eagerly, and formed ministries on three occasions - in 
1927» in 1929, and again in 193^. But none of these 
ministries was able to restore the Marathi region to the 
position of dominance it had enjoyed in the province 
before 1919» and none was able to stop the ascent of the 
Hindi region to a commanding position in the provincial 
government.
Besides taking office, the Responsivists made other 
attempts to preserve the leadership of the Marathi 
region in provincial politics. In 1930 they launched a 
Forest Satyagraha against the provincial government, but
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failed to win any significant electoral support for so 
doing. Again, between 1930 and 1933 the Responsivists 
made a determined but unsuccessful bid to separate Berar 
from the Central Provinces. Next, the Responsivists 
tried to safeguard Berar's position in the united 
province that was to come into existence under the 
constitution of 1935* Again, however, they failed to 
achieve their objective; and the Central Provinces, and 
the Hindi region in particular, entered the period of 
the constitution as the dominant member of the unified 
province.
The author of the Hindi region’s rise to power was 
Raghavendra Rao. In 1928 he ousted his Marathi colleague, 
Deshmukh, from the ministry, and formed a second ministry 
in which the Hindi region held the reigns of power.
After a period away from office, Rao again returned to 
power in 1930 as Home Member - a position he occupied 
until 1937* Between 1930-37 Rao controlled the 
legislature and enjoyed the full confidence of the 
Governor, and as a result was able to entrench the Hindi 
region firmly in the provincial government. In 
addition, Rao helped to shape various decisions relating 
to the new constitution in favour of the Central 
Provinces and the Hindi region. The dominant position 
attained by the Hindi region at the hands of Rao was 
epitomised in his appointment as Acting Governor in 1936, 
and as Premier of the united Central Provinces and Berar
in 1937.
The activities of the Indian National Congress 
between 1930 and 1937 reinforced the growing dominance 
of the Hindi region in the Government of the Central
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Provinces and Berar. From 1930 to 1933 the Congress 
sponsored campaigns of civil disobedience and Harijan 
reform that aroused the political consciousness of vast 
numbers of people in the Hindi and Marathi regions. In 
the Hindi region, the extension of political consciousness 
assisted the return of Hindi Congressmen to the 
Legislative Assembly in 1937 in large numbers. In the 
Assembly, these members enjoyed a majority over Marathi 
members in the Parliamentary party formed by the Indian 
National Congress to support a possible Congress 
ministry. As for the Marathi region, the extension of 
political consciousness between 1930 and 1933 assisted 
greatly in boosting the political fortunes of the region 
and in elevating Dr N.B. Khare to the position of 
Congress leader of that part of the province. And from 
leadership of the Marathi region, Dr Khare rose by a set 
of fortuitous circumstances to become the first Congress 
Premier of the Central Provinces and Berar in 1937*
Dr Khare's election as Premier presented the 
province with a strange paradox. During the previous ten 
years, Raghavendra Rao had placed the Hindi region in 
firm control of the provincial government. Then, in 
1937 the government reverted almost overnight to control 
by the Marathi region. Such control did not reflect the 
political realities then existing in the province, and 
could last for only a limited period of time.
The Marathi region, in fact, controlled the 
government for only one year - from July 1937 to July
1938. During that period the political leaders of the 
Hindi districts attempted to restore their region to the 
commanding position it had enjoyed in the provincial
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government before 1937* This attempt was evident in the 
four crises that engulfed the cabinet formed by Dr Khare. 
During the first crisis, the Hindi ministers abolished 
the Sim Formula. In the second crisis, the Marathi 
ministers rebuffed their Hindi colleagues by supporting 
the resignation of the Law Minister, M.Y. Shareef, from 
the cabinet. The Hindi ministers caused the third crisis 
when they attempted to reduce the powers held by the 
Marathi Premier on the grounds that he had failed to 
control the communal situation in Jabalpur. A fourth 
crisis followed, during which Dr Khare resigned his 
Premiership and formed a new cabinet which did not 
include the Hindi ministers.
The Hindi ministers stoutly refused to surrender 
their hold on the government, and to assist them to 
retain that hold, they sought the assistance of the 
Working Committee. With a view to establishing a stable 
ministry in the province, the Working Committee returned 
the Hindi region to its former dominant position in the 
government and relegated the Marathi region to a less 
important position. It did so by compelling Dr Khare to 
resign as Premier and Leader of the Parliamentary party, 
and by preventing him from contesting the latter position 
a second time. These moves led directly to the election 
of the Hindi leader, Ravi Shankar Shukla,as Premier of 
the Central Provinces and Berar.
The destructive rivalry between the Hindi and 
Marathi regions of the Central Provinces and Berar compels 
the writer to defend the existing division of India 
into linguistic states. In India at the present time, 
certain strands of public opinion appear to question the
hik
utility of linguistic states and urge their replacement 
by administrative units that transcend linguistic 
boundaries. The opponents of linguistic states condemn 
these states on the grounds that they quarrel among 
themselves and - so their opponents believe - weaken the 
unity of India. The same critics also condemn linguistic 
states because members of the major linguistic community 
in certain states demand the ejection from the state on 
economic grounds of those sections of the population who 
do not belong to that community. Further-, many people 
condemn linguistic states because the various regions 
comprising each state rival one another for the allocation 
of revenues and the development of resources.
In defence of linguistic states, first let I t  be 
said that these conditions would obtain, whether or not 
India was divided along linguistic lines. Most federations 
or unions of states experience severe disputes between 
their constituent parts, and between these units and the 
central government of the union or federation. Further, 
as these disputes have their basis in economic conflicts, 
in an under-developed and under-capitalised economy such 
as India they would continue regardless of the type of 
administrative unit into which the country was divided. 
Again, the formation of multi-lingual states would very 
probably increase the number of movements formed to 
protect the economic interests of the different linguistic 
communities residing within those states. Besides these 
problems, the formation of multi-lingual states would 
create formidable problems for the educators and those 
engaged in the work of administration.
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Developments in the Central Provinces and Berar 
between 1919 and 1939 would seem to suggest that, were 
multi-lingual states to replace the present linguistic 
states in India, the above problems would not merely 
persist, but would widen in scope and intensity. In the 
Central Provinces and Berar, besides the persistent 
political instability, the two linguistic regions duelled 
incessantly between 1919 and 1939 to control the 
government and thus serve their own political and 
economic interests. To ensure their victory in these 
duels, the political leaders of the two regions marshalled 
popular support by invoking the powers of language, 
culture and history. In doing so, however, they served 
destructive rather than creative ends, for by 1939 the 
Hindi and Marathi regions faced each other in bitter hate, 
each demanding its separation from the other and its 
incorporation into a separate state. And for a large 
section of one linguistic community, popular government 
in the Central Provinces and Berar had broken down, 
and the Working Committee's call for the ministry's 
resignation resolved an intolerable situation.
The prospects that conflicts similar to those in 
the Central Provinces and Berar would occur in any 
multi-lingual states formed in India are extremely high. 
Strong linguistic tensions at present exist between the 
various states of the Indian Union. But so long as these 
tensions occur between, rather than within, states, they 
cause relatively little havoc to the internal political 
life of the individual states. To construct multi­
lingual states, however, would, in the opinion of the 
writer, transfer these linguistic tensions from the
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interstate level, where they mostly operate at present, 
to the intrastate level, where they would assuredly cause 
no less damage than they did in the Central Provinces 
and Berar between 1919 and 1939* And this would be 
damage over and above that caused by the present political 
instability. Such a situation would without doubt 
endanger the political and economic life of India to an 
extent inconceivable at the present moment.
In a somewhat different vein, this thesis clearly 
shows that Gandhi succeeded in drawing new sections of 
society into the nationalist movement in the Central 
Provinces and Berar between 1919 and 1939* In 1919 
nationalist activity in the Marathi region was largely 
confined to the urban middle classes. In the Hindi 
region, smaller numbers of people from these same classes 
also supported the nationalist movement. Over the course 
of the ensuing 20 years, however, Gandhi enabled the 
nationalist movement in both regions to burst its middle 
class bounds by involving members of the wealthy trading 
communities and the lower classes of the towns and 
countryside in agitation against the government. Gandhi 
widened the social base of the nationalist movement by 
forming strong links with the leaders of the above groups, 
thus creating channels through which he could influence 
the behaviour of the groups themselves. Gandhi also 
widened the social base of the nationalist movement by 
taking agitation out of the local bodies and the 
legislature and into the streets of the cities and the 
fields and forests of the countryside.
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As we have seen, Gandhi had little difficulty in 
drawing the people of the Hindi region into nationalist 
agitation. Gandhi appeared on the scene at a time when 
the Hindi region was poised on the brink of exciting 
political changes. Nationalist activity in the region 
was on the increase, and a number of young men had 
entered, or were about to enter, public life. Many of 
these men were eagerly awaiting the introduction of 
the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms and in particular the 
opening of the new Legislative Council in Nagpur, as 
providing them with a wider arena for their political 
activities.
Gandhi skilfully tapped this fund of political 
energy before it reached the legislature. He attracted 
some Hindi leaders to his personality, and others to his 
ideas. He attracted some, again, because he provided 
the only avenue of political activity in India at the 
time. But whatever the reasons for Gandhi's conversion 
of the Hindi politicians, all alike supported his strong 
opposition to the continuance of British rule in India. 
And in the strength of that opposition, they aroused the 
Hindi region and prepared it for its destiny as a 
member state of a free and independent India.
This thesis also shows that Gandhi found great 
difficulty in establishing his leadership over certain 
parts of India, namely, the Marathi region of the Central 
Provinces and Berar. Gandhi experienced this difficulty 
because the Marathi leaders believed that he was trying 
to usurp the place of Tilak as the nationalist leader of 
the region. The Marathi politicians also opposed Gandhi 
because they were confident that Tilak's practical and
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aggressive tactics would win self-government for India. 
They were equally confident that Gandhi's weapons of 
non-cooperation and passive resistance would fail to 
achieve that objective. But perhaps the most telling 
reason why the Marathi nationalists refused to follow 
Gandhi concerned the appeals which Gandhi made to the 
pan-Islamic sympathies of the Indian Muslims to arouse 
their opposition to the government. The Marathi leaders 
believed that these appeals imperilled the unity of the 
Indian nation.
As we have seen, however, Gandhi refused to allow 
the Marathi nationalists to debar him from the Marathi 
region. He first won the support of an overwhelming 
majority of nationalists throughout India, so that even 
those, like the Marathi leaders, who opposed him were 
unable to voice their opposition. Next, Gandhi threatened 
to undercut the Marathi leaders by creating new 
nationalist leaders in the Marathi region and by drawing 
into nationalist agitation groups who owned the 
leadership of these men rather than the leadership of 
the older established nationalists. Gandhi then used 
the new leaders and their followers to launch agitation 
against the government in the Marathi region. These 
moves had the desired effect. The Marathi leaders, 
faced with the loss of their political leadership and 
nationalist reputation, threw in their lot with Gandhi - 
but only to show that his movement would not advance the 
cause of self government for India.
This study also bears witness to the political 
eclipse of the Marathi nationalists between 1919 and 1939» 
The eclipse occurred in the first instance because the
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Marathi leaders refused to link their political fortunes 
with those of Gandhi and the Indian National Congress.
As we have seen, in 1921 the Marathi nationalists took 
part in non-cooperation despite their opposition to 
Gandhi. In succeeding years, however, they pressed for 
the abolition of non-cooperation in favour of agitation 
in the councils. And after the Congress permitted them 
to enter the councils, the Marathi leaders led the van 
of those who desired to accept office in the government. 
The Congress, however, refused to sanction the acceptance 
of office, and the Marathi leaders formed the Responsive 
Cooperation party to facilitate that course of action.
From 1927 onwards the Responsivists undertook a wide 
range of political activities, but they were unable to 
win the permanent sympathy of the electorate. These 
activities included the formation of ministries, and the 
launching of a campaign of civil disobedience against the 
government. The Responsivists also led moves to influence 
the shape of the proposed constitution for India, and 
associated themselves strongly with the work of 
organisations such as the Hindu Mahasabha and the 
Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh. These activities, however, 
could not rival those in which Congressmen were engaged 
at the same time, namely the campaigns of civil 
disobedience and Harijan reform. Through these campaigns 
Congressmen captured the imagination of the electorate 
and swept to victory at the elections to the Legislative 
Assembly in 1937*
By 1939 the political eclipse of the Marathi leaders 
in their own region was virtually complete. In 1938 the 
Working Committee dispossessed Dr Khare of his
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Premiership and assisted a Hindi ministry to come to power 
in Nagpur. In so doing the Committee took the government 
of the Marathi region out of Marathi hands. Consequently 
many Marathi leaders withdrew from the Congress and gave 
their sympathy or outright support to the Hindu Mahasabha. 
In so doing they further lessened the possibility of their 
playing an effective part in the political life of the 
Marathi region.
A study of political developments in the Central 
Provinces and Berar between 1919 and 1939 clearly 
demonstrates that people responded in increasing numbers 
to each of the successive rounds of agitation launched 
by Gandhi. The first agitation - the Rowlatt Satyagraha - 
aroused the interest of very few people because the 
Marathi nationalists opposed the agitation, and because 
the lower classes had not yet been drawn into the 
nationalist movement. The people of the Central 
Provinces and Berar responded much more enthusiastically 
to Gandhi’s call for a movement of non-cooperation in 
1921. They did so because Gandhi used representative 
leaders to win the support of the middle classes, the 
merchants and the lower classes in the towns and 
countryside. Support for the agitation was greatest in 
the towns of the Central Provinces and Berar, and it was 
there that the agitation provided the government with its 
most severe challenge. This was affirmed in a note by 
the Chief Secretary of the province in 1921:
There is no gainsaying the fact that conditions 
have changed....A few years ago the deliberate 
disregard of law and order was unknown. Today 
there is ample evidence to show that it counts 
for little and that the people are ready to
421
resort to mob violence....The masses have now 
learnt their power. It has been clearly proved 
that we have only been able to restore order 
by a display of force....1 am of opinion that 
simultaneous trouble at different centres is 
likely to occur.^
This prognosis proved correct, for between 1930 and 
1934 the people of the Central Provinces and Berar 
responded magnificantly to Gandhi's call to launch civil 
disobedience against the government. Like the campaign 
of non-cooperation, the campaign of civil disobedience 
inflamed people in the urban areas against the government. 
But unlike the campaign of non-cooperation, civil 
disobedience also drew the population of rural areas into 
the struggle against the government on a massive scale. 
With what success can be judged from an official 
description of the rural scene between 1930 and 1933?
Meanwhile the Congress leaders and other 
extremists, who meant real business, saw 
their opportunity and hastened to spread 
the movement into the villages by appeals 
to the cupidity and ignorance of the 
villagers and aboriginal inhabitants of 
the jungles. A serious situation was 
created. In the circumstances, Government 
had no alternative but to accept the 
challenge or abdicate, and from this 
moment found itself up against mass action 
by ignorant dupes, inflamed by every sort of 
misrepresentation. At the same time, 
strenuous attempts were made to disturb the 
morale of the police and to tamper with the 
loyalty of the troops.2
1
MSN, Police, 1-1, 1922, Increase in the Special Armed 
Force in the Central Provinces, Note by K.W. Deighton,
26 May 1921.
2
MPS, P & M, 302/CDM, 1930, p.7»
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The progressive enlargement of the scope and intensity 
of nationalist agitation in the Central Provinces and 
Berar compelled the government to use increasingly extreme 
measures to control the situation. In 1919 the 
government quietly tided over the Rowlatt Satyagraha 
because so few people participated in the agitation. The 
government's response to the movement of non-cooperation, 
however, was much more extreme. To control the agitation, 
the authorities arrested the major leaders and some of 
their assistants; suspended the liquor auctions; imposed 
punitive police on troubled areas; prohibited assembly 
and on one occasion at least ordered the police to fire 
and called in the army.
Between 1930 and 1933 the government used even more 
lethal weapons to quell nationalist agitation. During 
that period, the authorities imposed ordinances to 
suppress the agitation. Under these ordinances they 
arrested all grades of leaders and imposed on them huge 
fines and lengthy sentences of imprisonment. Under the 
same ordinances the authorities also arrested volunteers 
in great numbers; restricted assembly; imposed censorship 
of the press; confiscated the buildings and funds of 
nationalist organisations; closed down educational 
institutions; and to control the rural disturbances 
restored to arrests, lathi charges, whipping and firing.
Although these latter penalties were imposed by the 
government of Sir Montagu Butler, that Governor made a 
more positive contribution to the Central Provinces and 
Berar than any other Governor between 1919 and 1939*
Butler held office from 1925 until 1933» a period which 
partly coincided with the period of the Montagu-
423
Chelmsford Reforms. During this period the political 
life of the province gave evidence of great instability 
as a result of regional rivalries and the proliferation 
of ’parties' in the legislature. This instability 
would assuredly have brought political life in the 
province to a standstill, had it not been for Sir 
Montagu Butler. The latter created political stability 
by associating the important regions with the 
government - as for instance Berar, in the appointment 
of Tambe as Home Member in 1925» Butler also created 
stability by drawing into the government men like 
Raghavendra R a o , who had 'both the desire for power 
and the ability to get it'.1 Again, Butler ensured 
stability by refusing to form governments that were 
themselves unstable. By these means, Butler created 
efficient government in the Central Provinces and Berar 
at a critical period in its history. By these means, 
Butler also helped the province to pass from control 
by British officials to control by an Indian government 
under the constitution of 1935»
1
NML, Rao MS, The Honourable E. Raghavendra Rao - A 
Pen Portrait, by Cover Point.
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Appendix A
EXTRACTS FROM THE WRITINGS OF LEADING NATIONALISTS 
IN THE CENTRAL PROVINCES AND BERAR 1919-1939
*I . A Note on Mahakoshal by Seth Govind Das«
The fourteen Hindi speaking districts of the British 
province of Central Provinces were known as Mahakoshal 
or Dakshina Koshal for a longer period of ancient Indian 
history than the ancient names of many other provinces 
of India. The Ramayana and Sanskrit drama Tatnavali 
expressly mention it....The name closely shows that 
this part of India was closely connected with Koshal 
proper or Uttar Koshal, the present province of Oudh, 
where Rama ruled in ancient times... .Mahakoshal is 
mentioned in the inscription of Samudra Gupta on the 
well known pillar in the fort of Allahabad as one of 
the countries conquered by that famous emperor of the 
Gupta dynasty in or about 3^0 A.D. But the fullest 
account of Mahakoshal available to us is by the famous 
Chinese pilgrim Hieun Tsang who visited India in the 
times of the Emperor Harsha in the middle of the 
seventh century....The limits of the then Mahakoshal 
coincided with the present Central Provinces Hindi 
(region).... We know from the pilgrim's itinerary that 
it must have been bounded by Ujjain on the north, by 
Maharashtra on the west, by Orissa on the east and by
*
NML, AIC C , 242, 1931, H. Vyas, secretary MPCC to 
Secretary AICC, 21 October 1931*
425
Andhra and Kalinga on the south.... It seems that though 
the boundaries of Mahakoshal were shrinking, yet the 
name survived in the south of the province in the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries. The thirteenth century 
witnessed a strange event.... While in northern India, 
the Pathans were busy defending their territories against 
the invading Moghuls, the Gonds rose to power and, 
subverting the Rajput supremacy, built up three kingdoms 
with their headquarters in the districts of Jabalpur, 
Chhindwara and Betul. Henceforward Mahakoshal became 
G-ondwana. . . .The Gonds gave place to the Marathas who 
in their turn were ousted by the British. The name 
Central Provinces was conferred in l86l....(lt is) 
meaningless and the adjective added by Congress has by 
no means improved it. Hence in 1930 the Provincial 
Congress Committee after careful consideration decided 
to go back to the time honoured name of Mahakoshal and 
(the) Provincial Political conference in the same year 
enthusiastically adopted it....Motilal Nehru used it 
when in 1930 he granted permission to the President of 
its Provincial Congress Committee to start forest 
satyagraha....The name is a household word by now and 
the newspapers in the province freely use it.
i) On regional tendencies in the Central Provinces -
NLI, Moonje MS, Letter Pad 4,  B.S. Moonje to
E. Raghavendra Rao, II June 1920.
But from your letter I feel - rather I am afraid - 
that time is fast approaching when perhaps it will be 
made impossible for the two parts of the province to 
work in harmony together....I protest strongly against 
the view...that whatever is done in Nagpur is done in 
the dark....If we surrender ourselves to the passing 
sentiments of the people then what is the use of our 
taking part in the politics of the province?
ii) A comparison of Tilak and Gandhi - NLI, Moonje MS,
Dairy 2, 11 August 1930*
(At) the Kayande school,...I addressed the students 
on the philosophy and methods of politics of Lokamanya 
and Mahatma Gandhi. I based my whole speech on two 
schools of thought which have been in existence in India 
from time immemorial.... If Mahatmaji could be likened 
to persons like Shukaracharya, Lokamanya could be likened 
to...Shree Krishna. Accordingly a boycott of British 
and not foreign goods and non payment of taxes based on 
the philosophy of passive resistance was the political 
weapon of Tilak, so boycott of foreign and not British 
goods and civil disobedience based on the philosophy of 
love and non violence are the weapons of Mahatma Gandhi.... 
Consequently the Mahatma is the only person who could 
conceive of writing in his ultimatum to Lord Reading 
that he is not frightened of a Pathan invasion, because
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2. Four Notes by Dr B.S. Moonje
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he said he will conquer the Pathans by love. To the 
Lokamanya it could never occur to speak in this language;... 
Gandhi is inspired by the utopian aspiration of 
establishing the kingdom of love over the whole world 
and therefore does not understand politics and swaraj 
for India....The Lokamanya is above all a scientific 
practicalist as the Mahatma is a hopeful idealist. ...There 
is not any comparison between the two; both are great 
in their own ways.
(iii) Linguistic states - N LI, Moonje MS, Diary 4,
22 October 1931»
Personally I am opposed to the idea. I do not want 
that India should be divided into small groups as 
Europe was....No Maharashtrian has ever agitated for it.
The Maharashtra still maintains its imperialistic mind 
and believes that the whole of India is one and belongs 
to it. But if all others would like to have their 
separate provinces, then Maharashtra, too, would like 
to be brought into one province.
(iv) The vocation of Maharashtra - NLI, Moonje MS,
Letter Pad 63, B.S. Moonje to Maharain Sahib, 
c. 9 August 1931»
In fact I wish to make Maharashtra the centre of 
the military regeneration of the Hindus of India....The 
whole Hindu community of India still looks up to 
Maharashtra to take the lead.... Besides the past history 
of Maharashtra, the thing that... appeals to them to 
look up to the Maharashtra for support in guidance in 
their search for protection against Muslim aggression is
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the example set by the late Lokamanya Tilak which is 
being followed with such efficiency....by his disciples 
including my humble self....The flag of Shree Shivajee 
must be held up and it can not be better done under 
present circumstances than by establishing a military 
school and a centre of military training and education.
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As soon as I was free, I started hearing all sorts 
of rumours about efforts being made by my political 
enemies to implicate me. I did not pay any attention 
as I thought the whole thing too far fetched to be 
believed.... On 8 June I left for Piparia to attend the 
provincial political conference....As days passed, rumours 
thickened that for political reasons I was going to be 
dragged and that the police were tutoring the girl. I 
remained still indifferent.. . . On 3 inst. I was called 
to the city kotwali on the pretext that I could give the 
police some information. I went....Five other persons 
were mixed with me. A veiled female was brought and 
asked to catch the hand of Mishraji of Gopalbagh. The 
female form hesitatingly raised her finger towards me 
without a word and did not touch me, although insisted 
upon by the police. Thus the identification was over.... 
My arrest...may follow any day (and).... will be only too 
welcome to me as it would give me an opportunity to 
clear up my character....It would be superfluous to 
assure you that I am perfectly innocent.
I have not the least doubt that the whole thing has 
been fabricated with political motives by my political 
enemies placed high in provincial government....! must 
tell you that since 1926 I have fought against 
Raghavendra R a o ’s dirty politics with the consistency 
and vehemence which no other political worker has shown 
in the whole of CP and Berar, He has persecuted me with 
equal zeal and consistency.... In 1926 his hirelings
3• A Letter by Shri P.P. Mishra
*
NML, AICC, P-13, 1937-8, P.P. Mishra to J. Nehru,
5 July 1937 *
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raised legal objections against my even becoming a voter 
for the Indian Legislative Assembly.. ..Ultimately I was 
elected.... In 1932 when I was arrested, I was deprived 
of my clothes and taken naked to Akola jail all the way 
from Jubbulpore....In 193^ I was almost the only congress 
candidate ... whose disqualification...the Governor General 
refused to remove. Later on when the question was raised 
on the floor of the Indian Legislative Assembly the 
government admitted that this step was taken in accordance 
with the advice of CP government.... Subsequently I was 
removed from my office of President of Jubbulpore 
municipality in a most high handed and illegal manner 
by the provincial government.
As regards the present motives I need not say much.
The whole thing is crystal clear. Even some high placed 
government officials have privately told me what is meant 
....1 have no right to speak for myself,...1 have never 
cared for municipal presidentship or a ministership.
I have faith in myself and I have always believed that 
I am destined for better honours in the service of my 
motherland than for these ephemeral and insignifleant 
positions....(i) hope truth will triumph.
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4. A Note by Shri R.M. Deshmukh on the Berar revenue
*dispute and the Khare 'crisis'
Ever since Berar was joined to impoverished C.P. 
administration in 1904 instead of Bombay administration 
(with which at least the four Districts of Berar, viz. 
Amraoti, Yeotmal, Akola and Buldana, had great affinity), 
Berar was dissatisfied. When (a) legislature under 
(the) Morely-Minto reforms was granted to these districts, 
it formed a forum wherein the then distinguished 
leaders of Berar, viz. Shri M.V. Joshi..., Shri R.N. 
Mudholker, Shri Y.G. Deshpande and others... kept 
expressing their dissatisfaction....This was mainly to 
record their protest against unfair treatment to Berar 
caused by diversion of the surplus funds from these four 
districts to the needs of (the) impoverished 
administration of C.P. A certain modicum of such 
diversion was not unexpected, because the joining of 
Berar to C.P. instead of to Bombay was a deliberate 
step to lend support to (the) crumbling finances of C.P. 
But when this was carried on to the extent of starving 
the Berar districts of their primary and essential needs, 
e.g. roads or grants to educational institutions, the 
discrimination between these four districts and the 
rest of the districts of then C.P. became too obvious to 
tolerate with patience. Please note that this was no 
Hindi-Marathi dispute. In this matter the four Marathi 
districts of Wardha, Nagpur, Bhandara and Chanda always 
sided with Hindi districts of old CP.
_
Sent to the writer from Amravati, d. 15/6 January 
1 9 6 8 .
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This dissatisfaction of Berar was carried over to 
the period of Montagu-Chelmsford reforms also. The 
proceedings of the legislature during the period...(from) 
1920 onwards will be found replete with disputations.
It, however, did not take the shape of Hindi-Marathi 
dispute. During this period, you will no doubt have 
observed that a formula of allocation of monies to the 
two disputants, (viz. Sim Formula) was evolved by 1923 
and came to be applied by 1924.
Thereafter the form of disputation changed. Old C.P. 
always was hostile to the arrangement and was bent upon 
resisting it at every step and defeating it as far as 
possible.... In fact you will find this formula, which 
was to allocate certain funds on a 60: 40 basis to C.P. 
and Berar was never fully given effect to. The nearest 
it came to being effective was when I became a minister 
in 1927-28 and 1928-29 to 3 0 > when it reached a 
proportion (speaking from memory) of 63:37 or thereabouts. 
Every debate during budget sessions will bear ample 
evidence of this acrimonious disputation.
Not only that but later on this process gave rise 
to the Berar members asking for a sub-province. A 
provision for this existed in the then constitution.
And debates on resolutions were fairly desperate. One 
such resolution you will find was moved by me - when I 
was not in office - I think in 1928-29» The C.P. 
members by this time were so desperate that they voted 
the resolution for separation of Berar, and an 
amendment to that effect moved by me was adopted 
unanimously by the house.
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When in 1937 Dr Khare's ministry came in, this 
tendency on the part of the old C.P. members assumed 
an aggressive form and they openly claimed that Sim 
Formula had lapsed with the coming in of the new 
constitution. Hot words were exchanged at a cabinet 
meeting held for formulation of the budget, and 
intemperate Late Shri Ravi Shanker Shukla literally 
threw away my note prepared for discussion and 
clarification in respect of the application of the 
Sim Formula. On this I...resigned and handed over 
my resignation to Dr Khare. This matter, however, was 
amicably settled by Dr Khare making certain concessions 
and directing Late Pandit Shukla to express regrets for 
his unbecoming action at the Cabinet meeting. You will 
pie ase observe that at this stage it was no Hindi-Marathi 
matter and even Mr Cole had not felt it necessary to 
join me in resigning.
Even in 1938 when the Dr Khare crisis came on, it 
was no Hindi-Marathi matter. In fact I negotiated 
between Dr Khare on one hand and Late Pandit Shukla and 
Pandit D.P. Mishra on the other hand, with a view to 
prevent a break up in the ministry. You will be 
interested to know that the first news of the approaching 
break up was disclosed to me not by Dr Khare or Cole, 
but by Shri D.P. Mishra, and when I asked Shri Mishra to 
give me some time to find a way to tide over the 
difficulty and not to take precipitate action, he agreed 
to hold his hands. I thereupon communicated this to 
Dr Khare, who refused to believe me in the first instance 
that Mr Mishra might be contemplating such a step and did 
not actually believe it until Mr G-ole, having been
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approached by Mr Mishra, later confirmed what I had 
already told Dr Khare.
On being thus convinced Dr Khare asked me to reduce 
the whole lot of events during these two or three days 
to writing. Because in the meanwhile I had had long 
discussions with prominent Hindi-side members of the 
party trying to convince them that the break up will not 
lead to any good either for us individually or to the 
Congress party, or to the smooth working of the province 
as a whole. The account of all this Dr Khare desired 
to have from me as he wished to arm himself with full 
and authentic facts in order to be able to put his 
position before the Congress High Command at their 
meeting to which the C.P. Ministers were all invited.
At this meeting the President of Congress, Late 
Shri Subash Chandra Bose, took this letter of mine and 
read it out to all present. It was admitted by members 
who were in opposition to Dr Khare as being - to say 
in their own words - as a 'more than fair account of 
events as they had occurred at Pachmarhi.’. So much so, 
that the High Command thereupon agreed that they had all 
the basic information about the crisis and asked us to 
appear the next morning to hear their decision. The 
decision announced to us by the spokesman of High 
Command (Late Pandit Jawarhalal Nehru) was that they 
had decided to refer the matter to the party.
On being asked for comments, I had expressed that 
this decision was not right and should be revised while 
there was yet time to do so. Nobody else from amongst 
the ministers offered any comments at that meeting. On
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being asked, I explained that by and large the party was 
not affected by the virus that had poisoned the relations 
of ministers who were members of the ministry. This 
decision is a clean order to go back and infect the friends 
and members of the ministers with the poison that 
rankled in the hearts of the six of us, who then were 
members of the ministry. The party would therefore X said 
never work happily or smoothly in this province and this 
evil must be avoided.
Thereupon I was asked by Late Nehru as to what was 
my solution in the matter. I offered this in reply that 
all the six ministers should be asked to resign without 
assigning any blame to any individual, but on the 
general ground that the High Command had constituted the 
ministry as a joint responsibility ministry, and since 
it had failed to achieve that objective, the ministry 
is asked to resign. This obviously was a face saving 
device. Further I told the High Command that any other 
six members from the party should be constituted into 
a fresh ministry, for which I maintained there was enough 
talent available in the party and I assured them that 
the party will support them as effectively as they had 
done this ministry. Unfortunately this solution was 
not accepted and after some quick thinking, Late Shri 
Nehru said that 'there was much in what I said,' but 
he concluded by saying that 'now we have taken the 
decision and so it would stand'.
It might interest you to know that this was just 
a few months in advance of the Congress session at 
Tripuri at Jabalpore. A crisis was then brewing in the 
High Command itself and not very long after this Late
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Shri Subash Bose defied the High Command and defeated 
the official Congress candidate who was to preside over 
the Tripuri Session. ...Such a conclusion is permissible 
that High Command were not unmindful of the fact that 
Shukla and Mishra were more useful in making Tripuri 
Congress a success which the High Command expected it 
to be, and therefore the atmosphere at Wardha meeting 
which decided the fate of Dr Khare's ministry was loaded 
against him and in favour of Shukla-Mishra. This became 
open and apparent in the manner in which these proceedings 
were conducted.
It might help you to see my own part in the correct 
perspective, if I note at this stage that at this time 
I had belonged to the party known as Responsivist party.
In order to avoid fight at the general elections of 
1936, Congress and Responsivists entered into an election 
compromise, by virtue of which the Responsivists had 
undertaken to stand at the elections of 1936-37 on 
Congress tickets and to keep themselves amendable to 
the Congress party's decision for the purpose of work 
within the legislature or connected with the legislature. 
But in no other respects had the Responsivists accepted 
jurisdiction of Congress party or of the Provincial 
Congress Committee of Berar. Thus my half-way house 
position in the party had arisen out of these 
circumstances. I was variously treated as a Congressman 
but not a full one, and was on occasions trusted or 
distrusted by both Hindi as well as Dr Khare's wings of 
the Marathi members in the party. This will explain to 
you why I was in a position to speak to both wings with 
some authority and some effectiveness.
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Things took Hindi-Marathi turn when High Command 
referred the dispute to the party. It was as a 
canvassing expedient adopted by Hindi districts members 
and feebly reciprocated by Marathi districts. Obviously 
it was in the interest of majority (i.e. Hindi districts) 
to adopt this slogan; after all Marathis were a minority 
and it was not in their interest to raise a dispute on 
that basis....
It now remains for me to explain as to the raison 
d'etre for the crisis....The beginnings of the crisis 
lie deeply rooted in the Hindu-Muslim rioting that had 
taken place at Jabalpore after the ministry took office. 
You should realise that Mr D.P. Mishra, a capable 
colleague, belongs to Jabalpore and was elected also 
from the city. As an aftermath of these riots, police 
investigations traced certain friends and supporters of 
Mr Mishra to have been involved. They were interrogated 
during investigations and Mr Mishra claimed that they 
were harassed and molested by the police. He considered 
it a point of his prestige and his honour that his friends 
and supporters should receive such a treatment. His 
desire was that all investigation in which his friends 
might be found, rightly or wrongly, involved should stop 
at once, otherwise his entire position as a politician 
in Jabalpore would be completely undermined. This, Dr 
Khare who was in charge of Police portfolio could not 
agree to, as, in his view, that would demoralise the 
Police administration and sabotage police investigation.
I had, however, suggested that before launching of 
prosecutions, all the papers of investigations would be 
sent for and since Government had the power to refuse to
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prosecute any person or a case, we may not, at our 
discretion prosecute Mr Mishra's friends if deemed fit. 
This did not prove acceptable to Mr Mishra and from that 
point onwards, Mr Mishra insisted that the police 
Department must be taken away from Dr Khare and given 
over to Late Pandit Ravi Shanker Shukla.
During the period of the wrangle that ensued,
Dr M.S. Aney who was then an all-India leader of the 
Responsivist party intervened, and since I was standing 
at the half way house, and treated as such by both wings, 
it was offered as a solution that I should hold the 
Police Department, if that would offer a solution and 
resolve the crisis. Personally I heartily abhorred the 
idea, but yielded if that could avert the crisis. This 
idea was put to Dr Khare, who appeared agreeable to it, 
if that solved the crisis, but Shri D.P. Mishra 
interposed by an excuse that even if he were agreeable, 
his friend, the Late Ravi Shanker Shukla, would not 
accept it. So far as I remember, Pandit Shukla had not 
said a thing, nor, I believe the idea had been put to 
him. When Mr Mishra, as the most effective and dominant 
partner of the combine had rejected it, it was scarcely 
any use putting it to Late Pandit Shukla. So the matter 
remained dropped there.
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I was elected Prime minister in C.P. and Berar and 
formed (a) ministry on 14 July 1937••••(The) ministry 
functioned well or smoothly for a few months. But the 
bilingualism of this province and Sardar Patel's secret 
hostility against me had their effect after all and the 
conspiracy to oust me was hatched at the Haripura Congress 
held in early 1938. Sardar Patel was an important entity 
in Congress organisation,... and this fact influenced 
other Congress leaders also against me. My Mahakoshal 
colleagues who were not very friendly towards each other, 
seeing the attitude of the congress high command towards 
me became united and took this opportunity to conspire 
against me and oust me from office. I was suspicious 
about the honesty and integrity of some of my colleagues 
and I was holding an informal enquiry against some of 
them.
T.J. Kedar, my friend and legal adviser, advised 
me not to take any hasty action but to consult Mahatama 
Gandhi in this matter. Accordingly I sent a letter to 
Mahatma Gandhi...during the summer of 1938 and requested 
him to grant me an interview so that I may place the 
relevant facts before him. Mahatma Gandhi promptly 
replied to my letter and fixed 12 June 1938 as a date 
for interview. I placed all the facts before him and 
also showed him some papers....Mahatma Gandhi saw all the 
papers ... with close attention and ... expressed profuse 
sympathy for me....Before leaving him I made a verbal
5 • An Extract from a Note by Dr N.B. Khare*
This note was given to the writer in Nagpur in 1967*
*
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request to grant me another interview in this connection 
in about a fortnight which Mahatma Gandhi conceded with 
pleasure. Accordingly I went to see him on 29 June 1938 
at Sevagram. During this interview I showed him a letter 
which I had got intercepted. This created suspicion about
D.P. Mishra my colleague in the ministry....Wonder of 
wonders the Mahatma suddenly became angry at me after 
seeing this letter and reprimanded me for troubling him 
every time in such matters, saying that he had no concern 
with these matters as he was not even a four-anna member 
of the Congress.
I was amazed at the surprising change in the 
Mahatma's mental attitude towards me. I was also angry 
and irritated....X knew that he was the creator and the 
dictator of the congress working committee and that I 
came to see him fully conscious of his capacity. I 
asked him whether he met Sardar Patel between 12 June and
29 June 1938 . The Mahatma replied that Sardar Patel was 
at Sevagram on 21 June 1938 . On this I realised the 
cause of the change of front in the Mahatma. I told 
(him)...that I was thoroughly disillusioned. Further I 
told him that in this matter I would now take such 
action as would be prompted by my inner voice which was 
as powerful as his.
After some days the situation of the ministry 
became worse and I decided to end my ministry. I 
requested all my colleagues to tender their resignations 
to me. Both my Maharashtrian colleagues...sent their 
resignations to me; but all the three Mahakoshal 
colleagues...went to Wardha and met Shri Rajendra Prasad 
a member of the parliamentary sub-committee and got a
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letter from him asking them not to tender their 
resignations even when demanded by...me....This will show 
who were involved in the conspiracy against me....
I had no desire to continue my association with 
some of my colleagues, whom I distrusted; therefore I 
had no alternative but to place the resignations of 
myself and my two Maharashtrian colleagues before the 
Governor. The Governor, Sir Francis Wylie, advised the 
Mahakoshal ministers to follow the democratic convention 
and tender their resignations to the leader but they 
flatly refused. Democratically, therefore, the Governor 
had no alternative but to accept the resignations of the 
three Maharashtrian ministers and terminate the tenure 
of office of the three Mahakoshal ministers. The 
Governor had this power under article 51 of the 1935 Act 
and there was no question of using his special power....
Under the law, the Governor could not carry on the 
administration of the Province without a ministry. 
Therefore, he had again to send for me and request me to 
assist him in the formation of another ministry because 
I was still the leader of the majority party. Accordingly 
I formed another ministry under the auspices of the 
Congress and under its programme and principle. I did 
not do anything wrong by taking the step under the 
democratic convention. Yet without any enquiry on which 
I insisted, the Congress working committee compelled me 
to resign my office. This amounted to virtual dismissal.
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BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS OF SOME LEADING POLITICIANS 
OF THE CENTRAL PROVINCES AND BERAR, 1919-1939
1. Moreshwar Abhyanker 1882-1935
b. Dhanodi Bahadur, Wardha, 1882; educated Dhanodi 
Bahadur, Neill City High School Nagpur, Morris 
College; law studies in England 1904-9; Bar-at-law 
1909; admitted Nagpur Bar 1909; member Nationalist 
party of Tilak 1910; member Home Rule League 1916; 
member Rashtriya Mandal 1916; member Reception 
Committee Nagpur Congress 1920; participated non­
cooperation 1921; resumed legal practice 1923; 
Swarajist member Nagpur division Central Legislative 
Assembly 1924-6; founded Tarun Bharat with Dr Khare 
1925; recognised President official PCC 1927-8 ; 
participated civil disobedience 1930-3; Congress 
member division of Nagpur Central Legislative 
Assembly 1934; d. 1935*
2. Madhao Shrihari Aney I88O-I968
b. 1880; educated Morris College; teacher Kashibai 
High School Amravati 1904-7; admitted Yeotmal Bar 
1908; Vice-president Home Rule League, founder- 
President Yeotmal branch Home Rule League 1916; 
founded Yeotmal District Association 1916; President 
Berar PCC 1921-30; member Working Committee 1924-25; 
Swarajist member Central Legislative Assembly 1924-5; 
Responsivist member Central Legislative Assembly 
1926-9; Vice-president Responsive Cooperation party 
1926-3?; participated civil disobedience 1930; 
member Berar All-Parties Committee 1931; member 
Working Committee 1931-4; President Indian National 
Congress 1933; General Secretary Congress 
Nationalist party 1933- ; Congress Nationalist 
member Central Legislative Assembly 1934; member 
Nagpur University Court from 1935; member Viceroy's 
Executive Council (Indians overseas) 1941-3; 
Representative, Government of India in Ceylon 1943-7; 
member Constituent Assembly 1947-8; Governor Bihar 
1948- ; member Lok Sabha; d. 1968 (?)
Appendix B
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b. Kashi-ka-bas, Sikar Principality, Jaipur 1889; 
adopted by Seth Bachraj of Wardha 1894; educated 
Wardha I896-I9OO; stepfather died 1907 ; met Gandhi 
1915; President Reception Committee Nagpur Congress 
1920; participated non-cooperation 1921-2 ; leader 
Nagpur Flag Satyagraha 1923; Chairman All-India 
Khaddar Board 1923; Treasurer All-India Spinning 
Association 1925; President do. 1927-34; member 
AICC and Working Committee; Secretary Anti- 
Untouchability Sub-Committee 1929; participated 
civil disobedience 1930-3; President All-India Hindi 
Sahitya Sammelan 1937; led Jaipur Satyagraha 1939; 
d. 11 February 1942.
4. Brijlal Biyani I896-
b. I896; educated Morris College; participated 
non-cooperation 1921-2; Congress member CPLC 1927-9; 
participated civil disobedience 1930-3; President 
Berar PCC 1931; Congress member Council of State 
1934-39; member Constituent Assembly 1947-8. Also 
founded Berar Chamber of Commerce; member Nagpur 
University Executive Committee, President All-India 
Marwari Sammelan, and Vice-President Municipal 
Committee Akola.
5. Seth Govind Das I896-
b. I896; educated privately; joined Congress 1920; 
President Provincial Hindi Sahitya Sammelan 1920; 
participated non-cooperation 1921-2; Swarajist 
member, Landholders' constituency, Central Legislative 
Assembly 1924-5; Swarajist and Congress member 
Council of State 1925-9; participated civil 
disobedience 1930-3; Congress member Central 
Legislative Assembly 1934-9; Chairman Reception 
Committee Tripuri Congress 1939; President MPCC 
1946; member Constituent Assembly 1947-8; President 
Provincial Hindi Sahitya Sammelan 1947; President 
All-India Hindi Sahitya Sammelan 1948; Leader 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Delegation New Zealand 
1949; member provisional Parliament India 1950-1; 
member Lok Sabha 1951; President All-India Marwari 
Federation 1954; First President MPCC, reorganised 
Madhya Pradesh 1957*
3• Jamnalal Bajaj 1889-1942
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6. Pun.jabrao Shamrao Deshmukh I896-?
b. I896; educated Fergusson College, Poona; Dunlop 
Research Scholar M.A. (Edinburgh), Ph.D. (Oxon); 
Bar-at-law 1925; founded Shetkari Sangh 1926;
Chairman Amravati District Council 1928-30; member 
Amravati CPLC 1930-6; Minister PWD and Agriculture 
1930-3? Chairman Cooperative Central Bank, Amravati
1934-41; member Nagpur University Court 1935-7; 
President Shivaji Education Society Amravati from 
1937; member Committee of Ministers of the Chamber 
of Princes 1942-6; President Kurmi Kshatriya Sabha 
1944; member Executive Council 1945; member PCC 
1947-8; 1950; member Constituent Assembly 1947-8; 
member Indian delegation FAO conferences, 1948,
1951» 1953; member Executive Committee Congress 
Parliamentary party 1950-1; member Central Advisory 
Board of Education 1950; member Lok Sabha 1951; 
Minister for Agriculture, Government of India 
1952-7; Minister Cooperation Government of India 
1957-8; President World Agricultural Fair 1959-60. 
Also F.R.S.A. (London) and Chairman of Cotton 
Marketting and State Trading Committees.
7. Ramrao Madhavrao Deshmukh 1892-
b. 1892; educated Cambridge 1913-6, M.A., LL.B.; 
Bar-at-law 1917; President All-India Maratha 
Conference 1917; legal practice Amravati and Nagpur 
1918-20; member CPLC 1921-3; member AICC 1921-7; 
Swarajist member CPLC 1924-5; President Greater 
Maharashtra Conference 1925; Responsivist member 
Central Legislative Assembly 1926; Chairman 
Amravati District Council 1926; Responsivist member 
CPLC; Minister LSG 1927-8; Minister for Agriculture
1929-30; Witness Joint Parliamentary Commission 
on Indian Constitutional Reform 1933; Chairman 
Democratic Swaraj party 1935-5; Adviser Raja of 
Sandur 1935-6; Congress member CPBLA 1937-9; Minister 
for Public Works 1937-8; Minister for Finance second 
Khare ministry 1938; Political Minister Dewas Junior 
1939; member Viceroy’s National Defence Council with 
responsibility for C.P. and Berar, 1940-4; Finance 
Minister Gwalior 1941-4; Indian High Commissioner 
in South Africa 1945-7; member Indian Delegation
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7* Ramrao Madhavrao Deshmukh 1892- (continued)
UNO 1946; Prime Minister Rewa and Adviser Rajpramukh 
Vindhya Pradesh 1947-8; President United 
Maharashtra Conference 1948; Director Central Board 
Reserve Bank 1949-52; member Rajya Sabha 1952.
8. Purshottam Balwant Gole 1886-?
b. 1886; educated Bombay, B.A., LL.B.; admitted 
Akola Bar 1.912; member Home Rule League 1916 ; 
participated in non-cooperation 1921-2; Congress 
member CPLC 1927-9j President Akola Municipal 
Committee 1928-31; participated civil disobedience
1930-3; Congress member CPBLA ; Minister for Revenue
1937-8 ; Minister for Revenue second Khare ministry 
1938. Also Chairman Central Bank Akola, and 
President Bar Association Akola.
9• Balkrishna Ganesh Khaparde I88O-I969
b. 1880; educated Deccan College, Poona, and Bombay,
B.A., LL.B.; admitted Amravati Bar; member Home Rule 
League 1916; Vice-chairman Amravati Municipal 
Committee; participated non-cooperation 1921; 
Swarajist member CPLC 1924-5; member Responsive 
Cooperation party 1926; Responsivist member CPLC 
1926-37; Leader Nationalist 'party' CPLC 1928-37; 
Leader of the Opposition CPLC 1930-4; Minister for 
Education 1934-6; Minister Government of Central 
Provinces and Berar 1937; member CPBLA 1937-9; 
d. 1969.
10. Ganesh Shrikrishna Khaparde 1854-1938
b. Hingoli, Hyderabad 1854; educated Berar, Bombay,
B.A., LL.B.; Extra Assistant Commissioner Berar
1885-9; admitted Amravati Bar 1889; Vice-chairman 
of Amravati Municipal Committee and Chairman of 
Amravati District Board; attended Madras Congress 
as a follower of Tilak 1895; Chairman Reception 
Committee Amravati Congress 1897; member Subjects 
Committee Banaras Congress 1905; member Tilak's 
Nationalist party I90 7; President Bombay Provincial
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10. Ganesh Shrikrishna Khaparde 1.854-193'8 (continued)
Conference 1916; member Home Rule League 1916; 
member Imperial Legislative Council; member Congress- 
Home Rule League delegation to England 1919; member 
Council of State 1920-9; opposed non-cooperation and 
civil disobedience; d.l93&.
11. Narayan Bhaskar Khare 1882-
b. 1882 at Nere near Panvel, Kolaba district,
Bombay; migrated to Jabalpur I896; educated Hitkarini 
High School and Government College Jabalpur; Medical 
College Lahore, M.B., 1903-7; CP Medical Service 
1907-16; Lahore Medical College, M.D., 1913; private 
medical practice Nagpur 1916; member Rashtriya Mandai 
and Home Rule League 1916; member Reception Committee 
Nagpur Congress 1920; participated non-cooperation 
1921; Swarajist member CPLC 1924-6; Congress member 
CPLC 1927-9; participated civil disobedience 1930-1; 
participated Harijan campaign 1933; President Nagpur 
PCC 1935-8; Congress member Central Legislative 
Assembly 1934-6; Congress member CPBLA 1937-8;
Leader Congress Parliamentary party 1937-8; Premier 
Central Provinces and Berar 1937-8; suspended as 
member Indian National Congress 1938; member Viceroy’s 
Executive Council (department Commonwealth Relations) 
1943-6; Prime Minister Alwar 1947-8; member 
Constituent Assembly 1947-8; President All-India 
Hindu Mahasabha 1949-52; Hindu Mahasabha member 
Lok Sabha for Gwalior.
12. Durgashanker Kripashankar Mehta I887-?
b. Hoshangabad 1887; educated Sagar, Government 
College Jabalpur, B.A.; Allahabad LL.B.; admitted 
Seoni Bar, then began practice in Jabalpur; 
participated non-cooperation 1921; President Seoni 
DCC 1921; President Municipal Committee Seoni 
1922-3; participated Nagpur Flag Satyagraha 1923; 
Congress member CPLC 1927-9 1930-3 participated 
civil disobedience; Congress member CPBLA 1937-9; 
Minister for Finance 1937-8, 1938-9; Minister 
Commerce and Industry, MP Government 1952.
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b. 1901; educated Raipur, Kanpur, Allahabad and 
Jabalpur; participated non-cooperation 1921-2; 
editor Sharda 1922; law studies 1924-6; Congress 
member Central Legislative Assembly 1927-9» editor 
Lokmat Jabalpur 1930; participated civil 
disobedience 1930-3; President Jabalpur Municipal 
Committee 1932, 1934, 1936; Congress member CPBLA
1937-9; Minister for Local Self Government 1937-8,
1938-9; Editor Sarathi 1941-2; Home Minister 
Government of Madhya Pradesh 1946; Vice-Chancellor 
Sagar University 1956; Chief Minister Madhya 
Pradesh 1963-7 *
14. Balkrishna Shivaram Moonje 1872-1949 (?)
b. Bilaspur 1872; educated Bilaspur, Raipur, Hislop 
College Nagpur; graduated Grant Medical College 
Bombay I898; Medical Service Bombay Corporation
1898-9; Medical Officer South Africa (Boer War) 
1900-1; Private Practice Nagpur 1901; became a 
follower of Tilak c.1906; member Tilak's Nationalist 
party 1907; President Home Rule League Nagpur 1916; 
member Reception Committee Nagpur Congress 1920; 
participated non-cooperation 1921; President CP 
Marathi PCC 1921-7; Swarajist member CPLC 1924-5; 
Leader CPLC Swaraj party 1924-5; member Responsive 
Cooperation party 1926; Responsivist member Central 
Legislative Assembly 1927“30; Working President 
Hindu Mahasabha 1927-34; Hindu Mahasabha delegate 
Round Table Conferences and constitutional 
discussions in London 1930-4; President Maharashtra 
Provincial Conference 1937; founded Bhonsla Military 
School Nasik 1937; d. 1949 (?)•
15• Poonamchand Ranka I889-
b. 1889; adopted by Shambhuraji Ranka of Nagpur; 
merchant, cloth shop Nagpur 1910-20; participated 
non-cooperation 1921; participated Flag Satyagraha 
1923; member Nagpur PCC; participated civil 
disobedience 1930-3; social work Nagpur.
13• Dwarka Prasad Mishra 1901-
448
b. 1889; educated Bilaspur, Hislop College; studied 
law Oxford 1909-14; joined Middle Temple 1914; 
admitted Bilaspur Bar 1914; first non-official 
President Bilaspur Municipal Committee 1916-27; 
Chairman District Council Bilaspur 1917; participated 
non-cooperation 1921; President CP Hindi PCC 1921-3; 
Swarajist member CPLC 1924-6; Leader Hindi Swaraj 
party CPLC 1924-6; founded Independent Congress 
'party1 1926; member CPLC 1927-36; Chief Minister 
CP and Berar 1927-8; 1928-9; Home Member CP and 
Berar 1930-7; Acting Governor CP and Berar 1936; 
Premier CP and Berar 1937; Leader of the Opposition 
CPBLA 1937-9; Adviser Secretary of State London 
1939; member Viceroy's Executive Council in charge 
of Civil Defence 194l; d. New Delhi 15 June 1942.
17• Ravi Shankar Shukla 1887-195?
b. Sagar 1887; educated Raipur, Hislop College 
Nagpur, Law College Jabalpur, B.A., LL.B.; teacher 
Hislop College, Hitkarini High School;¡Head Master 
Khairagarh High School; tutor to Chiefs of Bastar, 
Kavardha and Khairagarh 1902-5; admitted Raipur Bar 
1909; President Kanya Kubja Sabha Raipur; member 
Raipur Municipal Committee; leader nationalist 
movement Chhattisgarh 1915-9; participated non­
cooperation 1921; Chairman Raipur District Council 
1921-3 9; Swarajist member CPLC 1924-6; member 
Independent Congress 'party' 1926; member CP Hindi 
PCC 1929; participated civil disobedience 1930-3; 
President Mahakoshal PCC 1934; member CPBLA 1937-9; 
Minister for Education Khare ministry 1937-8;
Premier Central Provinces and Berar 1938-9; 
participated civil disobedience 1940-2; jailed 
1942-5; Chief Minister Madhya Pradesh 1946; founded 
Nagpur Times 1946; Chancellor Sagar University 1949-
18. Bishnu Datta Shukul 7-1921
b. 7 educated Allahabad; Honorary Magistrate; member 
Local Board Sihora and District Board Jabalpur; 
Vice-President Sihora Municipal Committee; member 
CPLC 1915-7; member Imperial Legislative Council
1917-20; Governor Federation of Cooperative Banks
16. E. Raghavendra Rao 1889-1942
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18. Bishnu Datta Shukul 7-1921 (continued)
Central Provinces 1919; participated non-cooperation 
1920; d. January 1921.
19• Shripad Balwant Tambe 1875"?
b. 1875; educated Hitkarini High School Jabalpur, 
Anglo-vernacular High School Amravati, Elphinstone 
College, Government Law College Bombay, B.A., LL.B.; 
admitted Amravati Bar; Vice-president Amravati 
Municipal Committee; President Berar PCC; member 
CPLC 1917-20; Swarajist member CPLC 1924-5; Leader 
Berar Swaraj party CPLC 1924-5; President CPLC 1925; 
Home Member CP and Berar 1925-30; member Round Table 
Conference London 1930-1; Acting Governor CP and 
Berar 1930; member Indian Franchise Committee 1932.
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I. ORIGINAL SOURCES
A. UNPUBLISHED SOURCES
The Private Papers of Sir G 0M. Chitnavis (Chitnavispura, 
Nagpur).
A Collection of Letters and Pamphlets by or about Dr N.
B. Khare (NAl).
The Private Papers of G.S. Khaparde (NAl).
The Gokhale Collection (NAl).
The Private Papers of M.R. Jayaker (NAl).
The Private Papers of Dr B.S. Moonje (NLl).
The Private Papers of Dr E. Raghavendra Rao (NML).
*The Correspondence of Jamnalal Bajaj (in Hindi).
b) Documents
i) Documents relating to the Indian National Congress
The All-India Congreee Committee Papers 1920-1939 (NML).
The Files of the Mahakoshal Provincial Congress 
Committee (NML)o
Central Provinces Ministerial Crisis (Allahabad, n.d.).
ii) Documents lodged with the National Archives of India
The Files of the Home Political Department, Government 
of India, 1918-1939-
Selected Files of the Home Public Department, Government 
of India, 1919-1939.
The Files of the Reforms Department, Government of 
India, 1919-1939.
* The writer has not seen this work and a number of others 
so marked, but he lists them to assist in compiling a 
Bibliography of Madhya Pradesh.
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iii) Documents of the Governments of Maharashtra and 
Madhya Pradesh
The Open Files of the Political and Military, General 
Administration, Police, Local Self Government, Jails, 
Separate Revenue, Forests, Appointments and Revenue 
Departments (MSN, MPS).
The Confidential Files of the Political and Military 
Department (MPS).
c) Other Sources
R.M. Deshmukh, A Note on the Berar Revenue Question and 
the Khare ’Crisis’, sent to the writer d.15-6 January 
1968.
N.B. Khare, History of the Central Provinces and Berar 
from 1919 to 1939, a typewritten note given to the writer 
in Nagpur 11967.
B. PUBLISHED SOURCES
a) Speeches, Letters, Diaries and Memoirs
Speeches of His Excellency Sir Montagu Butler, MA, KCSI, 
CP, CIE^  CVQ CBE^  ICS, Governor of the Central Provinces 
from 1925 to 1929> vol. I (^Nagpur, 1931) *
Speeches of His Excellency Sir Montagu Butler, MA, KCSI, 
CB, CIE, CVQ, CBE, ICS, Governor of the Central Provinces 
from I93O to 1933, vol.2 (Nagpur, 1933)-
Speeches and writings of Sir G.M. Chitnavis, vol.I 
(Nagpur, 1927).
M.G. Datar. Speeches and Statements of Dr N.B. Khare 
(Nagpur, 1943j.
A.H.L. Fraser, Among Indian Rajahs and Ryots; A Civil 
Servant's Recollections and Impressions of Thirty-Seven 
Years of Work and Recollections and Sport in the Central 
Provinces arid Bengal (London, 1911).
The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vols XIV-XXII 
(Ahmedabad, 1965-6).
The Speeches of His Excellency Sir Hyde Gowan, Governor
of the Central Provinces, v o l s 1 , 2 ( Nagpur,1938).
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K. Kalelkar (ed.),To a Gandhian Capitalist; Correspondence 
Between Mahatma Gandhi and Jamnalal Bajaj and Members of 
His Family (Bangalore, 1951)•
N.B. Khare, My Defence (Nagpur, 1938).
The Writings and Speeches of Rao Bahadur D. Laxminarayan 
(Poona, 1920).
Letter of His Exalted Highness the Nizam of Hyderabad to 
His Excellency the Viceroy Regarding the Berars (n.d.).
J. Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India (London, 3rd 
edition, I832).
A Summary of Dr Moonje’s Presidential Speech, Andhra 
Swarajist Conference, First Session, Bezwada 1935 
(Bezwada, 1935)*
J.H. Rivett Carnac, Many Memories: of Life in India, at 
Home, and Abroad (London, 1910).
Speeches from 1912 to 1920 by Sir Beniamin Robertson,
Chief Commissioner Central Provinces (Nagpur, 1921).
Speeches from 1920 to 1925 by Sir Frank Sly, Chief 
Commissioner and Governor of the Central Provinces 
(Nagpur, 1925)*
W.H, Sleeman (ed. V.A. Smith), Ramblings and Recollections 
of an Indian Official, vo1.1 ( London, 1893)•
R.A. Sterndale, Seonee or Camp Life on the Satpura Range:
A Tale of Indian Adventure (London, 1877)•
R. Thimmaleo, Speeches of B.G. Tilak (? , 1918).
M.D. Vidwans, Letters of Lokamanya Tilak (Poona, 1966).
b) Autobiographies
N.B. Khare, My Political Memoirs or Autobiography 
(Nagpur, 1959)•
c) Newspapers and Contemporary Journals
Bombay Chronicle, 1919-1921, 1937-1938 (Bombay).
Hitavada, 1914-1937, 1939 (Nagpur).
The Indian Annual Register, 1923-1939 (Calcutta).
The Indian Review, vols 22-7 (Madras, 1921-1926).
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Maharashtra, 1938 (Nagpur).
Mahratta, 1919-1921, 1937-1938 (Poona).
Pioneer, 1922-1926 (Allahabad).
Times of India, 1919-1921, 1937-1938 (Bombay).
^Various provincial newspapers, including Karmavir,
Subh Chintak (Jabalpur); Prajasewak (Hoshangabad);
Lokmitra(Chhindwara); Udaya (Amravati); Lokmat (Yeotmal); 
and Matribhumi (Akola).
C . GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS
a) Publications by the Governments of the Central 
Provinces and Berar, and Madhya Pradesh
i) The History of the Central Provinces and Berar 
Madhya Pradesh
C.U. Wills, British Relations with the Nagpur State in 
the Eighteen Century (Nagpur, 1926)) .
Early European Travellers in the Nagpur Territories 
(Nagpur, I93O).
The Battle of Seetabuldee, 26 November 1817 (Nagpur, 
1895).
Sitabuldi: Reprint of Documents Regarding the Action at 
Sitabuldi on 26 and 27 November 1817 and the Subsequent 
Operations Near Nagpur (Nagpur,1907)•
E. Roughsedge, A Report on the State of Sirgooja and its 
Dependencies; Written in 1818 AD (Nagpur, 1917)»
Collection of Correspondence Relating to the 
Subsequent Adventures of Appa Sahib, ex-Rajah o:
1818-1840 (Nagpur, 1939)-
P. Vansagnew, A Report on the Subah or Province of 
Chhattisgarh (Nagpur, n.d.
1820: Notes Suggested from a Perusal of Sir J. Malcolm's 
Revenue Report on Malwa (Nagpur, 1920).
Report on the Territories of the Raja of Nagpur Submitted 
to the Supreme Government of India by Richard Jenkins Esq 
Resident at the Court of His Highness the Raja of 
1827 (Nagpur, 1923).
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Supplement to the Report on the Territories of the Raja 
of Nagpur submitted to the Supreme Government of India 
by R. Jenkins, Resident at the Court of His Highness 
the Ra.ja. of Nagpur (Nagpur, 1925)«
Note on the Saugor and Nerbudda Territories by Robert 
Merttins Bird, Member of the Sudder Board of Revenue, 
North-West Provinces, Dated the 31st October 1834 
(Nagpur^ 1922 ) .
1847-1860; Collect ion of Papers Regarding Grant of 
Proprietary Rights in the Central Provinces (Nagpur,
1920). —
1853-1854: Escheat of the Nagpore State, the 
Arrangements for the Administration of the New Province 
and the Settlement of the Affairs of the Bhonsla Family 
(Nagpur, 1920).
1854-1860: Settlement of the Affairs of the Ranees of 
Nagporeand the Course of Events After the Escheat of the 
State (Nagpur, 1920).
1859: Administration of the Nagpore Province by Mr G. 
Plowden, Commissioner from 1855 to 1859 (Nagpur, 1920).
Colonel E.K. Elliot, Memorandum on the Amalgamation of 
the Jubbulpore Division with the Nagpur Province 1861 
(Nagpur, n . d . ) .
Selection of Papers on the Subject of Permanent 
Settlement in the Central Provinces (Nagpur, 1923)•
H.N. Sinha, Selections from the Nagpur Residency Records, 
5 vo1s (Nagpur, 1950-1957). ~ ~
W.C. Erskine, Narrative of Events Attending the Outbreak 
of Disturbances in the Saugor and Nerbudda Territories 
in 1857-58 (n.d. —
*R. Temple, Report on the Zamindaris and other Petty 
Chief tancies in the Central Provinces in 186)3 (Nagpur,
1923).
C.U. Wills, The Ra.j-Gond Mahara.jas of the Satpura Hills:
A Local History (Nagpur, 1923).
O.S. Crofton, Inscriptions on Tombs or Monuments in the 
Central Provinces and Berar with Biographical Notes 
(Nagpur, I932).
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Appreciations of the Administration of His Excellency, 
Sir H.C. Gowan, Governor of the Central Provinces and
Berar 1933-1938 (Nagpur, 1938).
D.P. Mishra et. al. (eds), History of Freedom Movement 
in Madhya Pradesh (Nagpur, 195^)•
ii) Land Settlement Reports
Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of the Balaghat 
District in the Central Provinces effected during the 
years 1895--1898 by J.R. Scott (Nagpur, 1901) .
Report on the Final Settlement of the Balaghat District 
in the Central Provinces effected during the Years 
1914-1917 (Nagpur, 1920).
Final Report on the Settlement of the Baihar Ryotvari 
Estate of the Balaghat District in the Central Provinces 
eff ected' during the Years 1908 and 1911 (Nagpur, 1912) .
Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of the Baitool 
District, Nerbudda Division Central Provinces, 1886), by 
W. Ramsay (Nagpur, 186>7) •
Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of the Bhundara 
District of the Central Provinces effected by A.J. 
Lawrence (Bombay, I867)•
Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of the Bhundara 
District in the Central Provinces effected during the 
Years 1894-1899 (Nagpur 1902).
Final Report of the Land Revenue Settlement of the 
Bhandara District in the Central Provinces effected 
during the Years 1916-1921 (Nagpur, 1922) .
Report of the Land Revenue Settlement of the Belaspore 
District in the Central Provinces 1868. Effected by 
J .¥. Chisholm (Nagpur, I869) •
Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of the Bilaspur 
District 1886)-1890 ( Nagpur, 1902) .
Final Report on the Bilaspur Settlement during the Years
1886-1890 (Nagpur^ n.d.).
Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of the Chanda 
District, Central Provinces I869 by C.B. Lucie Smith 
(Nagpur, 1870).
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Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of the Chindwara 
District, Nerbudda Division Central Provinces, effected 
by W. Ramsay (Nagpur, 186>9) .
Report on the Revision of the Land Revenue Settlement of 
the Chhindwara District in the Central Provinces 
effected during the Years 1891 'to 1895 (Nagpur, I900) .
Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of the Dumoh 
District, Jubbulpoor Division, Central Provinces, 
effected by A.M. Russell (Bombay, 18^7)•
Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of the Damoh 
District in the Central Provinces effected during the 
Years 1908-1913 (Nagpur, 1914)'.
Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of the Drug Tahsil 
in the Raipur District of the Central Provinces effected 
during the Years 1896>-1902 (Nagpur, 1903).
Final Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of the Drug 
District in the Central Provinces (Nagpur,1912).
Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of the District of 
Hoshungabad, Central Provinces : by Charles Alfred 
Elliot (Allahabad, 18^7)-
Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of the Hoshungabad 
District of the Central Provinces effected during the 
Years 1891-1898 (Nagpur, 1905)•
Final Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of the 
Hishangabad District in the Central Provinces effected 
during the Years 1913-1918 (Nagpur^n.d.).
Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of the Jubbulpore 
District in the Jubbulpore Division«- Central Provinces, 
effected by ¥. Nembhard and A.M. Russell (Na gpur , .18 o 9 ) •
Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of the Jubbulpore 
District in the Central Provinces effected during the 
Years 1886-1894 (Nagpur, 1896).
Forecast Report on the Re-settlement of the Jubbulpore 
District by G.F.C. Ramsden (Nagpur, 1927)•
Report on the Mundla District South of the Nerbudda by 
Captain G.F. Pearson (Allahabad,i860).
Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of the Mundlah 
District of the Central Provinces, effected by Captain 
H.C.E. Ward, I868-I869 (Bombay, I87O).
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Re^o rt on the Summary Settlement, Mandla, by J.B. Fuller 
( ?, 1894).
Final Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of the Mandla 
District in the Central Provinces 1904-1910 (Nagpur , .1913) •
Report 011 the Revision of the Land Revenue Settlement of 
the Mandla District in the Central Provinces effected 
during the Years 1927-1930 (Nagpur, 1931.) •
Supplement to the Settlement Report of the Nagpore 
District, being Copy of an Article on that District 
Written for the Central Provinces Gazetteer by M. Low 
(Nagpur, I867).
Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of the Nagpore 
Division, Central Provinces by A.B. Ross (Nagpur, 1869).
Nagpur Settlement Report, 3 vols, 1894 (Nagpur, I896).
Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of the Nagpur 
District in the Central Provinces, effected during the 
Years, 1912-1917 (Nagpur, 1917)•
Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of the Nursingpore 
District, Nurbudda Division, Central Provinces, effected 
by C. Grant Esquire, 186)0 (Nagpur, n.d.).
Final Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of the 
Narsinghpur District in the Central Provinces effected 
during the Years 1923-1926) (Nagpur, 1927).
Reports on the Province of Nimar Illustrating the 
Settlement of the Land Revenue and the Revenue 
Administration up to the close of AD 1855 (Roorkee, I.856) .
Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of British Nimar? 
a District of the Central Provinces, effected by Captain 
J. Forsyth, Bengal Staff Corps, .1868-9 (Nagpur, 1870)»
Final Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of the 
Nimar District in the Central Provinces effected during 
the Years 1911-14 (Nagpur, 1915)*
Report of the Land Revenue Settlement of the Raepore 
District, Chuteesgurh Division, Central Provinces, 1869, 
effected by J.F.kT Hewitt (Nagpur, I869)•
Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of the Raipur
District of the Central Provinces effected during the 
Years 1885-1889 (Bombay, 189-1) •
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Final Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of the 
Phuljhar Zamindari of the Raipur District in the Central 
Provinces (Nagpur, 1912).
Final Report on the Revision of the Land Revenue 
Settlement of the Phuljhar, Bilaigarh-Katgi and Bhatgaon 
Zamindaris of the Raipur District in the Central 
Provinces effected during the Years 1930°31 by 
Mr C.D. Deshmukh (Nagpur, 1931)•
Final Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of the 
Chandarpur, Padampur, and Malkharoda etc. Portion of 
Sambalpur District left in the Central Provinces(Nagpur, 
1912).
Selections from Correspondence Relating to the Revision 
of the Land Revenue Settlement in the Saugor and 
Nerbudda Territories, with a Summary, 18^0-62 (Nagpur, 
1863).
Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of the Saugor 
District, Jubbulpore Division, Central Provinces, I8 6 7, 
effected by Lieut. Col. J.N.H. Maclean (Nagpur, 186 7)•
Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of the Saugor 
District in the Central Provinces effected during the 
Years I887-I897 (Nagpur, 1902).
Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of the Seonee 
District of the Central Provinces, effected by 
W.B. Thompson, 1867 (Bombay, I867)•
Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of the Seoni 
District in the Central Provinces effected during the 
Years 1894-1898 (Nagpur, 1902 )~
Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of the Wardha 
District in the Central Provinces effected during the 
Years I89I to 1894 (Nagpur, I896).
Final Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of the Wardha 
District in the Central Provinces effected During the 
Years 1908-1912 (Nagpur, 1913)-
iii) Press Comment
Report on Indian Papers Published in the Central 
Provinces and Berar from .1921 to 1927 (Nagpur, 1921-7) •
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iv) Gazetteers
The Gazetteer of the Central Provinces of India, C. Grant,
ed. (Nagpur, 1970).
Gazetteer for the Haidarabad Assigned Dis triets,
Commonly called Berar, 1870, A.C® Lyall, ed. (Bombay,
I870).
Central Provinces and Berar District Gazetteers, Akoia
Districts vol. A, descriptive, C. Brown, ed. (Calcutta,
1910).
Central Pr0vinees Di stric t Gaze 11eers, Akola District,
vo 1. B , statistical tables, 1891-1928 (Nagpur, 1930).
Central Provinces District Gazetteers, Amraot i Di s t riet,
vo 1. A, descriptive, S„V. Fitzgerald and A.E. Nelson,
eds. (Bombay, I9H )  •
Central Provinces District Gazetteers, Balaghat District
vo1. A , descriptive, C.E. Low, ed. (Allahabad, .1907)*
Central Provinces District Gazetteers, Betul District,
vo 1. A , descriptive, R.V. Russell, ed. (Allahabad, .1907)
Central Provinces District Gazetteers, Bhandara District
vo 1. A , descriptive, R.V. Russell, ed. (Allahabad, 1908)
Central Provinces District Gazetteers, Bilaspur District
vo 1. A , descriptive, A.E. Nelson, ed. (Allahabad, 1,910).
Central Provinces District Gazetteers, Bul.da.na District,
vo1. A , descriptive, A.E. Nelson, ed. (Calcutta, I9I0).
Central Provinces District Gazetteers, Chanda District,
vo 1. A , descriptive, L.F. Begbie and A .E. Nelson, eds.
(Allahabad, I909)•
Central Provinces District Gazetteers, Chhindwara
District, vol. A 9 descriptive, R.V. Russell, ed. (Bombay
1907).
Central Provinces District Gazetteers, Damoh District,
vo1. A 9 descriptive, R.V. Russell, ed. (Allahabad, L906)
Central Provinces District Gazetteers, Drug District,
vo 1 . A, descriptive, A.E. Nelson, ed. (Caleut ta , 1910).
Central Provinces District Gazetteers, Ho shangabad
District, vol. A, descriptive, G.L. Corbett and
R.V* Russell, eds. (Calcutta, 1908).
Centrai Provinces District Gazetteers, Jubbulpore
District, vol. A, descriptive, A.E. Nelson, ed. (Bombay,
1909)•
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Central Provinces District Gazetteers, Jubbulpore
District, vol. Bj statistical t ab1e s, 1891“1928 (Nagpur,
1929).
Central Provinces District Gazetteers, Mandla District,
vo 1. A 9 descriptive, F.R. Rudman, ed. ( Bo mbay, .1912 ) .
Central Provi nees District Gazetteers, N a spur D i strict,
vo 1. A, descriptive, R.V. Russell, ed. (Bombay, I.9O8).
Central Provinces District Gazetteers, Nagpur District,
vo 1. B , statistical tables, 1891-1927 (Nagpur, I928).
Central Provinces District Gazetteers, N ars i nghpur
District, vol. A, descriptive, R„V. Russell, ed.
(Bombay , I906).
Central Provinces District Gazetteers, Nimar District,
vo1. A , descriptive, R.V. Russell, ed. (Allahabad, 1908)
Central Provinces District Gazetteers, Raipur District,
vo1. A , descriptive, A.E. Nelson, ed. (Bombay, 1909)»
Central Provinces District Gazetteers, Saugor District,
vo1. A , descriptive, R.V. Russell, ed. (Allahabad, .1907)
Central Provi, nces District Gazetteers, Seoni District,
vo 1. A , descriptive, R.V. Russell, ed. (Allahabad, 1907)
Central Provinces District Gazetteers, Wardha D i s tric t,
vo 1. A , descriptive, R.V. Russell, ed. (Allahabad, I.906)
Central Provinces District Gazetteers, Yeotmal District,
vo 1. A , descriptive, C. Brown and R.V. Russell, eds.
(Calcutta, 1908).
Central Provinces District Gazetteers, Yeotmal District,
vo1. B , statistical tables 1891-1926 (Nagpur, 1927)*
v) Proceedings of the Legislature
Proceedings of the Legislative Council of the Chief 
Commissioner of the Central Provinces, 1914-1920.
Proceedings of the Legislative Council of the Central 
Provinces, I92I-I936•
Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly of the Central 
Provinces and Berar, 1937-1939•
Summary of the Proceedings of the Madhya Pradesh yid.han 
Sabha on the draft of the States Reorganisation Bill, 
2-3 Apri l 1956 (Na'gp'ur, 1.956).
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a) Department of General Administration
Reports on the Administration of the Central Provinces 
and Berar from 1918 to 1939 (Nagpur, 1920-1941).
b) Department of Education
Reports on the State and Progress of Education in the 
Central Provinces and Berar for the Quinquennium ending 
31 March 1922 (Nagpur, 1923)»
Report on the State and Progress of Education in the 
Central Provinces and Berar for the Quinquennium ending 
31 March 1932 (Nagpur, 1933)•
c) Department of Excise
Reports on the Excise Administration of the Central 
Provinces 1919 to 1939 (Nagpur, 1920-1940).
Reports on the Excise Revenue of the Central Provinces 
and Berar from 1918 to 1940 (Nagpur, 1920-1941).
d) Forest Department
Reports on the Forest Administration of the Central 
Provinces and Berar from 1919 to 1939 (Nagpur, 1920-1940)
e) Judicial Department
Reports on the Judicial Administration (civil) of the 
Central Provinces and Berar from 1917 to 1 9 4 0 (Nagpur,
1918-1941).
Reports on the Judicial Administration (Criminal) of 
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